Supreme Court
No. 2025-247-Appeal.
(KC 24-294)
Shilo D. Horsman, individually, and in :
her capacity of as administratrix of the
Estate of Eric Horsman and as parent
and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew
Horsman, and Mason Horsman
v. :
Travelers Property Casualty Company :
of America et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email [email protected], of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2025-247-Appeal.
(KC 24-294)
Shilo D. Horsman, individually, and in :
her capacity of as administratrix of the
Estate of Eric Horsman and as parent
and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew
Horsman, and Mason Horsman
v. :
Travelers Property Casualty Company :
of America et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and Flaherty (ret.), JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, Shilo D. Horsman,
individually, and in her capacity of as administratrix of the Estate of Eric Horsman
and as parent and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew Horsman, and Mason
Horsman, appeals from an entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, Travelers
Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers) and Phalanx Engineering, Inc.
(Phalanx) (collectively, defendants). Before this Court, the plaintiff argues that the
Superior Court erred in granting Travelers’ motion for summary judgment and
denying her cross-motion. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
-1-Facts and Travel
On April 14, 2021, Eric Horsman (the decedent), while in the course of his
employment, was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in his tragic
death seven days later. The plaintiff, decedent’s widow, brought claims against her
personal auto insurance policy, the tortfeasor’s liability and excess policies, and the
tortfeasor individually in the amount of $1,785,000. The plaintiff ultimately
received such funds for herself and her minor children. The plaintiff then sought
underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under the commercial auto insurance policy
(the Policy) held by the decedent’s employer, Phalanx, issued by Travelers.
At the time of the decedent’s death, he was employed at Phalanx as a corporate
officer—an Assistant Vice President. The vehicle the decedent was driving at the
time of the accident was owned by Phalanx and covered under the Policy. The
Policy provided UIM coverage for twenty-six automobiles that were part of
Phalanx’s fleet. The Policy listed Phalanx as the Named Insured and identified the
Named Insured as a corporation. Under the UIM portion, the Policy specified that,
when the Named Insured is a corporation, the following are “insureds”: “[a]nyone
‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’” and “[a]nyone for damages he or she is entitled to
recover because of ‘bodily injury’ sustained by another ‘insured’.”
Travelers conceded that the decedent was an “insured” under the Policy
because he was operating a “covered auto” at the time of the accident—therefore
-2-plaintiff was able to recover on behalf of the decedent. Accordingly, Travelers paid
$1,000,000 to plaintiff, which is the per-accident UIM limit identified in the Policy’s
“Limit of Insurance” provision. The “Limit of Insurance” provision contained the
following language:
“Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’,
premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the
‘accident’, the most we will pay for all damages resulting
from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Uninsured
Motorists Insurance shown in the Schedule or
Declarations [($1,000,000)]. If there is more than one
covered ‘auto’, our limit of insurance for any one
‘accident’, if ‘bodily injury’ is sustained by an individual
Named Insured or any ‘family member’, is the sum of the
limits applicable to each covered ‘auto’.”
The parties agree that the above provision means that only an “individual Named
Insured” may stack UIM coverage to receive the sum of the limits of each covered
auto.
Despite accepting the $1,000,000 payment, plaintiff asserted that the decedent
should be considered an “individual Named Insured” and that, on behalf of the
decedent, she was entitled to “stack” the UIM limits for each of the twenty-six
vehicles covered under the Policy, totaling $26,000,000. Travelers denied plaintiff’s
demand to stack UIM coverage and sent e-mails to that effect on May 16, 2023, and
May 30, 2023. The plaintiff then filed a complaint in Kent County Superior Court
against defendants, arguing that she made a claim for additional UIM coverage,
which Travelers denied. The plaintiff then sought a declaratory judgment against
-3-both Travelers and Phalanx and asserted a claim for breach of contract against
Travelers. The defendants answered, and then Travelers moved for summary
judgment.1 A hearing was held on the matter, wherein the hearing justice instructed
the parties to submit a joint statement of undisputed facts, which they did. On June
11, 2025, the hearing justice entered an order granting Travelers’ motion for
summary judgment and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion, after finding that “there
[was] no circumstance in which [the decedent] could be considered an individual
named insured.” Final judgment was entered on the same day. The plaintiff timely
appealed to this Court.
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews de novo a trial justice’s decision granting summary
judgment.” Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 1257 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Glassie v.
Doucette, 157 A.3d 1092, 1096 (R.I. 2017)). “Examining the case from the vantage
point of the trial justice who passed on the motion for summary judgment, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we conclude
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the judgment.” Middle Creek Farm,
1
Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding a claim against Travelers for bad faith, and subsequently objected to Travelers’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint, asserting fifteen affirmative defenses. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment against Travelers, which was ultimately denied.
-4-LLC v. Portsmouth Water & Fire District, 252 A.3d 745, 750-51 (R.I. 2021)
(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 598
(R.I. 2019)). “Although summary judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, to
avoid summary judgment the burden is on the nonmoving party to produce
competent evidence that proves the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.”
Id. at 751 (quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 598). Accordingly, “a motion for
summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d at
1257 (quoting Glassie, 157 A.3d at 1096).
Discussion
Before this Court, plaintiff argues that the decedent should be considered an
individual Named Insured under the Policy and thus is entitled to stack UIM benefits
for the sum of the limits of each covered auto, totaling $26,000,000. The plaintiff
contends that she is entitled to intra-policy stacking because (1) the decedent was a
corporate officer of Phalanx and was acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the accident, (2) Travelers waived its right to contest the decedent’s status
as an individual Named Insured because, according to plaintiff, this reason was not
offered in Travelers’ pre-suit e-mails, (3) the “Limit of Insurance” provision in the
Policy which capped the maximum payment for UIM coverage rendered the stacking
benefit illusory, and (4) intra-policy stacking is required pursuant to the Rhode
Island Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Statute, G.L. 1956 § 27-7-2.1(i).
-5-Waiver
We begin with plaintiff’s argument that Travelers waived its right to contest
that the decedent was an individual Named Insured under the Policy, and to contest
plaintiff’s claim of intra-policy stacking of UIM benefits because Travelers did not
articulate its reasons in its pre-suit emails denying intra-policy stacking. The
plaintiff cites to Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Company, 799 A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002), to
argue that, under Rhode Island law, Travelers cannot defend this suit or file a motion
for summary judgment on facts or defenses not raised in its correspondence dated
May 16, 2023, and May 30, 2023.2 The plaintiff contends that, in its e-mails,
Travelers relied on the “Limit of Insurance” provision in the Policy, which limited
UIM coverage benefits to $1,000,000. The plaintiff argues that, in its e-mails,
“Travelers never disputed [plaintiff’s] assertion that [the decedent] was considered
a Named Insured under the policy[,]” even though that was the core of plaintiff’s
claim for the stacking benefit. (Emphasis omitted.) Therefore, plaintiff asserts that
Travelers waived its right to refute this claim now.
2
The plaintiff argues that in Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Company, 799 A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002), this Court addressed the obligations of an insurer with respect to denying a claim on specific grounds and then relying on other defenses later when the suit is filed. The plaintiff emphasizes the following language in support of her argument: “Moreover, the insurer is limited to introducing evidence that is actually relied upon and communicated to the insured when it denied the claim, and may not seek to enhance its defense by pointing to extraneous facts or arguments that it did not communicate to the insured when it refused payment.” Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1011.
-6-Conversely, Travelers argues that it met its obligations under Rhode Island
law when it denied plaintiff’s claim seeking to stack UIM benefits. Travelers
contends that it was only required to “promptly provide a reasonable and accurate
explanation of the basis of [the denial].” (Quoting G.L. 1956 § 27-9.1-4(a)(12).)
Travelers argues that it satisfied this requirement because its denial of plaintiff’s
right to stack coverage was based on the “unambiguous language” of the Policy—
“wherein the Named Insured was expressly identified as a corporation, not an
individual.”
The hearing justice determined that plaintiff’s waiver argument was
inapplicable to the present case because Travelers’ grounds for denying intra-policy
stacking were sufficiently cited in its e-mails. We agree.
In Skaling, this Court established certain guidelines that insurers doing
business in the State of Rhode Island must adhere to when denying an insured’s
claim. See Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1010-11. Those include “an implied obligation to
promptly and fully respond to their insured, to investigate a claim and to subject that
claim to appropriate review.” Id. at 1010. Additionally, “[a]n insurer has a
responsibility to assemble all the facts necessary for a fair and comprehensive
investigation before it refuses to pay a claim and may not base a defense to bad faith
on later acquired information.” Id. at 1010 (emphasis omitted). Particularly, “[t]he
decision of the insurance company to deny a claim under an insurance policy must
-7-be judged by what was before it at the time the decision was made.” Id. at 1011
(quoting Insurance Company of North America v. Citizensbank of Thomasville, 491
So. 2d 880, 883 (Ala. 1986)).
Indeed, in Skaling, this Court reinforced protections that prevent insurers from
denying claims in bad faith.3 See Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1006-07. We noted that, in
situations where the claim is “fairly debatable[,]” insurers must not “intentionally or
recklessly fail[] to properly investigate the claim or to subject the results of the
investigation to a cognitive evaluation and review.” Id. at 1011 (quoting Thomas v.
Principal Financial Group, 566 So. 2d 735, 744 (Ala. 1990)). However, the
circumstances in this case do not demonstrate that Travelers engaged in such
unreasonable conduct. See id. (“[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether there is
sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could conclude that in the
investigation, evaluation, and processing of the claim, the insurer acted unreasonably
and either knew or was conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable.”)
(brackets omitted) (quoting Zilisch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
995 P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000)). It is our opinion that Travelers did not deny
plaintiff UIM benefits—it paid the $1,000,000 policy limit; rather, it denied her the
3
“[B]ad faith is established when the proof demonstrates that the insurer denied coverage or refused payment without a reasonable basis in fact or law for the denial.” Shannahan v. Rhode Island Interlocal Risk Management Trust, 269 A.3d 737, 740 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company v. Bellini, 947 A.2d 886, 893 (R.I. 2008)).
-8-ability to stack UIM coverage for the sum of the limits of each covered auto in
accordance with the Policy’s “Limit of Insurance” provision.
An examination of Travelers’ correspondence confirms that Travelers
sufficiently explained its reasons for rejecting intra-policy stacking which included
reiterating language under the “Who is an insured” and “Limit of Insurance”
provisions of the Policy. Travelers did not rely on any “later acquired information”
in its motion for summary judgment that was not presented in its denial letters. See
Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1010. The record reveals that Travelers clearly identified the
decedent as an insured under the Policy and proceeded through the claim process
reiterating this premise.
On May 16, 2023, Travelers clearly communicated to plaintiff that “[i]n this
instance, [the decedent], as an employee of Phalanx, qualified as an insured, and
therefore so did his surviving spouse and children to the extent they are entitled to
recover damages for [the decedent’s] death. However, despite the number of
insureds, only one per accident limit is available.” Travelers indicated that, under a
policy where the named insured is the corporation, “insureds” were “[a]nyone
‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ or a temporary substitute for a covered ‘auto’” and
“[a]nyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of ‘bodily injury’
sustained by another ‘insured’.” Travelers also clarified that the Policy did not
provide for different limits based upon the classification of the insured.
-9-Additionally, Travelers restated the Policy’s “Limit of Insurance” provision,
which provided that “the most [Travelers] will pay for all damages resulting from
any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Uninsured Motorists Insurance shown in the
Schedule or Declarations.” Travelers explicitly stated that “under the Commercial
Auto Uninsured Motorist coverage, the Horsmans are entitled to a single limit of
$1,000,000 for their combined claims.”
Subsequently, on May 30, 2023, Travelers again stated that the limit shown
in the schedule ($1,000,000) was the most they were willing to pay, notwithstanding
the number of covered autos or insureds making a claim. Travelers further explained
that intra-policy stacking was prohibited, regardless of the number of vehicles
insured, where the insured paid a single premium. Travelers cited this Court’s
holding in Cardoso v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 659 A.2d 1097 (R.I.
1995), in support of its denial of plaintiff’s request to stack coverage. See Cardoso,
659 A.2d at 1098 (holding that § 27-7-2.1(i) “was added in 1987 after this [C]ourt
ruled in Constant v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 497 A.2d 343 (R.I. 1985), that the
insureds were not entitled to stack the uninsured-motorist benefits of their two
separate policies when the policies had specific language prohibiting stacking”).
Therefore, we conclude that Travelers did not waive its right to contest that the
decedent was not an individual Named Insured under the Policy, and that
intra-policy stacking was prohibited as applied to plaintiff’s circumstances.
- 10 -Illusory Coverage
Next, we turn to plaintiff’s argument that Travelers’ interpretation of the
“Limits of Insurance” provision would render the stacking benefit illusory. The
plaintiff acknowledges that the Policy explicitly provides for intra-policy stacking
when the named insured is an individual. She argues, however, that the stacking
benefit is illusory because no one would ever be entitled to it, given that the named
insured was the corporation, Phalanx, and a corporation cannot suffer bodily injury.
In response, Travelers contends that “[i]llusory coverage is that which ‘would
preclude coverage in almost any circumstance.’” (Quoting Empire Fire and Marine
Insurance Companies v. Citizens Insurance Company of America/Hanover
Insurance, 43 A.3d 56, 61 (R.I. 2012).) Travelers argues that the fact that the named
insured is Phalanx and thus stacking is prohibited, does not render UIM coverage
illusory. Travelers argues that the Policy provided for $1,000,000 of UIM coverage
per accident and that Travelers paid that amount to plaintiff because the decedent
was an operator of one of the vehicles covered under the Policy.
“It is well established that the terms of an insurance policy are interpreted ‘in
accordance with the rules of construction that govern contracts.’” Houle v. Liberty
Insurance Corporation, 271 A.3d 591, 594 (R.I. 2022) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Derderian v. Essex Insurance Co., 44 A.3d 122, 127 (R.I. 2012)). “[W]hen
interpreting an insurance policy * * * we shall not depart from the literal language
- 11 -of the policy absent a finding that the policy is ambiguous.” Mallane v. Holyoke
Mutual Insurance Company in Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I. 1995).
Additionally, “[t]his Court consistently has declared that central to the
resolution of an insurance-coverage dispute is the interpretation of the policy as a
whole.” Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, 43 A.3d at 60. Therefore,
“[w]e will not read a policy’s terms in isolation; instead, we read the policy ‘in its
entirety, giving words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.’” Id. (quoting Irene
Realty Corporation v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 973 A.2d
1118, 1122 (R.I. 2009)). Accordingly, in this case, we will not limit our reading of
the Policy to its “Limit of Insurance” provision, and “we will not apply the policy as
written if doing so would render the coverage provided illusory.” Id. at 60-61.
Here, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that Travelers’
interpretation of the “Limits of Insurance” provision rendered UIM coverage under
the Policy illusory. As the hearing justice noted, “the policy unambiguously states
that stacking is only permitted when an individual named insured sustains bodily
injury.” Because it is undisputed that the named insured was Phalanx, the decedent
thus was not permitted to stack UIM coverage. The mere exclusion of the decedent
as an individual named insured did not render UIM coverage under the Policy
illusory because coverage was not precluded—there was a $1,000,000 UIM
coverage limit per accident.
- 12 -The plaintiff also contends that, because a corporation cannot sustain bodily
injury, someone under the policy must receive the stacking benefit; otherwise,
coverage is illusory. The plaintiff is mistaken. This Court has established that, “[w]e
will deem an exclusion to an insurance policy illusory only when it ‘would preclude
coverage in almost any circumstance.’” Great American E & S Insurance Company
v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571, 576 (R.I. 2012) (quoting
Pressman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 574 A.2d 757, 759 (R.I. 1990)). That
is not the case here. Indeed, Travelers identified the decedent as an “insured” under
the Policy and provided UIM coverage to plaintiff in the amount of $1,000,000.
Therefore, because plaintiff was not precluded from UIM coverage but rather barred
from the stacking benefit, UIM coverage was not illusory. Contra Pressman, 574
A.2d at 759 (holding that the definition of the word “premises” in the policy at issue
was ambiguous and that the narrower definition adopted by the trial justice would
render coverage illusory in almost any circumstance).
Martinelli Exception
The plaintiff argues that, pursuant to Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance
Companies, 687 A.2d 443 (R.I. 1996), the decedent should be considered an
individual Named Insured under the Policy. See Martinelli, 687 A.2d at 446. The
plaintiff argues that, in Martinelli, this Court established an exception (the Martinelli
exception) where officers, shareholders, and employees of a corporation can be
- 13 -considered Named Insureds, for purposes of UIM coverage, under a policy that
identifies the corporation as the Named Insured, if the claimant is acting within the
scope of his or her employment at the time of the injury.
The plaintiff argues that the Martinelli exception is applicable to the present
case because it is undisputed that the Policy at issue listed Phalanx as the Named
Insured, and the decedent was an Assistant Vice President of Phalanx, operating a
covered auto in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Thus,
according to plaintiff, because this Court has affirmed the existence of the Martinelli
exception in subsequent cases and it is applicable here, the decedent is required to
be considered an individual Named Insured irrespective of contrary policy language.
Travelers argues that Martinelli does not apply to the instant case, in that
Martinelli does not address the issue at bar. Travelers argues that in Martinelli the
question was whether the plaintiff was eligible for UIM coverage under his
employer’s commercial auto policy. In contrast, Travelers argues, the question here
is whether the decedent is an individual Named Insured, entitled to stack UIM
coverage. Travelers also relies on Finch v. Centennial Insurance Company, 650
A.2d 495 (R.I. 1994), to argue that “‘employees who are injured while occupying
vehicles owned by their employers and insured under commercial-fleet policies’ are
‘generally classified as a class-II insured and not allowed to stack coverage.’”
(Quoting Finch, 650 A.2d at 498.) Travelers further contends that plaintiff’s
- 14 -position is a blatant contradiction of the Policy’s terms, contrary to public policy,
and would impose liability on Travelers greater than the parties’ contemplated in the
contract.
In Martinelli, this Court considered whether the plaintiff, a principal
shareholder and general manager of his company, was entitled to UIM coverage
under the commercial garage policy that listed the company as the Named Insured.
See Martinelli, 687 A.2d at 444. There, we held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
UIM coverage for two reasons. Id. at 446. First, we reasoned that the plaintiff was
not entitled to class-I coverage because the plain text of the policy at issue clearly
defined the named insured as the company. Id. at 445-46. Second, we reasoned that
the policy only provided for class-II coverage but that the plaintiff did not qualify
for such coverage because he was not occupying an insured vehicle at the time of
his injury. Id. at 446.4
4
See Roberge v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 356 A.3d 293, 296 n.1 (R.I. 2026) (“Named Insureds are * * * ‘commonly referred to as class-I insureds, and occupants of an insured vehicle are commonly referred to as class-II insureds.’”) (quoting Roberge v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 112 F.4th 45, 48 n.2 (1st Cir. 2024)); see also Finch v. Centennial Insurance Company, 650 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I. 1994) (“[Another state supreme court has] described class-I insureds as ‘the insured who bought and paid for the protection and the members of his family residing in the same household.’ * * * On the other hand, a class-II insured is one who is protected from damages received as a result of a collision while occupying an insured vehicle with an uninsured motorist. * * * These distinctions are widely recognized and frequently applied to cases involving employees who are injured while occupying vehicles owned by their employers and insured under commercial-fleet policies. That employee is generally classified as a
- 15 -In the instant case, it is undisputed that the decedent was as an “insured” under
the Policy because he was operating a covered auto at the time of the accident.
Travelers then tendered the maximum amount of UIM coverage. Thus, our holding
in Martinelli does not advance plaintiff’s argument that she is entitled to stack the
Policy’s UIM limits in clear contradiction to the Policy’s text. Accordingly, the
hearing justice did not err in finding that Martinelli was inapplicable to the facts in
this case.
Section 27-7-2.1
Lastly, plaintiff argues that she, on behalf of the decedent, was entitled to stack
the limits of UIM coverage for each covered auto, irrespective of contrary policy
language, pursuant to the Rhode Island Uninsured/Underinsured (UM/UIM)
Motorist Statute, § 27-7-2.1. The plaintiff argues that statutory stacking—stacking
required pursuant to legislation—applies when a policy itself does not provide for
stacking. The plaintiff argues that, under § 27-7-2.1, stacking is permitted if
multiple UM/UIM premiums are paid under a policy. The plaintiff argues that here
multiple UM/UIM premiums were charged for each covered auto and that the
decedent, as an officer of Phalanx, should be considered having paid said premiums.
class-II insured and not allowed to stack coverage.”) (deletion omitted) (quoting Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1979)).
- 16 -The plaintiff also asserts that other jurisdictions have held that when an insurer
attempts to charge a single premium but, in fact, assesses the risk and charges a
premium for each vehicle, the case is considered a multi-premium and not a
single-premium case for stacking purposes under UM/UIM statutes.
“[T]his Court reviews ‘questions of statutory interpretation de novo.’” In re
J.T., 252 A.3d 1276, 1280 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Crenshaw v. State, 227 A.3d 67, 71
(R.I. 2020)). “When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court
must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain
and ordinary meanings.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Crenshaw, 227 A.3d at 71).
“However, when faced with an ambiguous statute, it is incumbent upon this Court
to apply the rules of statutory construction and examine the statute in its entirety to
determine the intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting
Crenshaw, 227 A.3d at 71). Likewise, “‘in effectuating the Legislature’s intent,’
this Court reviews and considers ‘the statutory meaning most consistent with the
statute’s policies or obvious purposes.’” Id. (quoting Providence Teachers’ Union
Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hemond, 227 A.3d 486, 494 (R.I. 2020)).
Section 27-7-2.1(i) provides that
“[w]henever an insured has paid two (2) or more separate
premiums for uninsured motorists’ coverage in a single
policy of insurance or under several policies with the same
insurance company, the insured shall be permitted to
collect up to the aggregate amount of coverage for all of
- 17 -the vehicles insured, regardless of any language in the
policy to the contrary.”
In Finch, this Court specifically addressed the question of whether intra-policy
stacking of UIM coverage under commercial fleet policies is required under
§ 27-7-2.1(i) and determined that it was not required.5 See Finch, 650 A.2d at 496
(“By its clear and unambiguous terms, Rhode Island’s stacking statute does not
apply to commercial fleet policies.”). Therefore, we simply confirm what we stated
in Finch. We noted in that case that “[§ 27-7-2.1(i)] is based on the premise that an
insured must be the payer of the premium to be entitled to the stacking privilege.”
Id. at 496-97. Accordingly, we rejected an employee’s claim to intra-policy stacking
under his employer’s commercial fleet policy, reasoning that “a class-II insured is
one who has paid no premiums and has no reasonable expectations of coverage.” Id.
at 498.6 Here, the plaintiff “is an insured only by virtue of his occupancy of one
5
In Finch, the Court reasoned that “[t]he plaintiff in [that] case is an insured only by virtue of his occupancy of one vehicle out of his employer’s fleet of eleven vehicles. He did not pay the premium for the uninsured-motorist coverage provided by [the insurer]. By virtue of these two important facts, plaintiff does not fall within the express terms of the stacking statute: ‘an insured [who] has paid two (2) or more separate premiums’ for uninsured-motorist coverage.” Finch, 650 A.2d at 497 (quoting § 27-7-2.1(i)).
6
In support of our opinion, we cited to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Contrisciane, 473 A.2d 1005 (Pa. 1984). See Finch, 650 A.2d at 497-98. As this Court noted, in Utica, the court declined to extend stacking privileges to a deceased employee under his employer’s auto insurance policy, reasoning that “[a]s a class-II insured, [the decedent’s] entitlement to coverage arose from nothing more than ‘his temporary status as an occupant, rather than from his being a specifically intended beneficiary of the insurance
- 18 -vehicle out of his employer’s fleet of [twenty-six] vehicles.” See id. at 497.
Likewise, the payor of the UIM premiums is clearly identified in the Policy as
Phalanx. Therefore, because § 27-7-2.1(i) does not require that the plaintiff be
entitled to the stacking benefit, the hearing justice properly found that the statute was
inapplicable.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Superior Court judgment. The
papers in this case may be remanded thereto.
policy. * * * A claimant whose coverage is solely a result of membership in this class has not paid premiums, nor is he a specifically intended beneficiary of the policy. Thus, he has no recognizable contractual relationship with the insurer, and there is no basis upon which he can reasonably expect multiple coverage.’” Id. at 497-98 (quoting Utica, 473 A.2d at 1010-11).
- 19 -STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Shilo D. Horsman, individually, and in her capacity of
as administratrix of the Estate of Eric Horsman and as
Title of Case parent and guardian of Jack Horsman, Matthew
Horsman, and Mason Horsman v. Travelers Property
Casualty Company of America et al.
No. 2025-247-Appeal.
Case Number
(KC 24-294)
Date Opinion Filed July 30, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and
Justices
Flaherty (ret.), JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen
For Plaintiff:
James S. D’Ambra, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:
Jessica M. Savino, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)