[Cite as State v. Strattman, 2026-Ohio-2863.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NOS. CA2025-08-066
Appellee, : CA2025-08-067
vs. : OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DAZION TERRELL ANTONIO : 7/27/2026
STRATTMAN,
:
Appellant.
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case Nos. 24CR42129; 25CR42718
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Johnna M. Shia, for appellant.
OPINION
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dazion Strattman, appeals his conviction and sentence in the
Warren County Court of Common Pleas following a jury trial. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further
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proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On October 20, 2024, Strattman, Jeremy Evans, and Devontrae Williams
robbed the Verizon store on Towne Boulevard in Middletown, Ohio. Evans and Strattman
entered the store at approximately 4:15 p.m. wearing hoodies, masks, and gloves, while
Williams remained in a white sedan as the getaway driver.
{¶ 3} At that time, store manager Jamarcus Crosby, employee Alex Phifer, other
Verizon employees, and customers were present inside. Upon entering, Evans went
directly to the door to the inventory room at the back of the store. Strattman approached
Crosby on the sales floor and demanded, "Where the phones at?" "We're not here to
play," and "Take me to the phones." Evans and Strattman kept their hands in their
pockets, leading Crosby and the other store occupants to believe they had guns. Crosby
then led Strattman to the inventory room.
{¶ 4} After Crosby opened the inventory room, Evans began placing phones into
a trash bag. Strattman handed another trash bag to Crosby and ordered him to fill it with
phones. Unknown to Evans and Strattman, Crosby had activated a panic button when he
admitted them into the inventory room and had placed a GPS tracking device disguised
as a phone into the bag he was filling. Evans and Strattman then exited through the store's
rear door near the inventory room, entered the white sedan, and fled.
{¶ 5} At the same time that Evans, Strattman, and Crosby were in the inventory
room, Phifer directed everyone else in the store outside and called 9-1-1 to report the
robbery. Middletown Police Officer Brian Singleton responded to the store at 4:17 p.m.,
while Phifer remained on the 9-1-1 call. Singleton and another officer checked the store,
but the robbers had already left.
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{¶ 6} Using security-camera recordings and the tracking device, officers traced
the robbers to a Star Wireless store in Green Township, Hamilton County, Ohio. Green
Township police responded to the store and found Strattman, Evans, and Williams inside.
Strattman was wearing a backpack, and two trash bags containing cell phones were lying
on the counter.
{¶ 7} Strattman, Evans, and Williams fled on foot. Officer Tyler Bridwell eventually
arrested Strattman, seized his backpack, and quickly checked inside seeing cell phones.
Middletown police later obtained a warrant to search the backpack. The search revealed
cell phones taken from the Verizon store and other evidence connected to the robbery.
{¶ 8} Strattman was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury on November 12,
2024 for first-degree felony aggravated robbery, first-degree felony kidnapping, fourthdegree felony theft, and fifth-degree felony possession of criminal tools (Case No.
24CR42129). Strattman entered not guilty pleas and, on March 21, 2025, filed a motion
to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of his backpack. The trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on Strattman's motion to suppress on April 15, 2025.
By entry of May 6, 2025, the trial court denied Strattman's motion to suppress.
{¶ 9} Strattman waived his right to a jury trial and the matter proceeded to a joint
bench trial involving Strattman, Evans, and Williams on May 12-13, 2025. The trial court
found Strattman guilty of second-degree felony robbery, as a lesser included offense of
the aggravated robbery charge returned in the indictment, second-degree felony
kidnapping as the victim was released in a safe place unharmed, theft as charged, and
possession of criminal tools as charged.
{¶ 10} While Strattman's sentencing was pending he was indicted in a separate
case with third-degree felony bribery (Case No. 25CR42718). On July 31, 2025,
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Strattman entered a guilty plea to the bribery charge. The trial court then proceeded to
conduct a sentencing hearing for both the Verizon store robbery and the bribery cases.
The trial court merged the theft and robbery convictions and sentenced Strattman to a
six- to eight-year prison term for robbery, a consecutive two-year prison term for
kidnapping, and a concurrent twelve-month prison term for possession of criminal tools.
The trial court sentenced Strattman to a nine-month prison term for the bribery offense,
which was ordered to be served consecutively to the prison terms imposed in the Verizon
store robbery case.
{¶ 11} Strattman filed a notice of appeal on August 1, 2025. On appeal, he raises
six assignments of error for our review.1
II. Legal Analysis
{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 13} THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED STRATTMAN'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS.
{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Strattman asserts the police did not have
probable cause to arrest him and search his backpack without a warrant. Strattman
contends that Officer Bridwell unlawfully searched his backpack at the time of the arrest
because there was no probable cause for the arrest, and the search warrant that was
obtained after the fact did not cure the warrantless search because it relied in part upon
the stolen cell phones that were observed inside the backpack by Bridwell.
{¶ 15} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Hentenaar, 2020-Ohio-4503, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). The trial
1. On April 22, 2026, Strattman filed a motion for leave to supplement his brief with the sixth assignment of error, which this court granted. Strattman filed his supplemental brief on May 20, 2026, and the State filed a supplemental brief in response on June 1, 2026.
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court serves as the trier of fact and is therefore best positioned to resolve factual
questions and evaluate witness credibility. We must accept the trial court's findings of fact
if supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. But we independently review the trial
court's application of law to those facts, without deference, to determine whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
{¶ 16} "It is well established that searches conducted without a warrant are per se
unreasonable, subject to certain 'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions." State v.
Smith, 2009-Ohio-6426, ¶ 10, quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
A "search incident to arrest" is a well-established exception to the general rule against
warrantless searches that allows arresting officers to search both an arrestee's person
and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Smith at ¶ 11, citing Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969). "The exception derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations." Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
{¶ 17} "To suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or
seizure, the defendant must (1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2) raise the
grounds upon which the validity of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner
as to give the prosecutor notice of the basis for the challenge." Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio
St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. "Failure on the part of the defendant to
adequately raise the basis of his challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal."
Id. at 218. We recognize that in Strattman's original motion to suppress, he only
challenged the warrantless search of the backpack and validity of the search warrant
obtained after the fact; he did not challenge his warrantless arrest. Strattman has
therefore waived any issue with his arrest on appeal. Nevertheless, we find there was
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abundant probable cause to arrest Strattman, and the subsequent search incident to
arrest was valid.
{¶ 18} The warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause. State v. Gagaris, 2008-Ohio5418, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.), citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). Probable
cause to arrest exists when the officer has sufficient information, derived from his own
knowledge or a trustworthy source, which would lead a prudent person to believe the
accused committed the offense. Gagaris at ¶ 13. When determining whether probable
cause to arrest exists, a court reviews the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding
the arrest. Id.
{¶ 19} Officer Bridwell testified at the suppression hearing about the
circumstances leading to Strattman's arrest and the search of his backpack. Bridwell had
received a description of two black males who had robbed the Verizon store in
Middletown, along with GPS information from the tracking device placed inside one of the
bags of stolen merchandise. He followed that GPS information to Star Wireless, a store
he described as "shady" that buys and sells cell phones. When he arrived, he saw a white
sedan parked outside that matched the description of the suspect vehicle. Although initial
reports incorrectly identified the vehicle as a Nissan rather than a Pontiac, officers later
confirmed that it was the same vehicle and had the same license plate.
{¶ 20} Inside Star Wireless, Bridwell observed three black males at the counter
selling cell phones. He then asked the store manager to speak with him in the back office,
told the manager that the Verizon store in Middletown had been robbed, and asked
whether the three males at the counter were attempting to sell cell phones. The manager
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confirmed that they were.
{¶ 21} While Bridwell was speaking with the manager, the three males began
leaving the store. Based on the description of the suspects, the information from the
tracking device, the matching vehicle, the attempted sale of cell phones, and the
surrounding circumstances, the officers on scene ordered the three black males to stop.
They ignored those commands and ran, prompting a foot chase. Bridwell eventually
apprehended Strattman, removed the backpack from Strattman's back, unzipped it, and
observed cell phones inside.
{¶ 22} We find that Officer Bridwell had probable cause to arrest Strattman based
on the totality of the circumstances, and his subsequent search of Strattman's backpack
was a lawful search incident to the arrest.
{¶ 23} Strattman's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 25} STRATTMAN'S CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE NOR THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Strattman asserts the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to support his convictions and that his convictions were not
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues the State was
unable to identify him as one of the perpetrators who entered the Verizon store, and the
State did not satisfy the statutory elements of kidnapping.
{¶ 27} The standards governing sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges are
well settled. A sufficiency inquiry asks "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
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259, (1991), at paragraph two of the syllabus. In conducting this analysis, an appellate
court does not weigh credibility or resolve factual disputes; it asks only whether the State
has met a minimum threshold of evidentiary adequacy. We will not disturb the verdict
"unless [we] find[] that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the
trier of facts." Id. at 273.
{¶ 28} Manifest weight presents a different question. Here, the appellate court
must "'review[] the entire record, weigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" State v. Thompkins,
1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.). But the
discretionary power to grant a new trial "'should be exercised only in the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.'" Id., quoting Martin at 175.
{¶ 29} In the present case, Williams (Strattman's co-defendant) told Detective
Connor Kirby that Strattman was involved in the robbery of the Verizon store. In an
apparent attempt to protect Evans, Williams claimed that there were four men involved in
the robbery rather than three, with another "light-skinned" black male accompanying
Strattman into the store, rather than Evans. Surveillance footage at the Verizon store
showed the two perpetrators (later identified as Strattman and Evans) exit the white sedan
before the robbery and re-enter the sedan after the robbery to escape. The GPS tracking
device placed in the bag of stolen cell phones tracked the location of the suspects in real
time to Star Wireless. Surveillance footage at Star Wireless showed Strattman exit the
white sedan. After Strattman's arrest, clothing items were recovered from the backseat of
the sedan where Strattman was sitting which matched the description of the clothing of
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one of the perpetrators; Strattman's DNA was found on the interior mouth and nose area
of a Nike face mask and the interior of black gloves recovered from the rear of the sedan.
Additionally, stolen merchandise from the Verizon store was discovered in Strattman's
backpack.
{¶ 30} Strattman contends that Williams' statement to Detective Kirby was not
credible because he was motivated to receive a reduced sentence and that the remaining
evidence failed to establish Strattman was one of the two perpetrators who entered the
Verizon store. We disagree with Strattman's assessment of the evidence.
{¶ 31} Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the
evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the testimony are primarily for the original trier of fact. State v. Hollon, 2025-Ohio-2725, ¶ 20, (12th Dist.); State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). "'The [trier
of fact] is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and
voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of proffered
testimony.'" State v. Watson, 2025-Ohio-883, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Fox, 2009-Ohio-556, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). "[I]t [is] within the province of . . . the trier of fact, to take note
of any inconsistencies in the testimony and resolve them accordingly, believing all, part,
or none of each witness's testimony." State v. Lark, 2018-Ohio-4940, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.),
citing State v. Woodard, 2017-Ohio-6941, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.). "A conviction is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the testimony
offered by the prosecution." State v. Baker, 2020-Ohio-2882, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.). Even if
Williams' statements were to be discounted, the remaining evidence clearly establishes
Strattman as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and kidnapping.
{¶ 32} As to his kidnapping conviction, Strattman argues that the State failed to
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prove he "did, by force, threat, or deception, remove another from the place where he
was found or restrain the liberty of him for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a
felony or flight thereafter." Strattman contends that Crosby "was not removed from the
store, was not restrained in any way and was left unharmed."
{¶ 33} This court previously analyzed this kidnapping in the appeals of Strattman's
codefendants and found that the State satisfied the elements of the statute:
The kidnapping statute, R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), can be satisfied
by proof of either removal or restraint, and the record supports
both.
As to removal, the evidence is effectively undisputed. Crosby
was standing at a table on the sales floor when the two
masked men entered the store. Strattman, who appeared to
be armed, told Crosby, "we're not here to play," and ordered
him to "take me to the phones." Acting under the implicit threat
of force, Crosby left his position on the sales floor, walked
through a cubby area, a "quote room," and an employee area,
then unlocked and entered the inventory room. This is
textbook removal under R.C. 2905.01(A)(2): Crosby was
moved, by threat, from the place where he was found, to
facilitate the commission of a felony. No more is required.
As to restraint, we agree that Crosby's testimony about feeling
"free to step out" creates some tension in the record. But this
testimony must be weighed against the objective
circumstances that the trial court was entitled to assess.
Crosby moved to the back of the store at the direction of two
men he believed to be armed. Once inside the inventory room,
Strattman handed him a trash bag and ordered him to fill it
with phones. When Crosby was not putting the right phones
in the bag, Strattman "got pissed off" and snatched the bag
from him. Throughout this episode, Crosby was separated
from the other employees, who had remained on the sales
floor, and was alone in a back room with two masked,
apparently armed men. A reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that, whatever Crosby's subjective belief about his
freedom to leave at one particular moment, the totality of the
circumstances established that his liberty was in fact
restrained by force and threat for the purpose of facilitating the
robbery. The victim's momentary subjective impression does
not override what the objective evidence reveals about the
coercive nature of the encounter.
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In any event, because the statute is satisfied by proof of
removal alone, and the evidence of removal is overwhelming,
Evans's conviction stands even setting aside the restraint
question entirely.
State v. Evans, 2026-Ohio-1237, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.)
{¶ 34} This same analysis applies to Strattman's appeal. We find Strattman's
conviction for kidnapping, along with his other convictions, were supported by sufficient
evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 35} Strattman's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 36} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 37} THE PRC ADVISEMENT IN CASE NUMBER 25CR42718 WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
{¶ 38} In his third assignment of error, Strattman argues the trial court did not
substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 when it accepted his guilty plea to bribery. Strattman
contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty because the trial judge did not
inform him whether postrelease control would be discretionary or mandatory and did not
inform him of the duration of postrelease control.
{¶ 39} As pertinent here, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) provides that a trial court shall not
accept a guilty plea in a felony case without personally addressing the defendant and
"[d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the
nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved." Whether mandatory or
discretionary, postrelease control is an additional penalty for the offense that the
defendant must consider in determining whether to waive his constitutional rights and
enter a guilty plea. State v. Tipton, 2021-Ohio-1128, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 40} Here, the trial court advised Strattman that his offense "carries post-release
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control, which is a supervision by adult parole authority. If you violate the terms of postrelease control, the adult parole authority can send you back to prison for nine months
per violation up to a total of one half your stated sentence." Although the trial court
addressed postrelease control, it did not state whether it was mandatory or discretionary,
and did not state its duration.
{¶ 41} In State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed a
trial court's compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) and how best to review a trial court's plea
colloquy to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. As a
general matter, "a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he
demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions
of Crim.R. 11(C)," i.e., that "the plea would not have otherwise been made." Dangler at ¶
16. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: (1) when the trial court "fails to explain
the constitutional rights [set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)] that a defendant waives by
pleading guilty or no contest," and (2) "a trial court's complete failure to comply with a
portion of Crim.R. 11(C)." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 15. Under either exception, the
defendant is not required to show prejudice.
{¶ 42} This court has previously applied Dangler to find that a trial court's failure to
advise an appellant of the "duration and nature of the postrelease control to which he
would be subject . . . is not the type of failure that excuses appellant from demonstrating
prejudice." Tipton at ¶ 15. The trial court's mention of postrelease control during the
colloquy, "albeit incomplete or perhaps inaccurate, does not constitute a complete failure
to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)." State v. Fabian, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.).
Therefore, to have his plea vacated, Strattman must demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the trial court's incomplete advisements and he would not have otherwise made the
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plea. He has not done so.
{¶ 43} Strattman's bribery offense carried a maximum prison term of 36 months.
In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to recommend a 12-month sentence,
consecutive to the sentence in Strattman's other case. The record reveals no hesitation
on Strattman's part in accepting this favorable plea deal. Further, he did not raise any
objection to the court's imposition of postrelease control at sentencing. Therefore, we find
his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.
{¶ 44} Strattman's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 45} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 46} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
NOTIFY STRATTMAN OF THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION AND PROCESS PRIOR
TO SENTENCING.
{¶ 47} In his fourth assignment of error, Strattman argues the trial court failed to
comply with the notification requirements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) when classifying him as
a violent offender prior to sentencing.
{¶ 48} Strattman was convicted of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2).
Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2903.41(A)(1)(a), Strattman is considered a "violent offender."
Accordingly, the trial court was required to provide the advisements set forth in R.C.
2903.42(A)(1)(a) — the presumption established under this division, the offender's right
to file a motion to rebut the presumption, the procedure and criteria for rebutting the
presumption, and the effect of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and
possible outcome — before sentencing. The record reflects that the trial court failed to do
so prior to sentencing Strattman.
{¶ 49} "R.C. 2903.42(A)(3) further provides that when an offender, such as
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Strattman, has not filed a motion to rebut the presumption, 'the trial court must provide to
the offender, at sentencing, notice of his or her duties under Sierah's Law.'" State v. Baker,
2021-Ohio-4544, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-4107 at ¶ 34 (2d
Dist.). Specifically, the trial court must
require the violent offender to read and sign a form stating that
the violent offender has received and understands the notice.
If the violent offender is unable to read, the judge . . . shall
inform the violent offender of the violent offender's duties as
set forth in the notice and shall certify on the form that the
judge . . . informed the violent offender of the violent offender's
duties and that the violent offender indicated an
understanding of those duties.
R.C. 2903.42(C).
{¶ 50} This court has previously recognized that R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) advisements
are mandatory and must be provided "before sentencing," and the trial court lacks
authority to proceed with sentencing until these advisements are given. State v.
Delehanty, 2023-Ohio-337, ¶ 94 (12th Dist.); Baker at ¶ 21-22. In those cases we vacated
the defendant's sentence and remanded the matter for the purposes of complying with
the mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) and for resentencing. We do the same
here.
{¶ 51} We sustain Strattman's fourth assignment of error, vacate his sentence in
Case No. 24CR42129, and remand to the trial court for purposes of complying with the
mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) and for a new sentencing hearing.2
2. We note a new sentencing hearing will require that Strattman be resentenced for each of his offenses in Case No. 24CR42129, however his sentence for bribery remains in place as it stems from a separate case, Case No. 25CR42718, and is not a violent offender offense.
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{¶ 52} Assignment of Error No. 5:
{¶ 53} THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WAS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
{¶ 54} Assignment of Error No. 6:
{¶ 55} THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MERGE THE KIDNAPPING
AND ROBBERY OFFENSES.
{¶ 56} In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Strattman challenges his
sentences for his kidnapping and robbery offenses, arguing that the consecutive
sentences he received were not supported by the record and that these offenses should
have merged. The State has conceded that these offenses should have merged in
Strattman's case as this court previously examined this same legal issue and identical
fact pattern in the appeals of Strattman's codefendants and determined that their robbery
and kidnapping offenses should have merged. See State v. Evans, 2026-Ohio-1237 (12th
Dist.). Nevertheless, as discussed above, we have vacated Strattman's sentence in Case
No. 24CR42129 and remanded for resentencing, and therefore Strattman's fifth and sixth
assignments of error are rendered moot and need not be considered.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 57} We have overruled Strattman's first, second, and third assignments of error;
sustained his fourth assignment of error; and found his fifth and sixth assignments of error
moot. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the underlying convictions, but
reversed as to sentencing in Case No. 24CR42129. These cases are remanded to the
trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, reversed as to sentencing only in Case No. 24CR42129 and remanded for the limited purpose of resentencing according to law and consistent with the above Opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed 75 % to appellant and 25 % to appellee.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
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