J-S23011-26 2026 PA Super 158
DOLORES DUGAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MATTHEW DUGAN : No. 3167 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered November 7, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Domestic Relations at
No(s): CV-2025-00613,
PACSES: 57030337
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JULY 23, 2026
Dolores Dugan (Wife) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, denying her de novo appeal in this support
matter.1 After careful review, we affirm.
Wife and Appellee Matthew Dugan (Husband) were married on
December 23, 1989, and separated on January 15, 1997. Husband continued
to support Wife financially for more than 27 years following their separation.
In July 2024, Wife began living at Revelle Senior Living Nursing Home. In
September 2024, the parties sold the marital home for $300,000.00. Wife
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Because neither of the parties have filed for divorce, the court’s November
7, 2025 order is appealable. See Hasson v. Hasson, 696 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 1997); but see Leister v. Leister, 684 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 1996) (spousal support order not appealable until all economic issues as part of divorce action have been resolved).
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received the proceeds of the sale, which totaled $309,554.00. 2 The parties
dispute whether Husband agreed to give Wife the proceeds from the sale of
the house in exchange for him ceasing to make post-separation payments.
See N.T. De Novo Support Hearing, 10/14/25, at 8-9, 34-36.
On June 2, 2025, Wife, via her agent under a power of attorney, 3 filed
a complaint for spousal support.4 The support complaint notes that the parties
have not filed for divorce. See Spousal Support Complaint, 6/2/25, at 1. On
July 9, 2025, a support conference officer made the following findings of fact:
Husband agreed to let Wife keep the proceeds from the sale of the marital
residence; Wife’s agent stated the sale proceeds are being used for Wife’s
care; Wife’s monthly rent is $2,795.00; Wife receives $1,516.00 in monthly
social security benefits; and Husband receives $4,000.00 in monthly social
security benefits. See Summary of Trier of Fact, 7/9/25, at 2, 3. See also
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11(e) (requiring summary by conference officer).
2 Wife’s counsel stated that the proceeds from the sale were in a Vanguard
account at the time of the support hearing. See N.T. De Novo Support Hearing, 10/14/25, at 61.
3 Due to the fact that Wife was in a nursing home at the time, Wife’s daughter,
as Wife’s agent under a power of attorney, filed the support complaint. See Summary of Trier of Fact, 7/9/25, at 2. Wife, who was eighty-five-years-old at the time of the support hearing, suffers from severe Alzheimer’s Disease. Id. at 20.
4 As the trial court noted, this was not a petition to modify support because
no support order had ever been entered. See N.T. De Novo Support Hearing, 10/14/25, at 43.
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Following an August 7, 2025 support hearing, a hearing officer entered
the following order dismissing Wife’s claim for support:
Jennifer Munroe[,] [Agent] for [Wife,] was present. Parties are
still married and no divorce action was initiated despite being
separated for over 28 years. The parties were together as
husband and wife for approximately 8 years. The parties owned
real estate that recently sold and [Wife] retained the proceeds
from the sale of approximately $300,000.00[.] [Wife] is currently
residing in a nursing care facility and has social security income of
approximately $1,500.00 per month. [Husband] receives
approximately $4,000.00 per month in social security benefits and
receives a draw or salary of approximately an additional
$4,000.00 per month. Arguments were made regarding
entitlement to spousal support with supporting law[. W]hile it
appears that [Wife] is entitled[,] pursuant to the statute[,] to file
for spousal support[,] the facts of this case[,] specifically related
to the length of marriage, the separation of the parties for 28
years[,] and the support/assets received [by Wife] over 28
years[,] the equities and fairness inherent in these requests
dictate[] that the petition for support be dismissed.
Order, 8/7/25. Wife filed a de novo appeal.
On October 14, 2025, the trial court held a de novo support hearing,
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.11(i). At the hearing, Husband, who was seventy
years old, provided documentation of payments he voluntarily made to Wife
over the prior seven years, totaling over $500,000.00. 5 See N.T. De Novo
Support Hearing, 10/14/25, at 10. Husband’s counsel also produced a yearto-date pay stub showing Husband’s gross income was $192,307.00—for a
$250,000.00 yearly gross income and net income of $184,033.00/year. Id.
5 The payments included mortgage payments, cash deposits, loan payments,
and car payments. See N.T. De Novo Support Hearing, 10/14/25, at 10.
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at 62-63, 70. Finally, Husband’s counsel stated that Husband receives
$4,361.00 per month in social security income. Id. at 63.
Wife’s counsel stated at the hearing that Wife’s monthly social security
benefits of $1,516.00 are her sole source of income. See id. at 5-6, 50.
Wife’s counsel submitted bills showing Wife’s monthly expenses total
$5,845.00 (representing $5,459.00 in rent and $350.00 in medication costs).
See id. at 54. Although Wife’s counsel admitted that Wife received
$300,000.00 from the sale of the marital home in 2024, he stated that “that
has been depleted.” Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held
the matter under advisement and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the
issue of whether Husband’s post-separation payments to Wife constituted a
gift and whether the sale of the parties’ marital home is considered income.
See Order, 10/14/25, at 1.
On November 7, 2025, following the parties’ submission of post-hearing
memoranda, the court entered an order denying Wife’s support claim. The
order states:
The parties were married a total of eight (8) years, yet they have
been separated for twenty-eight (28) years. Since separation,
nearly all twenty-eight (28) years, [Husband] has made payments
towards [Wife’s] personal expenses totaling several hundred[s of]
thousand[s] of dollars. Thus, [Husband] has provided support to
[Wife] in excess of three (3) times the length of the marriage.
Moreover, in 2024, [Wife] received funds in an amount slightly in
excess of $300,000[.00] from the sale of jointly owned property,
of which [Husband] did not receive a share of the sale proceeds.
Order, 11/7/25.
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Wife filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Wife raises the following
issues for our consideration:
(1) Did the trial court err as a matter of law in its application of
Pa.R.C[.]P. 1910.16-5[,] which permits deviations for
support obligations [but] not the denial of that obligation[?]
(2) Did the trial court err as a matter of law and commit an
abuse of discretion by considering the voluntary payments
made by [Husband] prior to the initiation of the support
obligation as a basis for deviation from and/or a termination
of [Husband’s support] obligation[?]
(3) Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by considering the sale of a primary residence as
income available for support where such proceeds are
excluded from the statutory definition of “dealings in
property[?]”
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
Our standard of review in spousal support cases is well[-]settled:
this Court must determine whether the trial court has abused its
discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion or insufficient evidence
to sustain the support order, this Court will not interfere with the
broad discretion afforded the trial court. An abuse of discretion is
not merely an error of judgment, but rather a determination that
the trial court has misapplied the law, or has exercised judgment
which is manifestly unreasonable, or is the product of partiality,
prejudice, bias[,] or ill will as demonstrated by the evidence of
record.
Speaker v. Speaker, 183 A.3d. 411, 414-15 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
“The duty to provide spousal support is derived from marital
obligations.” Horn v. Horn, 564 A.2d 995, 996 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citation
omitted). Thus, the spousal support obligation terminates when the marriage
does. Remick v. Remick, 456 A.2d 163, 166 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1983).
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Moreover, “[t]here is no public policy or legal reason why an adult spouse may
not, under the proper circumstances, waive [his or] her right to future
support.” White v. White, 313 A.2d 776, 779 (Pa. Super. 1973).
Generally, “[m]arried persons are liable for the support of each other
according to their respective abilities to provide support as provided by law.”
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(1).6 Actions for spousal support may also be filed
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1, et seq.”7 See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1(a) (“[T]he rules
of this chapter govern all civil actions or proceedings brought in the court of
common pleas to enforce a duty of support, or an obligation to pay alimony
pendente lite.”).
In her first issue, Wife contends that the trial court erred in its
application of Rule 1910.16-5. Specifically, she argues that the rule does not
permit a court to deny support, but only permits deviations from support
obligations. We disagree.
Rule 1910.16-5 clearly states that a “trier-of-fact may deviate from the
basic [] spousal support” when he or she “determines a deviation is
appropriate based on the factors in subdivision (b) of the rule.” Pa.R.C.P.
6 The Divorce Code (Code), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3101-3904, also provides that “[i]n proper cases, upon petition, the court may allow a spouse reasonable . . . spousal support[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3702(a) (emphasis added). Additionally, courts have original jurisdiction under the Code “in cases of divorce and for the annulment of void or voidable marriages[.]” Id. at § 3104(a). Again, here the parties have not filed for divorce or annulment.
7 “[C]laims for . . . spousal support . . . shall be raised in the domestic relations
section by filing a complaint pursuant to [Rule] 1910.4.” Pa.R.C.P. 1920.31(a)(2).
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1910.16-5(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). A deviation applies to the total
support obligation amount or its duration. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b), cmt.
Rule 1910.16-5 sets forth nine factors a court shall consider when deciding
whether to deviate from the basic spousal support, including “the duration of
the marriage from the date of marriage to the date of final separation[] and
[] other relevant and appropriate factors[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b)(8), (9).
As stated above, when a court deviates from the traditional support
guidelines, that deviation may affect the total support obligation or its
duration. Thus, it is possible that an appropriate downward deviation, based
on the above-cited factors, could result in no support obligation for a party.
See id., cmt. (2005) (primary purpose of subsection (b)(8) is “to prevent the
unfairness that arises in a short-term marriage when the obligor is required
to pay support over a substantially longer period of time than the parties were
married and there is little or no opportunity for credit for these payments at
the time of equitable distribution”). Accordingly, Wife’s claim has no merit.
Wife next argues that the court erred when it considered Husband’s
voluntary post-separation payments, made before the initiation of the support
action, as a reason to deny her request for support.
“In determining a spousal support . . . obligation’s duration, the trierof-fact shall consider the marriage’s duration, i.e., the date of marriage to the
date of final separation.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1. Moreover, if a trier-of-fact
determines that a party has a duty to pay support, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the guideline-calculated obligation is the correct support
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obligation. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d). The presumption may be rebutted,
however, “if the trier-of-fact concludes in a written finding or states on the
record that the guideline support obligation is unjust or inappropriate.”
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d)(1) (emphasis added). Relatedly, comment G to Rule
1910.16-1 states:
The primary purpose of this provision is to prevent the
unfairness that arises in a short-term marriage when the obligor
is required to pay support over a substantially longer period of
time than the parties were married and there is little or no
opportunity for credit for these payments at the time of equitable
distribution.
Id., cmt. G (2010) (emphasis added).
As the trial court noted, when making its decision to deny Wife’s support
claim:
[It] considered the substantial money given to [Wife], over nearly
20 years post-separation, the fact that [Wife] had been involved
in a serious long-term relationship since separation, and the other
assets available to [Wife.] The money[] given to [Wife] was not
used to determine a deviation from income . . . but was rather
one of the many factors the [c]ourt initially considered when
concluding that an award of [support 8] was not proper in this case. ____________________________________________
8 The trial court uses the term “alimony pendente lite” (APL) several times throughout its opinion. APL is “[a]n order for temporary support granted to a spouse during the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3103 (emphasis added). See DeMasi v. DeMasi, 597 A.2d 101, 104-05 (Pa. Super. 1991) (APL based on need of one party to have equal financial resources to pursue divorce proceeding; APL based on state of litigation), but see id. at 104 (“alimony[, by contrast,] is not available until after the divorce decree has been entered”) (emphasis added). As previously noted, at the time of the instant appeal, neither party had filed for divorce. See supra note 1. Thus, the proper term for Wife’s claim is spousal support, not APL. See also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.4(b) (“A party shall commence an action for [APL] by filing a complaint in the domestic relations section if a (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/26, at 2 (unpaginated).
“In evaluating a spouse’s support obligation, the trial court must
consider the spouses’ income, potential earning capacity, and other property
and financial resources[.]” Brotzman-Smith v. Smith, 650 A.2d 471, 475
(Pa. Super. 1994). “[I]n addition, the amount of the award must be fair, non[-]confiscatory, and attendant to the circumstances of the parties.” Haselrig
v. Haselrig, 840 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. Super. 2003). Based on the fact that
Wife received almost 28 years of post-separation support from Husband—
totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars—after a marriage that lasted only
eight years, we cannot find that the trial court’s decision to deny Wife’s
support claim was an abuse of discretion. Speaker, supra; Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-1, cmt. G. See also Hasson, supra (where trier-of-fact makes
specific findings on record to justify deviations form support guideline amount,
presumption that guideline amount is correct is rebutted).
Finally, Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
considering the sale of the parties’ residence as income 9 available for support
divorce action has been filed with the prothonotary.”) (emphasis added).
9 Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302, income includes:
[C]ompensation for services, including, but not limited to, wages,
salaries, bonuses, fees, compensation in kind, commissions[,][
and similar items; income derived from business; gains derived
from dealings in property; interest; rents; royalties; dividends;
annuities; income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
all forms of retirement; pensions; income from discharge of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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where the sale proceeds are excluded from the statutory definition of “dealings
in property.” Appellant’s Brief, at 8.
First, the trial court states that it considered the proceeds of the sale of
the marital home as an asset, not income, when it made its decision to deny
Wife support. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/26, at 3 (unpaginated). Second,
the court noted that “the money [] from the sale of [the] property[] was not
used to determine a deviation from income, . . . but was one of many factors
the [c]ourt considered when concluding that an award of [spousal support]
was not proper in this case.” Id.
A court shall consider “other relevant and appropriate factors” when
deciding whether to deviate from the basic spousal support. Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-5(b)(9). Moreover, “[i]n determining the reasonable needs of the []
spouse seeking support . . ., the guideline shall place primary emphasis on
the net incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable
deviations for . . . other factors, such as the parties’ assets, as warrant
special attention.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a) (emphasis added). Based upon ____________________________________________
indebtedness; distributive share of partnership gross income;
income in respect of a decedent; income from an interest in an
estate or trust; military retirement benefits; railroad employment
retirement benefits; social security benefits; temporary and
permanent disability benefits; workers’ compensation;
unemployment compensation; other entitlements to money or
lump sum awards, without regard to source, including lottery
winnings; income tax refunds; insurance compensation or
settlements; awards or verdicts; and any form of payment due to
and collectible by an individual regardless of source.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302.
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Rule 1910.16(5)(b) and subsection 4322(a), we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion when it considered, among other factors, the more
than $300,000.00 Wife received from the sale of the parties’ marital home
and concluded she was not entitled to receive spousal support.
Order affirmed.
Date: 7/23/2026
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