2026 IL App (1st) 241172-B
Fourth Division
Filed July 23, 2026
No. 1-24-1172
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County
)
v. No. 02 CR 2751201
)
ANDRES REYES, ) The Honorable Marc W. Martin,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendant-Appellant.
)
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Presiding Justice Navarro dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In 2004, Andres Reyes was sentenced to 75 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder and
attempted first degree murder. At the time of the offenses, he had been 19 years old. Fourteen years
after his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, Reyes filed an initial
postconviction petition claiming that mandating a de facto life sentence despite his youthful
characteristics, as applied to him individually, violated article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The petition was dismissed on the State’s motion.
We hold that his claim is not barred by res judicata or forfeiture where it was not (and could not
have been) raised on direct appeal, that he adequately pleaded that the delay in filing his petition
was not attributable to culpable negligence, and that he made a legally sufficient showing that his
sentence violated the proportionality and restoration clauses, but not that he was denied his right
No. 1-24-1172
to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We therefore reverse in part and remand for an
evidentiary hearing.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On December 2, 2000, Reyes, then 19 years old and a member of the Latin Kings, found
himself embroiled in a fight in front of his Palatine home with members of the Suernos 13 gang.
He ran across the street to retrieve a gun from under a dumpster, and the rival gang members fled.
Reyes, still armed, got in his sister’s car and started driving around the neighborhood, looking for
other Suernos 13s. He found two—Arnulfo Munoz and Emigdio Hernandez—and shot at them,
striking and killing Munoz. After the killing, he fled with his girlfriend and daughter to Mexico.
Two years later, after being arrested in El Paso, Texas, he confessed to the shooting. In 2004, a
jury convicted him of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder.
¶4 Reyes’s convictions carried sentences of 45 years to life for first degree murder (with the
mandatory firearm enhancement) and 6 to 30 years for attempted murder. The sentencing hearing
was brief. The pretrial investigation report disclosed that Reyes had no prior criminal history.1
According to the report, Reyes had moved to the United States in 1988 with his parents and two
older sisters. He recalled having a good childhood and said that he had not been abused or
neglected. He also said he had a good relationship with his parents. He was expelled during his
freshman year of high school for gang activity, and he did not continue his education. The only
other evidence presented at the sentencing hearing were two victim impact statements. The court
sentenced him to 65 years for first degree murder and 10 years for attempted murder, running the
sentences consecutively as required by law, resulting in an aggregate term of 75 years.
¶5 On direct appeal, Reyes challenged only his sentence, which he argued was excessive in light
of his young age, lack of criminal background, the circumstances of the offense, his remorse, and
his potential for rehabilitation. He also contended that the trial court had ignored the constitutional
1
The defense waived a presentence investigation report, noting that Reyes had been in custody since his
arrest and, therefore, there was no additional information to be reported.
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goal of restoration to useful citizenship. See id. Finding that the court’s chosen sentence was not
an abuse of discretion, we affirmed. See People v. Reyes, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1198 (2006) (table)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Reyes sought no further review.
¶6 In 2020, Reyes filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The petition alleged that, at the time he committed the murder and
attempted murder involved here, “his 19 year old brain development was no different than that of
a juvenile,” rendering his mandatory sentence of de facto life without parole unconstitutional under
the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 11, of the state
constitution. See U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.
¶7 In support of this claim, Reyes attached a report, dated June 9, 2020, prepared by
developmental psychologist Dr. James Garbarino. As written, Dr. Garbarino’s report functions
primarily as a mitigation analysis, focusing on explaining the psychological factors that led Reyes
to chase and shoot at Munoz and Hernandez and showing that, in spite of his crime, he is a good
candidate for rehabilitation and eventual release. As part of that analysis, the report discusses
various circumstances in Reyes’s life that adversely affected his development and maturation.
¶8 According to the report, Reyes suffered significant physical and psychological abuse as a
child. He experienced rejection and abandonment when his father left Mexico for the United States
without warning. After he and the rest of his family joined his father in the late 1980s, his parents
“were psychologically unavailable to him to a serious degree.” His mother worked long hours,
leaving him unattended, and his father would come home in the evening drunk and sometimes
violent. Both parents beat their children as a means of discipline—including for offenses such as
wetting the bed—sometimes “really hurt[ing]” him or his sisters. He also regularly witnessed his
parents fighting to the point where he thought they were trying to kill each other. Dr. Garbarino
emphasized the psychological component of abuse, explaining that it is the “most significant in
producing developmental damage.”
¶9 The report also detailed various childhood trauma Reyes experienced outside the home. He
joined the Latin Kings when he was 12 years old. Like his parents, the gang used physical violence
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as discipline. During childhood and adolescence, he also “had multiple firsthand encounters with
violence,” experiencing many of his friends hurt or killed in their high-violence neighborhood.
According to Dr. Garbarino, research showed that “frequent exposure to trauma in childhood can
have effects on the development of the brain,” affecting both executive function and emotional
regulation.
¶ 10 In his report, Dr. Garbarino opined that Reyes’s “history of adversity growing up can be
expected to have compromised his maturation” and that “although he was tried as an adult in the
criminal justice system, he was best understood as ‘an untreated traumatized child inhabiting and
controlling the body of a teenager.’ ” 2 He also opined that Reyes’s criminal conduct “reflected
immature impulsiveness due to his brain development.”
¶ 11 The court advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed counsel, who did not
initially make any amendments. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Reyes’s
eighth amendment claim was without merit because he was over the age of 18 years at the time of
the offense and that his proportionality and restoration clauses claim was untimely and barred by
the res judicata effect of the decision on direct appeal.
¶ 12 Counsel filed a response to the State’s motion to dismiss and then a supplemental petition
largely tracking the response. The supplemental petition incorporated the pro se petition and added
a new claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting age-based mitigation evidence at
sentencing. The supplemental petition also argued that Reyes was not culpably negligent for filing
his petition past the deadline because it was based on developments in case law that had not been
available to him at the time of his trial and sentencing.
¶ 13 The supplemental petition was supported by a handwritten affidavit made out by Reyes. In it,
Reyes asserted that he did not become aware that he would be able to raise an age-based sentencing
2
We note that this appears to be something of a stock phrase used by Dr. Garbarino. See People v. Lowe,
2026 IL App (1st) 241544-U, ¶ 23 (quoting same language from a report prepared by Dr. Garbarino);
People v. Croom, 2022 IL App (4th) 210410-U, ¶ 38 (same); see also People v. Green-Hosey, 2025 IL
App (2d) 240284, ¶ 50 (collecting cases criticizing Dr. Garbarino’s opinions).
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challenge until the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932. He
determined that the record of his trial and sentencing lacked the kind of factual development that
Harris called for, so he began doing research on science, juvenile maturity, and brain development,
a process that took some time due to his lack of access to the internet. He also knew that he would
need to show how that science applied to the specific facts and circumstances of his case. At some
point, his daughter’s mother put him in touch with Dr. Garbarino, with whom he corresponded for
a period of several months so he could analyze Reyes’s developmental history. Upon receiving Dr.
Garbarino’s report, which opined that that Reyes “met the criteria,” he went about investigating,
researching, and drafting his claims pro se and “immediately” filed his petition supported by
independent corroborative evidence.
¶ 14 The State filed a supplemental motion to dismiss arguing that Reyes’s ineffective assistance
claim was untimely, barred by res judicata, and in any event without merit because the
supplemental petition failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failure to raise an
age-based challenge to Reyes’s sentence.
¶ 15 After a hearing, the court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the petition. As relevant
to this appeal, it found that Reyes’s proportionality and restoration clauses claim was untimely and
res judicata, and it found that Reyes forfeited his challenge to trial counsel’s representation at
sentencing by not challenging it on direct appeal.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Reyes is appealing from the dismissal of his postconviction petition on the State’s motion.
See 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2020). A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the petition
by asking whether the defendant’s allegations, if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle
him to relief. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. In answering that question, the petition’s
well-pled allegations and any supporting evidence are assumed to be true so long as they are not
positively rebutted by the record. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 45. Review is de novo.
People v. Moore, 2023 IL App (1st) 220919, ¶ 22.
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¶ 18 In our original decision in this appeal, we affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. People v.
Reyes, 2025 IL App (1st) 241172-U, vacated No. 132341 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2025) (supervisory order).
We held that Reyes’s claim that his sentence violates the proportionality and restoration clauses of
our state’s constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) was barred by res judicata because he
challenged his sentence as excessive on direct appeal. Reyes, 2025 IL App (1st) 241172-U, ¶¶ 21-26. We also held that Reyes did not make a legally sufficient showing that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Id. ¶¶ 28-32. The Illinois Supreme Court denied
Reyes’s petition for leave to appeal, but it vacated our judgment and directed us to reconsider our
finding that Reyes’s sentencing claim was res judicata in light of People v. Spencer, 2025 IL
130015. See People v. Reyes, No. 132341 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2025) (supervisory order). At our request,
the parties have filed supplemental briefs on that issue.
¶ 19 A. Res Judicata and Forfeiture
¶ 20 The State contends that, the merits of the petition notwithstanding, Reyes’s claim is barred by
the doctrines of res judicata and forfeiture. Postconviction proceedings exist to allow inquiry into
allegations of constitutional error occurring at the original proceedings that were not, and could
not have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. So, as a
general rule, claims that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by res judicata. Id.
Similarly, claims that could have been raised but were not are considered to have been forfeited.
Id.
¶ 21 In our original decision, we found that Reyes’s sentencing challenge was barred by
res judicata. That holding was based on the premise that Reyes’s excessive-sentence argument on
direct appeal and his constitutional challenge in this postconviction proceeding were,
fundamentally, the same claim. See Reyes, 2025 IL App (1st) 241172-U, ¶ 23. Spencer undermines
that premise.
¶ 22 In Spencer, the defendant was directly appealing from his convictions for first degree murder,
attempted murder, and home invasion and his aggregate sentence of 100 years. Spencer, 2025 IL
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130015, ¶ 1. He was 20 years old at the time of the offense. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued
that this 100-year sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated article I, section 11, of the
Illinois Constitution as applied to him because it was imposed without consideration of the
mitigating effect of his youth. Id. ¶ 23. The court rejected the premise that the defendant’s sentence
amounted to de facto life, finding that the defendant’s eligibility for parole 20 years into his
sentence gave him a meaningful opportunity for release. Id. ¶ 40. But that, the court found, was
not dispositive of the defendant’s as-applied challenge because article I, section 11, allows
defendants to challenge sentences of any length, not just sentences that amount to de facto life
without parole. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. Nevertheless, the court did not resolve the defendant’s as-applied
challenge. Relying on the “general principle that as-applied constitutional claims cannot ultimately
succeed absent a sufficiently developed evidentiary record,” the court found that “the proper
venue” for the defendant’s claim was in postconviction proceedings. Id. ¶ 45. It then pointedly
held that the defendant was “not foreclosed” from raising his as-applied challenge in a future
postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 46.
¶ 23 Spencer did not directly concern the doctrine of res judicata, but it is nonetheless instructive
because it makes clear that, when the record on direct appeal is not adequately developed to allow
the court to resolve a young adult’s age-based as-applied challenge to his sentence, the defendant
is not precluded from raising that challenge in a later postconviction proceeding. This is consistent
with the long-recognized principle that, in postconviction proceedings, “res judicata and forfeiture
do not apply *** where facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original appellate
record.” People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 450-51 (2005).
¶ 24 Here, the record on direct appeal contained only the most basic facts about Reyes’s
background found in the bare-bones pretrial investigation report. His postconviction claim,
however, is based on detailed factual information presented in Dr. Garbarino’s report and other
exhibits attached to Reyes’s petition that was not found in the original appellate record. So, even
if we assume that Reyes’s excessive-sentence argument on direct appeal raised the same claim that
he is advancing in this postconviction proceeding, his current claim is based on facts that did not
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appear on the face of the original appellate record, so it is not barred by the res judicata effect of
our decision on direct appeal. Similarly, to the extent that Reyes could have raised the kind of agebased constitutional challenge to his sentence on direct appeal, forfeiture does not bar him from
raising that challenge here based on facts that, again, were not found in the original appellate
record.
¶ 25 In so holding, we find People v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, and People v. LaPointe,
2018 IL App (2d) 160903, distinguishable. The defendants in those cases presented postconviction
claims that did no more than repackage, using constitutional language, the same excessive sentence
claims they had raised on direct appeal. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶¶ 18-22; LaPointe,
2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 63. Here, as we have just explained, Reyes’s postconviction petition
does not merely slap a new label on an old claim. It raises what is effectively a new claim based
on facts that were not before us on direct appeal. It is therefore not barred by res judicata or
forfeiture.
¶ 26 B. Timeliness and Culpable Negligence
¶ 27 The State next argues that Reyes’s claim is barred by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’s
statute of limitations. Where, as here, the defendant files a direct appeal but does not seek further
discretionary view, a postconviction petition must be filed no more than six months after the date
a petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court was due; otherwise, it is considered untimely.
People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 24; see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2020). We issued our
decision in Reyes’s direct appeal on March 22, 2006. As Reyes did not seek rehearing, the petition
for leave to appeal would have been due 21 days later, on April 12, 2006. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(b)
(eff. Jan. 1, 2005). Hence, his postconviction petition was due six months after that, on October
12, 2006. See Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 24. He did not file his petition until August 14, 2020. It
was undeniably untimely.
¶ 28 That time limit, however, is not a strict one. “Although our criminal justice system needs
finality in criminal litigation and judgments, it should not come at the expense of justice and
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fairness.” People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 102 (2002). Section 122-1(c) therefore contains “a
special ‘safety valve’ ” (People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (1988)) that permits a petition to be
filed late if “the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable
negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2020). Culpable negligence “contemplates something
greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to recklessness.” Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 108. Although
it does not require intentional conduct, it does involve an indifference to, or outright disregard of,
consequences. Id. at 106 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). It implies conduct that can
“fairly be labeled blamable or censorious.” People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 421 (2003). By
construing culpable negligence broadly, this definition ensures that the safety valve “does not stand
as empty rhetoric.” Id. at 420.
¶ 29 Reyes alleged in his amended petition that he was not culpably negligent because his claim
is based on case law—in particular, Harris, 2018 IL 121932—that developed long after his initial
filing period expired and because, once that case law became available, he filed his petition within
a reasonable length of time. At this stage of postconviction proceedings, the question is whether
these allegations “are sufficient to establish a lack of culpable negligence.” Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at
418. We therefore treat the allegations as true and review their sufficiency de novo. People v.
Walker, 331 Ill. App. 3d 335, 340 (2002).
¶ 30 Reyes’s theory that he was not culpably negligent can be broken down into two distinct
periods: before the supreme court decided Harris on October 18, 2018, and after it issued that
decision.
¶ 31 The first period, which comprises the bulk of the delay in filing by far, spans the
approximately 12 years that elapsed between the initial filing period in 2006 until the 2018 decision
in Harris. According to Reyes’s affidavit, he did not learn that he could raise the particular kind of
sentencing challenge at issue here until Harris was decided and he could not have anticipated the
legal developments that led to Harris. Assuming these allegations are true, they certainly show a
lack of culpable negligence. Before Harris, the Illinois Supreme Court had not recognized that
emerging adults might be able to show that their own neurological development was so like that
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of a person under the age of 18 as to be entitled, under our state constitution’s proportionality and
restoration clauses, to the same protections extended to under-18 offenders in Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012). See Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 37, 45-46.
¶ 32 In arguing that Reyes’s failure to anticipate Harris was culpably negligent, the State relies on
case law holding that Miller and subsequent decisions did not provide defendants raising Harristype claims the legal cause necessary to avoid the bar against filing successive postconviction
petitions. See People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40-42. These cases are not controlling because
cause and lack of culpable negligence are not the same thing.
¶ 33 In terms of Illinois postconviction law, cause is an element of the cause-and-prejudice test,
which is the only statutory exception to the general prohibition against filing more than one
postconviction petition. 3 See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). The obvious purpose of
prohibiting successive petitions is to prevent the piecemeal litigation of postconviction claims. See
People v. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 108. The cause-and-prejudice exception exists purely to
ensure “fundamental fairness.” People v. McCoy, 2026 IL 131565, ¶ 48. To satisfy the cause
requirement, the defendant must establish that there was “some objective factor external to the
defense that impeded [his] efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.” Montanez, 2023 IL
128740, ¶ 77. Among other things, a defendant can establish cause by “ ‘showing that the factual
or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.’ ” Haines, 2021 IL App (4th)
190612, ¶ 43 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991)). Under this definition, a
particular legal theory can be considered available, as a technical matter, even if it has not been
recognized by a court or even raised by a creative attorney. See id. ¶¶ 44-45.
¶ 34 The exception to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’s statute of limitations is more permissive.
It represents a legislative judgment that, except when the defendant’s delay is not merely neglectful
3
The other exception, which applies to claims of actual innocence, is recognized solely in decisional law.
People v. McCoy, 2026 IL 131565, ¶ 49.
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but reckless or blameworthy—as might be the case when a defendant sits on a claim he knows he
has—the remedial purpose of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is more important than the State’s
interest in assuring that convictions are not susceptible to collateral attacks after a given period of
time. See Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 421 (explaining how permitting late filings in the absence of
culpable negligence furthers the aims of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
¶ 35 Objectively speaking, there may not have been an external impediment preventing Reyes
from raising this claim during the initial filing period in 2006 because, whether or not he (or anyone
else) recognized it, “ ‘the essential legal tools’ ” were already there. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42
(quoting People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93). But the question before us is not whether Reyes
could have raised the claim in 2006; it is whether not raising it before Harris was issued in 2018
amounted to culpable negligence. And for him to have raised this claim during that period of time
would have “require[d] a level of legal knowledge and expertise that veers into the improbable.”
People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 60. We would not find an experienced attorney
ineffective for failing to anticipate Harris. Id. We can hardly fault Reyes—an indigent prisoner
with an eighth grade education—for not doing better. Assuming the truth of his allegations, Reyes
was not culpably negligent for failing to file this claim before Harris was decided.
¶ 36 The question becomes whether Reyes has shown that he was not culpably negligent for failing
to file his petition for nearly two years after Harris was decided. In his affidavit, Reyes averred
that Harris made clear that, to raise the claim contemplated by that decision, the limited facts found
in the record on direct appeal would not be enough; he would need to put together a detailed factual
basis to support his assertion that the brain science cited in Miller applied to him and to the
circumstances of this offense. Lacking internet access, he had to rely on outside sources of
information and traditional postal services, which took time. He was eventually put in touch with
Dr. Garbarino, with whom he “corresponded for months” so Dr. Garbarino could do the necessary
analysis and prepare a report. Once Reyes received Dr. Garbarino’s June 9, 2020 report, which
indicated that he “met the criteria,” he did the investigation, research, and drafting necessary to
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prepare his pro se petition, which he put in the mail at Hill Correctional Center on August 7,
2020—not even two months after Dr. Garbarino issued his report.
¶ 37 Taking Reyes’s allegations as true, they show that he was not culpably negligent for the delay
in filing his petition after Harris was decided. Once that decision was issued, Reyes had a choice:
he could slap together a generic petition and file it, or he could take the time necessary to build a
fact-specific case to support his claim that he was entitled to the benefit of Miller. Heeding Harris,
he followed the latter course. A fact finder could easily find that his choice, by which he avoided
presenting the court with an undeveloped claim that would have been doomed to dismissal, did
not amount to culpable negligence.
¶ 38 In summary, Reyes’s allegations show that he could not have been expected to even know
that he could challenge his mandatory de facto life sentence as a 19-year-old offender until Harris
and that, upon learning that he might be able to make that claim, he worked diligently to put
together and then file a pro se petition that was well-grounded in the specific facts and
circumstances of his own developmental history. Accepting those allegations as true, as we must,
they show that he was not culpably negligent for not bringing this claim at an earlier point in time.
That is all that Reyes has to show at this stage.
¶ 39 C. Merits
¶ 40 Having dispensed with the procedural obstacles, we now consider whether, on the merits,
Reyes has made a legally sufficient showing that, as applied to him, the statutes that mandated he
receive a sentence of de facto life without parole violate the proportionality and restoration clauses
of the Illinois Constitution. 4
4
Under the applicable sentencing statutes, Reyes’s conviction for first degree murder, along with the
finding that he personally shot and killed the victim, carried a sentence of 45 years to natural life without
eligibility for good-time credit. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i), 5-8-1(a)(1)(a), (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000). The
parties do not dispute that the mandatory minimum of 45 years constituted a de facto sentence of life
without parole. See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 (holding that sentences of 40 years or less
are not de facto life sentences).
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¶ 41 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. To overcome that presumption, Reyes must clearly
establish that the combination of sentencing statutes at issue here are invalid as applied to him.
People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304, ¶ 25. In the context of an emerging-adult claim under the
proportionality and restoration clauses of the Illinois Constitution, that means he “must plead, and
ultimately prove, that his or her individual characteristics require the application of Miller.” People
v. Green-Hosey, 2025 IL App (2d) 240284, ¶ 39, appeal allowed, No. 131560 (Ill. Sept. 24, 2025).
In other words, he “must demonstrate that his *** own individual characteristics were so like those
of a juvenile that receipt of a life sentence without the Miller safeguards was cruel, degrading, or
so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community.” Id. ¶ 58
(citing People v. Garcia, 2024 IL App (2d) 210488-B, ¶ 14, and People v. Wilson, 2022 IL App
(1st) 192048, ¶ 87).
¶ 42 In his petition, Reyes alleged that, at the time he committed the charged offenses, his brain
was comparable to that of a juvenile offender, thus diminishing his culpability and enhancing his
rehabilitative potential. That allegation is supported by Dr. Garbarino’s report, which identified
adverse events and environments in Reyes’s childhood and—crucially—explained how those had
hampered Reyes’s psychological development, particularly in the areas of executive function and
emotional regulation, which, according to Dr. Garbarino, are “crucial elements in effective, prosocial decision-making.” In the report, Dr. Garbarino described Reyes, at the time of the shooting,
as “an ‘untreated, traumatized child inhabiting and controlling the body of a teenager.’ ” He also
opined that Reyes “demonstrated immaturity of thought and emotional control, impetuous and
impulsive action, and failure to appreciate the full consequences of his criminal behavior,” all of
which reflected a slower maturation process than Reyes would have experienced in a healthier
environment. Taking all of this as true, we find that Reyes has made a legally sufficient showing
that “his *** individual characteristics require the application of Miller,” making the statutes that
mandated a de facto sentence of life without parole, as applied to him, violative of the
proportionality and restoration clauses.
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¶ 43 The State argues that the account of Reyes’s childhood presented in Dr. Garbarino’s report is
rebutted by the pretrial investigation report, which indicated that Reyes had a “good” childhood
where he was not abused or neglected. At most, this is only an inconsistency between the evidence
supporting Reyes’s petition and the evidence that was before the court at his original sentencing
hearing. An allegation is not positively rebutted by the record simply because it conflicts with
evidence in the record. See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60. To the extent that Dr. Garbarino’s
analysis conflicts with Reyes’s self-report to a probation officer a month after his arrest, it presents
a factual dispute that is meant to be resolved after an evidentiary hearing, not on the pleadings.
Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 46.
¶ 44 The State also argues that Reyes’s de facto life sentence is fully justified by the severity of
his conduct, which outweighs whatever rehabilitative potential he might have. This argument puts
the cart before the horse. Reyes’s claim is that, because his individual characteristics render him
developmentally akin to an under-18 offender, he is entitled under the proportionality and
restoration clauses to the benefit of Miller’s prohibition against mandatory sentences of life without
parole for juveniles. If he proves that claim, the trial court will determine the appropriate remedy,
which may include a new sentencing hearing. If de facto life without parole remains available as
an option at any new sentencing hearing, the State will have the chance to make its case that,
notwithstanding Reyes’s rehabilitative potential, a de facto life sentence is appropriate.
¶ 45 Reyes’s petition makes a substantial showing that his mandatory life sentence, as applied to
him, violates the proportionality and restoration clauses of the Illinois Constitution. We therefore
reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand for the State to file an answer and the court to hold
an evidentiary hearing if necessary. See 725 ILCS 5/122-5, 122-6 (West 2020).
¶ 46 D. Ineffective Assistance
¶ 47 Finally, in our original decision, we held that Reyes’s petition did not make a legally sufficient
showing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The supreme
court did not order us to reconsider that holding, and neither party has asked us to do so. We adhere
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to our original finding that Reyes’s petition did not make a legally sufficient showing that counsel
was ineffective where, among other things, “counsel cannot be faulted for not introducing evidence
of science not yet developed.” Reyes, 2025 IL App (1st) 241172, ¶ 32.
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 As it is based on facts not before us on direct appeal, Reyes’s sentencing claim is not barred
by res judicata or forfeiture. Further, assuming the truth of his petition’s allegations and its
supporting materials, Reyes has shown that the delay in filing his petition was not attributable to
culpable negligence, and he has made a substantial showing that his mandatory sentence of
de facto life without parole, as applied to his individual circumstances, violates the proportionality
and restoration clauses of article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. We therefore
hold that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to dismiss that claim. However, we
hold that the trial court properly dismissed Reyes’s ineffective-assistance claim.
¶ 50 Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Reyes’s challenge to his sentence under the
proportionality and restoration clauses, and we remand for further proceedings. We otherwise
affirm.
¶ 51 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
¶ 52 PRESIDING JUSTICE NAVARRO, dissenting:
¶ 53 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion regarding culpable negligence and
would find that Reyes could have raised his as-applied proportionate penalties clause claim by the
time the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’s (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) statute of
limitations expired on October 12, 2006.
¶ 54 Instructive is People v. Macias, 2026 IL App (1st) 242228-U, ¶¶ 2, 4, where a defendant, who
was 18 years old at the time he committed first degree murder based on accountability, was
sentenced to 42 years’ imprisonment, with the sentencing occurring in 2004. The defendant
unsuccessfully appealed to this court, and the supreme court denied his petition for leave to appeal.
Id. ¶ 5. Based on the conclusion of his direct appellate proceedings, the defendant had until October
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2009 to file a timely postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 19. Ultimately, he filed his petition in 2023,
claiming that his 42-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause where the trial court
failed to “consider[ ] his youthful characteristics at the time of the offense.” Id. ¶ 7. Recognizing
the amount of time that had elapsed between his direct appellate proceedings and when he filed
his petition, the defendant argued that he was not culpably negligent for the delay. Id. ¶¶ 8, 23. He
posited that, because Illinois case law extending Miller’s protections to young adults developed
between 2019 and 2022, he was unable to file the petition until 2023. Id. On the State’s motion,
the circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely, finding that the defendant failed to show a lack
of culpable negligence for the delay. Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 55 On appeal, in rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was not culpably negligent because
of recent development in Miller-based case law, this court noted that “those developments did not
affect the law governing defendant’s age-based proportionate penalties claim.” Id. ¶ 23 (citing
People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42). We observed that, because the defendant was 18 years
old at the time he committed murder, “he has always been able to raise an age-based proportionate
penalties challenge of his sentence.” Id. (citing People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87). This court
further observed that “[t]he proportionate penalties clause has existed since 1970 and ‘Illinois cases
have long held the proportionate penalties clause required the circuit court to take into account the
defendant’s youth and mentality in fashioning an appropriate sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting Clark, 2023
IL 127273, ¶ 92 (citing cases back to 1972)).
¶ 56 We asserted that,
“[e]ven prior to Miller and the Illinois case law it produced, [the] defendant has always
‘had the tools to construct a claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties
clause because the sentencing judge did not take into account (1) his youth and (2) how his
particular neurobiological development affected his maturity and decision-making.’ ” Id.
(quoting People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 83).
In turn, this court found that the “[d]efendant could have raised his age-based proportionate
penalties claim at his sentencing hearing in 2004, on direct appeal in 2006 or 2007,” or by the time
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a postconviction petition was due in October 2009. Id. Therefore, we concluded that the
“defendant’s petition fail[ed] to allege facts demonstrating that his delay in filing was not the result
of his culpable negligence, so that exception does not excuse his untimely filing.” Id.
Consequently, this court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s petition as untimely. Id. ¶¶ 23,
26.
¶ 57 Based on the rationale of Macias, I would likewise find that Reyes failed to allege sufficient
facts showing he was not culpably negligent for the delay in bringing his proportionate penalties
clause claim in a timely postconviction petition. Well before October 12, 2006—the deadline for
Reyes to file a postconviction petition under the Act—Illinois courts acknowledged as-applied
claims under the proportionate penalties clause and that the clause itself mandated trial courts to
consider the defendant’s youth and mental circumstances prior to sentencing. See Clark, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 92; People v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶¶ 46-47; Macias, 2026 IL App (1st)
242228-U, ¶ 23. In fact, as far back as 1894, our supreme court observed that it was “the law of
nature” that there is “a marked distinction between persons of mature age and those who are
minors,” whom the court defined as persons between 16 and 21 years of age. People ex rel. Bradley
v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 422-23 (1894); see Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 92
(highlighting Bradley). “The habits and characters of the latter are, presumably, to a large extent
as yet unformed and unsettled.” Bradley, 148 Ill. at 423. Accordingly, the legal tools were available
to Reyes to raise his proportionate penalties clause claim within the Act’s statute of limitations.
¶ 58 The fact that Reyes posits his proportionate penalties clause claim is based not only on
developments in the law but also on the emergence of new scientific evidence previously
unavailable to him, including Dr. Garbarino’s report, does not excuse Reyes’s untimely filing.
While Dr. Garbarino’s report was certainly additional evidence to support his claim, scientific
research existed in 2006 that Reyes could have utilized. See People v. Searles, 2024 IL App (1st)
210043-U, ¶ 14 (citing studies from 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2004 and observing that “research into
young adult and adolescent brain development prior to” the defendant’s trial in 2002 “recognized
that brain development continues into an individual’s 20s”). Reyes could have cited such studies
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and applied them to his circumstances, which generally were known to him in 2006, when he was
25 years old, to raise a proportionate penalties clause claim. See People v. Boclair, 2025 IL App
(1st) 240911-U, ¶ 43 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that he could only have recently raised
his proportionate penalties clause claim because a report from Dr. Garbarino “was not previously
available to him” and finding that scientific research existed long before he obtained the report
from Dr. Garbarino such that he should have raised the claim much “earlier”). The fact that Dr.
Garbarino’s report—the most individualized evidence supporting Reyes’s proportionate penalties
clause claim—was not obtainable at the time the Act’s statute of limitations lapsed does not show
a lack of culpable negligence on his part.
¶ 59 Given the foregoing, I would affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Reyes’s proportionate
penalties clause claim as untimely and decline to advance his petition to an evidentiary hearing.
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People v. Reyes, 2026 IL App (1st) 241172-B
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 02-CR2751201; the Hon. Marc W. Martin, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Manuela Hernandez, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, David H. Iskowich, and Whitney Bond, Assistant
Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
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