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State v. Keaton
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTOINE KEATON
(SC 20845)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. While investigating the shooting, the police interviewed the defendant. At the outset of the interview, the defendant informed the interviewing detectives that his father had spoken with an attorney on his behalf and that the attorney would not be available until later that day. The defendant then asked the detectives whether he was under arrest or whether he was free to leave. In response, they told the defendant that they could not provide him with any answers to his questions unless he executed a written waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). When the detectives asked the defendant to initial and sign the written waiver, he specifically indicated that he wanted his attorney. As the detectives began to leave the interrogation room, they informed the defendant that they were questioning him in connection with a murder investigation. Thereafter, the defendant agreed to speak to them without his attorney present, and they read him his Miranda rights from a second waiver of rights form, which the defendant initialed and signed. During the remainder of the interview, the defendant admitted that he was in the vicinity of the shooting when it occurred and identified himself in a compilation of video footage captured around the time of the shooting from video cameras mounted on public streets and in still photographs derived from that footage. At trial, defense counsel did not object to the testimony of one of the interviewing detectives describing the defendant’s interview and the waiver of his rights. Moreover, when the prosecutor sought to admit into evidence a video recording of the police interview and the waiver of rights form, defense counsel stated that he had no objection to their admission. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the admission of the compilation of video footage violated his constitutional right of confrontation and, in seeking reversal of his conviction, urged this court to invoke its supervisory authority to either adopt a prophylactic rule requiring the police, upon learning that a suspect is represented by counsel, to immediately cease questioning until counsel is present, or to conclude that the defendant’s right to counsel was violated under the circumstances of this case. Held:
The defendant’s claim that the trial court had violated his constitutional right of confrontation by admitting the compilation of video footage, insofar as a computer program was used to manipulate the unedited video footage in order to create the compilation and he was entitled to cross-examine the program’s developer, failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as defense counsel affirmatively waived the defendant’s claim.
State v. Keaton
Defense counsel clearly and unequivocally stated, “[n]o objection,” in response to the prosecutor’s offer of the video compilation into evidence, counsel did not question the detective, who testified for the state regarding the video compilation, about its contents, purpose, or creation, and counsel instead strategically chose to refer to the compilation during closing argument in arguing to the jury that the defendant was one of a number of individuals in the video footage dressed in a white T-shirt and blue shorts. Alternatively, the record was inadequate for this court to review the defendant’s confrontation claim, as the record did not reveal whether the video compilation, which was a synchronized sequence of discrete images, constituted hearsay or whether it was testimonial in nature.
The defendant’s claim that the police had violated his constitutional right to counsel by improperly questioning him without his attorney present was unpreserved and, therefore, was not reviewable under Golding, as defense counsel stated “[n]o objection” in response to the admission into evidence of the recorded police interview and the waiver of rights form, and the defendant’s conviction was not subject to reversal under the plain error doctrine. Moreover, this court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervisory authority to reverse the defendant’s conviction, either by adopting a prophylactic rule requiring the police, upon learning during a custodial interrogation that a suspect is represented by counsel, to immediately cease all questioning until counsel is present, or by reaching the merits of the defendant’s claim that his right to counsel was violated. This court was not persuaded that existing constitutional safeguards, announced in cases such as Edwards v. Arizona (451 U.S. 477) and State v. Purcell (331 Conn. 318), that protect a suspect’s right to counsel in situations in which the suspect, during interrogation, asks for counsel or makes an equivocal request for counsel, were inadequate or that a more stringent rule was necessary for the fair administration of justice.
Argued March 11—officially released July 28, 2026
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before Schuman, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant
appealed. Affirmed.
Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender,
with whom, on the brief, was Daniel J. Krisch, assigned
counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
State v. Keaton
attorney, and Robert Diaz, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
DANNEHY, J. A jury found the defendant, Antoine
Keaton, guilty of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-217. On appeal,
the defendant claims that (1) the admission of certain
video evidence at trial violated his confrontation clause rights under the sixth amendment to the United States
constitution, and (2) we should exercise our supervisory
authority to reverse his conviction by either (A) adopting a new, bright-line rule requiring that, whenever
the police learn that a suspect in custody and subject to interrogation is represented by counsel, regardless of
whether counsel is present or the suspect has invoked
his right to counsel, they must immediately cease all
questioning until counsel is present, or (B) concluding
that his right to counsel was violated. We affirm the
judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On July 12, 2019, the defendant and the victim,
Anthony Wright, attended a nighttime street vigil in
Hartford. During the vigil, the victim socialized with
friends at a street intersection, while the defendant
stood with a group of individuals on the stoop of a nearby apartment building. After spending some time on the
stoop, the defendant walked to a package store, purchased a small bottle of alcohol, and returned to the
stoop. Approximately fifty minutes later, the defendant
left the stoop and walked toward the intersection where
the victim was speaking with his friends. Upon reaching
the intersection, the defendant fired a gun at the victim, who collapsed. The defendant immediately fled the scene,
and the victim was later pronounced dead.
During the investigation, the Hartford police obtained
closed-circuit camera footage from street cameras located throughout the city. Investigators then used a computer
State v. Keaton
program known as Milestone to compile and synchronize
footage from those cameras in the vicinity of the shooting. The resulting video depicted a man wearing a white
T-shirt and dark pants entering and exiting the package
store and later approaching the victim at the intersection, shooting the victim, and fleeing the scene. After
reviewing this footage and interviewing witnesses present on the night of the shooting, the police identified the defendant as a potential suspect. A few days later, Detectives Jeffrey Pethigal and James Newell interviewed the
defendant at the Hartford Police Department. During
the recorded interview, the defendant reviewed the street camera footage and identified himself as the individual
wearing a white T-shirt who was seen entering and exiting the package store, and as that same individual in a
still frame of the video captured approximately fifteen
seconds before that individual shot the victim.
At trial, the prosecutor introduced into evidence both
the Milestone video compilation and the video recording of the defendant’s police interview. The prosecutor
argued that the Milestone compilation, together with the
defendant’s identification of himself as the individual
wearing a white T-shirt, established that he was the
shooter who killed the victim. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the
jury’s verdict and sentenced the defendant to fifty-five
years of imprisonment. The defendant appeals directly to
this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court violated
his confrontation rights under the sixth amendment to
the United States constitution1 by improperly admitting
into evidence the Milestone compilation of footage captured by the street cameras. He contends that, because
1
The sixth amendment right of confrontation is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).
State v. Keaton
the Milestone program “manipulat[ed]” the underlying, unedited video footage used in the prosecution, he
was entitled to cross-examine the program’s developer.
The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not
preserved at trial and therefore seeks review pursuant
to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.
773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).2 In response, the state
argues that the claim was affirmatively waived by defense counsel and that the record is inadequate for review. We
agree with the state.
The following additional facts are pertinent to our
resolution of this claim. On the first day of trial, Steven Citta, a detective with the Hartford Police Department,
was called to testify regarding the Milestone program
and the video compilation. Detective Citta explained that the Hartford police have access to a series of street cameras throughout the city and that the footage from the
cameras is uploaded and stored at the Capitol Command
City Center (C4). Once recorded and saved, the police are unable to add or omit anything to or from the footage.
He explained that C4 uses the Milestone program, which
allows the police to create video compilations based on
the stored footage. The Milestone software allows the
police to select which saved camera footage they want to
include, along with the time parameters of the footage,
and then it “automatically formats” and “scrunches [the
footage] down” so that the separate video feeds appear
as one synchronized video. Detective Citta testified that, during the investigation, the police selected stored footage from five cameras that had captured the intersection
where the shooting occurred, as well as the surrounding
2
Under Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved claim if “(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see also In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of Golding).
State v. Keaton
streets. The Milestone program synchronized the selected
video feeds, generating a compilation in which five separate frames displayed the events of the night within
a single screen. The compilation also included precise
date and time references to the events that night. When
asked on direct examination if the Milestone program
has glitches, Detective Citta acknowledged that he was
“not an IT professional,” but he indicated that the system may experience brief glitches, issues connecting to the
server, or issues with motion sensitive cameras failing
to record because of a lack of movement.
After Detective Citta testified on direct examination,
the prosecutor offered the Milestone compilation into
evidence. In response, defense counsel stated, “[n]o objection,” and the trial court admitted the Milestone compilation as a full exhibit. The trial court asked defense counsel if he would like to cross-examine Detective Citta, to which defense counsel replied, “[n]o questions, Your
Honor.” The prosecutor then called Detective Pethigal,
who testified about the events depicted in the Milestone
compilation and to previously showing the defendant still photographs taken from the video. In closing argument,
defense counsel referred to the Milestone compilation as
evidence establishing that multiple people near the vigil had worn a white T-shirt and blue shorts that matched
those of the suspect.3
In addressing a confrontation clause claim, well established principles guide our analysis. “The confrontation
clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness]
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Villanueva, 352 Conn.
439, 470, 337 A.3d 734 (2025), quoting Crawford v.
3
During his interview with the police, the defendant indicated that he thought he was wearing “black pants” on the night of the incident, and the individual he identified as himself in the security camera footage and still photographs was wearing dark pants. During closing argument, however, defense counsel argued that the defendant, along with multiple other people at the vigil, was wearing blue shorts.
State v. Keaton
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158
L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). The confrontation clause “bars
only the introduction of hearsay—meaning, out-of-court
statements offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v.
Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 785, 144 S. Ct. 1785, 219 L. Ed.
2d 420 (2024). In addition, it “applies only to testimonial hearsay”—a category whose contours have been “variously described.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 784. Although “there is no comprehensive definition of testimonial,” courts “largely [have] focused on
the reasonable expectation of the declarant that, under
the circumstances, his or her words later could be used
for prosecutorial purposes.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bester, 353 Conn. 720, 732, 347 A.3d
146 (2025). Thus, “the threshold inquiries [for purposes
of] a confrontation clause analysis are whether the statement was hearsay, and if so, whether the statement was
testimonial in nature . . . . These are questions of law over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Villanueva, supra, 470.
Golding review of confrontation clause claims is often
unavailable because the claim was either waived at trial
or the record is inadequate for review on appeal. See State v. Bester, supra, 353 Conn. 729 (observing that Golding
review in this context is available for “narrow class of
unpreserved but not affirmatively waived confrontation clause claims . . . when a constitutional violation is apparent from an adequate record”). “A waived claim,
as opposed to an unpreserved claim, does not satisfy the
third prong of the Golding test because, in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has
been] done to either party . . . or that the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167, 179, 263 A.3d 350
(2021). “A defendant, or his counsel, may abandon the
defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, either expressly or impliedly by . . . deliberate action.” (Internal
State v. Keaton
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hinton, 352 Conn.
183, 203, 336 A.3d 62 (2025).
“To be effective . . . defense counsel’s waiver must be
knowing and intelligent.” State v. Culbreath, supra,
340 Conn. 181. In our adversary system, a trial court
is entitled to presume that counsel is familiar with the
relevant constitutional principles and acts competently
to safeguard a defendant’s constitutional rights. See,
e.g., State v. Holness, 289 Conn. 535, 544, 958 A.2d
754 (2008). As a result, we have held that defense counsel effectively waives a claim under the confrontation
clause if he or she affirmatively states to the court that they do not object to the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence. See, e.g., State v. Iverson, 352 Conn. 422, 436–37, 336 A.3d 1212 (2025) (defense counsel
waived confrontation clause claim when he responded,
“ ‘[n]o, Your Honor,’ ” to court’s inquiry of whether he
objected to admission of autopsy report); State v. Hinton, supra, 352 Conn. 204–205 (defense counsel waived
confrontation clause claim when he responded, “[u]nder
that [ground], no, Your Honor,” and, “[n]o objection,”
to court’s question of whether he objected to admission
of recorded interview under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn.
743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107
S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986)); see also State v.
Culbreath, supra, 182 (defense counsel affirmatively
waived constitutional claim under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966),
when he stated, “ ‘[n]o objection,’ ” to admission of defendant’s recorded interview and written statements). To
hold “otherwise would require the trial court to canvass
defense counsel with respect to counsel’s understanding
of the relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel’s agreement on how to proceed . . . [and]
there is nothing in our criminal law that supports such a requirement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Bellamy, 323 Conn. 400, 419, 147 A.3d 655 (2016).
In the present case, defense counsel affirmatively
waived the defendant’s confrontation clause claim.
State v. Keaton
Counsel clearly and unequivocally stated, “[n]o objection,” in response to the prosecutor’s offer of the Milestone compilation into evidence. This statement, made
without qualification, operates as a waiver of the defendant’s confrontation clause claim on appeal, and the claim thus fails under Golding’s third prong.
Our conclusion that defense counsel waived the defendant’s confrontation clause claim is buttressed by counsel’s tactical use of the Milestone compilation at trial. On direct examination of Detective Citta, the prosecutor established the foundation for the admission of the
Milestone compilation and offered it in evidence. Defense counsel neither challenged the admission of the Milestone compilation nor questioned Detective Citta about its
contents, purposes, or creation. Instead, defense counsel utilized the Milestone compilation in his closing argument, arguing to the jury that the defendant was not the
only individual in the vicinity of the shooting dressed
in blue shorts and a white T-shirt. These decisions by
defense counsel suggest that his affirmative waiver to
the admission of the Milestone compilation was based in
part on trial strategy.
The defendant contends that the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Arizona,
supra, 602 U.S. 779, precludes any conclusion that
defense counsel waived the defendant’s confrontation
clause claim because that decision changed the controlling law on the confrontation clause that was in effect
at the time of the defendant’s criminal trial. He asserts that Smith outlined the rights that an individual possesses under the confrontation clause, such that defense
counsel would have objected or developed the record
differently if Smith had been decided prior to trial. We
are not persuaded. Although we have explained that,
“when the law governing a defendant’s constitutional
claim has changed after the defendant’s trial, counsel
acting under binding precedent in effect at the time of
the trial cannot make a knowing and intelligent waiver
of rights affected by the later decision changing the
State v. Keaton
law”; State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 188–89, 283
A.3d 477 (2022); we are not presented with such circumstances here. As we recently explained, Smith did not
materially change the law governing the confrontation
clause analysis. See State v. Iverson, supra, 352 Conn.
438. In fact, Smith confirmed that the confrontation
clause applies to statements conveyed by an out-of-court
forensic analyst, which is consistent with controlling
precedent in existence since at least 2011. Id. Accordingly, the defendant’s confrontation clause claim was
waived by defense counsel and, thus, fails under the
third prong of Golding.
Additionally, we conclude that record developed at trial
is inadequate for this court to review the defendant’s
claim. The record does not reveal whether the Milestone
compilation, which is a synchronized sequence of discrete images, itself is hearsay. See State v. Villanueva, supra, 352 Conn. 472 (“the overwhelming weight of authority
suggests that [photographs] are not hearsay unless the
photographs contain words, markings, or some other
indicative contention that can reasonably be understood
as an assertion”). Further, the record lacks evidence that the compilation was testimonial in nature, as neither
Detective Citta’s testimony nor Detective Pethigal’s
testimony explained why it was created or whether it was
prepared with litigation in mind. See State v. Bester,
supra, 353 Conn. 734–35. As such, the defendant’s claim
is also unreviewable under the first prong of Golding.4
II
The defendant next claims that the police violated
his right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378
(1981) and State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 362, 203 A.3d 542 (2019), by improperly questioning him without his
4
The defendant alternatively argues that we should remand the matter for a hearing pursuant to State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700, 732–33, 756 A.2d 799 (2000), so that he can supplement the record to allow this court to review his claim. Because we conclude that his claim was waived and therefore fails under Golding, we decline to address this claim.
State v. Keaton
attorney present.5 He acknowledges that his unpreserved
claim is unreviewable under Golding and is not subject
to reversal under the plain error doctrine. Nonetheless,
he requests that we exercise our supervisory authority to reverse his conviction and to adopt a new, bright-line rule requiring that, whenever the police learn that a suspect
in custody and subject to interrogation is represented
by counsel, regardless of whether counsel is present or
the suspect has invoked his right to counsel, they must
immediately cease all questioning until the suspect’s
attorney is present. In the alternative, he requests that we invoke our supervisory authority to reverse his conviction by concluding that the police either did not honor his unambiguous assertions of the right to counsel or
did not clarify his ambiguous requests for counsel. The
state argues that we should not invoke our supervisory
authority to review the defendant’s expressly waived
claim. We agree with the state that the exercise of our
supervisory authority to reverse the defendant’s conviction is not warranted in the present case.
The following additional facts are relevant to our analysis. On July 15, 2019, the defendant was interviewed by
Detectives Pethigal and Newell at the Hartford Police
Department because of his suspected involvement in the
shooting. At the outset of the interview, the defendant
informed the detectives that his father had talked to an
attorney on his behalf and that the attorney would not be available until later in the day. The defendant did not say whether he had spoken personally to the attorney. During the early portion of the interview, the defendant was primarily concerned with determining whether he was
under arrest and whether he could leave the interview.
However, the detectives informed the defendant that
they could not provide him with any answers unless he
executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights.
5
After the parties completed briefing the confrontation clause issue, addressed in part I of this opinion, the defendant moved this court for permission to raise this issue by way of supplemental briefing. We granted that motion over the state’s opposition.
State v. Keaton
The defendant agreed that the detectives could
advise him of his rights, and they proceeded to read
him a Miranda form that listed the rights he was electing to waive. As the detectives read from the waiver of
rights form, the defendant continued to agree, until
the detectives advised him of his right to an attorney
and instructed him to sign and initial the form. At this
point, the defendant again asked the detectives if he was under arrest and, if he was not under arrest, whether
he could leave. The detectives told the defendant that
he was under arrest but that they could not tell him the
basis for the arrest or any other information at that point unless he was willing to speak with them. The defendant
asked whether he could call his father to have him call his attorney, to which Detective Pethigal asked, “[l]isten, do you want your lawyer here right now, or do you want to
speak to us,” and the defendant answered, “[h]ell yeah, I want my lawyer.” Detective Pethigal replied, “[y]ou want
your lawyer? All right.” And, as Detective Pethigal stood up to leave the interview room, the defendant stated,
“[b]ecause you all don’t want to tell me nothing.” The
detectives then repeated that the defendant was under
arrest and gathered their materials.
As the detectives began to exit the interview room,
the defendant asked if they could tell him anything, and
they replied, “[m]urder.” The defendant then inquired,
“[m]urder for what,” and, as Detective Pethigal stood in
the doorway facing the defendant, he stated, “[m]urder.
We can’t talk to you. You don’t want to talk to us, all
right? If you want—if you want to talk to us, you want to change your mind, let us know. But we got to go through
this form again. If you want to tell us your side of the
story, it’s up to you. But we can’t do anything without
you agreeing to speak to us.” The defendant acknowledged that they could talk but stated, “you all are not—
you all were not trying to tell me shit, like . . . .” The detectives told the defendant that they would not talk
with him unless he signed the form and agreed to speak
to them. The defendant confirmed that he wanted to
speak with the detectives and that they would “tell [him]
State v. Keaton
everything that’s going on.” The detectives explained
that they would get a new waiver of rights form and, in
response to the defendant’s question, told the defendant
that he could use the phone at any time to call his father, who could in turn call his attorney, and that he could stop talking at any time. The detectives proceeded to confirm
with the defendant that he had an attorney representing
him and that he was willing to speak without the attorney present. The detectives then reviewed a second waiver
of rights form with the defendant, which he signed and
initialed. Over the course of the remainder of the interview, the defendant admitted that he was in the vicinity
of the shooting and identified himself as the man in the
white T-shirt in the video footage and still photographs.
At trial, Detective Pethigal testified regarding his
interview with the defendant. He explained that, during
the initial interview, he attempted to review the waiver
of rights form with the defendant. He testified that
this conversation, however, stopped and was resumed
when the defendant indicated that he wanted to know
more information about the evidence that the detectives
had. Detective Pethigal then explained that he went
through a second waiver of rights form with the defendant, which was signed and initialed by the defendant.
Defense counsel did not object at any point during the
testimony describing the initial interview proceeding
or the defendant’s waiver. Thereafter, the prosecutor
offered the recording of the interview and both waiver of rights forms into evidence, and defense counsel stated,
“[n]o objection,” to each one. On cross-examination,
defense counsel did not elicit any information about the
circumstances leading to the interview or ask any questions about the defendant’s waiver of rights, instead
focusing on the failure of the police to request a search warrant for the defendant’s home and the failure of the
police to obtain handwritten statements.
Because defense counsel affirmatively waived any claim
about the admission of the recorded interview and the two waiver of rights forms when he stated, “[n]o objection,”
State v. Keaton
the defendant recognizes that any claim concerning his
constitutional right to counsel “is probably unreviewable under Golding and [for] plain error.”6 He therefore
does not brief claims under either doctrine and requests
only that this court exercise its supervisory authority to reverse his conviction. We are mindful that our
“[s]upervisory authority is an extraordinary remedy that
should be used sparingly . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn. 709, 724, 275
A.3d 1181 (2022). “Although [a]ppellate courts possess
an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice . . . [that] authority . . . is not a form of free-floating justice, untethered to legal principle. . . . Our supervisory powers are not a last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal. . . . Constitutional, statutory
and procedural limitations are generally adequate to
protect the rights of the [litigant] and the integrity of 6
The terminology in our decisions governing waiver of appellate claims can be a source of confusion. We first labeled certain waivers of appellate review as “affirmativ[e]” waivers in Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 70, 967 A.2d 41 (2009). We stated in Mozell that, “when a right has been affirmatively waived at trial, we generally do not afford review under either Golding or the plain error doctrine.” Id. With respect to plain error, as opposed to Golding, that view was based on our agreement with the Appellate Court’s decisions in State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274, 794 A.2d 565, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935, 802 A.2d 88 (2002), and State v. Wilson, 52 Conn. App. 802, 809–10, 729 A.2d 778 (1999). Those decisions, in turn, had relied solely on the federal plain error doctrine as applied by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1207–1208 (7th Cir. 1994). See State v. Wilson, supra, 810; see also State v. Corona, supra, 274–75 (quoting Wilson). We subsequently held, however, that waiver for purposes of Golding and plain error are not always coterminous. See State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 805, 155 A.3d 209 (2017) (under State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011), implied waiver of claim of instructional error “does not necessarily foreclose plain error review of that same claim”). In reaching that conclusion, we determined that, for purposes of delineating the contours of plain error waiver, “federal case law is inapposite and unpersuasive on the basis of the fundamental differences between the federal and state plain error and waiver doctrines.” State v. McClain, supra, 813 n.8. Because the defendant has not briefed, and therefore has abandoned, any plain error claim in the present case, we have no occasion to address whether Mozell remains good law after McClain.
State v. Keaton
the judicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked
only in the rare circumstance [in which] these traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just
administration of the courts.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 296, 998 A.2d
1114 (2010).
Under the circumstances of the present case, we decline
to invoke our supervisory authority to reverse the defendant’s conviction by adopting the rule he proposes or
by concluding that his right to counsel was violated.7
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 478–79, the
United States Supreme Court held that a suspect subject
to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning,
and that the police must explain this right to him before questioning begins. If a suspect effectively waives his
right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings,
law enforcement officers are free to question him. See,
e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–76,
99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979). The United
States Supreme Court has explained that the right to
counsel established in Miranda was one of a “series of
recommended ‘procedural safeguards’ ” that “were not
themselves rights protected by the [c]onstitution but
were instead measures to [e]nsure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected.” Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443–44, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 41 L.
7
In support of his argument for a new, bright-line prophylactic rule, the defendant argues that these circumstances are no different from those in State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 161–62, 166, 537 A.2d 446 (1988), in which law enforcement failed to inform the defendant in that case of efforts by his counsel to provide the defendant with legal assistance. We concluded that the Connecticut constitution requires that the police conducting a custodial interrogation of a suspect inform the suspect of their attorney’s efforts to provide legal assistance and that, because there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would have invoked his right to counsel had the police fulfilled their duty to inform, a new trial was required. Id., 166–67, 176–77. The circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those in Stoddard. There is no evidence in the record in the present case to suggest that the police precluded his counsel from contacting the defendant or failed to inform the defendant of any communications from counsel.
State v. Keaton
Ed. 2d 182 (1974); see also Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134,
142, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 213 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2022).
After Miranda was decided, the court in Edwards
v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 484–85, determined that
additional prophylaxis was necessary, aimed at preventing the police from badgering a defendant into waiving
his previously asserted Miranda rights. The court held
that, if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he may not be subjected to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates communication. Id. Following Edwards,
however, there were still some unresolved questions
about what a suspect must do to effectively invoke his
right to counsel. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the court explained that “the suspect must unambiguously request
counsel.” The court clarified that, “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal
in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel,” law enforcement officers
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect
clearly requests an attorney. (Emphasis in original.)
Id. The court concluded that there was no requirement
that law enforcement clarify an ambiguous request for
counsel. Id., 461–62.
In Purcell, this court adopted a more protective prophylactic standard under our state constitution than what
the United States Supreme Court required in Miranda
v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 478–79, and its progeny. See
State v. Purcell, supra, 331 Conn. 321. Specifically, we
held that, “if a suspect makes an equivocal statement that arguably [could] be construed as a request for counsel,”
all questioning “must cease except for narrow questions
designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect’s desire for counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 362. Notably, the question in Purcell was not
whether the Connecticut constitution provides a broader
constitutional right than the federal constitution but
State v. Keaton
“whether to adopt an additional layer of prophylaxis to
prevent a significant risk of deprivation of those vital
constitutional rights protected under Miranda.” Id.,
342. We relied in part on “the fact that Connecticut has
had a long history of recognizing the significance of the right to counsel, even before the right attained federal
constitutional importance.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 345.
The rule we announced in Purcell is a robust safeguard
for defendants—it acts as an additional protection of the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel. Defendants since Purcell have invoked that precedent in this
court to challenge violations of their right to counsel.
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 354 Conn. 96, 108–109,
349 A.3d 260 (2026); State v. Culbreath, supra, 340
Conn. 185–86, 191. We are thus not persuaded that, at
this juncture, the existing constitutional safeguards,
particularly those established in Purcell and Edwards,
are inadequate to protect the rights of defendants or
that the defendant’s more stringent rule is necessary
for the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., State
v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311, 337, 186 A.3d 672 (2018)
(declining to exercise supervisory authority when defendant “has not demonstrated that the claimed problem is
a pervasive one”).
It bears emphasis that the constitutional protections
articulated in Purcell and Edwards were firmly established well before the defendant’s criminal trial. Purcell, decided in March 2019, predated the defendant’s
police interview by approximately four months and
his trial by more than three years. Defense counsel did
not, however, raise those constitutional protections
as a basis to suppress the defendant’s statements or to
object to the testimony of Detective Pethigal describing
the defendant’s interview. Further, the defendant makes
no plain error claim, and he affirmatively waived any
Golding claim under either Purcell or Edwards when his
counsel stated, “[n]o objection,” to the admission of the recorded interview and the two waiver forms, focusing
State v. Keaton
his questioning instead on other areas of the investigation. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, supra, 354 Conn. 108
(affirmatively waiving Miranda claim at trial); State
v. Culbreath, supra, 340 Conn. 182 (same). As we have
made clear, “[t]he supervisory authority of this state’s
appellate courts is not intended to serve as a bypass to
the bypass, permitting the review of unpreserved claims
of case specific error—constitutional or not—that are
not otherwise amenable to relief under Golding or the
plain error doctrine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 686–87, 224 A.3d
129 (2020).
We decline, therefore, to exercise our supervisory
authority to reverse the defendant’s conviction by adopting the bright-line rule he suggests or reaching the merits of his waived claim that his right to counsel was violated.8
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
8
Nothing in this opinion should be understood as expressing the view that the police interrogation at issue in this case comported with the requirements of the United States constitution or article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. We hold only that the defendant waived this claim and, accordingly, do not address its merits.