United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-1975
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
ARNALDO J. IRIZARRY-IRIZARRY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.
Julie K. Connolly, with whom Julie Connolly Law, PLLC, was on
brief, for appellant.
Brendan B. Gants, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte,
Assistant United States Attorney, and Matthew R. Galeotti,
Supervisory Official, were on brief, for appellee.
July 24, 2026
MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Arnaldo
Irizarry-Irizarry ("Irizarry") appeals his jury conviction for
wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and money laundering
arising from his involvement in a scheme to defraud the
Municipality of Mayagüez ("Mayagüez") and its municipal
enterprise, Mayagüez Economic Development, Inc. ("MEDI").
Irizarry argues that the evidence presented at his trial was
insufficient to establish that he had the intent required to commit
the crimes underlying his convictions. He also appeals the
district court's denial of his pro se motion to reduce his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Because we conclude that there was no
error in Irizarry's conviction and that he did not file a notice
of appeal as to the district court's order on his pro se motion,
we affirm his conviction and dismiss his sentencing challenge.
I. Facts1
As a lawyer, Irizarry served as a legal advisor to
Mayagüez and its mayor, José Guillermo Rodríguez Rodríguez ("Mayor
Rodríguez"). In 2014, Mayagüez's municipal legislature authorized
Mayagüez to create MEDI, a legally-independent, for-profit
1 Irizarry's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge requires
us to examine the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict
and assess if that evidence, "including all plausible inferences
drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged
count or crime." United States v. Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 116, 120
(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Cruz-Díaz, 550 F.3d 169,
172 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)).
- 2 -corporation, to promote regional economic development and generate
income for Mayagüez. Separately, between July 2012 and July 2015,
Puerto Rico's legislature approved three multi-million-dollar
awards to Mayagüez for renovations on and improvements to its
trauma center. By March 2016, one of Mayagüez's bank accounts
held $9 million -- most of which was traceable to the funds awarded
for renovations to the trauma center.2 After learning about the
$9 million, Roberto Mejill-Tellado ("Mejill") and Eugenio
García-Jiménez ("García") -- financial consultants for
Mayagüez -- arranged a meeting to discuss the funds with Mayor
Rodríguez. At the meeting, García proposed investing the
$9 million in order to produce interest income to benefit Mayagüez
and its trauma center and proposed that the principal would be
returned to Mayagüez after generating interest. Mayor Rodríguez
approved García's proposal. But, unbeknownst to Mayor Rodríguez,
García had different plans for the $9 million in Mayagüez's bank
account.
On March 9, 2016, García asked his friend Stephen
Kirkland to prepare a fraudulent letter from UnionBanc Investment
2 Pursuant to the trauma center renovation awards, Mayagüez's
1First Bank account received deposits totaling $8,761,839 between
2014 and 2016. On March 11, 2016, Mayagüez's Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico account deposited a $14.6 million check issued from
the 1First Bank Account. The parties stipulated that on March 29,
2016, Mayagüez had $9 million in its Banco Popular account, which
is the amount represented at trial as being reserved for the trauma center.
- 3 -Services ("UBIS") offering MEDI investment services. Stephen
prepared the letter, which included the forged signature of his
brother Joseph Kirkland,3 a UBIS financial advisor. The same day,
García and Joseph applied to open a UBIS investment account ("UBIS
account") under MEDI's name. After the UBIS account opened,
$9 million was transferred from Mayagüez's bank account to the
UBIS account on March 29, 2016. Joseph then used the $9 million
to purchase U.S. Treasury bonds, which were used as collateral for
a line of credit, in turn allowing cash transfers out of the
account.
In April 2016, more than $4 million was wired from the
UBIS account to entities that García or Mejill owned. By the end
of April, UBIS personnel, after flagging the UBIS account's
suspicious activity, decided to close the account. García and
Joseph transferred the remaining funds (around $5 million) to an
LPL Financial account belonging to Mayagüez Economic Development
Financial Strategies ("MEDFS"), a separate corporation García
created and operated.
More than $3 million was transferred out of the LPL
Financial account between late June 2016 and early July 2016.
García returned $1.8 million to Mayagüez's bank account to conceal
the scheme, falsely asserting that the amount was an advance
3We refer to Stephen Kirkland and Joseph Kirkland by their
first names for clarity.
- 4 -interest payment. Overall, the funds transferred from MEDI's
UnionBanc account and MEDFS's LPL Financial account were
transferred into and out of over twenty different bank accounts
that the coconspirators held through various corporate entities.
Three of those entities were: (1) TEGA Holdings, LLC ("TEGA"),
which García and Mejill co-owned; (2) U.A. United Advisors
Corporation ("U.A."), which Irizarry owned and incorporated in
March 2016; and (3) IManagement, LLC ("IManagement"), which was
incorporated in March 2016 and operated by MEDI Executive Director
Alejandro Riera-Fernández ("Riera").4
With coconspirator Steve Minger's help, García and
Mejill had opened a bank account for TEGA in the United States
mainland, which received a $900,000 wire from the MEDI UBIS account
on April 4, 2016. And between April 2016 to December 2016, TEGA
transferred $126,100 to U.A. and $133,200 to IManagement. Both
U.A. and IManagement received a $90,000 wire transfer on April 6,
2016, a $9,000 wire transfer on July 18, 2016, and multiple checks
between August 2016 and December 2016. Through their respective
4 Roberto Santiago-Velázquez incorporated IManagement as a
favor to Riera, who indicated -- without explanation -- that he
could not incorporate IManagement in his own name. Thus,
Santiago-Velázquez was listed as IManagement's President and owner
and signed checks and documents on the corporation's behalf. But
other than those acts, Santiago-Velázquez did not perform any work
for IManagement or see any of its actual work product. Rather,
Mejill understood IManagement to be Riera's company because Riera
ensured IManagement's invoices were submitted to TEGA and picked
up the corresponding checks.
- 5 -entities, Irizarry and Riera sent invoices to TEGA to document
each of these payments. Irizarry's invoices each contained the
exact same description for the "professional services rendered,"
stating: "[c]onsultancy and advisory services regarding corporate
development and financial and banking investments" and "[a]dvisory
services regarding corporate transactions between different
private investors and entrepreneurs." 5 Similarly, Riera's
invoices each contained similar descriptions of the "services
rendered" by IManagement. Neither Irizarry nor Riera's invoices
provided specific dates or hours for the services they purportedly
rendered. Mejill paid these invoices at García's direction,
though he testified at trial that he knew the services described
in the invoices were not provided. Irizarry used part of the
money transferred to U.A. to pay off a personal car loan and to
purchase another car for himself.
The same year TEGA made these payments to U.A. and
IManagement, Irizarry, García, Mejill, and Riera held private
meetings together. Irizarry also frequently met García in
private. Additionally, Irizarry, García, Mejill, and Riera
regularly attended MEDI's board meetings -- Riera attending as
MEDI's Executive Director and the other three men attending as
5 Irizarry testified that the U.A. invoices to TEGA
represented the retainer fee García owed Irizarry for providing
legal services to García's financial brokerage business.
- 6 -consultants to either Mayagüez or MEDI. At those meetings, the
four men never mentioned the $9 million MEDI received for
investment from the Mayagüez bank account containing funds for
renovation of the Mayagüez trauma center.
In fall 2016, auditors reviewing Mayagüez's bank account
statements began inquiring about the $9 million outgoing transfer
and the account's receipt of the $1.8 million "alleged interest"
payment. The auditors wanted to know the nature of the $9 million
transaction and where those funds were transferred so that they
could make the correct entries in Mayagüez's financial statements.
Accordingly, in the following weeks, the auditors held multiple
meetings to discuss and gather information about the transactions.
Irizarry attended at least one of those meetings. At a meeting
Irizarry attended, which occurred in October 2016, he told the
auditors that the $9 million transaction was legal. He expressed
that the auditors "didn't really have to do anything" since the
$9 million, by virtue of being in an account belonging to MEDI,
was still in an account belonging to Mayagüez.
However, an auditor informed Irizarry that the
$9 million could not be used for investing because the legislature
specifically allocated those funds for Mayagüez's trauma center
and, thus, the funds were considered restricted for that purpose
only. The auditor recommended that the funds be returned to the
proper municipal account, warning that if the comptroller's office
- 7 -reviewed the $9 million outgoing transfer it could make a "major
finding." 6 Irizarry rebuked the recommendation to return the
funds, insisting that corrective action was not needed and that
the transactions were legal and for Mayagüez's benefit.
Over the course of the meetings, Irizarry, García,
Mejill, and Riera represented to the auditors that the $9 million
was invested for Mayagüez's benefit and the $1.8 million returned
to Mayagüez's account was an advance interest payment. Yet
despite the auditors' prodding, none of the men provided specific
information or documentation as to where the $9 million was
invested or the type of investment made. Thus, after three
meetings, in which the four men provided very little useful
information about the $9 million transaction, the auditors ceased
their inquiry into the matter and made the necessary adjustments
to Mayagüez's financial statements.
In 2018, the FBI began investigating what happened to
the $9 million. During that investigation, FBI Special Agent
Daniel Crecelius interviewed Irizarry and Riera several times.
Agent Crecelius testified that Irizarry stated: (1) Mayagüez
should have been the sole benefactor of the $9 million; (2) the
payments to his company, U.A., were related to the "investment" of
the $9 million; (3) he had not performed any work to justify the
6 It is unclear from the auditor's testimony, or the record
as a whole, what a "major finding" means or entails.
- 8 -payments to U.A.; (4) at García's direction, he fabricated invoices
to justify the payments to U.A.; and (5) he used the money paid to
U.A. for personal expenses. As for his interviews with Riera,
Agent Crecelius testified that Riera explained
that: (1) IManagement was created after García or Mejill asked him
to incorporate a company so they could facilitate payments to him;
(2) IManagement did not perform work in exchange for these
payments; and (3) he used the money for personal expenses.
II. Procedural History
On March 22, 2021, a federal grand jury in Puerto Rico
returned a thirty-three-count indictment against Irizarry, García,
Mejill, Riera, Minger, and Joseph and Stephen Kirkland. Irizarry
was indicted on four counts: (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349 (Count One); (2) wire
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts Seven and
Seventeen); and (3) money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957 (Count Thirty). The other defendants were similarly
indicted on Count One, the conspiracy charge, and on wire fraud
and money laundering counts.7
Irizarry and Riera were tried jointly in an eight-day
jury trial, while the other five defendants pled guilty to certain
counts in the indictment pursuant to their respective plea
7 Joseph was not charged with money laundering.
- 9 -agreements. At the close of the government's case, Irizarry filed
a motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts based on
insufficient evidence, which the district court denied. He
renewed his motion at the close of evidence, which also was denied.
Ultimately, the jury found Irizarry guilty on all counts leveled
against him. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven
months' imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release.
Irizarry timely appealed his conviction. While this appeal was
pending, Irizarry filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction
before the district court, which was denied. He also raises that
denial on appeal.
III. Discussion
Irizarry contests his convictions because they were
based on insufficient evidence. Additionally, he claims the
district court was wrong to deny his motion for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We address each in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Before we dive into the merits, we note that Irizarry's
sufficiency arguments as to the substantive counts -- wire fraud
and money laundering -- derive from his sufficiency challenge to
the conspiracy count. Specifically, he contends that because the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly and
intentionally participated in the wire fraud conspiracy, "no
rational jury could conclude that [he] committed the wire fraud or
- 10 -the money laundering that were the objects of the conspiracy."
Accordingly, we begin, and end, with assessing whether the evidence
at trial was sufficient to support Irizarry's conspiracy
conviction on Count One.
Turning to Count One, the indictment charged Irizarry,
García, Mejill, Riera, Stephen, Joseph, and Minger with conspiring
to defraud Mayagüez and MEDI by depriving those entities of their
money and property through "false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations[,] and promises." Irizarry contends there was
insufficient evidence that he knew about and agreed to participate
in the single, "overarching, multiple-crime conspiracy" to defraud
Mayagüez and MEDI, because the evidence at trial failed to show
the requisite interdependence and overlap -- factors we will
detail later -- between him and the other coconspirators charged
under Count One. He reasons that the evidence did not show he
knew Minger, Stephen, or Joseph or their roles and actions to
implement the fraud scheme, "what Mejill or Riera had agreed to do
with García," or that the payments from García to U.A. depended on
the other coconspirators' actions. Therefore, he asserts that the
jury's verdict must have been "based on a variance between the
conspiracy charged and the conspiracy proven." And he requests
his convictions be vacated on the grounds that the claimed variance
was prejudicial.
The government responds that there was ample evidence
- 11 -that Irizarry knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy and
that his arguments to the contrary contravene our conspiracy
precedent indicating that a single conspiracy's existence "does
not require the participants to know of all the other participants,
understand all the details of the conspiracy, or participate in
each aspect of the conspiracy." See United States v. Ortiz-Islas,
829 F.3d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 118 (1st Cir. 2011)). Further, the
government contends that Irizarry's prejudicial variance arguments
are "unpreserved and meritless" and asserts that, even if a
variance existed, Irizarry has failed to show it was prejudicial
to his "substantial rights."
We review preserved sufficiency of the evidence claims
de novo, examining the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the [verdict] and decid[ing] whether that evidence, including all
plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a rational
factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the charged count or crime." See United States v.
Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 116, 120 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Cruz-Díaz, 550 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)).
We must preface our analysis of Irizarry's sufficiency
claims with some conspiracy principles. To convict Irizarry of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government had to provide
sufficient evidence that there was an agreement to accomplish an
- 12 -unlawful objective and that Irizarry was a knowing participant in
that agreement. See United States v. Falcón-Nieves, 79 F.4th 116,
132 (1st Cir. 2023). Further, to establish conspiracy, two types
of intent must be shown: (1) intent to agree and (2) intent to
commit the substantive offense, i.e., wire fraud. Id.
When, as here, we must determine whether the evidence
was sufficient to prove that a set of criminal activities
constituted a single conspiracy, three factors guide our inquiry:
"(1) the existence of a common goal among the alleged participants
in the charged conspiracy, (2) interdependence among the alleged
participants in the charged conspiracy, and (3) overlap among the
alleged participants in the charged conspiracy." United States
v. Vavic, 139 F.4th 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified)
(quoting United States v. Abdelaziz, 68 F.4th 1, 42 (1st Cir.
2023)). And, as the government points out, when analyzing these
three factors, "we must remember" that a single conspiracy's
existence "does not require the participants to know of all the
other participants, understand all the details of the conspiracy,
or participate in each aspect of the conspiracy." Ortiz-Islas,
829 F.3d at 24-25 (quoting Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 118). Irizarry
concedes that the government's evidence was sufficient to
establish the first factor -- common goal -- but, as we noted
above, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy
the second and third factors of interdependence and overlap.
- 13 -Thus, we center our analysis on those two factors.
We begin with interdependence, which focuses on whether
"the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or
advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme."
Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117 (quoting United States v.
Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 422 (1st Cir. 2009)).
"Interdependence may be shown where one participant knows that his
own success depends on the continued existence and health of the
[unlawful] organization as a whole." United States v. Niemi, 579
F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009); see United States v. Mubayyid, 658
F.3d 35, 58 (1st Cir. 2011).
Here, Irizarry argues that the interdependence factor is
not satisfied because there was no evidence that he did anything
necessary for or advantageous to the wire fraud scheme that, he
contends, the other conspirators agreed to commit. He also
asserts that there was no evidence that he knew that the money he
received from TEGA depended on the actions that the
conspirators -- other than García -- took to implement the scheme.
The government counters that Irizarry's conduct was advantageous
to the success of the scheme because his efforts to persuade the
Mayagüez auditors that the financial transactions involving the
Mayagüez bank account were legal were designed to "stave off
efforts to claw back the diverted funds" and "allow[ed] the
conspirators to continue distributing and using those funds."
- 14 -Irizarry's arguments do not convince us. To start,
there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
Irizarry knew his success "depend[ed] on the continued existence
and health of the [unlawful] organization as a whole." Niemi, 579
F.3d at 127. Specifically, the trial evidence showed that
Irizarry, along with García, Mejill, and Riera, made efforts to
convince the Mayagüez auditors that: (1) the $9 million transaction
was legal; (2) the funds did not need to be returned to Mayagüez's
bank account; and (3) the auditors did not need to take any action.
Irizarry made these representations even though, per Agent
Crecelius's testimony, he knew that the payments made to his
company, U.A., originated from the "investment" of the $9 million
and that Mayagüez should have been the sole benefactor of the
$9 million. Thus, a reasonable jury could infer, from Irizarry's
efforts to conceal from the auditors precisely those activities
that were likely to reveal the impropriety of the $9 million
transaction, that he knew his success in receiving and retaining
the funds illicitly procured from Mayagüez's bank account depended
on the "continued existence and health of the [unlawful]
organization as a whole." Niemi, 579 F.3d at 127.
In addition to supporting the finding that he depended
on the fraud scheme's continued existence, the evidence of
Irizarry's efforts to conceal the scheme's discovery from the
auditors also supports a reasonable jury's finding that his actions
- 15 -were advantageous to the scheme. As we explained, the evidence
showed that Irizarry joined García, Mejill, and Riera's efforts in
stonewalling the Mayagüez auditors from receiving any information
necessary for them to discern the true nature of the $9 million
transaction. And such efforts helped ward off the auditors,
who -- while not necessarily convinced of the $9 million
transaction's propriety -- ended their inquiry into the matter
after the three unfruitful meetings and settled on making
accounting adjustments without the information they sought.
Protecting the scheme from being uncovered, in turn, enabled the
coconspirators' continued disbursement and use of the $9 million.
That said, Irizarry retorts that his statements to the
auditors were not advantageous to the scheme because they did not
"stave off their investigation," "dissuade them from concluding
that the [$9 million] had been improperly taken," or permit the
coconspirators' continued disbursement of the $9 million, since,
he attests, those funds had been completely disbursed by the time
he first met with auditors in October 2016. But as we explained,
while Irizarry's statements did not convince the auditors of the
$9 million transaction's propriety, it did "stave off" their
investigation, and Irizarry has not cited to any portion of the
record illustrating the contrary. Further, the record belies his
contention that the coconspirators did not continue to receive
disbursements traceable to the $9 million in the period after the
- 16 -October 2016 meeting with the Mayagüez auditors. For instance,
U.A. and IManagement received monthly checks from TEGA, the company
that siphoned $900,000 from Mayagüez's $9 million, between October
2016 to December 2016.
Accordingly, because the evidence, which we view in the
light most favorable to the verdict, sufficed to illustrate how
Irizarry's activities were dependent on and advantageous to the
overarching scheme to defraud Mayagüez and MEDI, a reasonable jury
could have concluded that interdependence existed in the charged
conspiracy.
Next, we address overlap, which may be satisfied if there
is "pervasive involvement of a single core conspirator, or hub
character." Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422 (citation modified)
(quoting United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir.
1999)). Here, both parties agree, and the evidence reflected,
that García was the "single core conspirator" or "hub character"
who had pervasive involvement in the charged conspiracy. See id.
García: (1) made the successful pitch to "invest" Mayagüez's
trauma center funds; (2) worked with Stephen, Joseph, and Minger
to create the investment or bank accounts needed to transfer those
funds to his and his coconspirators' corporate entities;
(3) directed payments, from the funds funneled to TEGA, to Irizarry
and Riera's corporate entities; (4) instructed Irizarry and Riera
to falsify invoices to justify those payments; (5) held private
- 17 -meetings with Irizarry, Mejill, and Riera; and, (6) with those
three men, attempted to conceal the scheme from the Mayagüez
auditors. With ample evidence of García's pervasive involvement
in all facets of the scheme -- from inception to disbursement to
attempted coverup -- a reasonable jury could have concluded that
there was overlap in the charged conspiracy.
Still, Irizarry disputes the existence of overlap,
asserting that "[e]vidence that García interacted with all the
defendants is not evidence that Irizarry knew about or overlapped
with the other defendants." For support, he relies on United
States v. Monserrate–Valentín, in which we stated that "the mere
fact that a central person (the 'hub' of a wheel) is involved in
multiple conspiracies (the wheel's 'spokes') does not mean that a
defendant . . . who participated in a spoke conspiracy, may be
convicted of participating in an overarching conspiracy
encompassing the entire wheel." 729 F.3d 31, 44-45 (1st Cir.
2013) (citation modified) (quoting United States v.
Franco-Santiago, 681 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016)). We
went on to explain that, in that circumstance, "[t]he government
must also produce 'evidence from which a jury could reasonably
infer that the spoke defendant knew about and agreed to join any
larger overarching conspiracy.'" Id. at 45 (quoting
Franco-Santiago, 681 F.3d at 11).
- 18 -But it is unclear how the portion of Monserrate-Valentín
that Irizarry invokes negates our overlap determination. In that
case, we did not opine whether the evidence the government
proffered as to the hub character was sufficient to satisfy the
overlap factor. See id. at 44-45. Nor did we alter our general
rule that overlap may be satisfied if there is "pervasive
involvement of a single core conspirator, or hub character."
Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation
modified) (quoting Portela, 167 F.3d at 695). Here, as we
explained above, and contrary to Irizarry's assertions, the
evidence of García's coordination of the scheme and interactions
with the coconspirators (i.e., pervasive involvement in the
charged conspiracy) supports a finding that the overlap factor is
satisfied. See Abdelaziz, 68 F.4th at 53 (noting that the core
conspirator "and his associates' interactions with the parents"
satisfied the overlap factor).
Moreover, while it is true that the government must
produce "evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that
the spoke defendant knew about and agreed to join any larger
overarching conspiracy," the government has produced exactly that.
Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d at 45 (quoting Franco-Santiago, 681
F.3d at 11). The evidence showed that Irizarry incorporated U.A.
in March 2016, just around the time García coordinated with the
Kirkland brothers to move the $9 million into MEDI's UBIS account.
- 19 -Then, a mere two days after $900,000 of the $9 million was
transferred from the UBIS account to TEGA, U.A. received the first
of several large payments from TEGA. The trial testimony revealed
that Irizarry did not provide services in exchange for TEGA's
payments to U.A., that he followed García's instruction to
fabricate invoices justifying those payments, and that he knew
those payments derived from the $9 million "investment" of which
Mayagüez should have been the sole benefactor. And, while
undertaking those actions, Irizarry joined García, Mejill, and
Riera's efforts to convince the auditors that the $9 million had
been legally invested for Mayagüez's benefit and need not be
recovered. And, lastly, throughout the year Irizarry and the
other charged coconspirators' companies were receiving money
derived from the $9 million, Irizarry met frequently with
García -- the "hub" or "core" person of the conspiracy -- and met
in a group with García, Mejill, and Riera in private. When viewing
all this evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a
reasonable jury could infer that Irizarry not only knew about the
overarching conspiracy to defraud Mayagüez and MEDI but also agreed
to join that conspiracy.
Accordingly, with the totality of the evidence and the
common goal, interdependence, and overlap factors weighing in the
government's favor, we find that the evidence at trial was
sufficient to prove the single wire fraud conspiracy charged in
- 20 -Count One and Irizarry's knowledge of and agreement to participate
in it. Such sufficient evidence for Count One means "there was
no variance, let alone a prejudicial variance, as to this count,"
Vavic, 139 F.4th at 34, so we reject Irizarry's prejudicial
variance argument. And, finally, because Irizarry's sufficiency
challenge to the wire fraud conspiracy conviction fails, his
derivative sufficiency challenges to his substantive wire fraud
and money laundering convictions fail as well.
B. Sentence Reduction Challenge
Lastly, Irizarry contends that the district court erred
when it denied his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) -- which permits such a motion when a defendant "has
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission . . . ." He asserts that his sentence should be
reduced under § 3582(c)(2) because there is no evidence he
personally caused substantial financial harm to Mayagüez. The
government counters that the court lacks jurisdiction to review
the district court's denial of Irizarry's § 3582(c)(2) claim
because he has not filed a notice of appeal as to that denial. It
asserts that where "the defendant's sole notice of appeal predates
and fails to encompass the order he seeks to challenge, this
- 21 -[c]ourt lacks jurisdiction and must decline to consider that
challenge."
We agree with the government that we lack jurisdiction
to hear an appeal of the denial of Irizarry's motion to reduce
sentence. "To secure appellate review of a judgment or order, a
party must file a notice of appeal from that judgment or order."
Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 120 (2017). While we
retain discretion to "overlook defects in a notice of appeal," we
"may not overlook the failure to file a notice of appeal at all."
Id. at 125 (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2).
Here, Irizarry does not dispute that he did not file a
notice of appeal from the district court's order denying his motion
to reduce his sentence. Thus, without such filing, we lack
jurisdiction to consider his challenge to that order.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we affirm Irizarry's wire fraud
conspiracy, wire fraud, and money laundering convictions and
dismiss, without prejudice, his appeal of the district court's
order denying his motion to reduce his sentence.
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