UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NATIONAL ARBOR DAY
FOUNDATION,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-cv-1732 (CRC)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff National Arbor Day Foundation (“Arbor Day”) filed this lawsuit against the
United States Department of Agriculture and the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”),
challenging the termination of a $75 million grant intended to support the planting of trees. The
Forest Service initially awarded the grant to Arbor Day in 2023, and Arbor Day allegedly used
the funds to support programs “focused on planting and maintaining healthy urban forests.”
Compl. ¶ 38. But in February 2025, the Forest Service notified Arbor Day that it was
terminating the grant, purportedly because it “no longer effectuate[d] agency priorities regarding
diversity, equity, and inclusion programs and activities.” Declaration of Logan Donahoo
(“Donahoo Decl.”), Ex. A at 1. Arbor Day alleges that Defendants’ termination of the grant—
along with the Forest Service’s cursory explanation—violated the Administrative Procedure Act,
the separation of powers, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
About two weeks after filing its complaint, Arbor Day moved for a preliminary
injunction. Among other things, it seeks an order vacating the grant termination, enjoining
Defendants from enforcing the termination, and restoring “all performance obligations” under
the grant while this litigation proceeds. In response, Defendants moved to stay the case in its entirety pending the outcome of two cases currently pending before the D.C. Circuit. See Vera
Inst. of Just. v. DOJ, No. 25-5248 (D.C. Cir.) (argued Oct. 14, 2025); Climate United Fund v.
EPA, Nos. 25-5122/5123 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (argued Feb. 24, 2026). Those cases, according
to Defendants, “could resolve the core of the claims in this case, obviating the need for further
proceedings[.]” Mot. to Stay at 3. The Court temporarily stayed the briefing schedule for Arbor
Day’s motion for a preliminary injunction until it resolved Defendants’ motion to stay.
“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to
control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). In exercising that
discretion, the Court must “‘weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance’ between
the court’s interests in the judicial economy and any possible hardship to the parties.” Belize
Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 732–33 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Specifically, the Court considers “(1) harm to the nonmoving party if a stay does issue; (2) the
moving party’s need for a stay — that is, the harm to the moving party if a stay does not issue;
and (3) whether a stay would promote efficient use of the court’s resources.” Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Ross, 419 F. Supp. 3d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2019). Because Defendants have moved for a
stay, they “bear[] the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708. “[I]f there is
even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damages to some one else,” the movant “must
make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936).
Defendants have not demonstrated that a stay of all proceedings in this case is warranted.
First and foremost, Defendants have not identified any “hardship or inequity” they would face if
the Court set a briefing schedule on Arbor Day’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. Nor
could they: Merely “being required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a clear
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case of hardship or inequity.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 21 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, Arbor Day’s motion and accompanying exhibits
provide at least some evidence that Defendants’ actions “continue[] to cause severe and
irreparable harm.” Donahoo Decl. ¶ 40. While the Court expresses no views on whether these
ongoing harms warrant preliminary injunctive relief, they certainly tip the scale in favor of at
least addressing Arbor Day’s motion, especially in the absence of a counterweight.
The Court is mindful that the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Vera Institute and Climate
United Fund will likely bear on the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over Arbor
Day’s lawsuit.1 If the circuit issues an opinion in either case before Arbor Day’s motion for a
preliminary injunction is resolved, the Court may request supplemental briefing from the parties.
For now, however, the Court will forge ahead. See Nat’l Digital Inclusion All. v. Trump, No.
25-cv-3606 (JDB), 2026 WL 980757, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2026) (“The well ‘beaten track’ of
civil litigation is for cases to proceed on their own schedules, and for courts to consider new
authority as it arises.” (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 256)).
1
Defendants note that both this Court and other courts in this district have stayed similar cases pending the outcome of Vera Institute and/or Climate United Fund. See Mot. to Stay at 2– 3. But those cases are inapposite. In two of them, the plaintiffs consented to the stay. See Joint Status Report (ECF No. 35), Butterbee Farm v. USDA, No. 25-cv-737 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2026) (acknowledging the parties’ agreement that the case should be stayed); Min. Order, Bldg. Materials Re-Use Ass’n v. EPA, No. 25-cv-2493 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2025) (granting the parties’ consent motion to hold the case in abeyance). In the third, the Court had already issued a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo ante; the stay only applied to the subsequent dispositive motion briefing. See Order, Harris County v. Kennedy, No. 25-cv-1275 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2026) (noting that the Court had already “expressly contemplated a return to the status quo ante until the case is finally resolved”). Unlike a dispositive order, a preliminary injunction “do[es] not conclusively resolve legal disputes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025). Its purpose is simply “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held, and to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that [14] Defendants’ Motion to Stay is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that [15] Defendants’ Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants shall file a response to Plaintiff’s [8] Motion for Preliminary
Injunction by August 6, 2026. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a reply in support of its [8] Motion for Preliminary
Injunction by August 13, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: July 23, 2026
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