In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00148-CV
HUB CITY VETERINARY CLINIC, PLLC, APPELLANT
V.
JEFF LEDFORD, DVM, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 237th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2023-CV-1532-A, Honorable Les Hatch, Presiding
July 21, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Hub City Veterinary Clinic, PLLC appeals from a final judgment entered in a cause
severed from underlying litigation between Hub City and one of its members, Jeff Ledford,
DVM. In five issues, Hub City challenges the trial court’s construction of the parties’
Company Agreement and the trial court’s order severing portions of the parties’
declaratory-judgment claims into a separate cause. Because we conclude that the
severance was an abuse of discretion, we sustain Hub City’s severance issue, reverse the severance order, vacate the judgment in the severed cause, and remand for
consolidation with the original cause. We do not reach Hub City’s remaining issues.
BACKGROUND
Hub City is a professional limited liability company. Ledford was one of its
members, holding an interest governed by a written Company Agreement. Paragraph
3.5 of that Agreement addresses removal of a member through an “Interest Buyout Call
Option,” pursuant to which Hub City may acquire the interest of a departing member at a
price based on the member’s “allocable percentage in the fair market value of the
Company.” Paragraph 3.5.2, in turn, addresses how the purchase price is to be
determined. Paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5 address a member’s “removal” and provide that a
removed member is entitled to a “Termination Payment” measured by the member’s
Capital Account balance.
In October 2023, Hub City sent Ledford a letter that Ledford construed as an
exercise of the Call Option under Paragraph 3.5. The next month, Hub City sent a second
letter purporting to remove Ledford pursuant to Paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5. Hub City then
sued for declaratory relief, seeking judicial construction of the Agreement and a
declaration that Ledford had been removed under Paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5. Ledford
counterclaimed for declaratory relief of his own, together with claims for appointment of a
rehabilitative receiver, damages against Hub City, and damages against third-party
defendants Cindy Heatwole, DVM, and Caleb Heatwole, DVM. Both parties requested
costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees under section 37.009 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
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The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the declaratory
judgment issues. On December 2, 2024, the trial court entered an Amended Order on
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment declaring, in relevant part, that (1) Paragraphs 7.4,
7.5, and 6.1.1 do not authorize involuntary removal of a member; (2) Hub City exercised
the Call Option under Paragraph 3.5 by its October 9, 2023 letter; (3) Ledford was
removed on November 8, 2023, pursuant to that exercise; and (4) the Paragraph 3.5.2
buyout is to be measured by Ledford’s allocable percentage of the fair market value of
the Company as of November 8, 2023, “to be determined at a later date.” The summary
judgment order further reserved for later determination whether an award of costs and
attorney’s fees under Chapter 37 would be equitable and just.
After the MSJ Order but before severance was granted, Hub City amended its
petition to add, in the alternative under paragraph 37(f), six additional declarations
addressing how fair market value under Paragraph 3.5.2(a) is to be determined, including
that the fair market value must be determined by the members, that determination
requires only a majority (not unanimity), and that the price paid by Ledford when he
acquired his interest continues to define fair market value unless changed by the
Members.
On March 26, 2025, the trial court granted Ledford’s motion to sever. The
severance order transferred certain declaratory rulings, referenced by their placement in
paragraphs 37(a)-(e) of Hub City’s first amended petition, into a new cause, No. DC-2023-CV-1532-A. The order declared the summary judgment order final in that severed cause.
The order also contained a specific exception:
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[W]ith respect to Count 5, the Court declines to rule upon and does not
hereby sever the issues of how Fair Market Value is to be determined or
whether to apply discounts for lack of control and minority status[.]
The paragraph 37(f) declarations added by amendment before severance remain
pending, along with all other unresolved claims, including Ledford’s receivership request,
damages counterclaims, third-party claims, and the reserved fee issue. Hub City timely
appealed.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
We first address our jurisdiction. A judgment that fully disposes of all parties and
claims in a severed cause is final and appealable even when claims remain pending in
the original cause. Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room
Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820–22 (Tex. 2024). A judgment that includes
clear and unequivocal finality language is final for purposes of appeal, even if it does not
in fact dispose of every claim before the trial court. Id. at 820; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,
39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). And an erroneous severance order does not deprive
the appellate court of jurisdiction; the severance, until reversed, effectively divides the
controversy, and any error may be challenged on appeal. Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822–24;
Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78–79 (Tex. 1959).
The severance order here unequivocally declared the summary judgment order
final in the severed cause. Whether the severance was procedurally proper is the subject
of Hub City’s issue on severance, but the asserted error does not defeat our jurisdiction.
See Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822. We proceed to that issue.
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ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND GOVERNING FRAMEWORK
We review a severance order for abuse of discretion. F.F.P. Operating Partners,
237 S.W.3d at 693; Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41
authorizes trial courts to sever “[a]ny claim against a party.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 41. A
severance is proper when “(1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action,
(2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of an independently asserted
lawsuit, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that the
actions involve the same facts and issues.” State v. Morello, 547 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex.
2018). Within those limits, severance may be used to avoid prejudice, do justice, or
increase convenience. Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822.
Three limits constrain that discretion. First, “severance of a single cause of action
into two parts is never proper.” Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822 (quoting Pierce, 329 S.W.2d at
79 n.1). Second, severance “should not be granted for the purpose of enabling the
litigants to obtain an early appellate ruling on the trial court’s determination of one phase
of the case.” Id. Third, severance of two or more causes of action “involving the same
facts and issues to be litigated” constitutes an abuse of discretion. Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at
822–23 (quoting Morello, 547 S.W.3d at 889; F.F.P. Operating Partners, 237 S.W.3d at
693).
B. THE SEVERANCE ORDER DIVIDED A SINGLE CONTROVERSY.
Hub City argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the order divided
interwoven portions of a single contract-construction and declaratory-judgment dispute.
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Ledford responds that the trial court severed resolved legal declarations that could stand
alone and retained only remaining factual issues and other causes of action.1 We agree
with Hub City.
At its core, the problem in this case is that the severed judgment does not actually
resolve anything the parties can act on. The trial court declared that Paragraph 3.5 was
invoked, that Ledford was removed pursuant to that invocation, and that Paragraph 3.5.2
supplies the pricing formula, meaning Ledford’s allocable percentage of the fair market
value of the Company. But the order expressly retained in the original cause the
questions that determine what fair market value means, how it is calculated, and whether
discounts for lack of control or minority status apply. Six additional declaratory requests
added by amendment before severance now target the same pricing mechanism,
addressing how fair market value is determined, by whom, and by what vote.
In other words, the severed judgment is simply a formula without any numbers.
Ledford cannot collect on it, Hub City cannot calculate what it owes, and neither side can
measure the ruling’s practical effect until the questions retained in the original cause are
answered. That is not a resolved controversy fit for independent adjudication; it is half of
one. The retained questions are the next step in applying the same Paragraph 3.5.2
formula the severed judgment declared controlling, and they arise from the same
separation dispute, the same Company Agreement, and the same October and
1 Ledford also contends that Hub City has failed to adequately articulate how the trial court abused its discretion. We disagree. Hub City’s brief identifies the Sealy framework, cites the record for each factual predicate on which its argument depends, and applies each Sealy factor to those materials. The argument could have been developed more expansively, but it is not so deficient as to present nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010).
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November 2023 events. Rule 41 authorizes severance of claims, not phases of claims.
See Pierce, 329 S.W.2d at 78–79. Dividing these inquiries between two suits runs afoul
of the rule that severance of a single cause of action into two parts is never proper. Pierce,
329 S.W.2d at 79 n.1; Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822.
C. RULE 41 SEVERANCE IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.
The severance also runs afoul of the rule against using Rule 41 to manufacture an
interlocutory appeal. Ledford’s brief acknowledges as much, describing the severance
as having “created a platform for the remaining actions . . . to be litigated with that
knowledge at hand.” That is the very purpose the Supreme Court has told trial courts not
to pursue: severance “should not be granted for the purpose of enabling the litigants to
obtain an early appellate ruling on the trial court’s determination of one phase of the case.”
Pierce, 329 S.W.2d at 79 n.1; Sealy, 685 S.W.3d at 822. In Sealy, the high court directed
that “[i]n cases where severance would be procedurally improper, courts should
encourage parties to use the permissive appeal option provided by the Legislature.” 685
S.W.3d at 824; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d). Rule 41 severance is not
a substitute for that statutory mechanism.
D. REVERSAL OF THE SEVERANCE PRETERMITS THE REMAINING ISSUES.
Because the severance was improper, we decline to reach Hub City’s remaining
issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Proceeding to appellate judgment on the severed
portion while the withheld portion remains pending below would give appellate effect to
the very division Rule 41 forbids and would deprive the parties, on remand, of an
integrated determination of their Paragraph 3.5 rights. The narrowest ground of decision,
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and the ground most faithful to binding authority, is to reverse the severance without
addressing the merits of the underlying construction of the Company Agreement. See In
re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003).
Nothing in this opinion should be read as approving or disapproving the trial court’s
construction of the Company Agreement. Because the severance is reversed, the
summary judgment order reverts to interlocutory status in the original cause, No. DC2023-CV-1532. On remand, the trial court retains full authority to reconsider or apply that
order in further proceedings as it sees fit, and nothing we hold today constrains it.
CONCLUSION
We sustain Hub City’s issue challenging the severance. Our disposition pretermits
Hub City’s remaining issues. The order of severance dated March 26, 2025, is reversed.
The judgment in Cause No. DC-2023-CV-1532-A is vacated to the extent it purports to
be a final judgment. The cause is remanded to the trial court for consolidation with Cause
No. DC-2023-CV-1532 and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Lawrence M. Doss
Justice
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