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Phuong Wong v. State

2026-07-28

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

FOURTH DIVISION

MCFADDEN, P. J.,

WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received in our clerk's office within ten

days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules

July 28, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A26A1507. WONG v. THE STATE.

PADGETT, Judge.

A jury found Phuong Kim Wong guilty of felony theft by shoplifting. Wong

appeals from the denial of her motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial,

arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

[T]he standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict

of acquittal is the same as for determining the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a conviction: the evidence must be sufficient for a

rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

was guilty of the charged offense. The evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to support the verdict and the defendant no longer

enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court

determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or

determine the credibility of witnesses.

King v. State, 364 Ga. App. 263, 265 (874 SE2d 439) (2022).

Viewed in this manner, the evidence shows that on September 6, 2024, Wong

and two companions arrived in the same car at Metro Chef, a wholesale food and

restaurant supply warehouse. Wong and her companions walked into the store

together and entered the walk-in meat cooler, located by the front entrance. Metro

Chef’s layout funnels customers from the right side of the store, where the entrance

is located, to the checkout registers on the opposite side of the store, near the exit.

Wong and her companions left the store together through the entrance,

without going around to the cash registers, with a shopping cart containing

approximately 70 pounds of beef tenderloin and 50 pounds of denuded beef worth

$1,192.48. As they exited the store, a Metro Chef employee asked Wong to show him

a receipt. Wong did not do so. Instead, she and her acquaintances “took off running”

toward Wong’s car. Store employees chased after them into the parking lot. By the

time the employees made contact with Wong, she was seated in the driver’s seat of

her car with the keys in her hand, and some of the boxes of meat had been put into

the vehicle. The store manager called 911 and Wong was escorted back inside the

store. Wong told the responding officer that she was under the impression that the

meat had already been paid for. The store manager testified that patrons are only able

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to pay for merchandise at the cash registers; no online or over-the-phone shopping is

available.

Wong was charged with felony theft by shoplifting and proceeded to a jury

trial. At the close of the State’s case, Wong moved for a directed verdict, which the

trial court denied. The jury found her guilty and she filed a motion for a new trial,

which the trial court denied without a hearing. This appeal followed.

Wong argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction

because, she asserts, the evidence was circumstantial and did not exclude every other

reasonable hypothesis except her guilt. Wong also contends that her theft by

shoplifting conviction cannot be sustained because she was merely present at the

scene. We disagree.

OCGA § 16-8-14(a)(1) provides in part that:

A person commits the offense of theft by shoplifting when such person

alone or in concert with another person, with the intent of appropriating

merchandise to his or her own use without paying for the same or to

deprive the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole

or in part, ... takes possession of the goods or merchandise of any store

or retail establishment.1

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The offense is punished as a felony if the value of the merchandise taken exceeds $500. OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(2). Wong does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the value of the merchandise.

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“A person who intentionally aids and abets in the commission of shoplifting is

a party thereto and may be convicted of shoplifting.” Veasey v. State, 244 Ga. App.

102, 103–04(1) (534 SE2d 129) (2000) (punctuation omitted). “[W]hile mere

presence at the scene of a crime affords no basis for a conviction, presence,

companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from

which one’s participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.” Saintpaul v. State,

358 Ga. App. 393, 395 (855 SE2d 399) (2021) (punctuation omitted). Moreover,

circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support a conviction “if the proved facts

are not only consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but exclude every other

reasonable hypothesis but the guilt of the accused. And when the evidence meets this

test, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, and whether this

burden has been met is a question for the jury.” Elkins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 816,

819(1) (830 SE2d 345) (2019) (citation modified).

Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to support Wong’s shoplifting conviction. Wong and her two companions arrived in

one car and entered Metro Chef together. They walked into the meat cooler together

and left the store with approximately 120 pounds of beef without paying for it. When

asked to provide a store receipt, Wong and her accomplices “took off running” to the

parking lot. By the time the store employees encountered Wong, the boxes of meat

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had been placed inside her car. Thus, the evidence supported the finding that Wong

was not merely present at the scene, but rather that, working in concert with her

accomplices, she purposely took possession of the merchandise without paying for

it, with the intent of appropriating it to her own use. See Saintpaul, 358 Ga. App. at

395; Veasey, 244 Ga. App. at 104(1). See also Shaheed v. State, 245 Ga. App. 754,

755(1) (538 SE2d 823) (2000) (“Flight [from the scene of a crime] is circumstantial

evidence of consciousness of guilt; the weight to be given such evidence is for the

jury to decide.” (punctuation omitted)).

While Wong claimed that she assumed that the meat had been paid for, the

jury was authorized to reject this explanation. See McClain v. State, 301 Ga. App.

844, 847(1) (689 SE2d 126) (2010) (holding that even in case based upon

circumstantial evidence, “[a] jury is not required to believe a defendant’s

testimony”).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Wong’s motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.

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