In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00346-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.W.H. AND T.L.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 31st District Court
Wheeler County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14617, Honorable Steven R. Emmert, Presiding
July 22, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”), appellant Maegan
Bridgman Hunt appeals the trial court’s order granting possession of and access to her
children, J.W.H. and T.L.H., to their paternal grandparents, Amy and Freddy Hunt. 1 In
two issues, Mother asserts the trial court erred in concluding that Grandparents had
standing to bring the suit and in determining that the evidence was sufficient to overcome
the fit-parent presumption. We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment
dismissing Grandparents’ suit for lack of standing.
1 We refer to Maegan Hunt as “Mother” and to Amy and Freddy Hunt as “Grandparents.”
BACKGROUND
Mother was married to Dustin Lee Hunt, the son of Grandparents. The couple
lived in Wheeler County, near Grandparents. Dustin and Mother’s first son, J.W.H., was
born in 2014. Dustin died in September of 2020, when Mother was pregnant with their
second son, T.L.H. T.L.H. was born in January of 2021.
After Dustin’s death, Grandparents assisted Mother with childcare for J.W.H. and
T.L.H. while Mother worked at a café she owned and operated. Mother eventually closed
the café to focus on the needs of J.W.H., who began acting out in the years following
Dustin’s death. In March of 2024, J.W.H. had an emotional and angry outburst directed
at Mother. J.W.H. stated that Grandmother told J.W.H. that Mother was on
methamphetamine and was going to die or go to jail. J.W.H. expressed to Mother that he
hated her and did not want to be alive. Mother took J.W.H. to Grandparents’ house to
discuss J.W.H.’s statements.
Following this confrontation, on April 29, 2024, Grandparents filed their Original
Petition in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship seeking to be named managing
conservators with the right to designate the primary residence of the children. The petition
alleged that Grandparents had standing to bring the suit under sections 102.003(a)(9),
102.003(a)(13), and 102.004(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Grandparents alternatively
sought an order granting them access to or possession of the children, alleging that denial
of such access or possession would significantly impair the children’s physical health or
emotional well-being.
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The trial court held a temporary orders hearing in September of 2024 and a final
hearing in September of 2025. At the time of the final hearing, Mother and the children
resided in Idaho with Mother’s fiancé. The trial court named Mother sole managing
conservator and Grandparents possessory conservators, allowing them to have
possession of and access to the children and electronic communication with the children.
Mother was ordered to share in the costs of travel for the children’s visits to Grandparents.
Mother timely filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Grandparents’ Standing
By her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
determined that Grandparents have standing to bring this lawsuit. Standing is a
component of subject-matter jurisdiction and is a threshold issue in a child custody
proceeding. In re A.D.T., 588 S.W.3d 312, 316 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).
Whether a party has standing to pursue a cause of action is a question we review de
novo. Id. A party seeking relief in a SAPCR must allege and establish standing within
the parameters of the language used in the relevant provisions of the Family Code. In re
H.L., 613 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, no pet.).
Our analysis of whether a party has standing begins with the petitioner’s live
pleadings, which we construe in the petitioner’s favor. See Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam.
& Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 527, 531 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.).
However, we must also consider evidence the parties presented below that is relevant to
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the jurisdictional issues, including any evidence that a party has presented to negate the
existence of facts alleged in the petitioner’s pleadings. Id. at 528.
In their original petition, Grandparents alleged that they have standing to sue under
subsections 102.003(a)(9), 102.003(a)(13), and 102.004(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated that Grandparents
“have standing under Texas Family Code 102.003 and 102.004 to file this original suit for
managing conservatorship because the order requested is necessary because the
children’s present circumstances would significantly impair the children’s physical health
or emotional development.” Because of its use of language from section 102.004(a)(1),
we construe this statement as a determination that Grandparents have standing under
that specific subsection. 2
Section 102.004(a)(1) allows grandparents and certain other close relatives to file
an original suit requesting managing conservatorship upon “satisfactory proof” that “the
child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
emotional development . . . .” TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a)(1). Generally, “standing is
based on the existence of certain facts, not the existence of certain proof.” In re K.D.H.,
426 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). But the standard
is different in cases such as this one, where the question of standing “impact[s] a parent’s
right to decide how to best care for her child free from interference by nonparents . . . .”
Bridges v. Pugh, No. 01-22-00027-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3159, at *7 (Tex. App.—
2 Grandparents concede that nothing else in the record indicates that the trial court found that they
had standing under section 102.003 and that the reference to this provision was likely an error. Our review confirms that the record does not support a determination that Grandparents had standing under either subsection 102.003(a)(9) or subsection 102.003(a)(13), the subsections pleaded by Grandparents.
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Houston [1st Dist.] May 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under subsection 102.004(a)(1),
the Texas Legislature has conferred standing based on the existence of proof rather than
the pleading of facts. Id. at *8. “Satisfactory proof” for purposes of establishing standing
under subsection 102.004(a)(1) means “proof established by a preponderance of the
evidence as the facts existed at the time the suit or intervention was filed.” Compton v.
Pfannenstiel, 428 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Grandparents had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that specific, identifiable
behavior by Mother would probably cause significant impairment to the physical health or
emotional development of the children. See In re L.D.F., 445 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.). “‘[P]hysical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or
alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent’ are all factors the trial court
may consider in assessing significant impairment.” Id.
The trial court made two findings, encompassing four specific behaviors, in support
of its conclusion that Grandparents have standing, namely:
11. The Court finds pursuant to Family Code Section 102.004, that [Mother]
is not a fit parent based upon her marijuana usage and leaving the children
unattended.
12. Additionally, the Court finds that [Mother] has compromised the
educational development of the children and has cohabited unmarried to
the detriment of the children.
We first consider Finding No. 12, then Finding No. 11.
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Educational development of the children
The trial court found that Mother had “compromised the educational development
of the children . . . .” At the time suit was filed in April of 2024, J.W.H. was in fourth grade. 3
The trial court heard evidence that J.W.H. has dyslexia and that he did not meet gradelevel standards for math and reading in third and fourth grade. Although the record
contains additional information regarding the children’s educational progress after suit
was filed, such as moving, changing schools, and being homeschooled, those facts are
not germane to our analysis. Standing and subject matter jurisdiction are determined at
the time suit is filed. See In re C.M.J., No. 02-12-00036-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS
10601, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that
grandparents who did not have actual possession of grandchild for six months at time
lawsuit was filed could not later acquire standing by amending pleading once six-month
requirement was satisfied). We consider the circumstances at the time Grandparents
filed suit, which is the relevant snapshot in time for determining standing. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 102.004(a)(1).
The record does not indicate that, at the time Grandparents filed suit, Mother had
taken or failed to take any specific action that harmed J.W.H.’s educational development.
Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that J.W.H.’s physical health or emotional
development were significantly impaired because of his challenges at school. Therefore,
3 T.L.H. was three years old when suit was filed and there is no evidence regarding his education
at that time.
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we conclude that this finding does not support a determination that Grandparents have
standing.
Cohabitation
By the time of the final hearing, Mother was engaged and she and the children
lived with her fiancé in Idaho. However, at the time Grandparents filed suit, Mother was
not cohabitating with her fiancé and there is no evidence that she “cohabitated unmarried
to the detriment of the children” with any other person. We do not view Mother’s living
arrangements in the months after suit was filed to be part of the children’s “present
circumstances” that we consider in determining whether Grandparents had standing at
the time they filed the lawsuit. See In re C.M.J., 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10601, at *5–6;
Zaan, LLC v. Sangani, No. 05-12-00423-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5133, at *12–13 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 20, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parties’ subsequent acquisition of
an interest sufficient to support standing will not retroactively vest trial court with
jurisdiction). Consequently, this finding does not support the conclusion that
Grandparents have standing.
Leaving children unattended
The trial court heard testimony that Mother had left T.L.H. sleeping in his crib at
home while she opened her café in the morning. This occurred on a few occasions when
T.L.H. was two years old. Mother testified that the café was “45 seconds away” from her
house and that she watched T.L.H. via a baby monitor. In connection with this conduct,
the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services investigated Mother for alleged
neglectful supervision. The investigator noted that the behavior had occurred in the past
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and she had no reason to believe Mother did it again. The Department ruled out the
allegation of neglectful supervision. At the time the suit was filed, T.L.H. was three years
old and Mother was no longer operating the café.
Evidence that Mother had left T.L.H. unattended in the past did not involve “present
circumstances” that would significantly impair T.L.H.’s physical health or emotional
development and thus does not confer standing under section 102.004(a)(1). See Rolle
v. Hardy, 527 S.W.3d 405, 420 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (non-parent
cannot meet standing burden with evidence showing that she would be better custodian
of child, has strong and ongoing relationship with child, or that parent would not have
been proper custodian in past).
Marijuana use
The trial court found that Mother is “not a fit parent based upon her marijuana
usage . . . .” In her testimony, Mother acknowledged that she had used marijuana once
or twice a week. She stated it was “that THC vape stuff” that she bought at a “vape store”
and that she used it at the café, not when she was at home with her children. Mother
testified that she did not use marijuana in front of the kids and that it did not affect her
parenting. She stated that she had used marijuana again after the temporary orders
hearing in September of 2024. The Department investigator who investigated Mother for
alleged neglectful supervision testified that Mother agreed to take a drug test and that she
passed. J.W.H.’s counselor testified that she did not see any negative effects in J.W.H.
that were related to Mother’s past use of marijuana. On the other hand, Grandmother
testified that she saw messages on a phone indicating that Mother had people bring her
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marijuana, that she had sold marijuana to a friend, and that Mother said she “almost went
to jail.” Grandmother stated that J.W.H. was “frightened and scared for his mother’s wellbeing and what would happen to them if she got caught with the drug use . . .” Although
Grandmother testified that she was concerned about the children because of Mother’s
marijuana use, she admitted that she did not contact the Department or law enforcement.
She also testified that she believed Mother was “a good mom” and “a fit parent.”
Grandmother agreed that if Mother would allow her access to the children, Mother’s drug
use would not be “a big issue,” and stated, “If I could see my grandkids, none of us would
be here.”
In our view, the evidence of Mother’s marijuana use does not rise to a level
demonstrating that the present circumstances of the children would significantly impair
their physical health or emotional development. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.004(a)(1).
For example, the record does not indicate that Mother’s marijuana use created a
dangerous or unstable home life or rendered her incapable of properly caring for her
children. See, e.g., In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d 62, 67–68 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet.
denied) (evidence justified appointment of third-party as managing conservator instead
of parent where parent had drug addiction, abandoned children, failed to support children,
and depended on parents for her well-being); see also In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 497–
98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (evidence of past criminal conduct and drug
use insufficient to show significant impairment because at time of trial, father had
appropriate housing and income, had completed parenting classes, and no witness
testified that father lacked parenting skills); Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 477 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (despite parent’s history of drug abuse, “there was no
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evidence presented of any current drug use that would cause significant impairment to
[child’s] physical health or emotional development in the present”).
The link between a parent’s conduct and harm to a child “may not be based on
evidence that raises mere surmise or speculation of possible harm.” In re K.R.B., No. 02-10-00021-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8161, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 7, 2010,
no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.116(a)(8) (specifying that Department
may not remove child from parent’s possession if parent “tested positive for marihuana,
unless the [D]epartment has evidence that the parent’s use of marihuana has caused
significant impairment to the child’s physical or mental health or emotional
development . . . .”). Here, the evidence indicated that Mother was a suitable parent and
that her use of marijuana did not cause significant impairment to J.W.H. and T.L.H.
We conclude that the factors relied upon by the trial court do not meet
Grandparents’ burden to show that specific conduct by Mother would probably cause
significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional development. See In
re L.D.F., 445 S.W.3d at 830. Therefore, Grandparents failed to establish their standing
to seek modification of conservatorship of J.W.H. and T.L.H. under section 102.004(a)(1)
and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on their petition. Because we conclude that
Grandparents do not have standing, we dismiss the suit. See La Tierra de Simmons
Familia, Ltd. v. Main Event Entm’t, LP, 03-10-00503-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1928, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 9, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Standing must exist at the
time a plaintiff files suit and must continue to exist between the parties at every stage of
the legal proceedings, including the appeal; if the plaintiff lacks standing at the time suit
is filed, the case must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an interest sufficient
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to support standing.”). Further, we need not address the second issue raised by Mother.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss
this cause.
Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice
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