In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-25-00142-CV
THOMAS W. EVERETT, Appellant
V.
CLEVELAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24-DC-CV-01313
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellant Thomas W. Everett (“Appellant” or “Everett”) appeals from
the trial court’s final judgment granting Cleveland Independent School District’s
(“Appellee” or “CISD”) plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing with prejudice
Everett’s claims against CISD. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
Background
Everett’s Live Petition
After Everett filed his pro se Original Petition 1 and pro se First Amended
Petition, and after CISD filed its Original Answer, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Claims Against Individual Defendants and Plea to the Jurisdiction, First Amended
Answer2, and Plea to the Jurisdiction, Everett filed a pro se Second Amended
Petition 3, which was the live petition (the “Petition”). The Defendant CISD then
filed its First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.
In the Petition, Everett alleges that he brings the suit against his former
employer, CISD, “for its wrongful and unlawful conduct that led to his forced
resignation, subsequent employment retaliation, and severe financial and emotional
distress.” Everrett alleges the following facts:
A. Plaintiff was employed by CISD and was wrongfully forced to
resign under duress.
B. Plaintiff was presented with a Gag Order and pressured to sign it
without review.
C. Upon refusal to sign, Plaintiff was informed that he could not
continue employment with CISD.
1
In Everett’s Original Petition, he also named certain individuals employed with CISD as defendants. In his amended petitions, he removed the individuals as defendants and only named CISD as a defendant.
2
In its First Amended Answer, CISD generally denied Everett’s claims and asserted various affirmative defenses including governmental immunity.
3
An amended petition takes the place of and completely supersedes the preceding petition. See Chamberlain v. McReight, 713 S.W.2d 372, 373-74 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 65).
2
D. Plaintiff applied for substitute teaching but was unlawfully blocked
from employment opportunities.
E. Plaintiff was initially awarded unemployment benefits, but CISD
appealed on the final day and won, resulting in an unjust repayment
demand of approximately $6,363.00.
F. Plaintiff discovered that coworkers’ statements were falsified, and
misleading information was provided by HR.
G. Plaintiff suffered severe medical issues, including cardiovascular
complications, due to the stress caused by Defendant’s actions,
incurring medical expenses totaling $27,800.
H. Without Plaintiff’s knowledge, CISD fraudulently filed a worker’s
compensation claim on his behalf, later revealed through
misdirected correspondence.
I. Defendant induced Plaintiff to take college courses under the
pretense of rehire but later denied him employment despite
completion.
J. Defendant’s HR Director, Rodrigo Cano, falsely claimed that the
complaint originated from Cypress Fairbanks School District. This
statement was proven untrue during the Texas Workforce
Commission Hearing.
K. During the unemployment hearing, the Defendant introduced two
documents allegedly written by the trainer. These documents were
signed under coercion by two individuals who did not author them,
and the information contained within was crossed and inconsistent.
Everett alleges the following causes of action against CISD: (1) wrongful
termination under Sabine Pilot; (2) defamation because CISD damaged his
reputation by falsely stating that Everett engaged in misconduct; (3) fraudulent
misrepresentation because CISD knowingly provided a false statement to harm
Everett; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress because CISD’s outrageous
conduct caused Everett severe emotional distress; (5) tortious interference with
employment because CISD’s false statements and retaliation interfered with
Everett’s employment opportunities; and (6) CISD’s retaliatory actions violated the
3
Texas Whistleblower Act. In the Petition, Everett contends that CISD waived its
governmental immunity and that his Petition “directly addresses and refutes the
governmental immunity argument raised in the Defendant’s plea to the Jurisdiction.”
CISD’s First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction
CISD filed it First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction alleging that although
Everett amended his petition to better identify his claims, CISD is “indisputably
entitled” to dismissal of Everett’s lawsuit based on governmental immunity from
suit and the trial court should dismiss the case with prejudice “due to an incurable
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” According to CISD’s plea, CISD is immune
from suit regarding Everett’s wrongful termination claims because there (1) is no
waiver of governmental immunity for Everett’s claim of “wrongful termination in
violation of public policy[]” and the Sabine Pilot claim is barred due to CISD’s
governmental immunity; (2) the Harris and Gratton federal cases cited by Everett
do not analyze governmental immunity under Texas law and lack any meaningful
application to CISD’s jurisdictional challenge; (3) Everett has not presented the trial
court with a clear and unambiguous statute that waives the District’s governmental
immunity from suit and liability; (4) Everett has not pled a viable cause of action
under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code and has failed to plead and prove that he
exhausted his administrative remedies under that chapter; (5) CISD is immune from
all common law tort claims that do not involve the negligent use or operation of a
4
motor-driven vehicle; and (6) Everett failed to initiate his administrative remedies
under the Texas Whistleblower Act and fails to plead the requisite jurisdictional
elements of a viable Whistleblower claim.
Final Judgment and Everett’s Appeal
After a hearing, the trial court signed a final judgment granting CISD’s First
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing with prejudice Everett’s claims
against CISD “due to an incurable lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based upon
Cleveland ISD’s governmental immunity from suit and liability.” Everett timely
appealed.
Standard of Review and Governmental Immunity
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.
2004). The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to defeat a cause of action without
regard to whether the claim has merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d
547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the court’s authority
to decide a case and is never presumed and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.
Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). A party asserting
governmental immunity to suit challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction. See State v.
Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). A motion or plea asserting such
5
immunity involves a question of law that we review de novo. Harris Cnty. Hosp.
Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings, the trial
court is required to review the pleadings, construe them liberally in favor of the
plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and determine whether the plaintiff “has
alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the
cause.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004). If the plaintiff has pleaded facts affirmatively negating jurisdiction, the trial
court may grant the plea to the jurisdiction without allowing the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. Even so, if the pleadings merely fail to allege facts
sufficient to affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction, “the issue is one of pleading
sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend.” Id.; see
also Tex. Tech Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. 2024).
Generally, we construe an appellant’s pro se brief liberally. Sullivan v.
Lemonade Ins. Co., No. 09-24-00211-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6990, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Sept. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Giddens v. Brooks, 92
S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“pro se pleadings and
briefs are to be liberally construed[]”)). That said, a pro se litigant is held to the same
standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of
6
procedure. Id. (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex.
1978)).
Like sovereign immunity, governmental immunity protects a political
subdivision of the state, including school districts, from liability and lawsuits. See
Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivisions
Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. 2006). “A political
subdivision enjoys governmental immunity from suit to the extent that immunity has
not been [waived or] abrogated by the Legislature.” Id. (citing Tex. Nat. Res.
Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). Governmental
immunity consists of immunity from suit and from liability. Harris Cnty. Hosp.
Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 842. Governmental immunity is waived only by clear and
unambiguous language indicating the Legislature’s intent to do so. Hillman v.
Nueces Cnty., 579 S.W.3d 354, 359-60 (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted).
The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively show that
the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
at 446. When the defendant in a suit is the state or a political subdivision thereof, the
plaintiff must plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate that immunity has been
waived and that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Dall. Area Rapid Transit
v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003).
7
Issues on Appeal
On appeal, Everett challenges the trial court’s grant of CISD’s Plea to the
Jurisdiction and he states his issues as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting Cleveland ISD’s plea to
the jurisdiction where Appellant alleged valid claims under the
Texas Whistleblower Act, the Sabine Pilot doctrine, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983, all of which fall within recognized exceptions to
governmental immunity.
II. Whether governmental immunity applies where Appellant’s
claims involve retaliation, constructive discharge, ultra vires
conduct, and violations of constitutional rights—actions that
exceed the lawful authority of school officials. []
III. Whether the trial court improperly dismissed claims involving
coerced resignation, and enforcement of a “gag order[,”] where
such actions constitute ultra vires and retaliatory conduct
actionable under Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925
(Tex. 1993).
IV. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Appellant’s claims
with prejudice after previously allowing amendment of the
pleadings, despite unresolved Jurisdictional fact[] issues and an
incomplete factual record.
V. Whether the trial court violated Appellant’s procedural due
process rights permitting retaliatory actions and denying a fair
and impartial administrative review during the employment
separation process. []
Analysis
In CISD’s First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, CISD alleged that Everett
failed to plead any basis for a waiver of governmental immunity and Everett would
be unable to plead facts to demonstrate jurisdiction over CISD if given the
opportunity to replead. CISD, a school district, is a political subdivision of the state,
and governmental immunity protects it from liability and lawsuits. See Ben Bolt8
Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 212 S.W.3d at 324. CISD enjoys
governmental immunity from suit to the extent that immunity has not been waived
or abrogated by the Legislature. Id. Everett contends on appeal that he established
that CISD waived its governmental immunity for each of his claims. We address
each of Everett’s appellate arguments below, but we group the claims when possible
to simplify our discussion.
Everett’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim, Due Process Claim, Other Constitutional Claims, and Ultra Vires Claims
In his appellate brief, Everett alleges he has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, due process and other unspecified constitutional claims, and what he labels
“ultra vires” claims against CISD. However, in his Petition he did not allege these
claims against CISD. He cannot raise new issues or claims for the first time on
appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Hatch v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 03-22-00489-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6780, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30,
2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. App. 33.1(a)(1); Morrell Masonry Supply,
Inc. v. Perez, No. 01-13-00887-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8495, at **7-9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)). We overrule issue
one as to Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, issue two and three as to his ultra vires
claims, issue two as to his constitutional claims, and issue five as to his due process
claim because no such claims were asserted in the Petition which was the live
pleading at the time the trial court granted the dismissal.
9
Everett’s Sabine Pilot Claim
On appeal, Everett also alleges that his retaliation claim fits within the Sabine
Pilot doctrine and immunity does not bar it. CISD argued at trial and argues on
appeal that Everett’s alleged claim brought pursuant to the Sabine Pilot doctrine is
barred by CISD’s governmental immunity. We agree.
In Sabine Pilot, the Texas Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine in Texas: “That narrow exception covers only the
discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform
an illegal act.” Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
The Texas Legislature, however, has not waived governmental immunity under
Sabine Pilot. See Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Thomas, No. 09-15-00029-CV, 2016
Tex. App. LEXIS 879, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citing Midland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Watley, 216 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2006, no pet.). As stated in Watley,
The Texas Supreme Court created a common law cause of action to
protect at-will employees in Sabine Pilot for cases in which an
employee is terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act. Sabine
Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735. However, the exception created by Sabine
Pilot does not overcome a governmental entity’s sovereign immunity.
216 S.W.3d at 381; see also Nueces Cnty. v. Thornton, No. 13-03-011-CV, 2004
Tex. App. LEXIS 2103, at *16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 4, 2004, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Salazar v. Lopez, 88 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002,
10
no pet.) (citing Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175,
177 (Tex. 1994)); Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d
767, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Carroll v. Black,
938 S.W.2d 134, 134-35 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, writ denied)). The trial court did
not err in dismissing Everett’s Sabine Pilot claim. We overrule issue one as to
Appellant’s Sabine Pilot claim.
Everett’s Tort Claims
On appeal, Everett argues that CISD’s assertion that his tort claims are barred
by governmental immunity “is overly broad and fails to consider critical
exceptions.” Everett cites to City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex.
2009), in arguing that ultra vires acts performed outside the scope of lawful authority
are not protected by governmental immunity, and he cites Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976), in arguing that governmental immunity does not apply when tort claims
are tied to constitutional violations and retaliatory acts beyond lawful authority. We
have already determined that Everett’s Petition did not assert any ultra vires claims
or constitutional claims.
Everett’s claims against CISD for defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with employment,
11
and retaliation,4 are intentional torts, and a government unit is generally immune
from all common law intentional tort claims unless immunity is specifically waived
by statute. See Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 375 (Tex. 2011) (explaining
that it is firmly established “that any tort claim against the government is brought
‘under’ the [Texas Tort Claims] Act for purposes of section 101.106, even if the Act
does not waive immunity[]”); Pineda v. City of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276, 280-81
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“[A] governmental entity does not
waive its sovereign immunity to a party’s claim for personal injury or death if that
claim arises out of an intentional tort.”); see also Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73
S.W.3d 178, 182 (Tex. 2001) (defamation is an intentional tort); Ginn v. NCI Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)
(fraudulent misrepresentation is an intentional tort); City of Houston v. Guthrie, 332
S.W.3d 578, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (tortious
interference is an intentional tort) (citing Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Tex. 1995)); Thomas v. Dallas Hous. Auth., No. 05-21-00273-CV, 2022 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3747, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(retaliation is an intentional tort). The Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive
immunity for intentional tort claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§
4
Everett did not plead a claim for retaliation under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. §§ 21.001-556.
12
101.025 (waiving immunity from suit against a government unit for negligence
solely in the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or equipment that causes
injury or death and for “personal injury or death so caused by a condition or use of
tangible personal or real property[]”), 101.057 (“This chapter does not apply to a
claim . . . arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional
tort. . . .”); see also Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629,
643 (Tex. 2012). Everett does not allege any negligence claims related to the
operation of or use of a motor-driven vehicle. The trial court did not err in dismissing
Everett’s intentional tort claims. As a matter of law, we conclude that governmental
immunity has not been waived for Everett’s intentional tort claims. 5 We overrule his
stated issues two and three.
Everett’s Whistleblower Claim
As to his Whistleblower claim, Everett argues on appeal that “[t]he trial court
erred in dismissing Everett’s claims under the Texas Whistleblower Act (Tex. Gov’t
Code §§ 554.001-554.010). The Act expressly waives immunity where a public
employee suffers retaliation for making a good-faith report of a legal violation to an
5
Everett cites to Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Renya, 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1993) in his third stated issue. He cites to Reyna in support of his position that “[g]overnmental immunity does not shield public employers from Sabine Pilot claims brought against officials in their individual capacities when the conduct is retaliatory, malicious, or ultra vires.” However, Reyna is completely inapposite, and it does not address or involve governmental immunity or a Sabine Pilot claim, nor does it support his argument.
13
appropriate law enforcement authority.” Everett argues he made “protected, goodfaith reports concerning[] [f]raudulent or unauthorized use of workers compensation
procedures[,] . . . [c]ohorst and signatures related to ‘gag orders’[,] . . . [and] alleged
fabrication of employee statements[,]” and that these reports “satisfy the
Whistleblower Act [r]equirements.”
The Texas Whistleblower Act prohibits a governmental entity from
terminating or taking any adverse employment action against an employee who in
good faith reports to an appropriate law enforcement authority a violation of law by
the entity or a public employee. Montgomery Cnty. v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 612
(Tex. 2007) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 554.001-.010). The Act contains a
provision waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of liability for authorized relief.
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035; State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 881-82 (Tex.
2009). To demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction over an asserted Whistleblower
Act claim, a plaintiff must actually allege a violation of the act and not merely a
reference of it. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 882 (“‘[M]ere reference to the . . . Act does not
establish the state’s consent to be sued and thus is not enough to confer jurisdiction
on the trial court.’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587
(Tex. 2001)). Thus, the elements of a Whistleblower Act claim “must be included
within the pleading so that the trial court can determine [if] they sufficiently allege
a violation under the Act [and] fall within” the waiver of immunity from suit
14
provided by section 554.0035. Id. at 884. For example, under Lueck, whether an
employee made a “good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law
enforcement authority is a jurisdictional question.” Tex. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs. v. Okoli, 295 S.W.3d 667, 668 (Tex. 2009).
A plaintiff establishes a claim under the Whistleblower Act by showing: (1)
he is a public employee; (2) he acted in good faith by making a report; (3) the report
involved a violation of law by an agency or employee; (4) the report was made to an
appropriate law enforcement authority; and (5) he suffered retaliation as a result of
making the report. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002; Windham Sch. Dist. v.
Thomas, No. 09-24-00183-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3527, at *18 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont May 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 554.002; Phelan v. Tex. Tech Univ., No. 07-07-00171-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
500, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 23, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
In his Petition, Everett alleges that he “engaged in protected whistleblower
activity by reporting illegal or unethical conduct within CISD[,]” and that “[i]n
retaliation, [CISD] imposed a coercive gag order, disseminated falsified internal
statements, and initiated wrongful employment actions that forced [Everett’s]
resignation.” However, Everett’s Petition fails to identify the appropriate law
enforcement authority to which he reported the alleged illegal conduct within CISD.
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002; Windham Sch. Dist., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
15
3527, at *18. Accordingly, Everett fails to sufficiently plead jurisdictional facts for
at least one of the necessary elements to a claim under the Whistleblower Act. See
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002; Windham Sch. Dist., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3527,
at *18. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the claim.
Dismissal with Prejudice
Everrett argues in his fourth issue that the trial court erred in dismissing his
claims with prejudice prior to discovery because it denied him the opportunity to
develop factual support for his claims, and Everett requests that this Court remand
the case “for full adjudication on the merits and the opportunity to develop the
record.”
Generally, if the plaintiff’s petition does not allege facts sufficient to
affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction but the defects in the petition are curable by
amendment, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be
afforded an opportunity to amend her petition. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.-Cmty. Just.
Assistance Div. v. Campos, 384 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 226-27; Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317, 321 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2007, no pet.). But if a governmental unit filed its plea to the jurisdiction asserting
its immunity and the plaintiff was given a reasonable opportunity to amend his
petition, and the plaintiff’s amended petition still did not allege facts that would
16
constitute a waiver of immunity, the trial court should dismiss the case with
prejudice. See Campos, 348 S.W.3d at 815-16; Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 639-40.
After Everett filed his Original Petition, CISD filed its original Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individual Defendants and Plea to the
Jurisdiction, wherein CISD argued that the trial court should dismiss Everett’s suit
against CISD because CISD enjoys governmental immunity from suit and liability.
Everett filed Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition, then CISD filed a new Plea to the
Jurisdiction, then Everett filed a Second Amended Petition, and CISD filed a First
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction. In such circumstances, The Texas Supreme Court
has held that a party is not entitled to an additional opportunity to replead his case.
See Campos, 348 S.W.3d at 815-16; Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 639-40; Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 231 (holding parties had opportunity to amend their pleadings and were
not entitled to another opportunity to replead); see also Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist.
v. Braun, 625 S.W.3d 622, 636 n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.)
(plaintiff filed her first amended petition after governmental unit filed its plea to
jurisdiction; “[i]n such circumstances, the supreme court has held that a party is not
entitled to an additional opportunity to replead [her] case[]”); Amador v. City of
Irving, No. 05-19-00278-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2353, at *25 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Mar. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (after governmental unit’s plea to
jurisdiction notified plaintiff its immunity had not been waived, plaintiff, in her
17
amended petition, filed after plea to jurisdiction, did not allege additional facts to
support waiver of immunity and trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claim with
prejudice). The trial court did not err in dismissing Everett’s claims with prejudice.
We overrule issue four.
Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on July 1, 2026
Opinion Delivered July 23, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
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