COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0800-25-4
SIMONE P. PARKER
v.
ENTERPRISE TRADING INC.
Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Bernhard
Argued at Fairfax, Virginia
Opinion Issued July 28, 2026
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
Michael E. Levy, Judge
Simone P. Parker, pro se.
No brief or argument for appellee.
PUBLISHED OPINION BY
JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
Simone P. Parker, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s order that, following Enterprise
Trading Inc.’s (Enterprise) appeal from a general district court judgment in Parker’s favor,
dismissed the case under Code § 16.1-106.1(D), entered judgment for Enterprise, and ordered the
$6,050 appeal bond returned to Enterprise. On appeal, Parker argues that the circuit court erred
by dismissing the case and entering judgment for Enterprise under Code § 16.1-106.1(D), by
denying her motion to reconsider, which violated her due process rights, and by denying her
proposed statement of facts. Because the court erroneously applied Code § 16.1-106.1(D) to
dismiss the case, we reverse and remand.1
1
“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that generally [appellate courts] decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 188, 198 (2024) (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4 (2010)). Given our resolution of Parker’s appeal, we do not reach her arguments concerning her other assignments of error.
BACKGROUND
Parker filed a warrant in debt against Enterprise in the Stafford County General District
Court. After a hearing, the general district court awarded her $6,050. Enterprise appealed to the
circuit court for a trial de novo. See Code § 16.1-106(A).
At the January 30, 2025 term day, the circuit court set a trial date. In mid-February 2025,
the court sent a notice to the parties that the case had been scheduled for trial “on April 15, 2025,
at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom #1.” The notice also advised the parties to be “present and ready to try
this case at the hearing.” A month before trial, Parker requested permission for a witness to
appear virtually, and the circuit court provided her with a copy of the Virginia Supreme Court
Rule about remote testimony.
Parker did not appear in Courtroom #1 for trial at 9:00 a.m. on April 15. The court called
the case at 9:20 a.m., and only Enterprise and a language interpreter were present. At 9:35 a.m.,
Parker still had not appeared, and the court dismissed the case under Code § 16.1-106.1(D)2 and
entered judgment for Enterprise.
A few days later, Parker moved the court to reconsider its decision and to reset the matter
for trial. According to Parker, she never intended to miss the trial because she had attended
every prior hearing, including term day, spent hours traveling to the courthouse over the course
of the litigation, and had inquired about remote witness testimony during trial preparation. She
asserted that she had arrived at the courthouse early “and was accidentally given incorrect
information about what courtroom to attend” when she asked an officer at the information desk
for directions. Around 9:10 a.m., after watching two criminal matters, she realized that no one
looked familiar, left the courtroom, “and start[ed] asking around [for] the correct room.” Parker
2
Code § 16.1-106.1(D) states that “[i]f a party who has appealed a judgment . . . of a district court fails to appear in circuit court . . . on the trial date, the circuit court may, upon the motion of any party, enter an order treating the appeal as withdrawn.”
-2-explained that she found the correct courtroom at 9:25 a.m. She contended that “[i]t would be a
miscarriage of justice” to dismiss the case because of this “misunderstanding,” as there is a
preference for deciding cases on the merits, and Enterprise would suffer only “minimal
prejudice.”
The circuit court denied Parker’s motion without a hearing. The court ruled that “[t]he
matter was in Circuit Courtroom One, so the direction given was correct” and noted that “[t]he
General District Court had already tried the case.” It also observed that Parker had not taken the
proper steps for a witness to appear via video. The court reiterated that Enterprise and the
interpreter had “found the correct courtroom and incurred . . . expenses for the day of trial” and
the judge, court staff, and a court reporter were also present.
ANALYSIS
We first address preservation. See Rule 5A:18. The circuit court dismissed the case on
Enterprise’s oral motion, in Parker’s absence, so Parker had no opportunity to object when the
ruling was made. The absence of a contemporaneous objection does not bar her appeal. Code
§ 8.01-384(A). She argues here that dismissal under Code § 16.1-106.1(D) must be reserved
“for parties who abandon their appeal.” The issue is properly before us.
Parker’s appeal requires us to construe Code § 16.1-106.1(D). “Issues of statutory
construction are questions of law which [appellate courts] review de novo.” McKee Foods Corp.
v. County of Augusta, 297 Va. 482, 495 (2019). “[W]e must give effect to the legislature’s
intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would
result in a manifest absurdity.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 382, 387 (2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 35, 48 (2011)). “Where the legislature
has used words of a plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction
-3-which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed.” Id.
(quoting Crislip v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 66, 71-72 (2001)).
Code § 16.1-106.1(D) states that “[i]f a party who has appealed a judgment . . . of a
district court fails to appear in circuit court . . . on the trial date, the circuit court may, upon the
motion of any party, enter an order treating the appeal as withdrawn.” (Emphasis added). Stated
otherwise, if an appealing party fails to appear for trial, the circuit court has discretion to treat the
appeal as withdrawn, which would reinstate the general district court’s judgment. See Wal-Mart
Stores E., LP v. State Corp. Comm’n, 299 Va. 57, 70 (2020) (holding that a statute’s use of the
word “may” provides “a broad[] grant of discretionary authority”); see also Leidel v. Leidel,
No. 0592-23-1, slip op. at 6 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2025) (“Code § 16.1-106.1(D) grants a circuit
court broad discretionary authority to treat an appeal from a district court as withdrawn when the
party who appealed does not appear for trial in the circuit court.”).3
By its plain language, Code § 16.1-106.1(D) authorizes dismissal when the “party who has
appealed” fails to appear for trial.4 The language “party who has appealed” is plain and definite; it
means the appealing party. Smith, 66 Va. App. at 387; Code § 16.1-106.1(D). Here, Enterprise
was the appealing party, not Parker, and Enterprise was present for trial. Parker, the
non-appealing party, was missing. Because Parker was the non-appealing party, the court erred in
dismissing the case under Code § 16.1-106.1(D).5
3
“Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for their persuasive value. Rule 5A:1(f).” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012).
4
Code § 16.1-106.1(D) also addresses when “no party appears for trial,” which is not at issue here.
5
We note that even if Parker had been the appealing party, the statute would not support the entered order. Subsection D authorizes only an order treating the appeal as withdrawn and disposing of the case pursuant to the district court’s judgment. Code § 16.1-106.1(D), (E). A proper disposition under the statute thus would have reinstated the district court’s judgment in Parker’s favor, not entered judgment for Enterprise.
-4-Our holding is narrow. We decide only that Code § 16.1-106.1(D), which permits a circuit
court to treat an appeal as withdrawn when the appealing party fails to appear, did not authorize
dismissing Parker’s case and entering judgment for Enterprise. We do not foreclose other options
available to a circuit court when a plaintiff who did not appeal fails to appear for a trial de novo.
These other options are matters committed to the circuit court’s discretion, which the court has not
exercised and for which the court has not made the prerequisite findings.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
-5-