Opinion issued July 21, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00402-CV
LANNY V. DAO, Appellant
V.
MISSION BEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 80th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-81307
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Lanny V. Dao (“Dao”), appeals from the trial court’s order
granting the plea to the jurisdiction of appellee, Mission Bend Homeowners
Association, Inc. (“Association”), in Dao’s suit seeking access to the Association’s
books and records. In six issues, Dao contends the trial court erred in (1) concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Dao’s claims, (2) misinterpreting the
“amount in controversy” requirement, (3) finding that Texas Property Code section
209.005(n) grants exclusive jurisdiction to justice courts, (4) finding that the district
court was not the proper venue for Dao’s claims, (5) dismissing the case without
considering the substantive right of homeowners to access homeowner association
records under Texas Property Code section 209.005, and (6) ignoring Texas
Government Code section 24.007 which provides separate and independent bases
for district court jurisdiction.
We reverse and remand.
Background
Dao is a homeowner in Mission Bend, a residential deed-restricted community
in Harris County, Texas. The Association enforces the deed restrictions related to
properties within Mission Bend.
In November 2023, Dao, proceeding pro se, filed an original petition in district
court seeking injunctive relief against the Association, alleging that it had refused to
provide him with requested financial information in violation of Texas Property
Code section 209.005. Dao sought the production of:
“(1) All relevant financial statements from all financial institutions handling
association funds from August 2022 to the present, including bank statements
and meeting minutes[;]
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(2) Documentation for check 7293 ($21,437.50) on August 17, 2018,
including purpose, board authorization, vendor invoices, and vendor tax form
1099-MISC[;]
(3) Documentation of payments to Ramos, Lopez, and Classic Sports,
including vendor invoices, contracts, and board authorization[;]
(4) Relevant records clarifying the $50,000 withdrawal by Terry Blair on May
30, 2018[;]
(5) A copy of the individual life insurance policy for board member Terry G.
Blair and pertinent approval documents[;]
(6) Details of the fidelity bond insurance for the Treasurer’s position as
mandated by the by-laws[; and]
(7) Documentation of payments to board member Lynne Alwine during the
time frame of 2015 to 2022, including several large payments during the
pandemic year (2020).”
The petition further alleged that Dao “reserves the right to amend these pleadings to
allege other and further damages as may be determined once discovery is complete
and before the case proceeds to trial.”
The Association filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss Dao’s
claims. It asserted that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims because
justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under Texas Property
Code section 209.005(n) relating to the denial of access to a homeowner
association’s books and records. The Association sought dismissal of Dao’s claims
against it for lack of jurisdiction.
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In his response to the Association’s plea, Dao asserted that the district court
has original jurisdiction over civil matters in which, as here, the amount in
controversy is more than $500. He asserted that although Texas Property Code
section 209.005(n) does, in fact, provide an option for homeowners to file a petition
with the justice court, the statute does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on justice
courts as evidenced by the use of “may” in the statute, which is permissive rather
than mandatory. Dao further asserted that he had paid more than $1,500 in annual
assessments from 2015 to 2022 for the benefits and betterment of the community,
and the Association had collected more than $2 million in annual assessments from
more than 1,400 homeowners. Thus, Dao argued, the amount in controversy
exceeded the $500 threshold requirement to file suit in district court, and the
Association’s refusal to provide him with the requested records constituted an
injury-in-fact to his legally protected interests.
In its reply to Dao’s response, the Association argued that Dao’s petition
failed to substantiate an “amount in controversy” sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the district court. It asserted that Dao’s petition exclusively sought the
production of documents—association records, financial statements, and related
documents—without alleging any monetary damages directly attributable to the
Association’s actions. It asserted that the “amount in controversy” requirement
pertains to the monetary value of the claim itself and must be based on direct,
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personal loss due to the Association’s actions, not the aggregate of unrelated
transactions or the total assessments collected over several years. The Association
noted that the clear legislative intent behind Texas Property Code section 209.005(n)
is that disputes concerning a property owner’s access to homeowner association
records are to be resolved within the jurisdiction of the justice court. It argued that
while it is true that the statute contains discretionary language by its use of “may,”
this discretion does not concern the selection of the court by the aggrieved party, but
rather the decision of whether to initiate the lawsuit in the first place.
Dao filed a sur-reply asserting that he sufficiently pleaded an amount in
controversy because his petition identified financial transactions and expenditures
by the Association totaling more than $500. He argued that the Association denied
him access to records which he had a legally protected right to obtain, and that this
denial constituted a direct, personal loss in itself, even if the precise monetary value
of the loss was not yet quantified. Dao asserted that the deprivation of his legally
protected right, combined with the possible financial implications of the information
contained in the records, was sufficient to establish the requisite “amount in
controversy” at this stage of the proceedings. He argued that the permissive
language in section 209.005(n), which allows for suits in justice court, does not
negate the district court’s general jurisdiction.
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The trial court entered an order granting the Association’s plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissing Dao’s claims for lack of jurisdiction on May 22, 2024.
Upon Dao’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
This appeal followed.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be
challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction. See Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609,
612 (Tex. 2018). A plea to the jurisdiction is the proper procedural device for
challenging a suit brought in one court when another court has continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Bovee, 632 S.W.3d 244, 251
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). We review the trial court’s denial
of such a plea de novo. Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 612. If the court does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, it must dismiss the case without
1
A party is entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law after a conventional
trial on the merits to the court. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro–Line Corp., 938
S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997). A “trial” is a hearing in which the court hears and
receives evidence. U. Lawrence Boze’ & Assocs., P.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal
Dist., 368 S.W.3d 17, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). If the trial
court renders judgment as a matter of law, such as when a court grants dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, findings and conclusions are not improper, but they have no
purpose and should not be requested or considered on appeal. See IKB Indus., 938
S.W.2d at 443; U. Lawrence Boze’, 368 S.W.3d at 33. When reviewing these
decisions, we exercise our own judgment in determining each issue, and, therefore,
we “cannot consider findings and conclusions even if they are included in the
record.” U. Lawrence Boze’, 368 S.W.3d at 33.
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prejudice. See Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Bell v. State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
945 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied)).
When we consider a trial court’s order on a plea to the jurisdiction, we
construe the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the pleader’s intent. See
Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).
“When a plaintiff fails to plead facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does
not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of
pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend.”
Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002) (citing Peek v. Equip.
Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804–05 (Tex. 1989)). On the other hand, if the pleadings
affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may
be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Brown, 80
S.W.3d at 555.
Discussion
In six issues, Dao asserts that the trial court erred in (1) concluding it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over his claims, (2) misinterpreting the “amount in
controversy” requirement, (3) finding that Texas Property Code section 209.005(n)
grants exclusive jurisdiction to justice courts, (4) finding that the district court was
not the proper venue for Dao’s claims, (5) dismissing the case without considering
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the substantive right of homeowners to access association records under Texas
Property Code section 209.005, and (6) ignoring Texas Government Code section
24.007 which provides separate and independent bases for district court jurisdiction.
Because these issues are intertwined, we address them together.
We begin with an overview of Texas court jurisdiction.
A. General Jurisdictional Framework
The Texas Constitution and state statutes provide the sole sources of
jurisdiction for Texas courts. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.
1996). District courts are courts of general jurisdiction and generally have subject
matter jurisdiction absent a showing to the contrary. In re Entergy Corp., 142
S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see also Dubai Petroleum Co. v.
Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[A]ll claims are presumed to fall within the
jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that
they must be heard elsewhere.”). Under article 5, section 8 of the Texas
Constitution, “[d]istrict court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and
original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where
exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution
or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” T EX. CONST.
art. 5, § 8. In addition to this constitutional jurisdiction, the Legislature has provided
that district courts have “original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount
8
in controversy is more than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
24.007.
By contrast, Texas justice courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Town of
Anthony v. Lopez, 661 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied).
Article 5, section 19 of the Texas Constitution grants justice courts “exclusive
jurisdiction in civil matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred dollars
or less, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” TEX. CONST. art. 5,
§ 19. The Texas Legislature has also expressly granted justice courts exclusive
jurisdiction over particular types of claims. For example, it has committed
jurisdiction of forcible detainer (eviction) suits exclusively to a justice court in the
precinct where the property in question is located. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 24.004. Texas Government Code section 27.031 grants justice courts original
jurisdiction over “civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district
or county court and in which the amount in controversy is not more than $20,000,
exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1). Thus, the original
jurisdiction of justice courts is concurrent with that of district courts in civil cases in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $20,000.
B. Texas Property Code Section 209 Claims
Dao asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction
over his claims against the Association. He argues that although Texas Property
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Code section 209.005(n) does, in fact, allow homeowners to file a petition in the
justice court, the statute does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on justice courts as
evidenced by the use of “may” in the statute, which is permissive rather than
mandatory. He asserts that the district court has original jurisdiction over civil
matters in which, as here, the amount in controversy is more than $500.
In its brief on appeal, as in its plea to the jurisdiction, the Association asserts
that the trial court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Dao’s claims.
It asserts that “subsection (n) of § 209.005 explicitly states that disputes arising from
the denial of access to records are to be brought before the justice court, not the
district court.” Thus, it reasons that section 209.005(n) grants justice courts
exclusive authority over such claims. We disagree.
Chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code, known as the Texas Residential
Property Owners Protection Act, governs the relationship between residential
property owners’ associations and their members. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 209.001–.017; see also Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 667
S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Section 209.005
provides that “a property owners’ association shall make the books and records of
the association, including financial records, open to and reasonably available for
examination by an owner . . . in accordance with this section. An owner is entitled
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to obtain from the association copies of information contained in the books and
records.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.005(b).
Relevant here, section 209.005(n) states: “A member of a property owners’
association who is denied access to or copies of association books or records to
which the member is entitled under this section may file a petition with the justice
of the peace of a justice precinct in which all or part of the property that is governed
by the association is located requesting relief in accordance with this subsection.”
Id. § 209.005(n). If the justice court finds that the member is entitled to access, the
court may grant remedies, including an order to release records, attorney’s fees, and
a judgment authorizing the owner to deduct awarded amounts from future
assessments. Id.
When construing a statute, “[o]ur primary objective is to determine the
Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the
words chosen.” State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006); see also
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (“A statute’s plain
language is the most reliable guide to the Legislature’s intent.”). As Dao notes, the
Legislature’s use of the permissive term “may” in section 209.005(n) is incompatible
with the concept of exclusive jurisdiction. “‘May’ creates discretionary authority or
grants permission or a power,” whereas the terms “shall” and “must” convey
mandatory conditions. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 311.016(1)–(3). Section
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209.005(n) contains no language mandating exclusive jurisdiction in justice courts
over record access claims. See Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d
444, 447 (Tex. 1996) (noting statute merely providing that action “may” be brought
in district court “does not express an intention to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
district courts,” but rather, “to the extent that statutory courts share concurrent
jurisdiction with district courts, nothing in [such a] statute limits or excludes that
concurrent jurisdiction”); see also Eris v. Giannakopoulos, 369 S.W.3d 618, 620–
21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (concluding language of
Texas Property Code section 23.002 did not indicate legislative intent that district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over partition actions; rather, use of word “may”
demonstrated permissive, rather than mandatory, procedure). The Association has
directed us to no authorities, nor are we aware of any, holding that justice courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over Texas Property Code section 209.005(n) claims.2
2
Other courts of appeals have considered chapter 209 claims without any suggestion
that district or county courts lacked jurisdiction to hear such claims. See, e.g., Swan
Point Landing Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Martin, 718 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2025, pet. denied) (considering appeal by property owners’
association from district court’s order granting summary judgment to property
owners on their claim that association violated open meeting protocols under Texas
Property Code section 209.0051 without suggesting that district court lacked
jurisdiction); Candle Meadow Homeowners Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 05-17-01227-CV, 2018 WL 6187616, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (examining section 209.0051’s open meeting requirements in context of district
court proceeding without suggesting that justice courts held exclusive jurisdiction);
Spears v. Falcon Pointess Cmty. Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 03-14-00650-CV, 2016
WL 1756486, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(affirming in part, and reversing in part, county court at law’s order granting
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Thus, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction over Dao’s claims so
long as his suit was within the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy range over
which district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with justice courts.
C. Amount in Controversy
Dao asserts that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “amount in
controversy” requirement. Specifically, he argues that the court mistakenly
concluded that his petition failed to establish an “amount in controversy” sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the district court. According to Dao, he is seeking
information about the legitimacy of a $50,000 withdrawal from the Association’s
funds (and potentially the return of these funds), which exceeds the jurisdictional
limit of justice courts. He also asserts that the trial court’s narrow view that “amount
in controversy” requires a direct, personal, financial loss conflicts with the prevailing
legal standard.
Section 24.007 of the Texas Government Code states that “[a] district court
has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in controversy is more
than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.007. In Texas, the
sum of money in controversy between the parties to a civil suit is a component of
homeowner association’s summary judgment motion and denying homeowners’
summary judgment motion on their claim that association violated section 209.005
by refusing to make its records available without raising any jurisdictional concern).
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subject matter jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554
(Tex. 2000).
In his original petition, Dao did not allege a specific amount of damages or
that the damages sustained exceeded the district court’s minimum jurisdictional
limits. Dao sought the production of financial and insurance-related documents to
which he alleged he was entitled, which the Association refused to provide despite
numerous requests, in violation of Texas Property Code section 209.005. Dao’s
petition stated that he “reserves the right to amend these pleadings to allege other
and further damages as may be determined once discovery is complete and before
the case proceeds to trial.”
The Association argues that Dao’s original petition failed to substantiate an
“amount in controversy” sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the district court. It
points out that Dao’s petition exclusively requested document production without
alleging any monetary damages directly attributable to the Association’s actions.
According to the Association, the jurisdictional “amount in controversy” must be
based on direct, personal loss to Dao due to the Association’s specific actions or
omissions. It argues that to the extent Dao seeks to obtain the records free of charge
as a form of damages, the fees associated with the production of the records are
nominal and do not approach the $500 threshold required for district court
jurisdiction.
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Dao responds that the Association mischaracterizes the nature of his claims.
He is not seeking “free documents” as a form of damages, but rather is seeking
information regarding a $50,000 withdrawal, among other things. He asserts that
the value of this withdrawal—not the cost of producing documents—constitutes the
true amount in controversy. According to Dao, the right to be protected, i.e., his
access to financial information, and the potential injury to be prevented, i.e., the
misuse of $50,000 in association funds, establish an amount in controversy within
the district court’s jurisdiction, even if the precise monetary value of that loss is not
yet quantified.
“It has long been the law that the phrase ‘amount in controversy,’ in the
jurisdictional context, means ‘the sum of money or the value of the thing originally
sued for.’” Tune v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000) . The
Texas Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hile the amount in controversy is frequently
determined by the damages sought, that is not always so.” Id.
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Peek v. Equipment Service Co., 779
S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) is instructive. In Peek, the Court considered whether a
plaintiff seeking damages under the wrongful death and survival statutes invoked
the jurisdiction of a district court by filing a petition which pleaded various
categories of damages but failed to allege either a specific amount of damages or
that the damages sustained exceeded the court’s minimum jurisdictional limits. See
15
779 S.W.2d at 802. The district court dismissed the suit concluding that its
jurisdiction was not invoked because the plaintiffs’ pleading had not properly
alleged damages until after the applicable statute of limitations had run. See id. at
802–03. The court of appeals, in two unpublished opinions, affirmed. See id. at
803.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. See id. The Court concluded that the
plaintiffs’ original pleading, although defective, was sufficient to invoke the district
court’s jurisdiction and prevent the running of limitations. See id. The Court noted
that “[a]lthough the petition did not expressly allege that the amount sought was
within the court’s jurisdiction, neither did anything in the petition suggest that the
court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at 804. The Court explained:
In any doubtful case all intendments of the plaintiff’s pleading will be
in favor of the jurisdiction. Unless it is clear from the pleadings that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the amount in controversy, it should retain
the case.
The failure of a plaintiff to state a jurisdictional amount in controversy
in its petition, without more, thus will not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction. Even if the jurisdictional amount is never established by
pleading, in fact, a plaintiff may recover if jurisdiction is proved at trial.
Id. at 804–05 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that “the omission of any
allegation regarding the amount in controversy from plaintiff’s petition did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction, but was instead a defect in pleading subject to
16
special exceptions and amendment. Although defective, the original petition filed
in this cause was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.” Id. at
805; see also Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27
(Tex. 2004) (concluding plaintiff should be afforded opportunity to amend its
pleading when petition does not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate
trial court’s jurisdiction but does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in
jurisdiction).
We note that the “Peek presumption”—that the failure of a plaintiff to state a
jurisdictional amount in controversy in his petition, without more, will not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction—applies only when (1) the defendant fails to object to
the plaintiff’s defective pleadings, and (2) the plaintiff’s pleadings do not
affirmatively demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction. See Buethe v. O’Brien, No. 03-09-00363-CV, 2010 WL 2643087, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804 (quotation omitted)). If those conditions
are met, the court should presume in favor of jurisdiction and allow the plaintiff an
opportunity to prove jurisdiction at trial. Id. The Association did not object to Dao’s
pleading.
Applying these principles, we conclude that although Dao’s original petition
did not allege a specific amount of damages or that the damages sustained exceeded
the trial court’s minimum jurisdictional limits, neither is it clear from his pleading
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that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the amount in controversy. We hold
that the district court erred in granting the Association’s plea to the jurisdiction and
should have retained the case and allowed Dao an opportunity to amend his pleading
before dismissing his claims.
We sustain Dao’s first issue.3
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order granting the Association’s plea to the
jurisdiction and dismissing Dao’s claims against it and remand the cause to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kristin Guiney
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.
3
In light of our disposition, we need not address Dao’s remaining issues. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.1.
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