[Cite as State v. Cox, 2026-Ohio-2851.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. Nos. 30681; 30682; 30683
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case Nos. 2024 CR
v. : 01611/2; 2025 CR 01151; 2025 CR
: 02556
CHRISTOPHER M. COX :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
Appellant : Court)
:
FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
OPINION
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on July 24, 2026, the judgments of the
trial court are affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and EPLEY, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. Nos. 30681; 30682; 30683
MICHAEL O. MILLS, Attorney for Appellant
MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant Christopher Cox appeals from
his convictions, upon guilty pleas, on one count of receiving stolen property, one count of
misuse of credit cards, one count of theft, one count of having weapons while under
disability, and one count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound. He contends that
his sentence was unduly harsh and contrary to law, because the trial court failed to consider
the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors set
forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. However, Cox’s sentence on each offense was within
the statutory range, and the trial court specifically stated that it had considered the purposes
and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors before sentencing
Cox to a prison term of 24 months. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In June 2024, Cox was indicted on one count of receiving stolen property in
violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), a felony of the fifth degree; one count of misuse of credit cards
in violation of R.C. 2913.21(B)(2), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of theft
in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree.
{¶ 3} In November 2024, Cox pleaded guilty to all three counts. During the plea
hearing, the trial court explained to Cox that the receiving stolen property offense was
punishable by a prison term from six to twelve months and that the misdemeanor charges
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were each punishable by jail terms of 180 days. The court ordered a presentence
investigation for Cox and advised him not to commit any further violations of the law before
his final sentencing.
{¶ 4} In June 2025, Cox was indicted again on one count of having weapons while
under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a felony of the third degree. In October
2025, he pleaded guilty to the weapons under disability charge. He also pleaded guilty to a
bill of information charging one count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree. The trial court advised Cox that
the State took no position regarding sentencing, deferring to the trial court. The court again
ordered a presentence investigation and made no promise to Cox of community control.
{¶ 5} The three cases proceeded simultaneously to sentencing. During the
sentencing hearing, Cox expressed remorse and apologized. The trial court stated that it
had reviewed the presentence investigation report, noted Cox’s criminal history (including
twenty-six adult misdemeanor convictions, seven prior felony convictions, four prior prison
sentences, and multiple revocations of community control sanctions), and considered the
principles and purposes of sentencing (including avoiding unnecessary burden on the
government’s resources) and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in the Revised
Code. The court sentenced Cox in all three cases as follows: 12 months for receiving stolen
property; 180 days for misuse of credit cards and theft; 24 months for having weapons while
under disability; and 18 months for possession of fentanyl. The court ordered all sentences
to run concurrently for an aggregate prison term of 24 months.
{¶ 6} Cox timely appealed.
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II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 7} Cox’s sole assignment of error states:
DESPITE BEING WITHIN THE SENTENCING RANGE, THE SENTENCE
WAS UNDULY HARSH. THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF OHIO SENTENCING LAW
AND IS THEREFORE CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE COURT COMMITTED
PLAIN ERROR BY IMPOSING AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.
{¶ 8} Cox contends that the trial court committed plain error by not carefully
considering the purposes and principles of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12 when sentencing him. He argues that he showed genuine remorse; that there was
no physical harm to any victim; and that substance abuse contributed to the commission of
his offenses. Thus, he contends that while he was sentenced within the statutory range, the
sentence was unduly harsh. We disagree.
{¶ 9} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized
statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for
imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021, ¶ 45
(2d Dist.), citing State v. Foster, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus. However,
a trial court must consider the statutory criteria that apply to every felony offense, including
those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Leopard, 2011-Ohio-3864, ¶ 11
(2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38.
{¶ 10} The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are set forth in R.C. 2929.11,
which states:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by
the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of
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felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender
and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation
of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state
or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing
court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the
offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making
restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to
achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division
(A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness
of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.
{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the seriousness of crime and recidivism factors to be
considered by a trial court when imposing a sentence under R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12(A)
states:
Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised Code,
a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a
felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the
purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the
Revised Code.
R.C. 2929.12(B) through (F) then provide several factors for the court to consider, “relating
to matters such as the seriousness of the offender’s conduct, the likelihood of the offender’s
recidivism, and the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States, if any.” State
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v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 19. The trial court may also consider “any other factors that are
relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.” R.C. 2929.12(A).
“[N]either R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific factual
findings on the record.” Jones at ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 31,
and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000).
{¶ 12} When reviewing felony sentences, we must apply the standard of review set
forth in R.C. 2953.08(G). State v. Worthen, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Under that
statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or vacate it all
together and remand for resentencing, if it “‘clearly and convincingly’ finds either (1) the
record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is
contrary to law.” Id. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has observed that
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a
sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Jones at ¶ 39. Thus, when we review a
felony sentence imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,
we do not examine whether the sentence was unsupported by the record, but rather, we
simply determine whether the sentence is contrary to law. Id., quoting State v. McDaniel,
2021-Ohio-1519, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), and State v. Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).
A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if the
sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Dorsey at ¶ 18, quoting State
v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 13} Cox was sentenced on five offenses—each with different prison terms. In
Ohio, a first-degree misdemeanor carries a maximum jail sentence of 180 days.
R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). The prison terms for a third-degree felony generally range from 9 to
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36 months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). For a felony of the fourth degree, the prison term ranges
from 6 to 18 months, and for a felony of the fifth degree, it ranges from 6 to 12 months.
R.C. 2929.14(A)(4); R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
{¶ 14} In this case, there is no dispute that Cox’s sentence for each offense was
within the appropriate statutory range. Cox contends that his sentence is contrary to law,
because the trial court failed to consider the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12. He points out that he showed genuine remorse, there was no physical harm to any
victim, and substance abuse was a contributing factor. However, at Cox’s sentencing
hearing, though the trial court did not discuss every factor set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, the court specifically stated that it had considered the purposes and principles of
sentencing and the seriousness of crime and recidivism factors before sentencing Cox.
Among other things, at sentencing the court noted Cox’s lengthy criminal record and multiple
prior community control sanctions revocations. The trial court was not required to give
particular weight to any demonstration of remorse, the absence of physical harm resulting
from the criminal offenses, or the contribution of substance abuse to his conduct. The trial
court had full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory range and
was not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more
than minimum sentences. Because R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not require a trial court to
make any specific factual findings in the record, we conclude that the trial court sufficiently
complied with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Under these circumstances, we cannot say Cox’s
sentence is contrary to law. His assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
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LEWIS, P.J., and EPLEY, J., concur.
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