IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DELBORRELLO FINANCIAL )
SERVICES DE LLC, d/b/a UNITED )
CHECK CASHING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Civ. A. No. N26C-03-323 MAA
)
JEFF D’AMBROSIO IMPORTS )
INC., d/b/a JEFF D’AMBROSIO )
CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Jeff D’Ambrosio Imports, Inc.’s (“Defendant”)
May 6, 2026 Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment Directed by Plaintiff
(“Motion”) pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b).1 For the reasons that
follow, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts which preceded the filing of the pending motion and response are
not in material dispute. On or about January 28, 2026, Tylier Jabree Hawkes
Smallwood (“Smallwood”) appeared at Defendant’s Pennsylvania car dealership
and negotiated the sale of a vehicle for $47,500.00. Defendant paid Smallwood
with a check. A short time later, Smallwood presented the check to Plaintiff, a
1
Docket Item (“D.I.”) 4.
1
check-cashing business, for payment. Before paying the check, Plaintiff contacted
Defendant and confirmed the check it issued to Smallwood was negotiable and
valid. After confirming same, Plaintiff honored the check, paying Smallwood in
cash.2
On or about January 30, 2026, Defendant “became aware of irregularities
concerning ownership of the subject vehicle sold [by Smallwood], reported those
concerns to law enforcement,”3 and stopped payment on the check it issued to
Smallwood (after Plaintiff had honored same).4 Plaintiff then initiated this lawsuit
to recover the funds Plaintiff provided to Smallwood from Defendant as a result of
Defendant’s issuance of the stop payment order.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2026, Plaintiff Delborrello Financial Services DE, LLC
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint asserting three claims for relief: Breach of Drawer’s
Obligation Under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code; Promissory Estoppel;
and Negligence.
On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant a copy of the Complaint upon
Defendant through an Affidavit of Non-Resident Service, which was accepted by an
2
D.I. 5, ¶ 1. A representative of Defendant told Plaintiff the check “was good and payable,” and was “not subject to any stop payment order, hold, or restriction.” D.I. 1, ¶ 11. 3
D.I. 6, ¶ 3.
4
Id.
2
authorized employee of Defendant’s Pennsylvania car dealership.5 Two days later,
on April 2, 2026, Defendant submitted a copy of the lawsuit paperwork to its
insurance carrier, Brightline Dealer Advisors (“Brightline”).6
On May 6, 2026, thirty-six days after the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff filed
a Direction for Entry of Default Judgment, which this Court entered.7
On May 29, 2026, fifty-nine days after an Answer was due, Defendant
received a letter dated April 16, 2026 from Brightline disclaiming coverage on the
grounds that the purported damages in Plaintiff’s claim did not constitute a “covered
loss under D’Ambrosio’s liability policy.”8 Defendant also reported that its
insurance carrier’s delay in sending out the letter “related to an internal review of
the coverage determination.”9 Defendant denies receiving any notice of the results
of the coverage determination prior to May 29, 2026.10 Four days later, Defendant
became aware that a default judgment was obtained.11
On June 23, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment
5
D.I. 3, ¶ 3.
6
D.I. 6, Ex. A, ¶ 4. Defendant denies having “any contact, or [receiving] documents via mail or electronic transmission, with the Plaintiff or its attorneys from March 31, 2026 through June 1, 2026.” D.I. 6, Ex. A, ¶ 8.
7
D.I. 4.
8
Id. at ¶ 5.
9
Id. at ¶ 6.
10
Id.
11
Id., ¶ 7.
3
(“Motion”).12 In the Motion, Defendant asserts that (1) it can demonstrate
“excusable neglect” to vacate the judgment;13 (2) if the judgment were vacated, the
outcome of the litigation may be different than if the judgment were permitted to
stand; and (3) Plaintiff would not suffer substantial prejudice if the judgment were
vacated.14
In support of its argument that excusable neglect is established, Defendant
asserts that two days after receipt of the Complaint,15 it “tendered the defense of this
lawsuit to CNA, its liability insurance carrier.”16 But, as noted supra, Defendant’s
next communication with its insurance carrier was a letter received on May 29, 2026,
informing it that coverage was denied.17
On July 6, 2026, this Court received Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate.18 According to Plaintiff, Superior Court Civil Rule
12(a) required the Defendant to file an Answer on or before April 20, 2026, and it
failed to do so. Plaintiff argues (a) “Defendant was properly served yet took no
action to respond to the Complaint or otherwise protect its own interests for well
12
D.I. 5.
13
Id., ¶¶ 6-7.
14
Id., ¶ 5.
15
D.I. 6, Ex. A, ¶ 3.
16
Id., ¶ 3. Defendant also notes that even though Plaintiff filed a Direction to Enter Judgment by Default with the Court on May 6, it wasn’t until June 2 – nearly an entire month later – that it finally served the judgment on the Defendant. Id., ¶ 4.
17
The letter was apparently dated April 16, 2026.
18
D.I. 7.
4
over two weeks past its answer deadline;”19 (b) Defendant failed to explain why no
answer was filed once the claim was tendered; (c) Defendant’s reliance on the
conduct of its insurer in failing to timely respond back with a coverage determination
and representation was misplaced; and (d) Defendant’s obligation to respond to the
Complaint arose when the Complaint was served, not upon the insurer’s decision to
accept or reject coverage.20 As a result, plaintiff contends Defendant cannot
demonstrate excusable neglect, and for that reason alone the Court should deny the
pending motion. Additionally, based on these facts, the Defendant cannot
demonstrate a meritorious defense (i.e., that the result of the proceeding would be
different) or that Plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the motion were granted.21
On July 10, 2026, Defendant’s motion was scheduled to be heard in this Court,
but consideration of the motion was deferred pending further review of the parties’
written submissions and possible additional oral argument. After review of the
parties’ written submissions, this matter is being decided without the need for further
argument.
III. DISCUSSION
Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) provides a procedure by which a party may
obtain relief from a judgment or order:
19
D.I. 6, ¶ 10.
20
Id., ¶ 15.
21
Id., ¶¶ 22-31.
5
(b) Mistake; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. A motion under this subdivision does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This Rule
does not limit the power of a Court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to grant any
relief provided by statute, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
Court, or to deal with judgments by confession as provided by law.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela are abolished,
and the procedure for obtaining relief from judgments shall be by
motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent action.
The grant or denial of a motion to vacate judgment rests within the sound discretion
of this Court.22 Delaware courts favor motions to vacate, when appropriate, as they
“promote Delaware’s strong judicial policy of deciding cases on the merits and
giving the parties to litigation their day in court.”23
Here, Defendant asserts, inter alia, that excusable neglect exists to vacate the
default judgment. “Excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect which might
22
Mendiola v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1173898, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2006) (citing Battagila v. Wilmington Savings Fund Soc., 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Del. 1977)). 23
Id. (quoting Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Baldwin Line Const. Co., Inc., 2004 WL 838610, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2004)).
6
have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.”24 This
Court described the application of the excusable neglect standard in McDonald v. S
& J Hotel Enterprises, Inc. as follows:
A mere showing of negligence or carelessness without a valid reason
may be deemed insufficient. All the surrounding circumstances may
be considered in determining the issue. Excusable neglect has been
described as that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstances. However, negligence may be
so gross as to amount to sheer indifference, to open and vacate
judgment upon such excuse would cease to give meaning to the words
“excusable neglect.”25
If a party establishes excusable neglect, there are two additional hurdles they must
overcome before this Court will grant a motion to vacate. These are demonstrating
(a) the possibility of a meritorious defense, and (b) a showing that a plaintiff will not
suffer substantial prejudice if the motion is granted.26
Defendant relies, at least in part, on the delay in its insurance carrier’s
coverage determination to excuse its failure to file a timely answer to the Complaint.
A similar argument was raised and ultimately rejected by this Court in State Farm
& Casualty Insurance Co. v. Laborers Eastern Organization Fund.27 In State Farm,
the defendant attempted to demonstrate excusable neglect because the initial lawsuit
24
Id. (quoting Apt. Cmtys. Corp. v. Martinelli, 859 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 2004)). 25
2002 WL 1978933, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2002) (internal citations omitted). 26
See Mendiola, 2006 WL 1173898, at *2 (citing Verizon, 2004 WL 838610, at *1; Apt. Cmtys. Corp., 859 A.2d at 69-70).
27
2009 WL 81290 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2009).
7
paperwork was erroneously served on defendant’s predecessor insurance broker.28
That predecessor insurer (Conover Beyer) failed to advise defendant that it was not
covering the accident.29 Several months later, the defendant discovered the error and
contacted its current insurer, Crum & Foster, who then retained counsel to defend
the lawsuit.30 At that point, default judgment had already been entered against
defendant. In rejecting the defendant’s claim that excusable neglect was established,
this Court observed, “[Defendant] fails to establish why its failure to notify the
correct insurance carrier is excusable neglect, as opposed to mere neglect.
[Defendant] also fails to establish why its failure to follow up with the insurance
carrier after initially reporting the accident is excusable neglect as opposed to mere
neglect.”31
As in State Farm, I conclude Defendant has failed to establish its threshold
requirement that its conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person. While the
record reflects Defendant did notify its insurer promptly of its claim when the
Complaint was received, Defendant failed to follow up over the next fifty to sixty
days to determine if coverage was accepted or declined. In fact, almost two months
had passed from the time Defendant advised the insurance carrier of the Complaint,
28
State Farm, 2009 WL 81290, at *1.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at *2.
8
and the record is devoid of any follow up by Defendant to inquire the status of its
claim. Once Defendant received the May 29, 2026 letter from its insurer, another
three-plus weeks passed before Defendant sought to vacate the default judgment.
Defendant’s conduct in failing to follow up with its insurer was unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Court can find that the Defendant’s conduct in failing to follow
up with its insurer was the result of inexcusable neglect, I need not address whether
the Defendant has meritorious defenses and whether the Plaintiff would be
prejudiced by an order vacating the default judgment.32 Wherefore, Defendant’s
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment is DENIED.
/s/ Martin B. O’Connor
Commissioner
Original to Prothonotary
32
That being said, it is unclear what valid defense(s) Defendant would effectively assert. Defendant purchased a car from an out of state seller without conducting sufficient due diligence or confirmation that the seller possessed valid title to the vehicle at the time of the transaction, and that the vehicle being sold wasn’t stolen or the property of someone other than the seller. Then, a day or so later, when the seller presented the check received from Defendant for the transaction, Plaintiff called Defendant to confirm the check was valid and a representative of Defendant’s business expressly stated it was. It was only then that Plaintiff accepted the check and paid the seller its value, minus processing fees.
9