IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CA-00223-COA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF APPELLANT WILLIAM BARNARD PACE: KATE WOODARD
PACE
v.
KATHRYN PACE PHILLIPS, APPELLEES ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, DECEASED AND TOM
PACE, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
WILLIAM BARNARD PACE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/21/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT GEORGE CLARK III COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL MADISON TAYLOR JR.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: G. TODD BURWELL
JILLIAN ROCHELLE ETHERIDGE
RICHARD ALLEN EISENBERGER JR.
KENNETH B. RECTOR
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 07/28/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. As a condition of their divorce judgment, a father agreed to carry a million dollar life
insurance policy in favor of his four children, with their mother to serve as trustee of the
money. But he did not hold up his end of the bargain. After his death, the mother discovered
there was only half the amount available, and she was cut out as trustee.
¶2. She probated a claim to enforce the judgment, which resulted in the children receiving the full amount due to them. But she was not made trustee. The trial court found her petition
to probate was satisfied.
¶3. She appeals, arguing she should hold the powers of trustee over her children’s money.
Finding error, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶4. Kate and William Pace were married in 2000. They had four children during their
marriage.
¶5. About 16 years later, the couple mutually sought a divorce on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences. The Paces further entered into a “Child Custody and Property
Settlement Agreement.” Both parties signed the PSA and initialed each page.
¶6. The terms of their PSA required Will to maintain a life insurance policy worth a
million dollars for the benefit of the four children, and named Kate as trustee for the children:
Husband and Wife acknowledge and agree that Husband shall continue to
maintain his life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $250,000 per
child for the total sum of $1,000,000 with the minor children being named as
the irrevocable beneficiaries and Wife being named trustee. . . . Husband/Wife
each agree to maintain [a] life insurance policy with the other party being
named trustee of same until said child turns Twenty-One (21) years old. In
addition, Husband nor Wife shall not borrow against, encumber or hypothecate
said policy.
Said total value(s) on each child shall remain in effect until each child has
attained the age of Twenty-One (21), or until such time that all of the minor
children have obtained their bachelor degree, whichever occurs first.
¶7. The following sentence was included toward the end of the PSA: “Husband and Wife
both understand and agree that this Agreement is made and entered into as a Mississippi
Contract, and this Agreement shall be binding and enforceable upon execution of the same.”
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And, “Each party acknowledges and agrees that in the event either party is required to seek
relief from the [c]ourt to enforce this Agreement, then the defaulting party shall be
responsible for the non-defaulting party’s attorneys, costs and expenses associated with such
action.”
¶8. The chancery court officially granted Will and Kate a divorce in 2016 and
incorporated their PSA into the final judgment of divorce.
¶9. Kate discovered years later, only after his death, that Will violated the court’s final
judgment in at least three ways. First, he did not maintain life insurance in the amount of a
million dollars. Rather, his policy was for half that, only $500,000. Second, the children
were not named as beneficiaries on the policy, as was required. Instead, he named a new
entity called the William Barnard Pace Insurance Trust, that he created. Third, he did not
name Kate as trustee, like the parties had agreed. Instead, he named his brother Tom, and
expressly foreclosed naming Kate as the trustee.
The Opening of Will Pace’s Estate
¶10. Will died six years after their divorce, in 2022. His brother Tom was appointed
executor of his estate.
¶11. Shortly thereafter, a creditor probated a claim against the estate based on a prior
judgment. William Phillips had obtained a default judgment against Will Pace in 2021, the
year before he died. The default judgment had been taken after Will failed to pay Phillips
back on a loan of over $550,000. The judgment was for $718,515.82, and also included 8%
interest until it was paid. Over $168,000 was for interest and a 10% penalty contained in the
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promissory note.
¶12. Kate, “individually and on behalf of the Pace Children,” then filed a “Petition to
Construe, Modify, and/or Reform the William Barnard Pace Life Insurance Trust 2022,” in
the Pace Estate. Her petition was later amended. Kate’s amended petition claimed that she
was “the rightful trustee” of the Trust and alleged that “[t]he Trust is to continue for the
benefit of the minor children” of her and Will.
¶13. In the amended petition, she alleged, “However, a potential legal issue has arisen with
respect to the naming of the Trustee.” She argued she should have been named Trustee per
the final judgment of divorce and the terms of their incorporated PSA. She sought for the
Trust to be reformed since Will “was in violation of the previous Order of divorce” and she
was not named as trustee.
¶14. She also claimed it should be reformed since “[u]pon information and belief: the trust
is only funded in the amount of $500,000.00 which is only half of the amount required under
the Final Judgment of Divorce.” Crucially, Kate argued that since the Trust did not name her
as trustee, “said items should be deleted from the Trust.”
¶15. Her prayer for relief asked “that the [c]ourt modify or reform the Trust to appoint [her]
as trustee,” and “empower the Trust to immediately file a proof of claim for $500,000.00 to
fully fund this trust, and that attorney’s fees for the modification . . . be assessed to the trust
and/or trustee.”
Probating the Two Claims Against the Pace Estate
¶16. William Phillips and Kate Pace both battled Will Pace’s Estate to probate their claims.
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(During the litigation, Phillips passed away, and his estate was substituted). Phillips sought
to attack Kate’s claims, attempting to limit what she could seek to $500,000. Ultimately, the
two parties’ claims were both competing with the comparably limited assets of the Estate.
¶17. The Pace Estate subsequently made payments to the parties pursuant to an agreed
order to resolve their claims. The agreed order noted that by agreeing to the order, the parties
did not “waive or release any claim or defense . . . including, but not limited to, the right to
contest any claim filed herein or contend that any claimant has . . . received all to which said
claimant is entitled[.]”
¶18. Phillips received partial payment of his probated claim totaling $477,618.40, or a little
more than half of the amount he sought.
¶19. The Pace Estate then divvied up $500,000 to the four Pace children. One of the four
was an adult by then and received a payment of $125,000.00. The other three children were
still minors so $375,000 was paid into conservatorship accounts for their benefit.
¶20. Phillips then sought to force Kate out entirely and have her probated claim canceled.
Phillips pursued cancellation arguing that Will’s financial obligation to provide life insurance
for the benefit of the children had been essentially satisfied. Phillips also contended Will’s
“obligation to provide life insurance as set forth in the Divorce Agreement has been fully
satisfied,” so Kate’s claim for control of the Trust did not matter. He further sought to cancel
her claims contending Kate’s mission to become trustee was “irrelevant to the determination
of whether the Decedent’s contractual obligation to provide $1,000,000.00 life insurance
coverage for the benefit of the children has been fully satisfied.”
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¶21. The chancery court found that Will’s financial obligation to his children “has been
fully satisfied by the aforesaid payment from the assets of this estate and by virtue of the
insurance policy provided by the Decedent for the benefit of his children.” The court
concluded that “this estate has no further obligation to [Kate] or her children arising out of
the provision of the Divorce Agreement requiring the Decedent to provide life insurance for
the benefit of his children.” The chancery court granted Phillips’ motion to cancel Kate’s
claim.
¶22. Kate filed a timely notice of appeal from the chancery court’s order.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancery court’s order was final and appealable.
¶23. The Pace Estate filed a motion to dismiss Kate’s appeal, arguing that the chancery
court’s order canceling her claim “was not a final, appealable order[.]” In the course of the
appeal process, a panel of our Supreme Court entered an order ruling the Estate’s “motion
should be passed for consideration with the merits of the appeal.”
¶24. Accordingly, as an initial matter, our Court must determine whether we have
jurisdiction over this appeal. As we have recently explained,
“An appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.” Blaney v. Black Jack
Oil Co., 325 So. 3d 1204, 1206 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). “This Court will
dismiss uncertified interlocutory appeals.” Id. And “[w]ithout the entry of a
Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the
claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim action, is
interlocutory.” M.W.F. [v. D.D.F.,] 926 So. 2d [897,] 900 (¶4) [(Miss. 2006)]
(referencing MRCP 54).
“Generally, a final judgment is one that adjudicates the merits of the
controversy and settles all issues between all parties.” LaFontaine v. Holliday,
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110 So. 3d 785, 787 (¶8) (Miss. 2013) (emphasis added). “In other words, an
order is considered final if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Id. (internal quotation
mark omitted).
Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. Montgomery, 425 So. 3d 520, 524 (¶¶12-13) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2025).
¶25. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. The Mississippi Supreme Court
“has held that an order that finally resolves a claim against an estate is final and appealable
although the estate remains open.” In re Est. of Pavlou, 308 So. 3d 1284, 1288 (¶12) (Miss.
2021).1
¶26. While characterizing this order as interlocutory, the Estate has failed to provide
meaningful argument as to why it is not final as to Kate’s claims. Instead, the Estate merely
resorted to a personal attack, asserting that Kate would only want to appeal “because she
wants money.” Yet as is clear from Kate’s appeal, and as will be addressed below, what Kate
seeks is not more money, but control over the money held in favor of her children.
¶27. While the Pace Estate remains open, the chancery court’s order at issue here
terminated all of Kate’s remaining claims. The trial court found “that the claim probated by
[Kate] Pace on behalf of her children . . . and the subsequently amended claim filed by Pace
individually and on behalf of her children . . . are hereby deemed satisfied, cancelled, and
released.” As in Pavlou, this “finally resolves a claim against an estate,” and is therefore
1
Pavlou considered a collection of cases spanning over 30 years that allowed such appeal, including three where our “Court of Appeals has exercised jurisdiction over timely appeals from orders that finally determined probate claims although the estates remained open.” Id.
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final and appealable.
¶28. In line with ample precedent, we find that the chancery court’s order canceling Kate’s
probated claims was final and appealable.
II. Whether the chancery court erred in finding that the payment
from the Pace Estate satisfied Kate’s probated claim.
¶29. Next, Kate alleges that Will breached the terms of their divorce judgment. She argues
that the chancery court erred when it failed to modify the Trust to appoint her as trustee or
in the alternative create a constructive trust. According to Kate, “[d]espite the breach of all
of these conditions,” “the chancellor treated this as a mere underfunding issue.”
¶30. This Court’s standard of review of a chancery court’s decision is limited. In re Est.
of Lewis v. Thomas, 422 So. 3d 484, 492 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). “We will not disturb
a chancery court’s factual findings ‘unless such findings are manifestly wrong or clearly
erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Prout v. Williams, 55 So. 3d 195, 197-98 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
2011)). We review questions of law de novo. Id.
¶31. “[A] property-settlement agreement, though ‘quasi-contractual,’ is not simply a
contract.” Moseley v. Smith, 180 So. 3d 667, 673 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). “Under
Mississippi’s irreconcilable-differences statute, [the parties’] property-settlement agreement,
upon approval by the chancellor, became incorporated into the final judgment of divorce.”
Id. “As a result, the property-settlement agreement is a court order.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶32. At issue is the underlying divorce between Will and Kate, which occurred years before
Will passed away. The two agreed on certain terms in a property-settlement agreement.
¶33. The most notable terms of the PSA, which were incorporated into the court order,
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were that “Husband and Wife acknowledge and agree that Husband shall continue to
maintain his life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $250,000 per child for the total
sum of $1,000,000 with the minor children being named as the irrevocable beneficiaries and
Wife being named trustee[.]” (Emphasis added). The PSA also mandated that “Said total
value(s) on each child shall remain in effect until each child has attained the age of TwentyOne (21), or until such time that all of the minor children have obtained their bachelor
degree, whichever occurs first.” (Emphasis added).
¶34. It is uncontested that Will violated the terms of this court order—an order to which
he willingly acceded to obtain the divorce. He did not maintain a life insurance policy in the
amount of $250,000 for each of his four children, they were not named as the irrevocable
beneficiaries, and Kate was not named trustee over these amounts.
¶35. Instead, Will only kept $500,000 total in life insurance, rather than the million to
which he agreed and was court-ordered to obtain. The children were not named beneficiaries
of the policy. The new Trust he created to hold the money stood in the children’s place. He
did not name Kate as trustee of the life insurance, choosing to name his brother instead.
¶36. By doing so, Will not only violated the express terms of the court order, but also the
spirit. Instead of providing for his children and allowing the children’s mother to govern
how those monies would be spent, Will thrust half a million dollars into a trust controlled by
his brother.
¶37. By granting the children access to the $500,000 held by the Trust, the trial court
remedied one of the violations by Will Pace—the underfunding. But as Kate argues on
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appeal, “the chancellor erred by treating this as a mere math problem that could be remedied
by ordering additional money to be paid[.]” While three of their children are still minors,
Kate will have to seek permission from Will’s brother before she can buy them clothes, pay
for sports and music lessons, or purchase a vehicle when they turn sixteen.
¶38. Money without the corresponding control of it is perhaps no money at all. There may
well be the equivalent of a million dollars held for these children, but their mother cannot
meaningfully control it as Will agreed she would, and as was incorporated into a Final
Judgment of Divorce.
¶39. One of the great maxims of chancery court is that “equity will not suffer a wrong
without a remedy.” Ainsworth v. Plunk, 343 So. 3d 1108, 1116 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)
(cleaned up). In this instance, the trial court allowed Kate to go without a remedy for Will’s
many wrongs. This was manifestly in error and allowed Will to posthumously disregard the
agreed terms of the PSA and a court order. We therefore reverse the chancery court’s order
finding Kate’s claims fully satisfied and canceled, and we remand for the court to fashion a
remedy for Kate’s lack of control over the monies accorded to her children.
¶40. At the inception of her petition in this estate, Kate always requested modification or
alteration of the Trust to allow her to be trustee. Whether the chancellor determines a
constructive trust should be imposed or substitutes Kate as trustee over the Insurance Trust
is a matter left to the chancellor’s discretion.
¶41. We also take this opportunity to clear up a misunderstanding by the parties, the
chancery court, and the separate opinion. In Moseley, we undertook to determine whether
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a three year statute of limitations applied to an action to enforce “a provision in the propertysettlement agreement” between a husband and wife. 180 So. 3d at 673 (¶24).
¶42. This Court determined that a spouse later seeking to enforce a PSA that had been
incorporated into a judgment was not seeking a remedy for a breach of contract. Id.
Because “the property-settlement agreement is a court order,” a suit to enforce it via
contempt “was not for breach of contract.” Id. “Rather, her action was to enforce a
judgment.” Id. (Emphasis added).
¶43. Regardless of what arguments were made below, it is clear from our precedent that
what Kate was seeking was “to enforce a court-entered judgment, and not merely a private
contract[.]” Id. at (¶31). Will had agreed to keep a million dollars in life insurance for the
benefit of his children and to make Kate the trustee, and “equity will regard that as done
which ought to have been done.” Faulkner v. Faulkner, 192 Miss. 358, 5 So. 2d 421, 422
(1942).
¶44. We note that the PSA included a provision that if a party had to seek enforcement of
its terms, then they were to be awarded attorney’s fees. We further note that per Moseley,
“[w]hen a party is held in contempt for violating a valid judgment of the court, then attorney's
fees should be awarded to the party that has been forced to seek the court’s enforcement of
its own judgment.” Moseley, 180 So. 3d at 675 (¶37). Such matters should be addressed by
the trial court upon remand.
CONCLUSION
¶45. The litigation below has spanned many lawyers and hundreds of pages of filings. In
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the end, it is a simple matter. When he divorced their mother, a father agreed to financially
support his children in a very specific way. He failed to do so. The chancery court did not
fully remedy the wrongs of the father, and so we must reverse and remand.
¶46. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND
LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES, C.J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION, JOINED BY CARLTON, P.J.
BARNES, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
¶47. Before this Court is an appeal from the chancery court’s judgment finding that Kate
Pace’s probated claim was satisfied and released. I concur with the majority opinion that the
chancery court’s order is final and appealable. However, this Court is without jurisdiction
to address Kate’s arguments to enforce the contract related to the Insurance Trust and the
judgment of divorce, as those matters still remain before the chancery court. Therefore, I
dissent from the majority opinion’s decision to address and rule on these arguments since
they are outside the scope of the judgment appealed from and are not ripe for consideration
by this Court.
¶48. Kate acknowledged in the trial court proceedings that her claim for breach of contract
was a separate claim. In responding to the Pace Estate’s arguments against summary
judgment, Kate asserted that her probated claims are “clearly unrelated to the breach of
contract claim for failure to maintain the life insurance policy pursuant to the terms of the
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Agreement[.]”2 Kate’s attorney also asserted at the hearing on the motion for partial
summary judgment, “The probated claims have no bearing on the motion for summary
judgment or the complaint that’s been asserted.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the
chancery court had not addressed the merits of these arguments or ruled on that motion by
the time this appeal was filed, which Kate concedes in her brief. Therefore, those issues may
not be considered in this appeal. See Asanov v. Hunt, 914 So. 2d 769, 774 (¶¶27-28) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that appellee/cross-appellant could not cross-appeal on issues not
yet ruled on by the trial court).
¶49. The sole issue before this Court is whether the chancery court erred in granting
Phillips’s motion to release Kate’s probated claim and finding that the probated claim is fully
satisfied. Kate asserts on appeal that the chancery court’s allowing the Insurance Trust “to
serve as ‘partial compliance’” of the property-settlement agreement and ordering the
$500,000 payment to cover the “shortfall” was improper. Yet, the record clearly shows that
the court’s ruling granted Kate’s specific request from her initial and amended petition, as
stated:
19. Kate W. Pace is requesting that the Estate of William Barnard Pace
fund the remaining $500,000.00 as prescribed in the Trust, and makes
said request as the Estate is a party to this suit as William Barnard Pace
did not fully and finally fund the Trust as required in Exhibit “B.”
20. Kate W. Pace is requesting authority from the Court to file a claim on
behalf of the trust and/or as next friend of the minor beneficiaries
against the Estate for the shortage.
2
The Pace Estate explains in its appellee brief that Will Pace had another life insurance policy that was “lost” after he suffered health issues, and he was unable to qualify for another policy.
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By an agreed order of the chancery court entered on September 18, 2024, the remaining
$500,000.00 “shortage” Kate requested in both petitions was paid from the assets of the Pace
Estate. As the Phillips Estate asserts, “[s]ince it is undisputed that the Pace Children have
received the benefit of $1,000,000.00 as agreed in the Divorce Agreement, it is impossible
to conclude that the judge erred in deciding this limited issue presented to him for decision.”
(Emphasis added).
¶50. Much of Kate’s discussion on appeal, however, focuses on the chancery court’s failure
to impose a constructive trust, which Kate only requested in her May 2023 “Petitioner’s
Reply to Response in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” with regard to
her breach-of-contract claim. Again, Kate attempts to assert issues related to her separate
claim for breach of contract, which is not before us on appeal. Nor was the imposition of a
constructive trust argued during the proceedings related to Phillips’s motion and the current
appeal. See White v. White, 913 So. 2d 323, 324 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (“This Court’s
function is to consider claims of error committed at the trial level[,] and matters not presented
to the trial court for a ruling may not usually be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
¶51. I therefore agree with the Phillips Estate that this issue is “irrelevant to the issue then
before the court for resolution.” I also find no merit to Kate’s repeated arguments that “the
chancellor erred by treating this case as mere monetary shortfall.” Considering that the
chancery court provided Kate with the requested relief asserted in her petitions, I do not find
the court’s ruling granting Phillips’s motion was an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous.
¶52. Accordingly, I would affirm the court’s judgment. Kate’s remaining issues could be
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raised in subsequent appellate proceedings once the chancery court has ruled on such issues,
if the parties so choose.
CARLTON, P.J. JOINS THIS OPINION.
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