In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00171-CR
JASHUN R RILEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 5th District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23F0740-005
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Bowie County jury found Jashun R. Riley guilty of three counts of sexual assault of a
child, second-degree felonies, and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment on each count
and assessed a fine of $10,000.00.1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2). The trial court
ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Riley appeals his convictions, arguing that he was
denied his right to confront the alleged victim with evidence that contradicted her accusation that
she was sexually assaulted. Because we find that Riley failed to preserve the issue he presents
on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Riley Failed to Preserve His Sole Complaint
The State filed a motion in limine prior to trial seeking to exclude any alleged misconduct
or bad acts of the alleged victim. At the motion in limine hearing prior to trial, Riley asked the
trial court to review evidence related to the alleged victim that Riley intended to introduce at
trial. The evidence purportedly related to the alleged victim’s bad acts, which Riley argued went
to her credibility. The evidence, photographs and video recordings described as “explicitly
sexual,” was viewed by the trial court in-camera. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court
excluded the exhibits pursuant to the State’s request in its motion in limine pursuant to Rule 412
of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 412.
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In this memorandum opinion, we address Riley’s challenge to his conviction in trial court cause number 23F0740-005. In his companion appellate cause number 06-25-00172-CR, Riley challenges his conviction for one count of sexual assault of a child in trial court cause number 24F0718-005. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2). In his companion appellate cause number 06-25-00173-CR, Riley challenges his conviction for one count of sexual assault of a child in trial court cause number 24F0719-005. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2).
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At trial, when the State finished questioning the alleged victim on re-direct examination,
Riley approached the trial court and argued that the door had been opened regarding previous
sexual abuse and thus sought to renew his motion to admit the “videos and other information that
[he] asked to be admitted.” The trial court reiterated that it would not allow Riley to “get into
[the] past sexual history of an alleged victim” as it is prohibited by Rule 412. No argument was
made by Riley as to why the evidence was admissible over a Rule 412 objection.
A. Standard of Review
To preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence, a party must show the substance
of the excluded evidence by offer of proof unless the substance is apparent from the context of
the questions asked. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.2; TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); Holmes v. State, 323
S.W.3d 163, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670–71
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We review a trial court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (plurality op.); Bautista
v. State, 189 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d).
“If a proponent of evidence wishes to complain on appeal regarding the exclusion of that
evidence, ‘it is not enough to [have] t[old] the judge that [the] evidence [wa]s admissible’; the
proponent ‘must have told the judge why the evidence was admissible.’” Stephenson v. State,
673 S.W.3d 370, 386 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pet. ref’d) (alterations in original) (quoting
Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a)(1)(A))). “If the proponent did not tell the trial court why the evidence was admissible, or
if the ground for admission that he gave the trial court does not comport with his argument on
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appeal, then ‘he has preserved nothing for review.’” Id. at 386–87 (quoting Ibarra v. State, 11
S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177–80; McDonald v.
State, No. 02-13-00483-CR, 2015 WL 2353307, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 14, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication))). Moreover, a constitutional argument
regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence must be made in the trial court to be preserved
for appeal. Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 670 (quoting Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012)) (“Parties are not permitted to ‘bootstrap a constitutional issue from the most
innocuous trial objection,’ and trial courts must be presented with and have the chance to rule on
the specific constitutional basis for admission because it can have such heavy implications on
appeal.”).
Here, prior to questioning the alleged victim on re-cross examination, the only argument
made by Riley was that the door had been opened to the alleged victim’s prior sexual abuse. At
no point did Riley discuss the requirements of Rule 412 or whether the evidence at issue fell
within any of Rule 412’s exceptions. See Stephenson, 673 S.W.3d at 387. Having failed to
make this argument during trial, Riley is precluded from raising it on appeal. See Reyna, 168
S.W.3d at 179–80; see also Barker v. State, No. 01-19-01009-CR, 2021 WL 4733789, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 12, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding defendant forfeited complaint that evidence excluded under Rule 412 was
“constitutionally required” under Rule 412(b)(2)(E) when he argued at trial that it was
admissible to prove “motive or bias” under Rule 412(b)(2)(C)).
4
Because Riley failed to preserve this argument for appellate review, we overrule his sole
issue on appeal.
II. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: July 16, 2026
Date Decided: July 22, 2026
Do Not Publish
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