In the United States Court of Federal Claims
SHARON Y. HART
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-1376
Filed July 27, 2026
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Sharon Y. Hart, Štore, Slovenia, pro se.
Elinor J. Kim, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Granting the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
denying Dr. Hart’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings
Sharon Hart, proceeding without an attorney, seeks Sunday differential pay that she alleges
the United States Agency for International Development owes but did not pay her under a personal
services contract. The government moves for judgment on the pleadings and asks the court to
dismiss the complaint for failure to plausibly allege that USAID was required to pay Dr. Hart at
the rate she asserts. Dr. Hart cross-moves for judgment on the pleadings.
The government is correct that neither the contract nor governing law required USAID to
pay Dr. Hart the higher Sunday differential pay rate she claims, and neither party disputes that
USAID paid Dr. Hart for each Sunday hour she worked at a rate of 25 percent above her basic
hourly rate. The court will therefore grant the government’s motion and deny Dr. Hart’s crossmotion.
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I. Background
Dr. Hart contracted with USAID to serve as a senior education and youth advisor in Amman, Jordan, from February 4, 2024, through February 1, 2025. ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 4. The contract
identifies Dr. Hart as an offshore personal services contractor. Id. at 1, 3. The contract consists of
a cover page, a schedule, and the relevant Agency for International Development Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR) and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clauses. Id. at 1. The contract sets a
Sunday-through-Thursday workweek with an expected eight hours per workday. Id. at 4.
Article IV of the schedule, titled “Contractor’s Compensation and Reimbursement,” sets
Dr. Hart’s position grade at GS-15, step 10. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. It lists an annual basic compensation
of $159,950, corresponding to an hourly rate of $76.64. Id. The same page includes a table titled
“Contract Estimation.” Id. That table lists seven “Budget Categor[ies].” Some of the line-item
budget categories include percentages. The Sunday differential entry lists “25%.” Id. The table
also includes dollar amounts for each budget category in the “Year 1” column. Id. It lists
“$39,987.50” for Sunday differential. Id. The “Total - Contract” is “$243,107.00” for the year. Id.
The entire table is provided below.
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ECF No. 1-1 at 4.
Article IV then explains some of the line items. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-6. It provides that “a
contractor may be eligible for additional pay ... in accordance with the contract clause entitled
‘Differentials and Allowances.’” Id. at 5 [¶5]. It also describes the table as a “budget,” presenting
the “total estimated cost budgeted for compensation, fringe benefits, and other direct costs,” “calculated to cover the period of February 04, 2024 through February 01, 2025.” Id. at 5. Article IV
labels the total the “Maximum U.S. Dollar Obligation,” which “must not exceed $243,107.00.” Id.
at 5; see also id. at 1; ECF No. 14-1 at Appx110-11.
Before the parties executed the contract, USAID sent Dr. Hart a nonbinding “Conditional
Selection Letter.” ECF No. 1-1 at 34. That letter lists “Sunday Premium Pay - currently at the rate
of 25%” among the “benefits and allowances” for which Dr. Hart may be eligible. Id. The letter
also states that USAID grants those benefits and allowances “in accordance with [AIDAR] Appendix D.” Id.
The parties do not dispute that Dr. Hart worked 224 Sunday hours in 2024 and 32 Sunday
hours in 2025, totaling 256 Sunday hours. ECF No. 1-1 at 45-46; ECF No. 11 at 1 [¶3]. USAID
paid her $4,910.24 in Sunday differential pay: $4,291.84 for 2024 and $618.40 for 2025. ECF No.
1-1 at 45; ECF No. 14 at 6-7. That is approximately equal to 25 percent of her hourly rate of $76.64
times the total 256 Sunday hours. (Dr. Hart was paid slightly more because her hourly rate increased to $77.30 in 2025. See ECF No. 14 at 3 n.4, 7.)
Dr. Hart alleges that USAID miscalculated her Sunday differential pay rate. She reads the
“$39,987.50” entry in the table as the amount USAID expected to pay for the full year, assuming
eight-hour Sunday workdays every Sunday. ECF No. 1-1 at 46. From that assumption, Dr. Hart
derives a rate of $96.12 in differential pay per Sunday hour, by dividing $39,987.50 by 416 total
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possible Sunday hours. Id. She then multiplies $96.12 by the 256 Sunday hours she worked, yielding $24,606.72. Id. After subtracting the $4,910.24 USAID paid her, Dr. Hart seeks an additional
$19,696.48 in Sunday differential pay. Id.; ECF No. 1 at 2.1
In January 2025, Dr. Hart submitted a written claim to the executive office director, Dr.
Cynthia Rogers, alleging that USAID had miscalculated her Sunday differential pay. ECF No. 1-1 at 41-42. Dr. Rogers responded that because the contract was not “fixed price,” the amount it
listed for Sunday differential pay was only a “budget estimate” that “must be in excess so that
[USAID] never fall[s] short.” Id. at 38-39. Dr. Rogers explained that USAID pays contractors
Sunday differential pay “under the same terms and conditions that apply to noncommissioned
[Foreign Service] Direct-Hire employees.” Id. at 39. Dr. Rogers added that she could not approve
payment above the rate the Office of Personnel Management set. Id. at 38.
Dr. Hart later contacted USAID’s personal services contract ombudsman. ECF No. 1-1 at
37, 44. She filed this suit in August 2025. ECF No. 1. The government moves for judgment on the
pleadings and to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 14. It argues that the contract required USAID
to pay Sunday differential pay at only 25 percent of her basic hourly rate for each Sunday hour
worked, resulting in the amount she already received. Id. at 2. Dr. Hart opposes and cross-moves
for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the “$39,987.50” entry in the table entitled her to a
higher rate, which, when prorated for the actual number of hours she worked, should result in her
receiving an additional $19,696.48 in Sunday differential pay. ECF No. 15 at 3.
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The government explains that, even though Attachment 6 in Dr. Hart’s initial complaint says “415” (ECF No. 1-1 at 46), that was evidently a typo. ECF No. 14 at 12 n.10. The number of Sunday hours per year works out to 52 times 8 equals 416. And, in fact, Dr. Hart’s own math works with the number 416, not 415, as $39,987.50 divided by 416 equals Dr. Hart’s calculated rate of $96.12 per hour. See ECF No. 1-1 at 46.
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II. Discussion
This court’s jurisdiction is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides the court
with exclusive jurisdiction to decide specific types of monetary claims against the United States.
Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Contract Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383, 2388 (1978), amends the Tucker Act and provides
the court with “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a
contractor arising under [41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(1)] ... on which a decision of the contracting officer
has been issued under [the Contract Disputes Act].” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
“[A]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings.” Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), Rule 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when “there are no material facts in dispute and the party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.3d 877,
881 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The court applies the same standard it applies to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under the court’s rule 12(b)(6). Jordan v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 694, 697 (2015). A
complaint should be dismissed under rule 12(b)(6) “when the facts asserted by the claimant do not
entitle [her] to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court will accept well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the claimant’s favor. Lindsay, 295
F.3d at 1257. This court has traditionally held the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent
standard than those of a litigant represented by counsel. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)
(stating that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards
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than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (marks omitted)). The court has therefore exercised its
discretion in this case to examine the pleadings “to see if [the pro se] plaintiff has a cause of action
somewhere displayed.” Ruderer v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 456, 468 (1969). Regardless, a pro
se plaintiff still has the “obligation to provide the grounds of her entitlement to relief.” Arunachalam v. Apple, Inc., 806 F. App’x 977, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
A breach-of-contract claim requires a valid contract, a duty arising from that contract, a
breach of that duty, and damages caused by the breach. San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage District
v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Here, Dr. Hart must identify a contractual
duty requiring USAID to pay her Sunday differential pay at the higher rate that she claims.
Contract interpretation is a question of law. Banknote Corporation of America v. United
States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court begins by reading the written agreement
“as a whole, interpreting it in a manner that harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all of its
provisions.” Id. “A contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two different and reasonable interpretations, each of which is found to be consistent with the contract language.” Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A disagreement between the
parties does not itself create ambiguity; both interpretations must be reasonable. Id. If the plain
meaning of the contract is unambiguous, the court’s “inquiry ends, and the plain language of the
contract controls.” Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
A. The contract’s plain language shows that the “$39,987.50” entry in the
table was a budget estimate and did not obligate the government to pay
that amount
Dr. Hart argues that the “[c]ontract stipulated [that she] would receive an estimated
$39,987.50” in Sunday differential pay. ECF No. 1-1 at 46. Her theory rests on the “Sunday Diff.”
row in the table, which shows “25%” and “$39,987.50.” Id. at 4. The table does not explain how
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USAID calculated its estimate. Id. Dr. Hart reads the entry as part of her compensation package,
concludes that it represents the amount she would be owed for 416 hours of Sunday work (52
Sundays at 8 hours each day), then converts $39,987.50 into an hourly Sunday differential pay rate
of $96.12. Id. at 46. Dr. Hart acknowledges that she worked only 256 of those 416 hours. Id. She
therefore claims less than the full $39,987.50, seeking $96.12 only for each of the 256 Sunday
hours she worked, or a total of $24,606.72 in Sunday differential pay. Id. Dr. Hart argues that
Article IV’s title, “Contractor’s Compensation and Reimbursement” (id. at 4), together with the
table’s use of “specific line items and dollar amounts,” shows that USAID meant the table to reflect
“the compensation framework being offered.” ECF No. 15 at 6-7; see also ECF No. 18 at 2.
The government responds that the “$39,987.50” entry is “plainly only an estimate.” ECF
No. 14 at 17. Under the government’s reading, the table sets “a ceiling for budgetary purposes, not
a promise to pay that amount.” Id. at 13; see also ECF No. 16 at 2; ECF No. 1-1 at 39 (Dr. Rogers
at USAID explaining to Dr. Hart that “[t]he budget in the contract is a budget estimate to ensure
sufficient funds are obligated. It is a maximum number. The budget must be in excess so that we
never fall short.”).
The government is correct. The contract, read as a whole, presents the table as a budget,
and its line items accrue only as the contract’s clauses provide. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-6. The contract’s
plain language shows that the “$39,987.50” entry estimates USAID’s maximum cost exposure for
Sunday differential pay. Id. at 4. That value did not promise Dr. Hart any specific amount as fixed
compensation or set her hourly rate for Sunday differential pay at $96.12 per hour. The table itself
is titled “Contract Estimation.” Id. It then includes the labels “Budget Category” and “Contract
Estimation” as categories covering all of the line items. Id. Both of those labels show that the
“$243,107.00” total is the government’s budget and estimate, and that each line item included in
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that total is part of the budget and estimate, not that the government is guaranteeing a particular
total payment for each line item to Dr. Hart. The table identifies “Sunday Diff.” as one of the lineitem “Budget Categor[ies].” Id. The text following the table in Article IV likewise calls the “total
estimated cost” a “budget” and states that the total is the agency’s estimate of all costs and the
“maximum U.S. dollar obligation under [the] contract.” Id. at 5; see also ECF No. 14-1 at
Appx110-11 (stating that a requesting officer “must prepare a comprehensive budget” as an “estimate of all costs associated with the individual [contract].”).
There is at least one entry in the table that is not a sum that Dr. Hart would be paid directly.
The table includes “FICA” (Federal Insurance Contributions Act), which is an expense incurred
by USAID but not a payment to Dr. Hart. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Article IV explains that USAID
deducts tax and FICA withholdings and covers the employer FICA contribution. Id. at 5 [¶3]. Thus,
Dr. Hart’s conclusion that all table entries were supposed to be direct compensation to her (see
ECF No. 15 at 7-8) is not quite correct.
The table also includes insurance amounts. ECF No. 1-1 at 4; see 48 C.F.R. ch. 7, Appx D
(“AIDAR, Appendix D,” available at ECF No. 14-1 at Appx3). The insurance line items allow Dr.
Hart to receive reimbursement for her “actual costs” up to a certain amount. See ECF No. 1-1 at
17-19. The life insurance line item, for example, provides for a reimbursement of “up to 50% of
actual annual life insurance costs,” capped at $500 per year. Id. at 18 [¶2]. The table therefore
includes USAID’s maximum insurance reimbursement, given to Dr. Hart only if she incurs the
cost. Reading the contract as a whole, the Sunday differential entry should be interpreted similarly,
as a maximum, not as a fixed obligation. See Banknote, 365 F.3d at 1353.
Article IV likewise refers to “the allowable costs above” in reference to the budget presented in the table. ECF No. 1-1 at 6. It explains that USAID will pay Dr. Hart for “necessary and
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reasonable costs actually incurred in the performance of the contract, as described in the allowable
costs above.” Id. The contract clauses on the pages following the table determine what USAID
owes for each category. See id. at 5-6, 15-18.
The surrounding “Budget” and “Estimation” references unambiguously limit the scope of
the “$39,987.50” term to an approximation and a maximum, not an actual compensation total. See
ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5; see also Evie’s Catering, Inc. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 562, 564 (2016)
(explaining that “contract terms that are qualified as an ‘estimate’ are ... unambiguous and nonbinding”), aff’d, 680 F. App’x 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2017). And the contract makes clear that USAID
would only reimburse compensation and costs Dr. Hart “actually incurred in the performance of
the contract.” ECF No. 1-1 at 6. If Dr. Hart were entitled to the total Sunday differential pay estimate as a fixed sum, her compensation would not depend on costs “actually incurred.” Id. Interpreting the Sunday differential entry as an obligated sum would render those terms meaningless.
“[A]n interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred
to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless.” United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The contract also incorporates FAR 52.232-20, “Limitation of Cost.” ECF No. 1-1 at 31.
Under that provision, “the estimated cost shown in the contract constitutes a ceiling on the government’s contractual liability.” Advanced Materials, Inc. v. Perry, 108 F.3d 307, 310 (Fed. Cir.
1997); see also 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20(d)(1) (“The Government is not obligated to reimburse the
Contractor for costs incurred in excess of ... the estimated cost specified in the Schedule”). Dr.
Hart acknowledges that the contract describes the total as the “Total Estimated Cost” and “maximum obligated amount.” ECF No. 18 at 2, 3 (emphasis added).
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The court sympathizes with Dr. Hart’s argument that the government, by significantly
overestimating her Sunday differential pay, presented a confusing compensation structure (ECF
No. 15 at 2, 7-8). USAID provided a large maximum estimate for Sunday differential pay, without
explaining how it reached that number. See ECF No. 1-1 at 4. USAID likely provided the estimate
because the agency could not predict how many Sunday hours Dr. Hart would actually work. Thus,
the contract lists Sunday differential as an anticipated cost and shows that that cost contributes to
the total estimate. Id. USAID appears to have reached its $39,987.50 budget based on an impossible scenario in which Dr. Hart would work all of her “forty (40) hours each week” only on Sundays. Id. ($39,987.50 equals 25 percent of the $159,950 “Year 1” “Basic Compensation” entry,
the premium USAID would owe Dr. Hart if each of her work hours for the year fell on a Sunday);
see also id. at 39 (stating that the budget “must be in excess so that [USAID] never fall[s] short”).
Dr. Hart argues that the government’s interpretation “read[s] the Sunday Differential entry
out of the contract altogether.” ECF No. 18 at 2; see also ECF No. 15 at 7 (arguing that “all other
components of the compensation structure were honored, and only the Sunday Differential was
later recharacterized as a mere estimate”). But contrary to her argument, the Sunday differential
pay estimate is necessary under the government’s interpretation of the contract (ECF No. 16 at 2).
The government’s interpretation obligates USAID to budget enough funds to cover Sunday differential pay, whatever number of Sunday hours Dr. Hart would later work. USAID paid Dr. Hart
Sunday differential pay, at a rate of 25 percent of her hourly rate, for the Sunday hours she worked.
See ECF No. 1-1 at 45; ECF No. 14 at 6-7. The parties dispute how much Sunday differential pay
the contract required, not whether it required any.
In fact, even under Dr. Hart’s own argument, the contract did not obligate USAID to pay
her the entire amount budgeted. Dr. Hart requests less than the entire $39,987.50 in differential
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pay. ECF No. 1-1 at 46 (arguing that she “should have been paid a total of $24,606.72” in Sunday
differential pay); ECF No. 1 at 2 [¶A]. She argues that she is eligible for Sunday differential pay
only for the Sunday hours she worked, seeking a prorated amount for only the 256 Sunday hours
she worked. ECF No. 1-1 at 46. That partially undermines her argument that she accepted USAID’s
offer and performed the contract in reliance on the “specific percentage and dollar amount” USAID
listed for Sunday differential pay in the contract (ECF No. 15 at 5). It likewise undermines Dr.
Hart’s argument that her pay was not an hourly rate but instead the total compensation as set forth
in the table (id. at 3).
Nothing in the contract’s text converts the “$39,987.50” entry into additional hourly pay.
That entry only guarantees that USAID has budgeted enough funds to cover Sunday differential
pay for whatever schedule Dr. Hart ends up working.
B. The contract and controlling regulations set Sunday differential pay at
25 percent of Dr. Hart’s basic pay rate
There are at least three independent sources capping Dr. Hart’s Sunday differential pay rate
at 25 percent of her basic pay rate: (1) the contract Dr. Hart signed includes a 25 percent Sunday
differential pay rate; (2) the conditional selection letter describing the position sets out a 25 percent
Sunday differential pay rate; and (3) the contract expressly incorporates the AIDAR and FAR
clauses tying personal services contractors’ Sunday differential pay to USAID’s rate for directhire employees, which is capped at 25 percent of an employee’s basic pay rate.
First, the estimation table in the contract Dr. Hart signed lists “25%” in the “Sunday Diff.”
row. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. The same page identifies Dr. Hart’s basic hourly rate at “$76.64.” Id.
Reading those entries together, the contract provides a Sunday premium of 25 percent of $76.64,
or $19.16 for each qualifying Sunday hour. Under Dr. Hart’s interpretation, however, she would
be entitled to a Sunday differential rate that is 125 percent of her basic pay rate, resulting in her
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receiving a total of 225 percent of her basic pay for Sunday hours worked. That contradicts the
“25%” rate stated in the Sunday differential pay row. Id.
Second, USAID sent Dr. Hart a nonbinding conditional selection letter describing Sunday
differential pay “currently at the rate of 25%” among the benefits and allowances granted “in accordance with [AIDAR] Appendix D.” ECF No. 1-1 at 34. The letter gave Dr. Hart notice of
USAID’s interpretation, because it lists the Sunday differential pay rate as 25 percent. And because
the letter does not mention $39,987.50, the only logical interpretation is that it was 25 percent of
her basic pay rate.
Third, the contract incorporates the AIDAR and FAR clauses requiring Dr. Hart’s Sunday
differential pay rate to follow the terms applicable to direct-hire employees. The cover page states
that the “contract consists of this Cover Page, the Schedule and AIDAR and FAR Clauses,” and
that the parties’ “rights and obligations” “shall be subject to and governed by the Schedule and the
AIDAR and FAR Clauses.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2. The FAR defines USAID’s Automated Directives
System (ADS), which “sets forth the Agency’s policies and essential procedures.” 48 C.F.R.
§ 702.170-1 (2014); see also ECF No. 14 at 5 n.7. Under the ADS chapter governing personal
services contracts, each group “has the option to authorize Sunday Pay” for contractors, and any
authorized Sunday pay “must be paid under the same terms and conditions that apply to noncommissioned [Foreign Service] Direct-Hire employees who receive Sunday Pay.” ADS 309, Personal Services Contracts with Individuals, § 309.3.2.2 (Oct. 31, 2023) (available at ECF No. 14-1
at Appx134). The group exercised that discretion here—noted in the table, which budgets for Sunday differential pay—and USAID paid it. ECF No. 1-1 at 4, 45. Sunday differential pay is therefore
available under the contract only as USAID policy authorizes it, on the terms that apply to directhire employees.
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The terms governing direct-hire employees set their Sunday differential pay rate at 25 percent of basic pay for each Sunday hour. ADS 472 directs USAID to administer Sunday differential
pay for direct-hire employees under a provision, titled “Sunday Premium Pay” that incorporates 5
C.F.R. § 550.171(a). ADS 472, Premium Compensation (June 9, 2017) (available at ECF No. 14-1 at Appx150, incorporating “3 FAM 3136”); see 3 FAM 3136 (available at ECF No. 14-1 at
Appx163, incorporating “5 C.F.R. § 550.171(a)”). Under that regulation, direct-hire employees
receive Sunday differential pay “at a rate equal to 25 percent of his or her rate of basic pay for each
hour of Sunday work.” 5 C.F.R. § 550.171(a) (2015). Thus, like her direct-hire-employee counterparts, Dr. Hart is entitled to Sunday differential pay at 25 percent of her basic pay rate. See ADS
309, Personal Services Contracts with Individuals (available at ECF No. 14-1 at Appx134).2
C. USAID paid Dr. Hart the 25 percent Sunday differential pay the contract required, so she has no further claim
Dr. Hart was entitled to differential pay of 25 percent of her basic hourly rate for each
Sunday hour worked. The parties do not dispute that Dr. Hart worked 256 Sunday hours. ECF No.
1-1 at 45, 46; ECF No. 14 at 7. Nor do they dispute that her basic hourly compensation rate was
$76.64 in 2024 and $77.30 in 2025. ECF No. 1-1 at 4; ECF No. 14 at 3 n.4, 7. At 25 percent, those
rates yield Sunday premiums of approximately $19.16 and $19.36 per hour, so Dr. Hart was entitled to Sunday differential pay of $4,291.84 for 2024 and $618.40 for 2025, a total of $4,910.24.
USAID paid her $4,910.24 in Sunday differential pay. ECF No. 1-1 at 45-46. Because USAID
2
To the extent that the $39,987.50 figure in the contract presented an ambiguity in light of the “25%” number and other references to 25 percent of her basic pay rate, the ambiguity was patent, or evident on the face of the contract, because that dollar amount is not 25 percent of her hourly rate. Thus, even if the contract is considered ambiguous, Dr. Hart was obligated to clarify before signing the contract. See NVT Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that a patent ambiguity is one that is “obvious, gross, [or] glaring” and that it “triggers a duty to inquire”).
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paid Dr. Hart the Sunday differential pay owed under the contract, Dr. Hart cannot plausibly allege
a breach of contract.
III. Conclusion
The government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 14) is granted, and Dr.
Hart’s cross-motion (ECF No. 15) is denied. The complaint is dismissed. The clerk of the court
shall enter judgment and award no costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Molly R. Silfen
MOLLY R. SILFEN
Judge
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