NUMBERS 13-26-00222-CV, 13-26-00223-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER MATTHEW VICKERS, Appellant,
v.
LENA CHERIE CHAISSON-MUNOZ, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 444TH DISTRICT COURT
OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron
Appellant Christopher Matthew Vickers filed notices of appeal from protective
orders issued in trial court cause numbers 2025-DCL-06853-H and 2026-DCL-00059 in
the 444th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, docketed respectively in our appellate cause numbers 13-26-00222-CV and 13-26-00223-CV. We address both causes in this
single memorandum opinion in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. We
dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant and appellee Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz are the parents of a fouryear-old minor child, C.D.V. 1 Pursuant to an agreed order, the parties were named as
joint managing conservators and shared possession of the child. On December 16, 2025,
appellee filed an application for protective order against appellant in cause number 2025-DCL-6853 alleging that appellant “committed family violence, dating violence, or child
abuse.” She requested a temporary ex parte order, and she provided a supporting affidavit
in support of her request. Appellee’s affidavit stated that the child had sustained multiple
injuries during appellant’s period of possession, that the child sustained extreme distress
during transfers of possession, and that the child screams, cries, and begs to stay with
her. On January 6, 2026, appellee filed a different application for protective order against
appellant in cause number 2026-DCL-59, alleging in relevant part that appellant’s friend
had sexually abused the child. In each application, appellee invoked the provisions of the
Texas Family Code regarding protective orders.
The trial court held a hearing in these cases on January 22, 2026. After hearing
evidence, the trial court recessed the hearing. Before resuming the hearing, the trial court
signed a protective order on January 24, 2026. On February 12, 2026, the trial court
1 We refer to the minor child by their initials in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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signed the “Corrected Protective Order” at issue in these appeals. This order recounts, in
relevant part, that:
Cause No. 2023-DCL-01268 was filed in this Court in 2023 as a Suit
Affecting the Parent[-]Child Relationship (SAPCR). During the course of a
jury trial, the parties settled the case and an Agreed Final Order was entered
in the cause. In pertinent part, the parties agreed that [appellee] would have
custody of the Child for one week in Cameron County or a contiguous
county and the following week [appellant] would have custody of the Child
for one week in Bexar County or a contiguous county and so forth. On
January 20, 2026, [appellee] filed her Petition to Modify the Parent-Child
Relationship.
Cause Nos. 2025-DCL-6853 and 2026-DCL-59 are each Applications for a
Protective Order filed by [appellee] in 2025 and 2026, respectively. The first
Application was assigned to the 103rd District Court of Cameron County.
The second Application was assigned to the 107th District Court of
Cameron County. Both Applications were eventually transferred to the
444th District Court , where the SAPCR was filed.
. . . After some discussion on whether the Applications and the Petition to
Modify should be tried separately, the parties acquiesced that the Court
hear all three causes at the same time.
(Internal footnote omitted).
These appeals ensued. In each appeal, appellant has filed a motion for expedited
decision premised on the “irreparable harm” to appellant and the minor child caused by
the trial court’s protective order. Because we have sua sponte accelerated our review of
these appeals, we dismiss appellant’s motions as moot.
On July 20, 2026, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant in both appeals that it
appeared that appellant was “attempting to appeal an order which is unappealable.” The
Clerk advised appellant that the appeals would be dismissed if the defects were not cured
within ten days. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. On July 21, 2026, appellant filed motions for
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leave to file amended notices of appeal in each case. See id. R. 25.1(g). Appellant
asserted that he had received the Clerk’s notice, and he requested the Court to permit
him to file amended notices of appeal clarifying that the orders he is appealing are “final,
appealable protective order[s].” We grant appellant’s motions for leave, and we consider
appellants’ amended notices of appeal in each case.
II. JURISDICTION
We have the inherent power and obligation to ascertain our jurisdiction over an
appeal. 1 Coventry Ct., LLC v. Downs of Hillcrest Residential Ass’n, Inc., 728 S.W.3d
711, 714 (Tex. 2026) (per curiam). In general, we have appellate jurisdiction only over
final judgments. Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 718 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. 2025);
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 & nn.11–12 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is
final for the purposes of appeal if it either “actually disposes of every pending claim and
party” or “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all
parties.” Estate of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2026) (per curiam) (quoting
Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205). We also have jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory
orders when authorized by statute; however, we strictly construe such statutes as narrow
exceptions to the general rule requiring finality. Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P., 718 S.W.3d
at 237; Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 736 (Tex.
2019).
III. ANALYSIS
Title 4 of the Texas Family Code governs protective orders pertaining to family
violence. In re J.K.R., 658 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022,
no pet.); see TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.001–93.004. “A court shall render a protective order
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as provided by Section 85.001(b) if the court finds that family violence has occurred.” TEX.
FAM. CODE § 81.001; see id. § 85.001(a) (“At the close of a hearing on an application for
a protective order, the court shall find whether family violence has occurred.”). The Texas
Family Code expressly addresses the right to appeal a protective order issued under its
terms. Section 81.009 provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (c), a protective order
rendered under this subtitle may be appealed.
(b) A protective order rendered against a party in a suit for dissolution of
a marriage may not be appealed until the time the final decree of
dissolution of the marriage becomes a final, appealable order.
(c) A protective order rendered against a party in a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship may not be appealed until the time an order
providing for support of the child or possession of or access to the
child becomes a final, appealable order.
Id. § 81.009; see In re Martinez, 592 S.W.3d 170, 173 n.2 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, orig.
proceeding). Thus, an appeal is allowed for a protective order that is not issued in a suit
for dissolution of a marriage or regarding the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 81.009(a); see, e.g., Patil v. Joshi, No. 07-23-00028-CV, 2023 WL 5156675, at *2
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting the argument that a
pending divorce proceeding rendered the protective order unappealable because
“although there was a consolidated hearing, there was no overlapping of filings between
the two separate cause numbers”); Phillips v. Phillips, 651 S.W.3d 112, 115 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (concluding that a protective order was
appealable where the application was not filed as a motion in a suit for dissolution of a
marriage, was filed under a separate cause number in a separate court, and the appellate
record did not reflect that it was consolidated with the divorce proceeding); Puente v.
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Puente, No. 01-18-00583-CV, 2019 WL 3418510, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that a protective order was appealable
where it was filed in a different cause number and assigned to a different court than a
petition for divorce); Watts v. Adviento, No. 02-17-00424-CV, 2019 WL 1388534, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that a protective
order was appealable where it was docketed separately from a pending SAPCR and was
issued only in its own cause number); Culver v. Culver, 360 S.W.3d 526, 529 n.2 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (stating that protective orders issued in separate cause
numbers and treated “entirely separate” from divorce proceedings are appealable); In re
Keck, 329 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding)
(concluding that a protective order filed in a different case and different cause number
from a parental termination case was appealable). In contrast, protective orders issued in
a divorce proceeding or a SAPCR are interlocutory orders which are not subject to appeal.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 81.009(b), (c); A.C. v. S.G.A., No. 04-25-00761-CV, 2026 WL
1020691, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 15, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); Belmont v.
Belmont, No. 02-25-00388-CV, 2025 WL 2492351, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); McCoy v. McCoy, No. 03-25-00237-CV, 2025 WL 1583512, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, appellee has filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in cause
number 2023-DCL-1268, an application for protective order in cause number 2025-DCL6853, and an application for protective order in cause number 2026-DCL-59. The
protective order states that “the parties acquiesced that the Court hear all three causes
at the same time.” And, the protective order includes all three cause numbers in its style.
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By the terms of the protective order, appellee’s petition to modify remains pending, and
the trial court clearly envisions additional proceedings in the case. We conclude that the
protective order at issue is an interlocutory order which is not appealable. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 81.009(c); Daniels v. Funes, No. 03-10-00317-CV, 2011 WL 2437692, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Austin June 17, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that a protective order
proceeding and a divorce proceeding were “intertwined to such a degree that they must
be treated as a single suit” and thus the protective order was not appealable).
IV. CONCLUSION
We dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
JENNY CRON
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
24th day of July, 2026.
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