642 July 22, 2026 No. 692
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
HSI SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAWRENCE LAW, INC.,
Defendant,
and
Dean HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
23CV35082; A184675
Michael C. Wetzel, Judge.
Argued and submitted December 17, 2025.
James F. Marron argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs was Marron Law, LLC.
Maria Liesl Ruckwardt argued the cause for respondent.
Also on the brief was O’Donnell Law Firm LLC.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
Cite as 351 Or App 642 (2026) 643
AOYAGI, P. J.
In this defamation action, plaintiff HSI Security
Systems, Inc., a company that installs and maintains
security systems, seeks to hold defendants Dean Hill and
Lawrence Law, Inc. (LL) liable for a negative Yelp review that Hill posted in 2022. Defendant Hill filed a special motion
to strike under ORS 31.150, commonly known as the antiSLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)
statute. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant
appeals, challenging that ruling.1 As explained below,
we agree with the trial court that a portion of the review
implies an assertion of objective fact that could be actionable in defamation, but we conclude that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case as to that statement. The anti-SLAPP
motion therefore should have been granted. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
FACTS
The basic facts are undisputed. Plaintiff installed
a security system at a house owned by Tara Lawrence that
Lawrence used both as her primary residence and as the
principal place of business for her law firm, LL. Defendant
is Lawrence’s fiancé, periodically resided at the house, and sometimes helped Lawrence with technological issues as he
is an information technology professional.
On October 8, 2021, plaintiff performed work on the
security system, for which it billed Lawrence $1,015.96. The bill described the services provided that day as installation of an ethernet card, programming of the panel to integrate
with the existing network (with a note that they “worked
with IT rep”), partial testing to verify function, and providing user instruction. The cost breakdown on the bill was
$255.00 for a “Conettix IP Ethernet Interface,” $690.00 for
six hours of service and travel, and $70.96 for internet monitoring for the period from October 8 to November 30.
There was a dispute over the bill, and, in March
2022, defendant called plaintiff on Lawrence’s behalf to
1
Unless otherwise specified, we use “defendant” herein to refer to Hill alone, because defendant LL did not join in the anti-SLAPP motion and is not a party on appeal.
644 HSI Security Systems v. Lawrence Law
discuss the outstanding bill and try to cancel Lawrence’s
monthly monitoring service. Lawrence ultimately paid the
bill in May 2022 and cancelled the monitoring service.
On May 11, 2022, defendant posted a negative review
regarding plaintiff on Yelp:
“Most unprofessional company I have ever dealt with. Paid
nearly $1,000 dollars to ‘Upgrade’ my system. In actuality,
that was a $20 network card and by doing this, the monthly
rate nearly doubled? Old antiquated useless system. Motion
only. Left for less expensive detection including cameras
and state of the art iphone app for a fraction of the cost. My
wife calls these people crooks. Theres a reason you can’t
find them on social media, yelp, BBB. Do not do business
with this company.”
Plaintiff’s president learned of the negative review in
February 2023 and wrote a letter to defendant, who took
down the review by May 2023.
In August 2023, plaintiff commenced this action,
asserting a single claim for defamation. Defendant filed an
anti-SLAPP motion. He argued that his Yelp review consisted entirely of nonactionable opinion statements or, alternatively, that any factual statements in it were true and
therefore not defamatory. He further argued that plaintiff
could not prevail because the claim was filed outside the
statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and the trial court denied it. The court agreed with defendant that
most of the statements in the review were nonactionable
opinions but concluded that one part of the review implied
facts and was thus actionable: “Paid nearly $1,000 dollars to ‘Upgrade’ my system. In actuality, that was a $20 network
card and by doing this, the monthly rate nearly doubled?”
The court necessarily concluded that plaintiff had made out
a prima facie case of defamation as to that statement but did not state its reasoning. As for the statute of limitations, the court initially deferred ruling on that issue but ultimately denied that portion of the anti-SLAPP motion as well.
Defendant appeals. He contends that the trial court
erred in denying his anti-SLAPP motion, because his review
consists entirely of nonactionable opinion statements,
because there is no evidence that the statement deemed
Cite as 351 Or App 642 (2026) 645
factual by the trial court was false, and because plaintiff’s claim was filed outside the statute of limitations. Plaintiff defends the trial court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion.
ANTI-SLAPP STANDARD
Anti-SLAPP motions are governed by ORS 31.150,
which specifies that they “shall be treated as a motion to
dismiss under ORCP 21 A but shall not be subject to ORCP
21 F.” ORS 31.150(1). As relevant here, a defendant may
file an anti-SLAPP motion in a civil action arising out of a “written statement * * * presented[ ] in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” ORS 31.150(2)(a)(C). The defendant “has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the claim
against which the motion is made arises out of” a qualifying statement. ORS 31.150(4). If the defendant does so, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff in the action to establish that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a prima
facie case.” Id.
“To establish a prima facie case on a particular
claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to find in the plaintiff’s favor on the claim.” Cider Riot, LLC v. Patriot Prayer USA, LLC, 330 Or
App 354, 359, 544 P3d 363 (2024). In other words, a plaintiff must present “enough evidence to avoid a directed verdict—namely, enough evidence to meet the plaintiff’s burden of production.” Handy v. Lane County, 360 Or 605, 618,
385 P3d 1016 (2016). The court is to “consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based.” ORS 31.150(6). A
plaintiff ultimately must make out a prima facie case with
“evidence,” however, and can “not rely solely on pleadings
or written argument.” Snook v. Swan, 292 Or App 242, 247,
423 P3d 747 (2018). The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in assessing whether a prima facie case has been made. Handy, 360 Or at 608 n 1.
If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie
case, the court shall deny the anti-SLAPP motion, ORS
31.150(4), and shall enter a limited judgment to that effect, 646 HSI Security Systems v. Lawrence Law
ORS 31.150(1). The denial of an anti-SLAPP motion has no
bearing on the determination of the merits at trial. ORS
31.150(7). If the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, the court shall grant the anti-SLAPP motion and enter a
judgment of dismissal without prejudice. ORS 31.150(1).
We review the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion for legal error. Waggoner v. Husk, 337 Or App 519,
522, 564 P3d 167 (2025).
ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his anti-SLAPP motion.2 The parties agree that
defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s defamation claim arises out of a qualifying statement, such
that the burden shifted to plaintiff to make out a prima
facie case. They disagree as to whether plaintiff made out a prima facie case.
We begin with whether the Yelp review consists
entirely of constitutionally protected statements of opinion. In Neumann v. Liles, 358 Or 706, 369 P3d 1117 (2016), the
Oregon Supreme Court set out a two-step framework for
courts to use in the anti-SLAPP context to decide whether
allegedly defamatory speech is protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus
not actionable. At the first step, the court must determine
whether the statement “involves a matter of public concern.” Id. at 718. If so, the court proceeds to the second step, which is to determine “whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of objective
fact.” Id. at 719. The court must consider in making that
determination “(1) whether the general tenor of the entire
publication negates the impression that the defendant
was asserting an objective fact; (2) whether the defendant
used figurative or hyperbolic language that negates that
2
An assignment of error must be directed at a ruling. ORAP 5.45(3). Here, defendant takes issue with only one ruling—the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion—but purports to raise three assignments of error, with the first challenging the ruling itself and the second and third challenging aspects of the court’s reasoning. “Assignments of error are made to a ruling, not the reasoning for the ruling.” Towey v. City of Hood River, 321 Or App 414, 420 n 7, 516 P3d 738 (2022). We therefore treat all of defendant’s arguments as going to his first assignment of error.
Cite as 351 Or App 642 (2026) 647
impression; and (3) whether the statement in question is
susceptible of being proved true or false.” Id. “[T]he work as a whole, the specific context in which the statements were
made, and the statements themselves” should all be considered in making the determination. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
If a statement cannot reasonably be understood to
imply an assertion of objective fact, then it is “an expression of opinion on matters of public concern that is protected under the First Amendment” and, as such, not actionable.
Id. at 722 (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a defamation claim on the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion because
all of the statements at issue were protected by the First
Amendment). Conversely, if a statement can reasonably be
understood to imply an assertion of objective fact, it is not “opinion” and may be actionable. Waggoner, 337 Or App at
530. Whether a defamatory statement is protected by the
First Amendment is a question of law. Chief Aircraft, Inc. v. Grill, 288 Or App 729, 733, 407 P3d 909 (2017).
In this case, it is undisputed that defendant’s Yelp
review concerns a matter of public concern. See Lowell v.
Wright, 369 Or 806, 828-29, 512 P3d 403 (2022) (online
review of a piano store involved a matter of public concern); Neumann, 358 Or at 720 (online review of a wedding
venue involved a matter of public concern). What is disputed is whether the review consists entirely of subjective opinions, as defendant contends, or whether it can reasonably
be understood to imply some assertions of objective fact, as the trial court concluded and plaintiff maintains. Defendant contends that the trial court “fail[ed] to analyze the subject review under the Neumann framework for analyzing
whether or not an alleged statement is a protected opinion.” In substance, however, we understand him to argue that the
trial court misapplied Neumann, versus not applying it at
all. Neumann is a leading case, it was briefed and argued to the trial court, and it is apparent that the trial court applied it despite not expressly citing it by name.
We are unpersuaded that the trial court misapplied Neumann. The trial court concluded that all of the
statements in defendant’s Yelp review were nonactionable
648 HSI Security Systems v. Lawrence Law
expressions of opinion except one: “Paid nearly $1,000 dollars to ‘Upgrade’ my system. In actuality, that was a $20
network card and by doing this, the monthly rate nearly
doubled?” See Lowell, 369 Or at 833-34 (recognizing that
an online review may contain both actionable statements
implying facts and nonactionable statements of opinion). We
agree with the trial court that that statement can reasonably be understood to imply “an assertion of objective fact.” Neumann, 358 Or at 719. Specifically, it can reasonably be
understood to imply that defendant was a customer of plaintiff’s and that plaintiff charged nearly $1,000 to install a $20 network card in his security system.3
Nothing about the general tenor of the Yelp website
or defendant’s review negates the impression that defendant
was asserting objective facts regarding how much plaintiff
charged to install the ethernet card and how much the card
itself was worth. If anything, defendant’s reference to “my system” bolsters the impression that he was asserting objective facts about a matter on which he had direct personal knowledge. As for figurative or hyperbolic language, defendant’s
description of plaintiff as the “[m]ost unprofessional company I have ever dealt with” could be perceived as hyperbolic, but also could be taken literally, and the only figurative language is the term “crooks.” The review does not use figurative or
hyperbolic language to such a degree or in such a manner
as to negate the impression that the one statement at issue
asserts objective fact. See Lowell, 369 Or at 833 (although an online review of a piano store included some “evocative language, such as the store ‘smelled like grandma’s attic,’ ” it was “not so figurative or hyperbolic as to undermine” the impression that other statements relayed objective facts). Finally, the statement at issue is susceptible to being proved true or false. Plaintiff either did or did not install a $20 network card and either did or did not charge nearly $1,000 to do so.
The trial court therefore did not err in concluding
that, although many of the statements in defendant’s review
3
Although defendant’s statement that “the monthly rate nearly doubled” is included in the part of the review that the trial court concluded could be actionable as a statement implying objective fact, the parties have never made any arguments about that statement, in the trial court or on appeal, so we do not address it.
Cite as 351 Or App 642 (2026) 649
were constitutionally protected expressions of opinion, a reasonable factfinder could understand one statement—”Paid
nearly $1,000 dollars to ‘Upgrade’ my system. In actuality,
that was a $20 network card and by doing this, the monthly
rate nearly doubled?”—to imply assertions of objective fact, such that that statement was actionable without encroaching on the First Amendment.
We next consider defendant’s argument that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case because it failed to prove that that statement was false.
“The elements of a claim for defamation are: (1)
the making of a defamatory statement; (2) publication of
the defamatory material; and (3) a resulting special harm,
unless the statement is defamatory per se and therefore
gives rise to presumptive special harm.” National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Starplex Corp., 220 Or App 560, 584, 188
P3d 332, rev den, 345 Or 317 (petitions of Scottsdale Ins. Co. and Starplex Corp.), and rev den, 345 Or 417 (2008) (petition of Nautilus Ins. Co.). As to the first element, in the professional context, a statement is “defamatory” when “it is
false and ascribes to another conduct, characteristics[,] or a condition incompatible with the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade, or profession.” Brown v. Gatti, 341 Or 452, 458, 145 P3d 130 (2006) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden to prove that a statement on a matter of public concern is false. Lowell,
369 Or at 818 (“[A] private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity of statements in defamation cases
involving the First Amendment public comment defense,
even when the action is brought against nonmedia defendants.”); Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 111, 917 P2d 44, rev den, 323 Or 690 (1996) (“The axiom that ‘truth is an absolute defense’ in defamation cases is somewhat imprecise
in cases involving public figures or issues of public concern. Rather, in such cases, falsity is an element of plaintiff’s defamation case, because plaintiff has the burden of proving
it.” (Citation omitted.)).
Thus, as part of establishing a prima facie case of
defamation, plaintiff had to produce evidence sufficient to
permit a reasonable factfinder to find that the statement at 650 HSI Security Systems v. Lawrence Law
issue was false. See Cider Riot, LLC, 330 Or App at 359 (“To establish a prima facie case on a particular claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to find in the plaintiff’s favor on the claim.”). It failed to do so.
In support of his anti-SLAPP motion, defendant
filed a declaration in which he attested, among other
things, that he posted the Yelp review attached to the complaint and that, before doing so, he “was able to locate the same Ethernet card on-line for a cost of around $20.00.” In
response, plaintiff filed a declaration by its president that simply attached the invoice that plaintiff sent to Lawrence
for services rendered on October 8, 2021, and the monitoring agreement signed by Lawrence on September 20, 2021.4
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of defamation, because it was
insufficient to prove that the statement was false. Again,
the only statement at issue (because the remainder of the
review is constitutionally protected) is “Paid nearly $1,000 dollars to ‘Upgrade’ my system. In actuality, that was a $20 network card and by doing this, the monthly rate nearly doubled?” Plaintiff’s invoice shows that plaintiff charged $945 to install the ethernet card, specifically $255 for the card itself and $690 for labor. Plaintiff offered no other relevant evidence, including nothing to counter defendant’s evidence
that the same ethernet card could be purchased online for
$20. See Cider Riot, LLC, 330 Or App at 375 (explaining that, in deciding whether a plaintiff made out a prima facie case
for anti-SLAPP purposes, we consider the plaintiff’s evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, adopt the plaintiff’s version of the facts where there is conflicting evidence, and consider the defendant’s opposing evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law).
4
Defendant moved to strike plaintiff’s declaration, the trial court implicitly denied that motion, and defendant has not assigned error to that ruling on appeal. We therefore do not consider or address defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s declaration “should have been disregarded by the trial court.” See ORAP 5.45(1) (“No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claim of error * * * is assigned as error in the opening brief in accordance with this rule[.]”).
Cite as 351 Or App 642 (2026) 651
Plaintiff argues that its invoice is enough evidence
to prove that the Yelp review contained false statements, but it does not explain how, and we do not see how. The invoice
establishes only what plaintiff charged for the ethernet card and associated labor—nearly $1,000, as stated in defendant’s review. Plaintiff no doubt disagrees with defendant’s poor opinion of the security system that it provided, and
plaintiff might well have a perfectly reasonable explanation for the amount that it charged for the services rendered on
October 8. But defendant is entitled to his subjective opinion on whether the system was worth what it cost—he is
allowed to be unhappy. What he is not allowed to do, or at
least may face liability if he does, is make false statements of objective fact. Here, however, as to the one actionable
statement in defendant’s Yelp review, plaintiff failed to put forward evidence sufficient to prove that it was false. Cf.
Hickey, 141 Or App at 111 (holding that the defendant was
entitled to a directed verdict on the plaintiff’s defamation claim, because, as to those statements asserting objective
facts, the “plaintiff did not present any evidence from which the jury could have found defendant’s statements to be
false”); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F2d 1049, 1055-57 (9th
Cir 1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment for the
defendant on defamation claim because the plaintiff failed
to create a triable issue on falsity).
To the extent plaintiff relies on defendant having
misrepresented in his Yelp review that he was the customer (rather than Lawrence), that argument is misplaced.
Defendant’s portrayal of himself as the customer may have
bolstered the impression that he was asserting objective
facts based on personal knowledge, as previously discussed,
___ Or App at ___ (slip op at 8), but there is nothing defamatory about describing the system at Lawrence’s house as
“my system,” regardless of the accuracy of that statement.
Because plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie
case of defamation with respect to the only portion of defendant’s review that could reasonably be understood to imply
assertions of objective fact, in that it failed to put forth sufficient evidence to prove falsity, the trial court erred in 652 HSI Security Systems v. Lawrence Law
denying defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. We need not reach
the statute-of-limitations issue in light of our disposition.5
Reversed and remanded.
5
It is presently an open question whether, under ORS 31.150(4), “a plaintiff is required to produce evidence capable of defeating affirmative defenses in order [to] meet its prima facie burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.” Plotkin v. SAIF, 280 Or App 812, 829, 385 P3d 1167 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 851 (2017); see also Neumann v. Liles, 261 Or App 567, 580 n 8, 323 P3d 521 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 358 Or 706, 369 P3d 1117 (2016) (“We save for another day the question of whether and to what extent ORS 31.150 authorizes parties to litigate affirmative defenses in the context of a special motion to strike.”). We again save that question for another day.