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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1005
JOSUE ARIEL FUENTES; CRISTIAN AYALA RIVAS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Rossie D. Alston, Jr., District Judge. (1:23−cv−00408−RDA−IDD)
Argued: March 19, 2026 Decided: July 24, 2026
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
Diaz and Judge Gregory joined.
ARGUED: Margot Pyne Kniffin, YACUB LAW OFFICES, LLC, Woodbridge, Virginia,
for Appellants. Elizabeth A. Spavins, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ivan Yacub, Ajoo Kim, YACUB LAW
OFFICES, LLC, Woodbridge, Virginia, for Appellants. Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Katelyn Masetta Alvarez, Kevin Hirst, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
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DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge:
Josue Ariel Fuentes and Cristian Ayala Rivas (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are
naturalized United States citizens who received legal status through the Special Immigrant
Juvenile (“SIJ”) program. Plaintiffs’ noncitizen mothers both attempted to gain lawful
status through their children. However, the applications were denied, pursuant to an
exclusion clause in the SIJ statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II), and United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (“USCIS”) implementing regulation that excludes
the parents of SIJ recipients from receiving immigration benefits. Id.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II). Plaintiffs appeal the denials, challenging USCIS’ interpretation
of the exclusion clause and the exclusion clause itself on equal protection grounds. We
find that the plain text of the exclusion clause supports USCIS’ regulation and that the
exclusion clause survives rational basis review. Thus, we affirm the decision of the district
court.
I.
A.
In 1990, Congress amended the special immigrant classification to include
noncitizen juveniles who require the protection of the state courts due to parental abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); see also Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005–06. To receive SIJ status under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), an applicant must be (1) physically present in
the United States at the time of filing and adjudication of their petition, (2) unmarried at
the time of filing and adjudication, (3) under the age of 21 at the time of filing, (4) subject
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to juvenile court determinations issued in the United States that meet the specified
requirements, (5) obtain United States Department of Homeland Security consent, and (6)
obtain United States Department of Health and Human Services consent, if applicable. See
U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 6, pt. J, ch. 2 (2026).
Applicants must also file an I-360 petition with United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”). See id. Individuals with SIJ status can thereafter petition USCIS to
adjust their SIJ status to legal permanent resident (“LPR”) status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255; USCIS,
Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. F, ch. 7, § 2. After five years, an LPR can apply for
naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
The SIJ statute has an explicit restriction: the parents of minors with SIJ status can’t
receive lawful status based on their relationship to the minor child. The exclusion clause
provides that:
No natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special
immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such
parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II). The exclusion clause has remained unchanged in every
amendment of the INA since the establishment of the SIJ program in 1990. 1
1
See, e.g., Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 141, 105 Stat. 1733, 1744-45; Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460-61; William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235,
122 Stat. 5044.
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Separate from the exclusion clause, the SIJ classification provision was amended in
1997 and 2008. In 1997, Congress updated the provision’s required findings for a juvenile
to receive SIJ status to include a finding of parental “abuse, neglect or abandonment.”
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998 § 113. In the most recent 2008 amendments, Congress,
amongst other changes, allowed for SIJ status based on a finding that “reunification with 1
or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect or abandonment or
similar basis under state law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added); see also
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 § 235.
Through both the 1997 and 2008 amendments, the language of the exclusion clause was
left unchanged and does not distinguish between a parent with findings of “abuse, neglect
or abandonment” and a parent with no such findings.
And in 2022, USCIS reaffirmed the exclusion clause in § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II), as
it published a final rule that mirrors the exclusion clause:
No parental immigration rights based on special immigrant juvenile
classification. The natural or prior adoptive parent(s) of a petitioner granted
special immigrant juvenile classification will not be accorded any right,
privilege, or status under the Act by virtue of their parentage. This
prohibition applies to all of the petitioner’s natural and prior adoptive
parent(s).
8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i) (emphasis added); see also 87 Fed. Reg. 13066, 13093 (Mar. 8, 2022).
B.
Josue Ariel Fuentes arrived in the United States at 13 years old from El Salvador,
after he was abandoned by his father. His mother, Karla Yamileth Figueroa Guardado, was
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granted custody by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court in Loudoun County,
Virginia. The Loudoun court found that reunification with one or both of Fuentes’s parents
was not possible because of abuse, neglect or abandonment within the meaning of the INA.
He then successfully petitioned through the SIJ program for an immigrant visa and lawful
permanent residency. Fuentes became a naturalized United States citizen in 2016. In
November 2017, Fuentes’ mother submitted a Form I-131 for legal status “as the parent of
an active-duty member of the United States Armed Forces,” based on Fuentes’ military
service. 2 Her application was denied by USCIS “because [her] son was granted a Green
Card based on his SIJ classification and he later naturalized” and therefore “he may not
apply for his natural or prior adoptive parents to get military parole-in-place” even for the
“non-abusive, custodial parent.” J.A. 39. 3
Cristian Ayala Rivas arrived in the United States in 2010 from El Salvador. Rivas
was abandoned by his father and targeted by local gangs. His paternal uncle was granted
custody by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. 4 J.A. 201. The
Montgomery court found that “reunification with one or both of Christian’s [sic] parents is
not viable due to abuse, abandonment or neglect” within the meaning of the INA. J.A. 201
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rivas also successfully petitioned for an immigrant
2
Fuentes served as a United States Marine.
3
Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains
the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize
the “[J.A. or JA] #” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.
4
Rivas’ mother consented to the grant of custody to Rivas’ uncle.
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visa pursuant to the SIJ program and was granted lawful permanent residency. Rivas
became a naturalized United States citizen in 2021. In December 2021, Rivas filed an I130 petition for his mother, Teresa Rivas Vasquez. The petition was denied because
individuals, like Rivas, “who obtained [lawful permanent resident] status as an SIJ are not
eligible to later confer immigration benefits to their biological or adoptive parent(s), even
if they are not the parent that abused, neglected or abandoned the child.” J.A. 73.
Plaintiffs sued in federal district court asserting two challenges: (1) an
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) challenge to USCIS’ interpretation of the exclusion
clause such that it excludes any individual who was granted SIJ status from ever conferring
immigration benefits on their natural or adoptive parents; and (2) a constitutional challenge
asserting that the inability to confer immigration benefits onto parents of SIJ recipients
violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. The
parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court found in favor
of USCIS. On the APA claim, the district court reasoned that USCIS’ regulation
comported with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II). And on the equal
protection claim, it reasoned that Plaintiffs had no constitutional injury because the statute
impacted their parents and not Plaintiffs directly, and in the alternative, that the regulation
survives rational basis review.
Before us, Plaintiffs raise the same challenges, arguing that the district court erred
on both issues. We affirm the district court because the plain text of the statute supports
USCIS’ interpretation and Plaintiffs cannot overcome rational basis review to support an
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equal protection challenge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and each
challenge is addressed in turn.
II.
We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. J.D. by Doherty
v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 2019). And as a general
matter, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is also reviewed de novo. See Seven Cnty.
Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., Colorado, 605 U.S. 168, 179 (2025).
III.
We first address Plaintiffs’ APA challenge. Our analysis proceeds in two parts.
First, we interpret the exclusion clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) to determine
whether Congress barred natural parents of SIJ recipients from later receiving immigration
benefits based on parentage. Second, we consider whether USCIS’ implementing
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i), faithfully carries out that statutory bar.
A.
“The starting point for any issue of statutory interpretation . . . is the language of the
statute itself.” United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2007). To determine a
statute’s plain meaning, we review the “text of the statute, read in ‘the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” Taylor v.
Grubbs, 930 F.3d 611, 616 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
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337, 341 (1997)). “If the plain language is unambiguous, we need look no further.” Hately
v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 784 (4th Cir. 2019).
It is a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction that courts “have a duty, where
possible, ‘to give effect’ to all operative portions of the enacted language, including its
‘every clause and word.’” Shipbuilders Council of Am. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F.3d 234,
244 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). “A statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004).
And “when possible, we construe statutes to avoid absurd results.” See Timms v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 93 F.4th 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2024).
The judiciary’s role is not to rewrite the statute, but to interpret Congress’ intent.
United States v. Jones, 60 F.4th 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2023). Courts “must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
B.
Beginning with “the language of the statute itself,” Bly, 510 F.3d at 460, the
exclusion clause provides that “no natural parent . . . of any alien provided special
immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be
accorded any, right, privilege, or status under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (emphasis added). The dispositive question is how the term
“alien” should be construed. To properly construe the term, we must “consider all the
words employed,” rather than “review[ing] isolated phrases.” United States v. Ide, 624
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F.3d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 2010). And the last-antecedent rule of statutory construction
“provides that ‘a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only
the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.’” Bank of Am. Corp. v. United States, 148
F.4th 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2025) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Lockhart v. United States, 577
U.S. 347, 351 (2016)). “This canon captures the simple intuition that Congress more likely
intends a phrase to modify an adjacent noun or phrase than one far away.” Id. Applied
here, it means that we should understand the entire limiting clause “of any alien provided
special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter” to modify “no natural
parent,” and the nested limiting clause “provided special immigrant status” to modify
“alien.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II).
So, reading the statute in its specific context, Taylor, 930 F.3d at 616, the plain text
of the statute supplies the following: no natural parent of an alien who received SIJ status
can ever receive immigration benefits based on the parent-child relationship. Thus, the
district court properly concluded that the statute applies “to the natural parent of any person
who is an alien at the time that they receive special immigrant status and deprives them of
the opportunity to obtain benefits by virtue of the minor alien receiving the special status
for any time thereafter.” J.A. 205 (emphasis in original).
This plain reading is also supported by the general principles against superfluities
and absurdities. Plaintiffs’ interpretation would render the phrase in the statute “shall
thereafter” superfluous. Taken together, shall thereafter is understood to be a permanent
bar on the connected action. See Shall, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (explaining
“shall” has a “mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically
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uphold”); Thereafter, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (explaining “thereafter”
means “afterward” or “later”). To give “effect to all operative portions of the enacted
language, including its every clause and word,” Shipbuilders Council of Am., 578 F.3d at
244–45, we must apply a mandatory and permanent bar on parentage-based rights for the
parents of SIJ recipients.
Plaintiffs ask us to read the term “alien” in isolation so that the statute only applies
to noncitizens at the time of application. But Plaintiffs’ view would make the exclusion
clause applicable in only the narrowest circumstance. Typically, only United States
citizens who are 21 years or older may petition for immigrant visas on behalf of their
parents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(f). And LPRs can generally
only sponsor their spouse or unmarried children, with limited exceptions. Take military
parole-in-place, for example. Under military parole-in-place, active-duty members of the
United States armed forces or reserves and honorably discharged veterans of the armed
services or reserves can apply for a visa for a qualifying relative, including parents. That
is one limited avenue where a noncitizen may apply for benefits for a parent. Plaintiffs
focus on this exception as proof that the statutory bar is not wholly superfluous under their
interpretation.
But we understand that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Assn’s., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). The reverse is also true. It stretches reasonableness
to suggest that Congress included “shall thereafter”—a permanent bar—to apply only to
the limited circumstance of military parole-in-place. See Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD
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Financial Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344, 361 (4th Cir. 2020) (“The canon [against superfluities]
. . . is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same
statut[e].”). A reading of the statute that limits the exclusion clause to only noncitizens at
the time of applying would render the exclusion clause superfluous.
Accordingly, the Government’s reading comports best with the plain meaning of
the text. The statute as a whole means that the exclusion clause applies to those who
received SIJ status, past and present.
What’s more, Plaintiffs’ interpretation would allow a parent who has abused,
neglected, or abandoned their children to receive parentage-based immigration benefits.
Given the origins of the statute, this reading produces absurd results. Lynch v. Jackson,
853 F.3d 116, 122 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Readings of a statute that produce absurd results are
to be avoided.”). Congress created the SIJ classification with the express goal to protect
children:
The SIJ provisions of the INA were enacted in 1990 to protect abused,
neglected, or abandoned children who, with their families, illegally entered
the United States. Congress provided an alternative to deportation for these
children. Rather than being deported along with abusive or neglectful
parents, or deported to parents who had abandoned them once in the United
States, such children may seek special status to remain in the United States.
Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). The provisions of the SIJ
classification must be read with that purpose in mind. See United States v. Murphy, 35
F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e should give effect to the legislative will as expressed
in the language.”). Yet, Plaintiffs conceded in their brief and during oral argument that
their position would allow any parent of an SIJ recipient to receive immigration benefits,
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including the parent or parents who abused, neglected or abandoned their children. See
Appellants’ Br. (ECF No. 12) at 35 n.5 5 (hereinafter, “Opening Br.”) (“Per this, abandoning
parents would also not be excluded from the eligibility for benefits under the SIJS statute
and the exclusion clause.”). We interpret statutes to “avoid untenable distinctions and
unreasonable results” yet the proposed outcome from Plaintiffs would yield such a result.
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982).
“Taking the plain meaning of these texts, and assuming that the words say what they
mean and mean what they say,” Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277, we hold that the exclusion clause
means that the parent of a child who received SIJ status cannot claim immigration benefits
based only on the fact they are the SIJ recipient’s parent.
C.
We next address whether USCIS’ implementing regulation is “consistent with the
statute.” Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 609 (2013) (“It is a basic tenet that
‘regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are
promulgated.’” (quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977).)). We hold
that it is.
The regulation provides that “[t]he natural . . . parent(s) of a petitioner granted
special immigrant juvenile classification will not be accorded any right, privilege, or status
under the Act by virtue of their parentage” which “applies to all of the petitioner’s natural
and prior adoptive parent(s).” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that
Page numbers for citations to ECF documents utilize the page numbers in the red
5
header on each document.
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USCIS’ regulation runs contrary to congressional intent: first, because the use of petitioner
rather than alien broadens the scope of the statute beyond its intended purpose; and, second,
because Congress intended to make a distinction between parents who abandon their
children and parents who do not. See Opening Br. at 22–23. Yet, the plain statutory text
undermines both arguments.
First, as we discussed above, the plain text of the statute creates a permanent bar on
parentage-based immigration benefits for the parents of those who ever received SIJ status.
As such, the distinction between petitioner in the regulation and alien in the statute is “a
matter of semantics—not substance.” Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 573 (1984)
(Powell, J., concurring). The “shall thereafter” language confirms that an “alien provided
special immigrant status” under the statute is, in practical effect, the same as a “petitioner
granted special immigrant juvenile classification” as used in the regulation. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(i) (emphasis added).
Likewise, the plain text of the exclusion clause starts with “no natural parent.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II). It makes no distinction between any category of parent.
This statutory language has remained unchanged since it was first included in the statute.
As a result, the regulatory language saying the same is a valid interpretation of the statute.
Finally, nothing in the 2008 amendments changes this result. In 2008, Congress
reauthorized the INA and amended the SIJ section to allow children to receive SIJ status
based on the finding that at least one parent, rather than both parents, were abusive,
neglectful or abandoning. See § 1101(a)(27)(J). Previously, the finding had to be made as
to both parents. Plaintiffs argue that this created a statutory difference based on whether
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the parent abandoned their child. But there is no support for such a distinction. The change
to the visa requirements cannot be read to expand the category of people eligible for
immigration benefits without a clear statement of congressional intent. In Perez v.
Cuccinelli, the court considered whether Congress intended to require a finding of
permanent nonviability for reunification under the SIJ statute. 949 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir.
2020). In holding that Congress did not, the court stated that “if Congress had intended
such a requirement, it easily could have said so” as Congress rarely merely implies such
decisions. Id. The same is true here. If Congress intended to make a distinction based on
whether a parent abandoned their child, it would have said so. “Courts are not free to read
into the language what is not there” and should “apply the statute as written.” United States
v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Am. Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 71 n.6
(“Had Congress intended so fundamental a distinction, it would have expressed that intent
clearly in the statutory language or the legislative history.”). So, the regulation’s
prohibition on all parents is the correct interpretation of legislative intent.
In sum, we hold that USCIS’ implementing regulation is consistent with the
exclusion clause at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II).
IV.
Plaintiffs also bring an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment. See
Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 356 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that the “Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal protection
of the laws”). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
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that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that
the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison
v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). “Once this showing is made, the court
proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite
level of scrutiny.” Id. Where the classification involves unadmitted noncitizens, it is
subject to rational basis review. See Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“Although courts usually subject national-origin classifications to strict scrutiny, when
such classifications involve unadmitted aliens in the immigration context, we subject them
only to rational basis review.”).
We address each prong in turn. First, we conclude that Plaintiffs have shown
differential treatment for purposes of equal protection. Second, we conclude that the
distinction survives rational basis.
A.
The first inquiry is whether Plaintiffs were “treated differently from others with
whom [they were] similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654. The district court
found that Plaintiffs were not treated differently because USCIS’ decision denying relief
impacted the Plaintiffs’ parents and not Plaintiffs themselves. However, we disagree.
A benefit of citizenship is the ability to bring your loved ones, including your
parents, to your new home through the legal avenues provided by the government. See
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 806–07 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that in a
separate provision of the INA “Congress extended to American citizens the right to choose
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to be reunited in the United States with their immediate families” and as such “[t]he focus
was on citizens” and “[t]he right to seek such relief was given only to the citizen, not the
alien”). For Plaintiffs, these efforts are automatically futile as a matter of law because of
the type of visa they received. Unlike naturalized citizens who are entitled to the full set
of rights of any citizen, SIJ recipients don’t get the same benefit. And this unequal
treatment is “intentional or purposeful” because Congress drew the classification on the
face of the statute: citizens whose status traces back to SIJ classification are treated
differently from other citizens when they seek to petition for a parent. See Fiallo, 430 U.S.
at 806–07 (Marshall, J, dissenting) (identifying equal protection concerns where “Congress
did choose to extend such privileges to American citizens but then denied them to a small
class of citizens”).
B.
Thus, we must “proceed[] to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be
justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654. Neither party
disputes that rational basis review applies. See Midi, 566 F.3d at 137.
Under rational basis review, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). This review
is highly deferential and “not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
legislative choices.” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993). So, the court
must uphold a statutory classification against an equal-protection challenge “‘if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
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classification.’” Orquera v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 413, 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting FCC v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The evidentiary burden is on the
plaintiff, not the Government. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 at 314–
15. Plaintiffs “bear[] the heavy burden of negating every conceivable basis which might
reasonably support the challenged classification.” Van Der Linde Housing, Inc. v. Rivanna
Solid Waste Auth., 507 F.3d 290, 293 (4th Cir. 2007). Congress “need not ‘actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale that supporting its classification.’” Heller,
509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)); see also Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (“[I]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature.”). A legislative choice “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.” Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315. The court has
acknowledged that there is “no subject over which Congress has more power than the
admission of [noncitizens].” Santos v. Holder, 532 F. App’x 404, 405 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792).
Congress created the SIJ classification to protect abused, neglected, or abandoned
children. See Yeboah, 345 F.3d at 221. Thus, the exclusion clause serves the legitimate
purpose of preventing those children from current or future harm by preventing the parent
who may have abused, neglected, or abandoned the child from obtaining immigration
benefits via this parentage. Congress’ purview is at its strongest in the immigration
context, see Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 126–27 (4th Cir. 2011), and Plaintiffs
failed to negate “‘every conceivable basis’” for this clause. United States v. Timms, 664
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F.3d 436, 447 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320); see also Talley v. Folwell,
133 F.4th 289, 304 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 609 (2025) (finding no error in
a district court’s rational basis analysis “in light of the high bar set by the many opinions
applying rational-basis review”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show that the Government has
no rational basis for such a distinction.
V.
For the above reasons, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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