Supreme Court
No. 2024-144-Appeal.
(PC 15-4900)
Carol Williams, Individually, and for :
and on Behalf of the Estate and the
Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of
Anthony David Williams, et al.
v. :
Avco Corporation. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email [email protected], of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2024-144-Appeal.
(PC 15-4900)
Carol Williams, Individually, and for :
and on Behalf of the Estate and the
Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of
Anthony David Williams, et al.
v. :
Avco Corporation. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and Indeglia (ret.), JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiffs, Carol Williams,
individually, and for and on behalf of the estate and the wrongful death beneficiaries
of decedent Anthony David Williams, and William Gregory Young and Debra Anne
Thigpen, individually, and on behalf of the estate and wrongful death beneficiaries
of decedent William Clayton Young (collectively, plaintiffs), appeal from an entry
of judgment in favor of the defendant, Avco Corporation (Avco or defendant).1
Before this Court, plaintiffs argue that the Superior Court erred in granting summary
judgment under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
1
Lycoming Engines is a subdivision of Avco and maintains a principal place of business in Providence, Rhode Island.
-1-Facts and Travel
On November 13, 2012, Anthony David Williams and William Clayton
Young (decedents) boarded a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee 6 Aircraft (the aircraft)
which was piloted by John Tilton, Jr. Shortly after takeoff, one of the occupants
communicated to air traffic control that the aircraft was experiencing an engine
problem. Tragically, the aircraft crashed, and all aboard were fatally injured.
The aircraft was powered by a single Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 engine (the
engine), which was designed by Avco in the 1960s and approved by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in March 1966. Avco manufactured and shipped
the engine to Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper) in October 1972. Thereafter, Piper
installed the engine in the aircraft and put it into service. In 1983, the engine was
first overhauled by Florida Aircraft Engines.2 As part of the overhaul, Florida
Aircraft Engines sent the flow divider3 to Quality Aircraft Carburetors, Inc. (Quality
2
An engine overhaul consists of deconstructing the current engine by an authorized facility that can inspect, test, and repair the engine as necessary. Lycoming requires the subject engine to be overhauled after 2,000-2,200 hours of operation or twelve years of use and provides an overhaul manual to facilitate the process. In 1983, the engine received its first overhaul at 2,133 hours of operation. The engine then received its second overhaul in 2004 at 3,634 hours of operation. At the time of the accident, the engine had accumulated approximately 817 additional hours of operation since the 2004 overhaul.
3
A flow divider sits on top of the engine and distributes metered fuel that the servo sends to each of the six cylinders. It consists of a valve body and several internal sub-components including a plunger valve, a spring, and a flexible diaphragm. The diaphragm separates the air side from the fuel side of the flow divider to regulate fuel pressure.
-2-Aircraft). Quality Aircraft’s reported service tag indicated that the flow divider was
manufactured by Bendix, a corporation unrelated to defendant, and that its part serial
number was 961N. Later, in 2004, Mena Aircraft Engines, Inc. overhauled the
engine’s flow divider. Mena Aircraft Engines, Inc. outsourced the work on the flow
divider to Mike’s Aircraft Fuel Metering Service (Mike’s Fuel Metering). Mike’s
Fuel Metering’s reported service tag also recorded that the flow divider’s
manufacturer was Bendix and that its serial number was 961N. In May 2009,
Superior Pallet Co. purchased the aircraft.
On November 6, 2015, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in Providence
County Superior Court and asserted claims against Avco for strict liability (count I),
negligence (count II), breach of express and implied warranties (count III), and
negligent infliction of emotional distress (count IV). Avco answered and asserted
applicable defenses under GARA, a federal statute of repose that bars suits against
aircraft manufacturers after eighteen years, subject to certain enumerated
exceptions.4 In response, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint indicating that they
intended to rely on exceptions set forth in GARA.5
4
The plaintiffs pursued similar litigation in Mississippi against other defendants not named in this case. Additionally, there are related actions in Mississippi brought by other plaintiffs.
5
For our purposes, GARA, as a statute of repose, is subject to two exceptions: (1) a misrepresentation exception and (2) a rolling provision/ “new parts” exception. To overcome GARA, the former requires a claimant to show that a general aircraft manufacturer knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld from the FAA,
-3-Thereafter, the parties filed discovery motions, and a hearing was held on the
issue. 6 On July 8, 2021, the trial justice issued a decision summarizing what
transpired at the hearing and his rulings on the motions. Regarding discovery on
plaintiffs’ theory of liability under GARA’s misrepresentation exception, the trial
justice found that “[p]laintiffs must, from the outset, meet the pleading requirement
under GARA to properly invoke the [f]raud exception.”7 Thus, according to the trial
justice, plaintiffs were required to plead specific facts that showed that Avco
knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld required information from the
FAA. The trial justice reasoned that “[b]ecause [p]laintiffs [had] failed to plead with
the requisite specificity, the [f]raud [e]xception to GARA [did] not apply and
“required information that is material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered[.]” General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note. The latter requires a claimant to prove that (1) a new part was added to, or replaced an original part on the aircraft within eighteen years prior to the injury, (2) the defendant manufactured the new part, and (3) the new part caused the injury. See id.
6
The two discovery motions before the court were (1) plaintiffs’ motion to strike objections to production made by Avco and to compel Avco to provide responses and documents to plaintiffs’ first request for production, and (2) Avco’s motion to strike certain objections and answers to its discovery requests and to compel more responsive answers and documents. Following a hearing on the motions, both sides filed legal memoranda regarding Avco’s GARA defense.
7
Before this Court, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice misconstrued the law in interpreting § 2(b)(1) of GARA as a “fraud” standard as opposed to a misrepresentation standard. While we address plaintiffs’ argument later in our opinion, we note that, although the trial justice used the term “fraud” in analyzing § 2(b)(1), he applied the appropriate standard for misrepresentation under GARA.
-4-[p]laintiffs [were] not now entitled to discovery.” Regarding discovery pertaining
to GARA’s rolling provision, the trial justice accepted plaintiffs’ assertion that the
aircraft was equipped with a Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 engine, and that, according to
plaintiffs, the accident was caused by the failure of said engine. Accordingly, the
trial justice limited the scope of discovery to documents related to four parts that
plaintiffs alleged contributed to the engine failure: (1) the plunger in the flow divider
of the fuel system; (2) lack of an overboard line; (3) the fuel servo bellows; and (4)
exhaust valves four and six.
Subsequently, the parties engaged in discovery, and Avco moved for partial
summary judgment on all counts of plaintiffs’ amended complaint to the extent that
plaintiffs’ theories of liability were based on (1) cracked fuel servo bellows; (2) a
loose plunger in the flow divider; and (3) lack of an overboard line. The trial justice
heard arguments on November 14 and 15, 2023, and determined that plaintiffs’
claims were barred by GARA.8 As a result, the trial justice granted Avco’s motion
for partial summary judgment on all three parts.
8
In his decision granting partial summary judgment, the trial justice found that because he determined that plaintiffs did not meet GARA’s pleading standard to properly invoke the misrepresentation exception in his earlier discovery decision and that the same issue was before the court for partial summary judgment, “the law of the case doctrine govern[ed].” Thus, he determined that granting summary judgment on the same grounds was proper without further examination of the issue. The trial justice emphasized that this Court has noted that “the purpose of the law of the case doctrine is to ensure the stability of decisions and avoid unseemly contests between judges that could result in a loss of public confidence in the judiciary.” (Quoting
-5-Avco then moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts of
plaintiffs’ amended complaint, and arguments were heard on December 6, 2023.
During argument, plaintiffs implied that their claims relating to the engine’s fuel line
and fuel hose, in addition to the remaining exhaust valves, were not barred under
GARA’s rolling provision. The plaintiffs purported that the fuel line, fuel hose, and
exhaust valves four and six were all replaced within the eighteen-year period prior
to the accident, bore Lycoming part numbers, and were defective, leading to the
accident. The trial justice disagreed, finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that Avco
manufactured either the fuel line or the fuel hose. Additionally, the trial justice
found that plaintiffs failed to prove that either the fuel line, fuel hose, or exhaust
valves were defective such that it caused the accident. Accordingly, the trial justice
determined that there were no issues of material fact in dispute and granted Avco’s
motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal to this
Court.
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews a decision granting a party’s motion for summary
judgment de novo.” Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., 318
DiMaggio v. Tucker, 288 A.3d 981, 986 (R.I. 2023) (brackets omitted).) Although the trial justice recognized that the “law of the case doctrine” may not apply “when a subsequent ruling can be based on an expanded record[,]” he found that “the record ha[d] not expanded between the [discovery] decision and [the partial summary judgment] motion.” Therefore, the law of the case doctrine governed.
-6-A.3d 209, 214 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Nissensohn v. CharterCARE Home Health
Services, 306 A.3d 1026, 1033 (R.I. 2024)). “We assess the matter from the vantage
point of the trial justice, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will
affirm.” Id. at 214-15 (quoting Nissensohn, 306 A.3d at 1033). “Although summary
judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, to avoid summary judgment the
burden is on the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that proves the
existence of a disputed issue of material fact.” Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Palermo, 247
A.3d 131, 133 (R.I. 2021) (deletion omitted) (quoting Boudreau v. Automatic
Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598 (R.I. 2019)).
Discussion
GARA
An examination of GARA’s legislative history reveals that Congress enacted
the statute “in response to a serious decline in the manufacture and sale of general
aviation aircraft by United States companies.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-525(I) (1994).
Congress determined that a significant cause of the decline was the “tremendous
increase in the industry’s liability insurance costs.” Id. Congress recognized that
general aviation manufacturers were suffering from substantial financial losses due
to long-tail liability claims attached to aircrafts decades after they were
-7-manufactured and sold. See id. Accordingly, Congress’s purpose in enacting GARA
was to “curb excessive liability costs, while at the same time affording fair treatment
to persons injured in aircraft accidents.” Id.
GARA establishes a statute of repose, barring product liability claims against
manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and component parts brought more than
eighteen years from the date the product is delivered to its first purchaser. See
GARA, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note. GARA
provides, in relevant part:
“[Section] 2. Time Limitations on Civil Actions Against
Aircraft Manufacturers.
“(a) IN GENERAL. —Except as provided in subsection
(b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to
persons or damage to property arising out of an accident
involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought
against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the
manufacturer of any new component, system,
subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as
manufacturer if the accident occurred—
“(1) after the applicable limitation period[9] beginning
on—
“(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser
or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
“(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person
engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft;
or
9
The statute provides that the term “limitation period” means an eighteen-year period. GARA § 3(3).
-8-“(2) with respect to any new component, system,
subassembly, or other part which replaced another
component, system, subassembly, or other part originally
in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged
to have caused such death, injury, or damage, after the
applicable limitation period beginning on the date of
completion of the replacement or addition.
“(b) Exceptions. —Subsection (a) does not apply—
“(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts
necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with
respect to a type certificate or airworthiness certificate for,
or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of,
an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, or other
part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from
the Federal Aviation Administration, required information
that is material and relevant to the performance or the
maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the
component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is
causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly
suffered[.]” GARA § 2(a), (b).
The language of the statute, however, makes clear that GARA’s protections
are not absolute. See GARA §§ 2(a)(2), (b)(1). For our purposes, the statute provides
two exceptions where GARA will not guard against liability. See GARA §§ 2(a)(2),
(b)(1). The first is the rolling or “new parts” provision which provides that “[t]he
18-year period begins anew if the death, injury, or damage is caused by any ‘new
component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component,
system, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft.’” Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, 230 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)). The second is the misrepresentation
-9-exception, where a manufacturer knowingly misrepresents, conceals, or withholds
from the FAA “required information that is material and relevant to the performance
or the maintenance or operation of [a general aviation] aircraft, or the component,
system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the
claimant allegedly suffered[.]” GARA § 2(b)(1).
Misrepresentation Exception
Before this Court, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred in limiting the
scope of discovery and denying their motion to compel production under GARA’s
misrepresentation exception based on the pleadings. Specifically, plaintiffs assert
that, despite not being able to obtain documents concerning Avco’s
misrepresentation, concealment, and withholding—given that the documents were
not publicly available—their amended complaint satisfied GARA’s pleading
requirement. The plaintiffs also argue that, even if the amended complaint did not
satisfy GARA’s pleading requirement, “nothing in GARA precludes litigants from
engaging in discovery relevant to [their] claims and defenses.”
Conversely, Avco argues that the trial justice correctly determined that
plaintiffs must first satisfy GARA’s pleading standard to obtain discovery. Avco
asserts that, in the amended complaint, plaintiffs failed to plead facts with the
requisite specificity to invoke GARA’s misrepresentation exception. Avco also
argues that plaintiffs should not prevail before this Court because plaintiffs’ failure
- 10 -to further amend their complaint in the trial court to cure the deficiency cannot be
cured on appeal.
“This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” New
England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, 331
A.3d 730, 736 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Sosa v. City of Woonsocket, 297 A.3d 120, 124
(R.I. 2023)). “In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect
to the purpose of the act as intended by the legislature.” Id. (quoting Sosa, 297 A.3d
at 124). Likewise, “[i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the
words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting Sosa, 297 A.3d
at 124). “It is an equally fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory
language should not be viewed in [isolation].” Id. (quoting Sosa, 297 A.3d at 124).
Therefore, “[w]hen performing our duty of statutory interpretation, this Court
considers the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the
context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all
other sections.” Id. (quoting Sosa, 297 A.3d at 124).
GARA explicitly states that the eighteen-year repose period will not apply
“if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary
to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer * * *
knowingly misrepresented * * * or concealed or withheld
from the [FAA], required information that is material and
relevant to the performance or the maintenance or
operation of such aircraft, or the component, system,
- 11 -subassembly, or other part * * *.” GARA § 2(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
It is apparent from GARA’s plain text that § 2(b)(1) establishes a requisite pleading
standard to properly invoke its misrepresentation exception. See GARA § 2(b)(1);
see also Crouch v. Honeywell International, Inc., 720 F.3d 333, 344 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“Plaintiffs’ original complaint clearly failed to plead sufficiently specific facts to
invoke the § 2(b)(1) exception.”). The plaintiffs, however, do not contest that such
a standard exists. Rather, they contend that the amended complaint satisfied the
pleading requirement. We disagree.
An examination of plaintiffs’ amended complaint shows that they merely
restated the language of § 2(b)(1) in their theories of liability against Avco for
negligence and breach of express and implied warranties. Paragraph 92(t) of
plaintiffs’ amended complaint states that Avco was negligent in “mispresenting,
concealing, and/or withholding material information from regulatory authorities of
the problems with, and defects in the engine * * *.” Parallel language lies in
paragraph 107(t) of the amended complaint, regarding Avco’s alleged breach of
warranties. This is insufficient. GARA’s pleading standard required plaintiffs to
provide specific facts necessary to prove that Avco knowingly misrepresented,
concealed, or withheld certain information from the FAA. See Tillman v. Raytheon
Company, 430 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Ark. 2013) (“GARA expressly provides that it is
the claimant who must set out the facts to show that the fraud exception applies and
- 12 -must do so with specificity. * * * GARA places the burden on [plaintiff] to plead
facts with specificity and to prove that the fraud exception applies.”). Therefore,
plaintiffs’ iteration of the statute’s language merely asserted as conclusory
statements was inadequate to trigger the misrepresentation exception. See McAuliffe
v. Robinson Helicopter Company, 173 F.4th 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2026) (holding that
the plaintiffs failed to allege the misrepresentation exception with the requisite
specificity because “[g]eneralized averments * * * are not enough to overcome
GARA’s significant obstacles”). As such, we hold that the trial justice did not err in
limiting the scope of discovery relative to § 2(b)(1) on the grounds that plaintiffs’
amended complaint failed to plead facts with the requisite specificity to invoke
GARA’s misrepresentation exception.
Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred in finding that GARA
preempts plaintiffs’ “discovery efforts” which, they argue, is contrary to Rule 26 of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs assert that the trial
justice’s failure to correctly apply Rhode Island discovery rules denied plaintiffs the
ability to gather the necessary information to prove misrepresentation. The
plaintiffs’ argument is without merit.
“While we review the scope of Rule 26 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure de novo, a trial justice has ‘broad discretion’ in granting or denying
discovery motions, and ‘this Court will not disturb that discretion save for an abuse’
- 13 -of it.” Mile v. Kirkbrae Country Club, 331 A.3d 1003, 1006 (R.I. 2025) (brackets
and deletion omitted) (quoting State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 64 A.3d
1183, 1191 (R.I. 2013)). “‘If legally competent evidence exists to support the trial
justice’s determination, we will affirm it’ unless errors have so ‘infected the validity
of the proceedings as to warrant reversal.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Pastore
v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1073-74 (R.I. 2006)).
Indeed, there is no dispute that GARA was enacted as a statute of repose to
preclude product liability claims against general aviation manufacturers. The
plaintiffs, however, assert that the trial justice erred in requiring them to “plead and
prove ‘[f]raud on the FAA’ as a prerequisite to discovery[,]” but plaintiffs are
mistaken. The trial justice properly applied GARA, which requires a more
demanding pleading standard and does not disturb Rule 26.
Notwithstanding our generalized pleading standard, the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy GARA’s more demanding pleading standard. The amended complaint did
not identify one instance where Avco either misrepresented relevant information to
the FAA or failed to disclose such information. While plaintiffs assert that Avco
was on notice of similar IO-540 engine accidents and thus was aware of a defect in
the engine model, plaintiffs do not point to any specific evidence to show that Avco
mispresented, concealed, or withheld such information from the FAA and/or that
Avco’s misrepresentation caused the subject accident. See McAuliffe, 173 F.4th at
- 14 -1036 (“The complaint also fails to explain how the alleged misrepresentations were
‘material and relevant’ to the performance, maintenance, or operation of the
[component part], or any other part of the [aircraft] and critically omits any specific
allegations about how any such misrepresentations are ‘causally related to the harm
which the [plaintiffs] allegedly suffered.’”) (quoting GARA § 2(b)(1)).10 Therefore,
the trial justice properly restricted discovery pertaining to the misrepresentation
exception. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in finding that
plaintiffs were required to meet GARA’s pleading requirement prior to enabling
discovery.
We further reject plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ theories of liability relative to GARA’s
misrepresentation exception. Because we discern no error in the trial justice’s
determination that plaintiffs’ pleadings were insufficient to invoke § 2(b)(1), we
conclude that the resulting grant of summary judgment was proper.
10
See also DiLibero v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 2015) (noting that when a trial justice examines a plaintiff’s complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss, “allegations that are more in the nature of legal conclusions rather than factual assertions are not necessarily assumed to be true”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe ex rel. His Parents and Natural Guardians v. East Greenwich School Department, 899 A.2d 1258, 1262 n.2 (R.I. 2006)).
- 15 -Rolling Provision/ “New Parts” Exception
The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on plaintiffs’ theories of liability related to GARA’s rolling provision. The plaintiffs
contend that while Avco did not physically make the parts replaced during the
engine’s 2004 overhaul, the parts were specified by Lycoming for the engine model
at issue and bore Lycoming serial numbers.
In opposition, Avco argues that plaintiffs conducted extensive discovery yet
failed to prove that GARA’s rolling provision applied to the present case. Avco
argues that plaintiffs “had a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery for
purposes of determining whether any part manufactured by Avco was installed
within 18 years of the accident and whether any such part caused the accident.”
Avco also asserts that “[p]laintiffs participated in at least five wreckage inspections
in their search for a part that would trigger GARA’s new parts exception against
Avco. But [p]laintiffs never unearthed any such part.” Given that plaintiffs failed to
establish a part that invoked GARA’s rolling provision, argues Avco, the trial justice
did not err in granting its motion for summary judgment as to this exception.
To satisfy GARA’s rolling provision, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a new part
was added to, or replaced an original part on the aircraft within eighteen years
preceding the injury, (2) the defendant manufactured the new part, and (3) the new
part caused the injury. See GARA § 2(a)(2); McAuliffe, 173 F.4th at 1035 (“[T]he
- 16 -rolling provision only restarts the repose period where the ‘[new] part which
replaced another component, system, subassembly * * * is alleged to have caused
death, injury, or damage.’”) (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)). If plaintiff successfully
meets this burden, then the eighteen-year limitation period, for which liability claims
may be brought against the manufacturer of such a part, restarts and GARA does not
apply. See GARA § 2(a)(2).
In the instant case, during the discovery stage, the trial justice determined that
“because the [n]ew [p]arts [e]xception does not require [p]laintiffs to satisfy a
pleading standard like in the [f]raud [e]xception, [the] [c]ourt may find that they are
entitled to discover, in part, the requested documents in order to determine whether
the [exception] applies.” Accordingly, the trial justice limited the scope of discovery
to four parts identified by plaintiffs, allowing them to determine whether any such
part contributed to the engine failure. The parts were: (1) the plunger in the flow
divider of the fuel system; (2) the lack of an overboard line; (3) the fuel servo
bellows; and (4) exhaust valves in cylinders four and six. Subsequently, the trial
justice also allowed plaintiffs to determine if either the engine’s fuel hose or fuel
line caused the accident.
Avco then moved for partial summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ theories of
liability premised on a loose plunger in the flow divider, lack of an overboard line,
and cracked fuel servo bellows, which the trial justice granted. The trial justice
- 17 -reasoned that plaintiffs failed to prove that any of the three identified parts could
overcome GARA’s repose statute. The trial justice then granted summary judgment
on plaintiffs’ remaining theories of liability related to the exhaust valves, fuel hose,
and fuel line, grounded on a similar rationale. We discern no error in the trial
justice’s granting of summary judgment.
First, with respect to the fuel servo bellows, the trial justice indicated that
during the hearing on Avco’s motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs
conceded that the fuel servo bellows were not the cause of the accident. Indeed, the
record reveals that at the hearings on November 14 and 15, 2023, plaintiffs admitted
that the fuel servo bellows were not the cause of the accident. Plaintiffs’ counsel
stated that “[t]he fuel servo bellows, plaintiffs’ experts have, after a lot of
investigation and research, have ruled that out as being causative.” Given plaintiffs’
clear admission, the trial justice properly granted summary judgment as to the fuel
servo bellows.
Second, the trial justice determined that the plunger in the flow divider of the
fuel system did not constitute a “new part” under GARA. At the outset, the trial
justice considered the flow divider as consisting of three internal components: the
plunger, 11 the diaphragm, and a self-locking screw.12 With respect to the plunger
11
The plunger is also commonly referred to as a “plunger valve” or “valve stem.” 12
The trial justice rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the replacement of the flow divider’s diaphragm during the 2004 overhaul constituted a newly installed part to
- 18 -valve, the trial justice found that the plunger valve and body of a flow divider are a
“matched assembly.” Therefore, they “cannot be purchased or replaced
separately * * *.” Thus, following the chronological journey of the flow divider, the
trial justice found that the aircraft maintained the same flow divider for a minimum
of twenty-nine years preceding the accident. We agree.
Indeed, the Overhaul Manual and Illustrated Parts List indicates, with caution
to the reader, that the plunger valve and body of the flow divider are a matched
assembly. Therefore, “[d]amage to either part necessitates replacement of the
complete flow divider.” Using the overhaul manual as guidance, we, like the trial
justice, conclude that following the life span of the flow divider will be the best
indicator of the life span of the plunger valve. According to the engine’s logbook,
the flow divider was overhauled by Quality Aircraft in the 1983 overhaul. Quality
Aircraft’s service tag for the repair indicated that the manufacturer of the flow
divider was Bendix and recorded the part serial number as 961N. Later, during the
restart the eighteen-year limitation period under GARA. The trial justice stated that “[c]ontrary to [p]laintiff[s’] argument, it is well settled that the overhaul of an aircraft part or component does not render it ‘new’ for purposes of GARA.” The trial justice also reasoned that none of plaintiffs’ experts opined that the diaphragm was defective. The trial justice further noted that assuming arguendo that the diaphragm was defective, plaintiffs had not offered evidence to show that Avco manufactured that part. Rather, experts determined that a screw that was designed to secure the flow divider’s diaphragm to its plunger valve was loose. Nonetheless, the trial justice determined that the screw was an original part and had not been replaced within the eighteen-year period.
- 19 -2004 overhaul, Mike’s Fuel Metering serviced the engine’s flow divider and the
service tag for that repair also recorded Bendix as the manufacturer and the part
serial number as 961N. Therefore, we conclude that, because the serial number on
the flow divider was the same on the service tags for both the 1983 and 2004
overhauls—there is no evidence to suggest that the flow divider was repaired after
2004—the flow divider and, thus, the complementary plunger valve were original
parts, not newly installed within eighteen years preceding the accident.
Third, with respect to plaintiffs’ theory that the lack of an overboard line
caused the accident, the trial justice found that plaintiffs’ theory related to a design
defect as opposed to a defective new part. The trial justice stated that “[t]he absence
of a design feature cannot be considered a newly installed part under GARA’s
Rolling Provision.” As we have stated supra, to satisfy GARA’s rolling provision,
a plaintiff must prove that a new part was added to or replaced an original part on
the aircraft. Therefore, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the absence
of a part fits this description given that courts have limited the scope of GARA’s
rolling provision to defective new parts, rather than design or failure to warn defects.
See Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] failure to warn
is decidedly not the same as replacing a component part with a new one. It does not
allow the Survivors to bypass the GARA bar.”); see also LaHaye v. Galvin Flying
Service, Inc., 144 F. App’x 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “because the
- 20 -allegedly defective aspect of the design had been in the marketplace for over
eighteen years, it was barred by GARA’s statute of repose”).
Next, we consider whether the engine’s fuel hose and fuel line meet the
criteria of GARA’s rolling provision. Regarding the fuel hose, the trial justice
determined that “[d]espite the replacement of the fuel hose within eighteen years of
the accident, there is no evidence supporting [p]laintiffs’ argument that Avco is the
manufacturer. Instead, it is undisputed that the fuel hose was manufactured by either
Stratoflex or Aeroquip.” We discern no error in his determination. The record
reveals that plaintiffs’ accident investigation expert, Allen Fiedler (Mr. Fiedler),
provided in his report that as part of the 2004 overhaul, “all engine compartment
hoses were replaced.” Mr. Fiedler, however, did not report or opine that the
replacement fuel hoses were manufactured by Avco. Rather, in his deposition, the
following colloquy took place:
“Q. And is it fair to say then that you’re not offering an
opinion in this case that the engine compartment hoses that
were installed were new Lycoming parts, correct?
“A. I don’t recognize Lycoming as the source of the fuel
hoses. They’re usually Stratoflex or Aeroquip.
“* * *
“A. Let me, let me add to that. They may have been
purchased through Lycoming, but the true supplier would
be Aeroquip or Stratoflex.
- 21 -“Q. And you don’t have the ability to say one way or the
other whether they were purchased through Lycoming or
from another supplier, correct?
“A. Yeah, correct. Without the qualification in the
logbook entry, I would have no idea.”
Therefore, because the trial justice found Mr. Fiedler’s testimony to be credible and
uncontradicted, his conclusion that Avco was not the manufacturer of the fuel hose
was determinative.
Regarding the fuel lines, Mr. Fiedler also stated in his report that as part of the
2004 overhaul, Mena Aircraft Engines “used new Lycoming parts including all six
cylinder kits, [and] all six fuel injection lines * * *.” The plaintiffs sought thereby
to show that Lycoming was the manufacturer of the fuel lines. However, even if
plaintiffs were successful in establishing Lycoming as the manufacturer, they were
unable to prove causation. In his deposition, Mr. Fiedler declined to offer his opinion
as to whether there was a design or manufacturing defect with respect to any engine
compartment hose. Likewise, Steven Maier, plaintiffs’ accident reconstructionist
testified at his deposition that he was not able to identify a known defect with respect
to the fuel lines that caused or contributed to the accident. See American Commerce
Insurance Company v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185, 1195 (R.I. 2002) (“The traditional tort
concept of proximate cause focuses on legal culpability for the accident, and whether
the conduct of the alleged tortfeasor in any way produced plaintiff’s injuries.
‘Proximate cause in tort cases is established by showing that but for the negligence
- 22 -of the tortfeasor, injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred.’”) (brackets
omitted) (quoting English v. Green, 787 A.2d 1146, 1151 (R.I. 2001)). Accordingly,
absent a showing of causation, plaintiffs failed to establish a claim under GARA’s
rolling provision as to the fuel lines. See McAuliffe, 173 F.4th at 1035 (“The district
court appropriately imposed a causation requirement, however, as the rolling
provision only restarts the repose period where the ‘other part which replaced
another component, system, subassembly * * * is alleged to have caused * * * death,
injury, or damage.’ We have interpreted the causation requirement as one of
proximate cause.”) (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)).
Lastly, we address the exhaust valves in cylinders four and six. The trial
justice found that plaintiffs failed to establish that the exhaust valves in cylinders
four and six were defective and thus, GARA’s rolling provision criteria was not met.
We discern no error in this finding. As mentioned supra, Mr. Fiedler reported that
all six cylinders kits were replaced with new Lycoming parts as part of the 2004
overhaul. Nonetheless, given that none of plaintiffs’ experts testified or provided in
their reports of the accident that either exhaust valves in cylinders four or six were
defective, the element of causation was not met. See Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1158.
Accordingly, absent any remaining issues in dispute, the trial justice appropriately
granted summary judgment in favor of Avco.
- 23 -Right to Justice and Jury Trial
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court violated their right to justice under
article 1, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The plaintiffs cite to this
Court’s decision in State v. Almonte, 644 A.2d 295 (R.I. 1994), to argue that “statutes
prohibiting discovery violate the litigants’ Right to Justice.” Specifically, plaintiffs
contend that the trial court’s discovery orders violated their right to justice because
the trial court “preclude[d] litigants from obtaining and introducing material
evidence, thereby preventing litigants from effectively presenting their claims before
the trier of fact.” (Quoting Bartlett v. Danti, 503 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1986).)
Article 1, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution requires:
“Every person within this state ought to find a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or
wrongs which may be received in one’s person, property,
or character. Every person ought to obtain right and
justice freely, and without purchase, completely and
without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably
to the laws.”
“[T]his Court has recognized that the purpose of article 1, section 5 is to ‘forbid the
total denial of access to the courts for the adjudication of a recognized claim.’” Zab
v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections, 269 A.3d 741, 748 (R.I. 2022) (brackets
omitted) (quoting Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 595 (R.I. 1998)). Thus, the
plaintiffs’ argument distorts the principle behind the right to justice. See Zab, 269
A.3d at 750 (holding that the civil death statute violated article 1, section 5 “because
- 24 -it completely deprive[d] individuals of an expressly enumerated constitutional
right”—the right to gain access to the courts). It is clear from the record before us
that the plaintiffs’ access to the courts has not been denied or curtailed. Therefore,
the plaintiffs’ claims that the trial justice’s ruling implicates the right to justice
provision is misguided.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Superior Court judgment. The
papers in this case may be remanded thereto.
- 25 -STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Carol Williams, Individually, and for and on Behalf of
Title of Case the Estate and the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of
Anthony David Williams, et al. v. Avco Corporation.
No. 2024-144-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 15-4900)
Date Opinion Filed July 29, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and
Justices
Indeglia (ret.), JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht
For Plaintiffs:
Cynthia M. Devers, Pro Hac Vice
Attorney(s) on Appeal Lauren E. Jones, Esq.
For Defendant:
Nicole J. Benjamin, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)