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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCPW-XX-XXXXXXX
27-JUL-2026
09:07 AM
Dkt. 18 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---ALEXANDRA MILLER, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE LANCE D. COLLINS,
Judge of the District Court of the Second Circuit,
State of Hawaiʻi, Respondent Judge,
and
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAIʻI;
and WYLAN FAULK, Respondents.
SCPW-XX-XXXXXXX
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CASE NO. 2DSC-XX-XXXXXXX)
JULY 27, 2026
DEVENS, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND GINOZA, AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE COPELAND, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
I.
Bigsby is a dog.
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The small claims division of the District Court of the
Second Circuit ruled on Bigsby’s ownership.
The legislature has confined the small claims division to
three narrow categories: small money claims, residential
security-deposit disputes, and the return of leased or rented
personal property. Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 633-27
(2016).
Deciding who owns a dog is not on that list.
This case comes to us on a petition for a writ of mandamus.
There is no other path. A small claims judgment cannot be
appealed. HRS § 633-28(a) (2016); Rules of the Small Claims
Division (RSCD) Rule 12(b).
We grant the petition. The court lacked jurisdiction to
decide Bigsby’s ownership.
The small claims division’s March 4, 2026 ruling is
vacated. The case is remanded to the district court with
instructions to dismiss it without prejudice.
II.
Alexandra Miller and Wylan Faulk brought Bigsby home in
2017. After the couple separated, they shared possession of
their dog on a rotating schedule. That arrangement lasted for
about two years.
In January 2026, Faulk refused to return Bigsby on the
scheduled exchange date. Miller filed a statement of claim in
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the small claims division of the District Court of the Second
Circuit, Wailuku Division. Her “primary request” was the
“return of dog.” Alternatively, she sought $3,000.
Miller alleged that she and Faulk “jointly acquired”
Bigsby, that veterinary care had been registered under her name
and address, and that she had paid vet and related expenses for
years. She pleaded the dog as “unique personal property” for
which money damages would be inadequate. Miller asked the court
to order Faulk “to immediately return Bigsby.”
Trial was held in March 2026. Miller testified that the
case was “about the return of my dog, Bigsby, who is being
wrongfully held by the defendant.” Faulk testified that after
Miller told him she would likely be leaving the island, he
decided Bigsby would stay on Maui, ended the shared-custody
arrangement, and “assumed full custody to provide consistency
for the dog.” He asked the court to “confirm my ownership.”
Judge Lance Collins ruled for Faulk. The court found it
“equitable to allow Mr. Faulk to have legal and physical
ownership of the dog.” It then ordered Faulk to pay Miller
$1,504.79 — half the dog’s valuation plus half the veterinary
bills — to compensate her for “losing ownership of her half of
the dog.”
Subject matter jurisdiction was not raised at trial.
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Miller moved to set aside the judgment and, separately, for
reconsideration or new trial. At the hearing on April 27, 2026,
Miller argued for the first time that the judgment was void for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under HRS § 633-27.
The court denied the motion. It reasoned that Miller
“chose this forum, was requesting monetary relief, and the court
determined that it wasn’t her property.”
Miller filed this petition for a writ of mandamus in May
2026.
III.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear
and decide a particular type of case. It is fixed by law. It
cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel.
Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 125 Hawaiʻi 128, 141, 254 P.3d 439,
452 (2011).
A court that exceeds its jurisdiction acts outside the law.
The small claims division of the district court is a court
of statutorily limited jurisdiction. HRS § 633-27(a) confines
the division to three categories. Two are defined by what the
plaintiff can seek: money only, or the return of leased or
rented property. The third is defined by the parties’ dispute,
a residential landlord-tenant security deposit. The statute
reads:
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(1) Cases for the recovery of money only where the amount
claimed does not exceed $5,000 exclusive of interest and
costs, except as provided by section 633-30;
(2) Cases involving disagreement between landlord and
tenant about the security deposit in a residential
landlord-tenant relationship; and
(3) Cases for the return of leased or rented personal
property worth less than $5,000 where the amount claimed
owed for that lease or rental is less than $5,000 exclusive
of interest and costs.
HRS § 633-27(a).
The small claims division’s equitable powers are similarly
narrow. It may grant equitable relief only between parties to a
landlord-tenant disagreement. And even then, only in orders “to
repair, replace, refund, reform, and rescind.” See HRS § 633-27(c).
Miller’s claim is none of these. She sought an order
directing Faulk to return a dog she alleged she co-owned. That
is not a claim for money. It is not a landlord-tenant dispute.
And it is not a claim for the return of leased or rented
property.
The claim is, in substance, an action in replevin.
Replevin “seeks return of specific personal property.”
Kahawaiolaa v. Hawaiian Sun Invs., Inc., 146 Hawaiʻi 424, 434,
463 P.3d 1081, 1091 (2020). It rests on the plaintiff’s title
and right to immediate possession. See Chong v. Young, 39 Haw.
527, 529-30 (Haw. Terr. 1952). HRS § 654-1(a) (2016) codifies
the remedy.
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A dog is personal property. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 63 Haw. 557, 564 n.5, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 n.5 (1981).
An owner who claims a dog has been wrongfully detained may
pursue replevin. Or conversion. See Freddy Nobriga Enters.,
Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands, 129 Hawaiʻi 123,
129, 295 P.3d 993, 999 (App. 2013).
What the owner may not do is litigate ownership in the
small claims division.
The trial court did exactly that. It declared that Faulk
was entitled to “legal and physical ownership of the dog,”
ordered the transfer of Miller’s “half” interest, and set the
price of that transfer.
That is a ruling on title to personal property. The small
claims division had no power to make it.
We address two rationales the court below offered.
First, the court reasoned that Miller “chose this forum.”
Subject matter jurisdiction, though, is not a forum-selection
problem. Parties cannot manufacture it by their pleading
choices, and they cannot waive its absence by silence. A court
that lacks subject matter jurisdiction must announce it.
Whenever and however the defect appears.
Second, the court reasoned that it had “determined that
[Bigsby] wasn’t her property.” But a ruling that property does
not belong to a claimant is itself a ruling on ownership. The
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court could not say that Bigsby wasn’t Miller’s without saying
whose he was. And it did. It awarded Faulk “full legal and
physical ownership.” That is the very ruling HRS § 633-27
withholds from the division.
Nor does Miller’s alternative prayer for $3,000 rescue the
proceeding. Miller sought $3,000 as the money value of her
ownership interest in Bigsby, not as a freestanding debt.
Awarding it required the same jurisdictional finding. That she
owned a share of the dog. But that decision was not the small
claims division’s to make.
IV.
This court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. HRS
§ 602-5(a)(3) (2016) authorizes us to issue writs of mandamus.
Our supervisory jurisdiction reaches “all courts of inferior
jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors and abuses therein
where no other remedy is expressly provided by law.” HRS § 602-4 (2016). The small claims division is such a court.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It issues where the
petitioner shows a clear and indisputable right to the relief
requested and no other means to adequately redress the alleged
wrong. Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, 153 Hawaiʻi 307,
319, 537 P.3d 1154, 1166 (2023).
Miller meets both requirements. Her right to relief is
clear and indisputable. The small claims division exceeded its
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statutory jurisdiction. A judgment entered without subject
matter jurisdiction is void. Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawaiʻi 152,
159, 977 P.2d 160, 167 (1999).
And Miller has no other adequate means to obtain relief.
There is no appeal from a judgment of the small claims division.
See HRS § 633-28(a); RSCD Rule 12(b). That absence of appellate
review is compelling. See State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. 370, 373, 742
P.2d 373, 376 (1987). Miller has already pursued the only postjudgment relief available within the division — a motion to set
aside and a motion for reconsideration. Both were denied.
At the post-judgment hearing, the court invited Faulk to
file a separate small claims action concerning Miller’s posttrial conduct. The dispute may continue. Where it belongs is
now clear.
V.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The
court’s March 4, 2026 ruling is vacated. The case is remanded
to the District Court of the Second Circuit with instructions to
dismiss it without prejudice.
A dog is personal property. Deciding who owns Bigsby was
not the small claims court’s call to make.
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What the court had no power to do, it did. We undo it.
Adam P. Karp /s/ Vladimir P. Devens (on the briefs)
for petitioner /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ Rebecca A. Copeland
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