[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2026-Ohio-2822.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115716
v. :
BRANDON BALDWIN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 23, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-665692-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney and Chauncey Keller, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Stahl and Stephenson and Michael H. Stahl; Law Office of
Michael G. Aird, LLC, and Michael G. Aird, for appellant.
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
Defendant-appellant Brandon Baldwin (“Baldwin”) appeals from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas decision denying, without hearing, his petition for postconviction relief, raising one assignment of error for our review,
which states:
The trial court erred when it dismissed [Baldwin’s] Post-Conviction
Relief (PCR) Petition without a hearing, prejudicing [Baldwin] and
violating his 5th, 6th & 14th Amendment rights to the U.S. Constitution
and violating his rights under Article I, Section 1, 10 & 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.
After careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. Facts and Procedural History
After a bench trial, on January 12, 2023, Baldwin was found guilty of
one count of rape in violation on R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).1 Two days later, the trial
court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after serving a 25-year
prison sentence. The trial court also declared Baldwin to be a Tier III sex offender.
Baldwin appealed his conviction, which this court affirmed in State v.
Baldwin, 2023-Ohio-3795 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin I”). The following is a summary of
the facts adduced at trial.
I.C., then ten years old, was sleeping on the floor of the living room in
her home. In the early morning hours, Baldwin, who was married to I.C.’s mother,
returned home from Michigan where he worked and cared for his ailing father. I.C.
awoke around 4:00 a.m. to Baldwin digitally penetrating her. Baldwin stopped and
asked if she was okay. I.C. testified that she recognized his voice. She testified that
when Baldwin left the room, she texted her friend in Arizona because she was afraid
1 Baldwin was found not guilty of four counts of gross sexual imposition of a victim
under the age of 13, as well as the sexually violent offender specifications. One count pertained to I.C., and three counts pertained to A.C., I.C.’s twin sister. and she knew her friend could calm her down. She also told her sisters and her best
friend the following day. According to her best friend, while they were on FaceTime
I.C. revealed that Baldwin had touched her. Her best friend told her mother, who
eventually revealed the information to I.C.’s mother. After I.C. disclosed the abuse,
her sister claimed to have been sexually abused by Baldwin in the past as well.
I.C.’s mother called police, and I.C. reported to the officer that
Baldwin’s “hand was in her underpants.” (Tr. 298.) After further questioning of
I.C., the officer testified that he “determined there was penetration with a digit inside
of [I.C.].” (Tr. 299.)
Baldwin denied the allegations. He told the Children and Family
Services worker (“CFS worker”) that he was in the house that evening and
remembered seeing I.C. asleep on the couch. Baldwin claimed he was looking for
the remote control for the television when I.C. awoke.
At trial, Baldwin argued that I.C.’s older brother had potentially
sexually assaulted I.C.; however, there was no evidence the older brother was home
at the time. In addition, Baldwin argued that I.C.’s mother was lying on the witness
stand about her relationship with her 19-year-old fiancé, who was introduced to the
family as first becoming friends with I.C.’s sibling. Baldwin speculated that mother
wanted a divorce, so she manipulated I.C. to blame Baldwin.
In his direct appeal, Baldwin raised three assignments of error for
review, challenging the trial court’s decision excluding evidence implicating another
suspect, evidence that would impeach a witness, and evidence of a witness’s misconduct. Baldwin also challenged the trial court’s decision denying a mistrial
based on the witness’s misconduct. Finding no merit to Baldwin’s appeal, this court
affirmed his conviction for one count of rape. Baldwin I at ¶ 22.
Baldwin appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court
declined jurisdiction. State v. Baldwin, 2024-Ohio-555.
In January 2024, Baldwin timely filed with this court an App.R. 26(B)
application to reopen his appeal asserting the following five proposed assignments
of error:
First proposed assignment of error: The appellant was denied due
process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV
and Ohio const. Art 1, Sec. 10 where there was insufficient evidence of
penetration to the rape charge he was convicted of.
Second proposed assignment of error: The trial court’s nunc pro tunc
sentence entries were without jurisdiction, or alternatively the court
committed Preserved and Plain Error when it sentenced the Defendant
to a term of imprisonment that is contrary to the Ohio Revised Code
Sentencing Provisions.
Third proposed assignment of error: The Appellant was denied due
process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend V, VI, and XIV
and Ohio Const. Art. I Sec 10 when there was insufficient evidence of
force to the rape charge.
Fourth proposed assignment of error: The Appellant was denied due
process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV
and Ohio Const. Art. I Sec. 10 when the trial court amended the dates
of the indictment at trial.
Fifth proposed assignment of error: The trial court committed error
when it issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order changing the original sentencing
entry from 10 years to life to a new sentence of 25 years to life.
State v. Baldwin, 2024-Ohio-6177 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin II”). The State opposed the
motion to reopen.
According to App.R. 26(B), an application for reopening shall be
granted if there exists a genuine issue as to whether an applicant was deprived of the
effective assistance of appellate counsel on appeal. This court denied Baldwin’s
application to reopen finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective because (1)
“evidence of penetration, entering the vulva or labia, is sufficient to support a rape
conviction” therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to
raise the first proposed assignment of error; (2) “the trial court’s nunc pro tunc
entries issued during the pendency of Baldwin’s direct appeal were solely clerical in
nature” and trial courts retain jurisdiction to correct clerical errors; therefore,
Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise the second
and fifth assignments of error; (3) “the record clearly demonstrates that the element
of force was established because Baldwin held and maintained a position over the
minor child victim that did not require demonstration of any explicit threats or
display of force for the jury to determine that the element of force was present to
commit the offense of rape”; therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of
appellate counsel to raise the third assignment of error; and (4) Crim.R. 7(D) allows
the trial court to amend an indictment any time before, during, or after trial to
correct a defect that does not change the name or identity of the crime charged;
therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise the
fourth proposed assignment of error. Id. at ¶ 7-9, 14-15, 19-20, 23-25.
Baldwin appealed the denial of his application for reopening to the
Ohio Supreme Court. The Court again declined jurisdiction. State v. Baldwin,
2024-Ohio-4713.
In April 2024, Baldwin filed, in the trial court, a timely petition to
vacate or set aside sentence and conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. The State
opposed the petition, and the trial court denied Baldwin’s motion without a hearing
stating that
[Baldwin] has failed to state substantive grounds to establish that he is
entitled to [relief]. Specifically, [Baldwin]’s Petition fails to establish
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced
thereby in that the victim’s initial disclosure was made prior to any
claim of improper conduct by the government.
(J.E. July 15, 2024). Baldwin filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which the trial court denied.
Baldwin appealed the denial of his petition challenging, among other
things, that the trial court failed to issue proper findings of fact and conclusions of
law. This court agreed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue findings of
fact and conclusions of law in compliance with R.C. 2953.21(H). State v. Baldwin,
2025-Ohio-1260, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin III”).
Upon remand, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions
of law in accordance with this court’s order. The trial court found that
[d]efense counsel had the opportunity to and did conduct a thorough
cross-examination of each witness. On cross-examination with the
victim, counsel questioned her with respect to being coached, from
where did she learn some of her terminology that she used (e.g., the
internet), whether she was dreaming, what was said to investigators,
and whether the actual perpetrator was her brother. Counsel crossexamined the victim’s mother on alternate motivations and credibility.
Counsel cross-examined the CFS witness [Children Family Service
worker] with theories of suggestibility and/or manipulation, alternate
offenders, improper questioning, and investigative techniques and best
practices. Counsel, through questioning and argument, did raise or
address most, if not all, of the items that Dr. Jacobs suggests were the
basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In light of the evidence and testimony presented, there is not a
reasonable probability that the trial would have ended with a different
result had defense counsel hired an expert. The victim’s testimony, the
corroborating testimony, and the record as a whole demonstrate that
the defendant did not support his petition with sufficient operative
facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.
(J.E., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Sept. 25, 2025.)
Baldwin timely appeals.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In Ohio it is well-established that we review a trial court’s decision to
deny a postconviction-relief petition without conducting a hearing for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Grier, 2025-Ohio-2529, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Smith,
2010-Ohio-1869, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.); accord State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 38
(“We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief, including
the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in
an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”
Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.
B. Petitions for Postconviction Relief
A petition for postconviction relief is a civil collateral attack on a
criminal judgment that allows a defendant to establish a violation of his
constitutional rights, including a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
which is alleged in this case. Grier, ¶ 5, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,
281 (1999); R.C. 2953.21. A petition for postconviction relief is a means to resolve
constitutional claims that cannot be challenged on direct appeal because the
evidence supporting the claims is outside the record. State v. Gray, 2021-Ohio2446, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46 (1975).
A criminal defendant seeking to challenge his conviction through a
petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 is not automatically
entitled to a hearing. Grier at ¶ 5, citing State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 110
(1980). “To warrant an evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relief,
the petitioner bears the burden of producing evidence that demonstrates a
cognizable claim of constitutional error.” Hatton at ¶ 37, citing State v. Sidibeh,
2013-Ohio-2309, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).
In State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified
the standard for granting a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief,
particularly when the claims involve ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To grant
a hearing, the trial court must “‘determine whether there are substantive grounds
for relief.’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2953.21(D). If the petition “‘is sufficient on its
face to raise an issue that the petitioner’s conviction is void or voidable on constitutional grounds, and the claim is one which depends upon factual allegations
that cannot be determined by examination of the files and records of the case, the
petition states a substantive ground for relief.’” Id., quoting Milanovich at
paragraph one of the syllabus. In determining whether there are substantive
grounds for relief, the court must consider the petition, the supporting affidavits,
and the documentary evidence, as well as all the files and records pertaining to the
proceedings. R.C. 2953.21(D). “Unless the petition and the files and records of the
case show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall proceed to a prompt
hearing on the issues even if a direct appeal of the case is pending.” R.C. 2953.21(F).
C. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Standard
When a postconviction-relief petition alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel, the petitioner “‘bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary material
which contains sufficient operative facts to demonstrate a substantial violation of
defense counsel’s essential duties to his client and that this ineffectiveness operated
to the client’s prejudice.’” Grier at ¶ 4, quoting Jackson at syllabus. In other words,
Baldwin must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.
State v. Trimble, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). The failure to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it
unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio
St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing Strickland at 697.
Baldwin argues that for the trial court to properly evaluate his
counsel’s deficient performance, and whether that deficiency prejudiced him, thus
depriving him of a fair trial, it was necessary that a hearing be held. He points out
that he included in his petition an affidavit of Dr. Katherine Jacobs (“Dr. Jacobs”)
that highlights the importance of scientific knowledge about child psychology,
memory, and interview techniques in evaluating allegations. He argues that Dr.
Jacobs is a clinical and forensic psychologist with specialized training; she
emphasizes the unreliability of child testimony because of factors like suggestibility,
source monitoring errors, and developmental limitations; scientific research shows
children can confuse actual experiences with imagination or external influences;
proper forensic interview techniques and expert testimony are essential to assess the
reliability of child statements. Dr. Jacobs avers that the absence of such expert input
and scientific discussion at trial prejudiced Baldwin’s case because it could have
assisted the court in understanding the potential flaws in child testimonies, possibly
affecting the outcome.
The State counters that the trial court made sufficient findings
supporting that a hearing was not required because Baldwin did not prove his
counsel’s deficient performance and that it prejudiced him in that he did not prove
that the outcome would have been different. The State further argues that the
affidavit of Dr. Jacobs, suggesting that expert testimony was necessary, was not
sufficient to establish deficient performance. The record the State contends,
including I.C.’s testimony and corroboration, supported the conviction and that the cross-examination by defense counsel was sufficient for the trial court to deny
Baldwin’s petition on the record it had before it.
In this case, the crux of Dr. Jacobs’s affidavit is that “[i]t is [her]
opinion that statements made by — or purportedly made by — the children lack[ed]
indicia of trustworthiness and were elicited under circumstances which are known
to adversely influence children’s perception, interpretation and memory of
events[.]” (Petition exhibit No. 1, p. 3.) Specifically, Dr. Jacobs suggests that I.C.’s
allegations are not reliable because when she was interviewed by the police officer,
mother interjected and elicited details that were not originally reported by I.C. to
her friend. Dr. Jacobs insists that the formation of memories is outside a layperson’s
general knowledge and experience and cross-examination is insufficient to address
these issues.
First, we find no merit to Dr. Jacobs assertion that mother influenced
I.C.’s story. According to the transcript attached to Baldwin’s petition, mother only
interjected during the initial police interview with I.C. in an effort to determine when
the incident took place. Contrary to Dr. Jacobs’s accusations, mother did not
provide or elicit details from I.C. in an effort to frame Baldwin or to make the
accusations more salacious. Rather, it was clear from the transcript that mother was
beside herself with shock and could barely comprehend what was happening, much
less destructively influencing what I.C. was reporting. In addition, trial counsel
thoroughly cross-examined mother regarding how she handled the accusations and
mother’s incentive to enhance or influence the accusations.
Furthermore, I.C.’s best friend testified that I.C. told her that Baldwin
touched her inappropriately and that she relayed that information to her own
mother. The best friend did not elaborate on whether I.C. gave her specific details.
Therefore, Dr. Jacobs’s assertion that I.C.’s story was exaggerated, with the help of
her mother, by the time I.C. reported the incident to the police is purely speculation
because we do not know exactly what I.C. told her best friend.
Next, contrary to Baldwin’s assertion, I.C. was questioned extensively
about her memory of the incident and whether she was “coached”; where she
learned words like “sexual assault,” “vagina,” and “clitoris”; what her internet
browsing history included; and whether she could have dreamed the incident.
Furthermore, this was not a case of delayed disclosure; I.C. reported the incident to
her sisters and her best friend within a day of the incident and spoke with the police
officer soon thereafter. I.C. remained steadfast in her report of what happened to
her and who sexually assaulted her even after a rigorous cross-examination.
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the police officer and
the CFS worker failed to follow proper protocol when interviewing I.C., a review of
the record shows that trial counsel skillfully cross-examined them about how they
interviewed the children and how their investigation unfolded.
For instance, trial counsel questioned the CFS worker about her
initial interview with I.C., which occurred at home. The CFS worker testified that
mother was not present in the room when she spoke with I.C. because she wants to
create a safe environment for the child to describe what happened. The CFS worker confirmed that she speaks with children alone to avoid manipulation by a parent.
She also confirmed that parents have in fact manipulated children, especially during
custody battles. The CFS worker also admitted that if mother was in the room when
I.C. was interviewed by police, that could pose a problem if mother was not
supportive or answering for I.C. She said that it is best practice to interview children
by themselves to avoid undue influence. However, she was not surprised that
mother was present when I.C. spoke with the male police officer and suggested that
I.C. may not have been comfortable enough to speak with a male police officer.
In addition, trial counsel questioned the CFS worker regarding I.C.’s
sexual terminology and she explained that the words children use are dependent
upon how the parents raise the children. The CFS worker admitted that she was not
aware of prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family; however, she testified
that it had no bearing on this case because the accusations did not involve the same
individuals.
Likewise, trial counsel established that the police officer did not have
any special training or much experience with interviewing sexual-assault victims.
After careful review of the record, we find that trial counsel was able
to establish the circumstances surrounding I.C.’s disclosures so that the trial court
could evaluate I.C.’s memories properly. We also note that this was a bench trial
and that the same judge who presided over the trial and determined the credibility
of the witnesses and guilt of Baldwin also reviewed the postconviction-relief petition
and Dr. Jacobs’s affidavit. The trial court concluded, and we agree, that Dr. Jacobs’s expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Any flaws
pointed out by Dr. Jacobs in her affidavit could be properly evaluated by the trial
court without holding an evidentiary hearing.
We now turn to Baldwin’s reliance on Bunch, wherein a divided Ohio
Supreme Court held that Bunch met the standard to be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to engage an expert
regarding eyewitness identification and the phenomenon of unconscious
transference. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, ¶ 15, 52. Based on the facts of this particular
case, we find Baldwin’s reliance on Bunch misguided.
In Bunch, although the victim positively identified three out of four
perpetrators, the victim did not definitively identify Bunch as the fourth perpetrator
in the initial lineup. It was only after seeing his picture in a newspaper article over
a week later describing him as a suspect that she became certain that he was her
attacker. Id. at ¶ 6. Bunch’s first attorney secured funds to hire an expert witness
regarding eyewitness identification. After that attorney withdrew, however, Bunch’s
second attorney did not consult with any experts for trial. Id. at ¶ 10. Notably, the
second attorney later received a stayed suspension from the practice of law for
neglecting a different criminal matter around the same time as Bunch’s trial. Id. at
¶ 14.
In concluding that Bunch’s trial counsel may have been ineffective,
the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished other cases that involved “a trial counsel’s
choice between eliciting expert testimony through the cross-examination of the state’s expert witness or eliciting expert testimony by presenting a defense expert.”
Id. at ¶ 34.2 The Bunch Court explained that the State did not have an expert witness
for Bunch to cross-examine, and “[t]he only way for Bunch’s counsel to present
expert testimony to the jury regarding the psychology behind eyewitness
identification would have been through an expert for the defense.” Bunch at ¶ 34.
Unlike the victim in Bunch, who was repeatedly raped by a group of
strangers and was initially unsure whether Bunch was one of the assailants, I.C.
knew Baldwin because he raised her since she was a little girl. Even when Baldwin’s
trial attorney cross-examined her on the possibility that it was someone else who
assaulted her, I.C. never faltered in her accusation that Baldwin had sexually
assaulted her. Her story was consistent from the first time she reported the incident
to her friend until her trial testimony nearly two years later. There is no evidence,
unlike in Bunch, that the perpetrator was suggested to I.C. I.C. on her own, almost
immediately reported what happened to her friend and identified Baldwin as the
perpetrator. Indeed, Baldwin placed himself at the scene of the offense.
2 See State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 (1993) (“[T]he failure to call an
expert and instead rely on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11 (1987) (holding trial counsel not ineffective where they “decided not to request the appointment of a forensic pathologist, choosing instead to rely on their cross-examination of the state’s expert in order to rebut the evidence of rape”); see also State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299 (2001); State v. Foust, 2004-Ohio-7006, ¶ 97-98 (finding trial counsel’s failure to request funds for a DNA expert, an alcohol and substance-abuse expert, a fingerprint expert, and an arson expert did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because appellant’s need for experts was “highly speculative” and counsel’s choice “to rely on cross-examination” of prosecution's expert was a “legitimate tactical decision”).
However, the Bunch Court stated that “[a]lthough rare, there are
some instances in criminal cases when ‘the only reasonable and available defense
strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.’” Id.
at ¶ 39, quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011). We find that this is
not one of those cases where an expert is necessary to establish a defense because
Baldwin’s theory from the moment he spoke with the police and the CFS worker was
that someone else in the home sexually assaulted I.C. and that mother persuaded
I.C. to blame Baldwin because mother wanted a divorce. In essence, Baldwin argued
that I.C.’s memories were tainted by her mother’s animosity towards Baldwin.
Baldwin’s theory was established at trial through cross-examination, as well as
through witnesses who testified for the defense.
Although the formation of memories may not be common knowledge,
it is a well-known fact that children may be improperly influenced by the people
around them. Therefore, it was not necessary for trial counsel to hire or consult with
an expert to establish the theory when it was easily tested by cross-examination.
Furthermore, I.C. testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Any issue
with the “reliability” of the I.C.’s statements were developed without difficulty
during cross-examination, so that the trial court could evaluate I.C.’s credibility.
Finally, even if Baldwin hired an expert, we cannot say that the result of the trial
would have been different.
After careful review of Baldwin’s petition, the accompanying affidavit
and transcripts, as well as the entire record of the proceedings, we find that Baldwin did not establish substantive grounds for relief in order to warrant a hearing on his
petition. In other words, Baldwin’s petition, on its face, has failed to allege facts
sufficient to warrant a hearing. As a result, we find that the record does not support
Baldwin’s allegation that trial counsel was deficient or that Baldwin was prejudiced
by trial counsel’s performance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Baldwin’s petition without hearing.
Accordingly, Baldwin’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR