Opinion issued July 23, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-01015-CR
MANUEL PONCE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1874643
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Manuel Ponce, an elementary school teacher, of the
continuous sexual abuse1 of several of his second-grade students and sentenced him
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b) (providing elements of continuous sexual abuse
of young child).
to life in prison.2 On appeal Ponce argues that the jury charge was erroneous because
it identified one of the complainants by the same initials as those belonging to an
extraneous-offense witness. Ponce contends that this was error, and that the error
was harmful, arguing that the charge authorized his conviction based on an act of
abuse against the extraneous-offense witness. Because the jury charge was not
erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Ponce was an elementary school teacher, teaching mostly second-grade
students. After he left the school to pursue a master’s degree in education, one of
his former students, Y.R., who was then in third grade, told her parents that Ponce
had touched her vagina when she was in his second-grade class. Y.R.’s mother
reported the allegations to the school, and an investigation was started.
Y.R. was interviewed and she provided the names of other girls in her secondgrade class that had also been abused. Multiple children told similar stories about
Ponce touching them in the classroom as their classmates waited in the hall to use
the restroom.
The State eventually named four children as complainants. Three of the
girls—C.H., K.M., and Y.R.—were in Ponce’s second-grade class during the 2021–
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(h) (providing punishment at imprisonment for life
or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years).
2
22 school year. A fourth named complainant—Allison Rodriguez or A.R.3—was in
Ponce’s first-grade class when he began abusing her, and the abuse continued until
she was in the third grade. She was not in the second-grade class with the other
named complainants. She was in third grade at the time. Allison’s mother
considered Ponce a family friend, and she testified that she allowed Ponce to drive
her child to summer school and to go dress shopping with him. Allison testified that
Ponce would touch her legs when he drove her to school. And when they went dress
shopping, he told the clerks that he was her father. He went into the dressing room
with her, lifted her onto the dressing-room bench, and touched her vagina.
At trial, five other girls from Ponce’s second-grade class were permitted to
testify as extraneous-offense witnesses. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37 sec.
2(b) (permitting extraneous-offense evidence in continuous-sexual-abuse-of-young
child case “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the
character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of
the defendant”). These extraneous-offense witnesses were Ashley Ramirez, V.R.,
3
At trial, all the children were referred to by their legal names. However, for
purposes of anonymity, we will use their initials or pseudonyms in this opinion and
in any quotes from the record in which initials were used. To distinguish the two
children with the same initials, we will call the complainant “Allison Rodriguez” or
“A.R.” and the extraneous-offense witness “Ashley Ramirez.”
3
H.R., J.M., and M.L., and they were all members of Ponce’s 2021–22 second-grade
class.4
Two other children—I.M. and E.V.—testified that even though Ponce never
touched them, he looked inside their underwear. These two girls were permitted to
testify under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) about Ponce’s “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity.” See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).
The jury convicted Ponce of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. This appeal
followed.
Jury Charge on the Law of Parties
Ponce does not challenge the admission of evidence from the seven girls who
were not named complainants. Nor does he challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. Instead, Ponce argues that “[t]he trial court committed harmful jury
charge error by authorizing a conviction based on an alleged act of sexual abuse
against an unpleaded complainant.” Ponce points out that one of the complainants
was identified in both the indictment and the jury charge as A.R., and that one of the
extraneous-offense witnesses was named Ashley Ramirez, who, if referred to by
initials, would also be A.R. Ponce argues that the jury charge was erroneous because
4
The extraneous-offense witnesses all testified under their legal names, and their
complete legal names were used in the extraneous-offense paragraph of the jury
charge.
4
it permitted the jury to convict Ponce based upon acts committed against Ashley,
who was not a complainant.
The Indictment and Jury-Charge Provisions
The indictment in this case provided:
The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in the
District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas,
MANUEL PONCE, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or
about August 26, 2019, did then and there unlawfully during a period
of time of thirty or more days in duration, commit at least two acts of
sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen years of age,
including an act constituting the offense of Indecency with a Child,
committed against A.R. on or about August 26, 2019, and an act
constituting the offense of Indecency with a Child, committed against
Y.R. on or about September 1, 2021, and an act constituting Indecency
with a Child, committed against C.H. on or about October 1, 2021, and
an act constituting Indecency with a Child, committed against K.M. on
or about June 1, 2022, and the Defendant was at least seventeen years
of age at the time of the commission of each of those acts. (Emphasis
added).5
The application paragraph of the jury charge tracked the language of the
indictment and provided as follows:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that, in
Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Manuel Ponce, heretofore on or
about the 26th day of August, 2019, did then and there unlawfully,
during a period of time of thirty or more days in duration, commit at
5
The indictment used the initials of the child complainants. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 21.07; Jacob v. State, 587 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (presuming that article 21.07 permits naming complainants
by initials); Olvera v. State, No. 05-93-00628-CR, 1995 WL 33629, at *2 n.5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 27, 1995, no pet.) (“We acknowledge the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure specifically allows the use of initials to name persons in an
indictment.”).
5
least two acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen
years of age, including an act constituting the offense of indecency
with a child, committed against A.R. on or about August 26, 2019, and
an act constituting the offense of indecency with a child, committed
against Y.R. on or about September 1, 2021, and act constituting the
offense of indecency with a child, committed against C.H. on or about
October 1, 2021 and an act constituting the offense of indecency with a
child, committed against K.M. on or about June 1, 2022, and the
defendant was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the
commission of each of those acts, then you will find the defendant
guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child, as charged in the
indictment. (Emphasis added).6
In a separate paragraph, the jury charge instructed the jury about the purposes
for which extraneous-offense evidence against other victims could be considered:
You are further instructed that if there is any evidence before you in
this case regarding the defendant committing a separate offense or
offenses, against a child other that the victim of the offense alleged in
the indictment in this case, specifically [V.R., Ashley Ramirez, H.R.,
J.M., M.L.], you cannot consider such evidence for any purpose unless
you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed such other offense or offenses, if any. If you so find and
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such
other offense or offenses, you may then, and only then, consider the
same in determining its bearing on relevant matters, including (1) the
character of the defendant and (2) acts performed in conformity with
the character of the defendant.7
6
This paragraph of the jury charge, like the indictment, used the initials of the
complainants, not their legal names.
7
Again, for clarity, this paragraph used the entire legal names of all five extraneousoffense witnesses, and not their initials or the pseudonym “Ashley Ramirez” as we
have done above. The extraneous-offense witnesses’ complete legal names were
put in this paragraph of the jury charge at the request of the prosecutor.
6
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review potential jury-charge error using a two-step review to determine
whether reversal is required. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Vernon v. State, 571 S.W.3d 814, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet ref’d). First, we must decide whether error exists in the charge. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d
at 744. If we determine an error exists, we next determine whether sufficient harm
resulted from the error requiring reversal. Id. The level of harm necessary for
reversal depends on whether the appellant properly objected to the error. Abdnor v.
State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). When, as here, an appellant
fails to preserve error, we review the charge error under the “egregious harm”
standard articulated in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
See Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Almanza,
686 S.W.2d at 171).
“Egregious harm is a high and difficult standard to meet, and such a
determination must be borne out by the trial record.” Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d
429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Neither party bears
the burden to show harm or lack thereof. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Rather, the appellate court must examine the relevant
portions of the entire record to determine whether an appellant suffered actual, as
opposed to theoretical harm, as a result of the charge error. Id.
7
It is the trial court’s responsibility to deliver to the jury a written charge
distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
36.14; Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The purpose
of the charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them in its
application to the facts of the case. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
A proper jury charge consists of an abstract statement of the law and the
application paragraphs. Alcoser v. State, 596 S.W.3d 320, 332 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2019) (stating that “a jury charge should begin with an abstract paragraph defining
the elements of an offense, or defining significant words or phrases, followed by an
application paragraph that applies that law to the facts of the particular case”), rev’d
on other grounds, 663 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). The abstract paragraphs
serve as a glossary to help the jury understand the meaning of concepts and terms
used in the application paragraphs of the charge. Id. at 328. The application
paragraphs apply the “pertinent penal law, abstract definitions, and general legal
principles to the particular facts and the indictment allegations.” Vasquez, 389
S.W.3d at 366. Because the application paragraphs specify the factual circumstances
under which the jury should convict or acquit, they are often referred to as the “heart
and soul” of the jury charge. Id. at 367.
8
Because Ponce did not object to the charge, he must show not only error, but
that the error, if any, caused egregious harm. Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 346 (citing
Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
No Jury-Charge Error
Ponce acknowledges that the law does not require jury unanimity on which
specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date on
which those acts were committed. See McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 871–73
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Under the “Continuous Sexual
Abuse of a Child” statute, specific acts of sexual abuse are considered the “manner
and means” rather than factual elements of the crime. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.02(d) (stating that jury is “not required to agree unanimously on which specific
acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those
acts were committed”). Ponce, however, argues that the “jury charge in this case
contained a fundamental flaw that prevented the jurors from understanding which
complainant’s allegations could lawfully serve as the basis for conviction, allowing
the jury to convince [Ponce] based on acts committed against [Ashley] an unpleaded
complainant.”
Specifically, Ponce, without citing any authority, argues:
[T]he trial court should have clarified for the jury which “A.R.” it could
consider in reaching a verdict. But the charge provided no such
guidance. It failed to distinguish between the two individuals with the
initials “A.R.,” and the application paragraph referred generically to “a
9
child or children younger that 14 years of age,” without identifying the
complainants by name or by reference to the indictment. This invited
the jurors to convict [Ponce] based on evidence related to an unindicted
complainant,8 which is prohibited under Texas law.
But at no point were the jurors clearly instructed that their verdict had
to rest solely on the allegations involving the four named
complainants[.]
We disagree with Ponce’s assessment of the jury charge. The jury was
specifically instructed that it could only consider evidence of acts against Ashley
Ramirez if such acts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and those acts could
only be considered to determine (1) the character of the defendant and (2) acts
performed in conformity with his character.
There was no risk of confusing “A.R.” in the application paragraph with
“Ashley” in the extraneous-offense paragraph. At the prosecutor’s request,
Ashley’s complete legal name was used in the extraneous-offense paragraph
(presumably to distinguish her from “A.R.,” the named complainant), and the jury
was specifically instructed that it could only consider evidence of crimes against
Ashley for a very limited purpose. One of those purposes was not as a “manner
and means” of committing the charged offense. We presume that the jury followed
the trial court’s instructions in the manner presented. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d
8
Presumably by referring to an “unindicted complainant,” Ponce means a victim that
is not a named complainant, not a complainant who was not indicted.
10
221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). And Ponce has not pointed us to any evidence
that the jury failed to follow the trial court’s instructions to rebut that presumption.
See id.
Because the jury charge clearly distinguishes A.R., the named complainant,
from “Ashley Ramirez,” the extraneous-offense witness, there was no error in the
way those names were presented to the jury in the charge. Nor did the charge
authorize a conviction based on acts committed against Ashley. Because there was
no error in the charge, we need not address whether the alleged harm was
egregious.9 See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
We overrule Ponce’s sole issue on appeal.
9
Even if we were to reach the issue of egregious harm, we would find that none
existed. Both children with the initials “A.R.” were referred to by their complete
legal names during the trial. In addition to using A.R. in the application paragraph
and differentiating “Ashley Ramirez” in the extraneous-offense paragraph, the
prosecutor identified the complainants by their complete names for the jury during
closing argument: “Just so there’s no confusion, the complainants that are named in
the indictment are [A.R., Y.R., C.H., and K.M.].” Thus, the record clearly
distinguished Allison Rodriguez or A.R., the named complainant, from Ashley
Ramirez, the extraneous-offense witness.
11
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Terry Adams
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guerra.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
12