In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00268-CR
TONY DONNELL CURTIS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 106th District Court
Garza County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24-4269, Honorable Reed A. Filley, Presiding
July 22, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Tony Donnell Curtis, appeals from a judgment convicting him of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or
more but less than four grams, within a drug-free zone.1 However, the punishment range
was enhanced to twenty-five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment, based on
1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(c).
Appellant’s habitual offender status.2 By a single issue, Appellant argues that the
evidence was legally insufficient to support the “true” finding for Appellant’s second
enhancing conviction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Appellant for possession of a controlled substance—namely
methamphetamine—within 1000 feet of a school. The indictment alleged two prior
convictions, both for burglary of a habitation; one in Potter County in 1997 and one in
Lubbock County in 2009. A jury found Appellant guilty and the matter proceeded to the
punishment phase.
During the punishment phase, Appellant pleaded “true” to the first enhancement
from Potter County but “not true” to the second enhancement from Lubbock County. Will
Calfin, an investigator with the district attorney’s office, testified that both the Potter
County and Lubbock County judgments of conviction were for burglary of a habitation and
that “Tony Curtis” was the defendant. Calfin also reviewed the “pen packet” for each
conviction, noting that both contained the name, date of birth, and description for
Appellant, the same ORI number—TX221015C—and photograph of Appellant. Calfin
acknowledged that he did not compare fingerprints on the judgments.
Appellant testified that he was convicted of burglary of a building, not of a
habitation, in Lubbock County. Appellant agreed that the information in the pen packets
was identical and consistent with his identifying information. The jury found both
2 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.34(a), 12.42(d).
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enhancement paragraphs to be true and sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years in
prison.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
APPLICABLE LAW & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding of true to the Habitual Offender enhancement under Texas Penal Code § 12.42(d),
“we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the [jury’s] finding and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Wood v. State, 486 S.W.3d 583, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); accord
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) ); see also Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “We ‘determine whether the necessary
inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.’” Clayton, 235 S.W.3d
at 778 (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
“To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the
defendant is linked to that conviction.” Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). “No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two
elements.” Id. Courts have identified several means by which the State may establish
both elements, including through (1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation,
(2) testimony from a witness who was present when the defendant was previously
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convicted and who can identify the defendant as the person who was previously
convicted, (3) fingerprints supported by expert testimony that identifies the prints as those
of the defendant, or (4) a judgment, pen packet, or other records that contain sufficient
information or descriptors that show the defendant’s identity or physical description, such
as a photograph of the defendant. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016); Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22; see also Bartlome v. State, No. 07-24-00141-CR,
2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7543, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 23, 2024, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
“The trier of fact weighs the credibility of each piece of evidence and determines
whether the totality of the evidence establishes the existence of the alleged conviction
and its link to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wood, 486 S.W.3d at 589. The
Court of Criminal Appeals likened this process to that of “a jigsaw puzzle where the pieces
alone may have little meaning but when put together form a picture showing that the
defendant is the person who committed the alleged prior offense.” Id. (citing Flowers,
220 S.W.3d at 923).
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues, in essence, that because he denied the conviction for burglary
of a habitation and the State did not offer a fingerprint comparison analysis, the evidence
is insufficient to support the second enhancement via the Lubbock County conviction.
However, fingerprints are only one of several means through which the State can prove
the conviction. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Flowers, 220 S.W.3d
at 921–22; see also Bartlome, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7543, at *4–5. Another means of
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proving the conviction is through a judgment, pen packet, or other records that contain
sufficient information or descriptors that show the defendant’s identity or physical
description, such as a photograph of the defendant. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22; see also Bartlome, 2024 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7543, at *4–5. That is precisely what the State presented here. Although Appellant
denied that he was convicted of burglary of a habitation and believed it was burglary of a
building, the jury was free to disbelieve his testimony and rely on the information
contained in the judgments and pen packets. See Wood, 486 S.W.3d at 589. We
conclude the State produced sufficient evidence that would permit a rational trier of fact
to find that the Lubbock County conviction was in fact Appellant. We overrule Appellant’s
sole issue.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
Do not publish.
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