Supreme Court
No. 2024-219-Appeal.
(PC 17-1105)
Yohaira Galindez :
v. :
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority et :
al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email [email protected], of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2024-219-Appeal.
(PC 17-1105)
Yohaira Galindez :
v. :
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority et :
al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Indeglia (ret.), JJ.
OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The plaintiff, Yohaira Galindez
(Galindez), appeals from a judgment entered following a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant, Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA). Galindez sets forth
eleven assignments of error; namely, that the trial justice erred in: six evidentiary
rulings; allowing RIPTA to amend its answer at the eleventh hour; dismissing a
juror; rendering a prejudicial answer to a juror question; giving an improper jury
instruction; and improperly denying her motion for new trial. For the reasons set
forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
We recite only the facts necessary to address the issues on appeal. On March
9, 2017, Galindez filed a complaint in the Superior Court against RIPTA, alleging
-1-that she had sustained injuries while riding a RIPTA bus on July 1, 2016.1 Galindez
alleged that her injuries were caused by the bus driver’s negligent operation of the
vehicle. As recompense, Galindez sought damages for her medical bills and pain
and suffering, as well as costs and attorney’s fees. RIPTA filed an answer, denying
the substantive allegations contained in Galindez’s complaint. After several years
of motions and discovery, a jury trial commenced on November 30, 2023.
Testimony began on December 1, 2023. Galindez testified first, describing
the events of the alleged incident. Galindez stated that on May 29, 2016, she, her
four children, and her twin sister took the A-3 RIPTA bus to Oakland Beach.
Galindez stated that throughout the ride, the bus driver kept turning to speak with a
passenger who stood to his right, and that based on her experience on the RIPTA
bus, it seemed the bus was operating at a higher rate of speed than usual. Galindez
testified that as the RIPTA bus was traveling in the right lane, a gray vehicle crossed
over in front of the bus from the left lane. Galindez testified that because the bus
driver was speeding and talking, he had to abruptly apply the brakes three times as
the gray car entered the right lane. The abrupt braking allegedly caused Galindez to
hit her shoulder on the seat in front of her and then on a bar behind her.
1
Although the complaint alleged the incident took place on July 1, 2016, the parties later determined that the incident occurred on May 29, 2016.
-2-After the incident, the bus driver stopped the bus and called a supervisor, who
arrived on scene. Galindez never spoke to the supervisor. After the supervisor
departed, the bus driver asked Galindez if she needed an ambulance. Galindez
declined and, trying not to let her injuries ruin her children’s outing, continued to the
beach. However, once the family arrived at the beach, Galindez realized her pain
was severe, so she and her family took another bus back home.
Galindez did not immediately seek treatment, but after a few days of
increasing pain, she went to the emergency room at Rhode Island Hospital. There,
a doctor diagnosed Galindez with “chest concussions” and a shoulder fracture. The
doctor referred Galindez to an orthopedic specialist, who developed a treatment plan
for Galindez, which included shots and physical therapy. Galindez described the
treatment as difficult and painful. Galindez testified that although she had completed
several months of physical therapy, her life was never the same after the incident.
On cross-examination, RIPTA elicited that for years prior to the incident Galindez
suffered from depression and chronic pain due to arthritis that affected her daily life.
Next, the bus driver, Milton Luna (Luna), testified. Luna testified that he had
been employed as a RIPTA bus driver for about twenty years. Luna testified that,
on the date of the incident, he was not speaking with a passenger during the ride and
that he was operating the bus at a safe speed. Luna explained that, as he was driving
the bus a gray car cut him off, so he stopped the bus safely to avoid an accident.
-3-Luna also testified that he was unable to get the gray car’s license plate number
because the driver sped off right after the incident. Luna stated that, after the incident
he spoke with Galindez, who explained that she had been injured. Galindez declined
Luna’s offer to call for a rescue. With approval from a RIPTA dispatcher, Luna
continued his route. Upon his return to the station, Luna completed a report detailing
the incident.
At the conclusion of Luna’s testimony, both parties rested. The trial justice
dismissed the jury for the day and then discussed proposed jury instructions with the
attorneys. The next day, the trial justice issued her instructions and sent the jurors
to deliberate. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial justice expressing
some confusion regarding the doctrine of spoliation. Outside the presence of the
jurors, the trial justice and counsel discussed how the trial justice should respond.
The trial justice ultimately delivered a supplemental instruction which clarified the
standard the jury should apply. The jury thereafter continued its deliberations and
less than an hour after the supplemental instruction returned a verdict in favor of
RIPTA.
-4-Subsequently, Galindez filed a motion for new trial and a premature, albeit
timely, notice of appeal to this Court.2 Thereafter, the trial justice issued a bench
decision denying the motion for new trial.
Discussion
On appeal, Galindez sets forth a myriad of issues. We discuss each seriatim.
We note at the outset that several of these issues, as indicated infra, are waived.
Under this Court’s well-established raise-or-waive rule, “simply stating an issue for
appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the
issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the legal questions raised, and
therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.” Barnes v. Rhode Island Public Transit
Authority, 242 A.3d 32, 36-37 (R.I. 2020) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fisher v.
Applebaum, 947 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I. 2008)).
Evidentiary Rulings
“[T]his Court reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion
standard.” State v. Rivera, 253 A.3d 851, 855 (R.I. 2021) (quoting State v. Jones,
242 A.3d 47, 51 (R.I. 2020)). “[W]e are disinclined to perceive an abuse of
discretion so long as the record contains some grounds for supporting the trial
2
Galindez filed both a motion for new trial and notice of appeal on December 19, 2023. The trial justice did not render a bench decision on the motion for new trial until several months later, on May 17, 2024. The case was then transmitted to this Court on July 19, 2024. We then remanded for the entry of final judgment, which occurred on July 28, 2025.
-5-justice’s decision.” Id. at 856 (deletion omitted) (quoting Ims v. Town of Portsmouth,
32 A.3d 914, 926 (R.I. 2011)).
Impeachment of Statement Not Made by Plaintiff
First, Galindez challenges RIPTA’s reliance on “unauthenticated medical
records[,]” which, in her view, lacked foundation and authentication as required by
G.L. 1956 § 9-19-27. In response, RIPTA contends that § 9-19-27 is inapplicable
because Galindez’s medical records were utilized for impeachment purposes, not for
the purpose of prognosis, diagnosis, or causation. RIPTA also contends that
Galindez herself authenticated the documents as being her prior medical records.
Under Rule 901(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, evidence must first
be authenticated or identified “by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.” R.I. R. Evid. 901(a).
“[A]uthentication is not a high hurdle to clear.” O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111
A.3d 317, 323 (R.I. 2015) (quoting McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A., 91 A.3d
853, 860 (R.I. 2014)). In assessing authentication, “trial justices must decide
whether there is enough support in the record to conclude that it is ‘reasonably
probable’ that the evidence is what its offeror proclaims it to be. If so, then the
evidence’s suasive force is for the jury to decide.” Id. (brackets and deletion omitted)
(quoting State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 926 (R.I. 2001)).
-6-During trial, RIPTA utilized Galindez’s medical records to impeach her
testimony that she had never had shoulder issues prior to the incident. Defense
counsel asked Galindez if she had been treated by a Dr. Katarzyna Gilek-Seibert on
April 14, 2016, which Galindez answered in the affirmative. Galindez conceded
that, as reflected in the medical record, she had been treated for shoulder issues, but
attested that her prior pain had to do with her arthritis and was different from the
pain associated with her fracture.
Section 9-19-27(b), states:
“In any proceeding commenced in any court, commission,
or agency, an itemized bill and reports, whether
originating within this state or any other state, including
hospital or health care facility, medical records, relating to
medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions, or
orthopedic appliances rendered to or prescribed for a
person injured, and/or any report of any examination of the
injured person, including, but not limited to, hospital
medical records and written statements made by the
physician or dentist whether contemporaneous with the
treatment or not, subscribed and sworn to under the
penalties of perjury by the physician, dentist, or authorized
agent of the hospital or health care facility rendering the
services or by the pharmacist or retailer of orthopedic
appliances, shall be admissible as evidence of the fair and
reasonable charge for the services and/or the necessity of
the services or treatment, the diagnosis of the physician or
dentist, the prognosis of the physician or dentist; the
opinion of the physician or dentist as to proximate cause
of the condition so diagnosed, and the opinion of the
physician or dentist as to disability, incapacity or
permanency, if any, proximately resulting from the
condition so diagnosed.”
-7-We agree with RIPTA that § 9-19-27 is wholly inapplicable here, and we
reject Galindez’s generalized assertion that “[t]he authentication of medical records
as a substitute for live testimony requires strict adherence to * * * § 9-19-27 * * *.”
We have found no basis in this state’s jurisprudence for that proposition, nor does
Galindez provide any. The records at issue were not used for any of the purposes
enumerated in § 9-19-27; rather the statements were used appropriately for
impeachment.
Thus, we need only consider whether the records came in properly under Rule
803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(4) excludes from the rule
against hearsay:
“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment,
but not including statements made to a physician consulted
solely for the purposes of preparing for litigation or
obtaining testimony for trial.”
We have explained that “[t]he rationale for this exception is ‘the patient’s strong
motivation to be truthful about information that will form the basis of his diagnosis
and treatment.’” Perry v. Alessi, 890 A.2d 463, 471 (R.I. 2006) (quoting McKenna
v. St. Joseph Hospital, 557 A.2d 854, 857 (R.I. 1989)).
Here, the statements from Galindez’s medical records fall squarely within
Rule 803(4). The relevant portion of the record contained Galindez’s medical
-8-history, listing pain in her lower back, upper back, neck, and shoulders. Such
statements are specifically enumerated in Rule 803(4), and Galindez advances no
argument to the contrary in her briefing.
Moreover, Galindez’s claim that the records were not authenticated is without
merit. The records were authenticated by Galindez herself, who confirmed that she
had been treated by the named doctor on the specified date. Galindez’s own
confirmation that the record was what defense counsel purported it to be clears the
low hurdle of authentication. See O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323. We discern no error.
Spoliation
Second, Galindez asserts that a spoliation instruction was warranted and that
the trial justice failed to scrutinize RIPTA’s deletion of video footage of the incident.
RIPTA posits that “the determination of whether the destruction of evidence was
intentional or routine was in the purview of the jury.”
During the discussion with counsel about jury instructions, the trial justice
determined that, although she “did not believe that [Galindez] had done enough to
develop [the spoliation] argument or * * * theory,” a letter from a RIPTA attorney,
entered as an exhibit at trial, suggested that video of the incident had been taped
over, thus warranting a spoliation instruction. The trial justice gave the following
instruction:
“During this trial, you’ve heard and seen evidence that
RIPTA failed to preserve or otherwise destroy video from
-9-a camera on the bus in question that recorded the events at
issue on May 29, 2016. When evidence is destroyed, we
call it spoliation of this evidence. Under certain
circumstances spoliation of evidence may give rise to an
inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to
the position of the party who destroyed it; in other words,
the doctrine of spoliation permits the jury to make an
inference that the destroyed video evidence would be
unfavorable to RIPTA. But that is not conclusive. It is the
sole province of you, the jury, to decide whether or not to
make an adverse inference.
“Spoliation of evidence may be innocent, or intentional, or
somewhere between the two. It may occur along a
continuum of fault, ranging from innocence through
degrees of negligence to intentionality. Spoliation is the
unexplained and deliberate destruction of relevant
evidence that gives rise to an inference that the thing
destroyed would have been unfavorable to the spoliator.
A showing of bad faith is not necessary to permit a
spoliation inference, but such a showing will strengthen
the inference.
“If you find that, one, the RIPTA bus in question recorded
video on May 29, 2016, or, more specifically, that the
RIPTA bus recorded video of the incident giving rise to
this dispute, and, two, if you find that RIPTA destroyed
the video, and, three, that RIPTA did so intentionally, then
you are permitted, but you are not required to infer that the
jury’s consideration of that evidence would have been
unfavorable to RIPTA’s position in this case.
“In deciding whether the destruction of the May 29, 2016
video was deliberate, you may consider all of the facts and
circumstances which were proved at trial and which are
pertinent to that item of evidence. You may consider who
destroyed it, how it was destroyed, the legitimacy or lack
of legitimacy and the reasons given for its destruction, the
timing of the destruction, whether the individual
destroying the evidence knew the evidence might be
- 10 -supportive of the opposing party, whether spoliation was
intended to deprive the [c]ourt of evidence, and any other
facts and circumstances which you find to be true.
“You may also consider the extent to which it has been
shown that the spoliated evidence, that is any video from
May 29, 2016, would indeed have been unfavorable to
RIPTA’s position, and if spoliation of the evidence is
attributable to careless[ness] and negligence on the part of
RIPTA, you may consider whether the carelessness or
negligence was so gross to amount to a deliberate act of
spoliation.”
Galindez contends that a spoliation instruction was warranted but does not
acknowledge the indisputable fact that the trial justice did deliver a comprehensive
spoliation instruction. Although Galindez characterizes this assignment of error as
an erroneous evidentiary ruling, she appears to take issue with the trial justice’s
spoliation instruction, which this Court reviews de novo. Armour v. Bader, 316 A.3d
1164, 1173 (R.I. 2024). Our review reveals that the instruction more than
sufficiently covered the law of spoliation. See State v. Threadgill, 338 A.3d 311, 320
(R.I. 2025); Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC v. Huhtamaki, Inc., 110 A.3d 267, 282-83
(R.I. 2015). We discern no error.
“Impact of Injuries on Daily Life”
Next, Galindez argues that RIPTA failed to prove by clear affirmative
evidence that Galindez knowingly and voluntarily aggravated pre-existing
conditions. We note that Galindez’s argument on this point is, at best, unclear.
Galindez does not point us to any particular facts in the record regarding
- 11 -post-incident aggravation. Accordingly, we deem this argument waived. See
Giddings v. Arpin, 160 A.3d 314, 316 (R.I. 2017) (mem.) (“Without belaboring the
point, the plaintiff has failed to develop his arguments or provide any facts or law to
support the inartfully raised issues.”).
Impeachment with Prior Consistent Statement
Fourth, Galindez contends that prior consistent statements were improperly
introduced to bolster a witness’s in-court testimony. Notably, Galindez fails to
explain to which witness’s prior consistent statements she is referring. Galindez’s
brief does not identify any witness or statement, nor does it include a citation to the
record from which we could glean her intention. Accordingly, this issue is waived.
See Broccoli v. Manning, 208 A.3d 1146, 1149 (R.I. 2019) (“This Court generally
deems an issue waived ‘when a party simply states an issue for appellate review,
without a meaningful discussion thereof.’”) (quoting A. Salvati Masonry Inc. v.
Andreozzi, 151 A.3d 745, 750 (R.I. 2017)).
Violation of Rules 608 and 403
Next, Galindez alleges violations of Rules 608 and 403 of the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence. Again, Galindez fails to explain to what specific extrinsic
evidence she is referring. Because Galindez failed to meaningfully articulate this
particular argument, we need not address it. See Branson v. Louttit, 213 A.3d 417,
432 (R.I. 2019) (“[W]e will not scour the record to identify facts in support of her
- 12 -broad claims, and we will not give life to arguments that she has failed to develop
on her own.”) (brackets omitted) (quoting Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558
(R.I. 2018)).
Impeachment with Medical Records
Sixth, Galindez again argues that RIPTA failed to authenticate medical
records used to impeach her, in violation of Rule 901 of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence. Galindez also asserts that the medical records constituted inadmissible
hearsay evidence, and that the improper admission of those records warrants a new
trial. We have addressed this issue supra. Galindez also argues that her twin sister’s
medical records were introduced at trial and misattributed to her.
Galindez fails to direct us to where and how her twin sister’s records were
introduced at trial. Moreover, Galindez fails to cite any rule or case law in support
of her argument that the misattributed evidence unfairly prejudiced her. Had she
meaningfully briefed that argument, our review of the record reveals the following:
RIPTA posed a single question to Galindez regarding a January 2016 medical record
detailing a prior shoulder injury. Galindez responded that the medical record in
question belonged to her twin sister, Yahaira Galindez, and that the doctor’s office
often mixed up their records. Immediately after that response, the trial justice
conducted a sidebar with counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that he had
inadvertently provided the twin sister’s record in discovery and that these types of
- 13 -issues were “the whole reason [he] objected earlier, especially reading medicals into
the record for impeachment.” Counsel for both parties agreed that the medical
record belonged to Galindez’s sister and the trial justice subsequently issued a
curative instruction. Specifically, the trial justice explained to the jury that the
medical record belonged to Galindez’s twin sister and was “to be disregarded”
because it was “completely irrelevant” and “relates to a different person * * *.”
To start, we point out that Galindez produced the misattributed record during
discovery. When Galindez clarified on the stand that the record was not hers, RIPTA
agreed that the record could not be used. The trial justice then gave a swift and clear
curative instruction. See State v. Burkinshaw, 271 A.3d 580, 589 (R.I. 2022) (“[I]f
the trial justice determines that the prejudice is curable, he or she must issue a timely
and effective instruction.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. LaPlante, 962 A.2d
63, 71 (R.I. 2009)). The trial justice’s instruction was sufficient to dispel any
prejudice resulting from the single remark regarding the misattributed record. We
discern no error.
Sudden Emergency
Next, Galindez challenges RIPTA’s “eleventh-hour introduction of the
sudden emergency doctrine,” arguing that RIPTA’s late-stage amendment unfairly
prejudiced her and violated principles of procedural fairness. RIPTA contends that
the trial justice did not err in allowing the late amendment of its answer to include
- 14 -the sudden emergency doctrine because Galindez had adequate notice of RIPTA’s
defense.
On the first day of trial, outside the presence of the jury and prior to the parties’
presentation of their cases, the trial justice addressed whether the jury should be
instructed on the doctrine of sudden emergency. Galindez asserted that sudden
emergency is an affirmative defense, and because RIPTA had not raised it in its
answer, the defense could not be raised at trial. In response, RIPTA argued that
sudden emergency is not an affirmative defense, and therefore it did not need to be
pled in RIPTA’s answer to the complaint. Moreover, RIPTA pointed out that, based
on a 2018 letter from RIPTA containing the incident report, Galindez had notice
from the outset of the case that RIPTA was denying liability for the incident.
Ultimately, the trial justice ruled that the facts supporting the sudden
emergency theory had been known to Galindez for years, and that, therefore, there
was no prejudice to Galindez in including the sudden emergency instruction. The
trial justice then invited RIPTA to orally move to amend its pleadings to include
sudden emergency without conceding that it was an affirmative defense, which
RIPTA did. Accordingly, at the close of trial, the trial justice gave an instruction on
sudden emergency, explaining to the jury that RIPTA advanced the proposition and
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the “bus operator
was confronted with a sudden emergency.” The trial justice defined a sudden
- 15 -emergency as “a situation or circumstance that calls for immediate action. A sudden
emergency is a situation that could not have been anticipated by an ordinarily careful
person.” Further, she explained:
“When a person is faced with a sudden emergency not
brought about by his or her own conduct, and that the
person is required by that emergency to act without
sufficient time to determine the best course of action, that
person is not held to the same standard or judgment as
would be required if he or she had time to pause and
deliberate about what to do.”
The trial justice then instructed that, “if RIPTA has proven the bus operator was
faced with a sudden emergency, the jury must consider how a reasonably prudent
bus operator would have acted when suddenly confronted with a same or similar
emergency.”
A party may amend their pleadings under Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure. “This Court assumes a liberal position with respect to the
amendment of pleadings under Rule 15, and ‘affords great deference to the trial
justice’s ruling on a motion to amend.’” Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I.
2005) (citation omitted) (quoting Normandin v. Levine, 621 A.2d 713, 715 (R.I.
1993)). “We have long held both that the decision about whether to permit a party
to amend his or her pleading is one that is left exclusively to the sound discretion of
the trial justice and that we shall not disturb that decision unless it constitutes an
abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Normandin, 612 A.2d at 715). “Rule 15(a)
- 16 -liberally permits amendment absent a showing of extreme prejudice.” Harodite
Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corporation, 24 A.3d 514, 531 (R.I. 2011)
(deletion omitted) (quoting Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231,
236 (R.I. 2004)). “[T]o deny a motion to amend because of delay, ‘the trial justice
must find that such delay creates substantial prejudice to the opposing party.’”
Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 56 A.3d 92, 96 (R.I. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 79 (R.I. 1990)).
Galindez can demonstrate no such prejudice. Although RIPTA did not move
to amend until the eve of trial, Galindez had notice at least from 2017 of Luna’s
position that he braked because another vehicle abruptly cut in front of him. The
facts adduced during years-long discovery put Galindez on notice of RIPTA’s theory
of the case, that Luna stopped the bus in response to another driver’s sudden actions.
Considering that Galindez had ample notice of RIPTA’s theory of the case, we fail
to see any prejudice despite the eleventh-hour amendment. See Mikaelian v. Drug
Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 722-23 (R.I. 1985) (affirming grant of motion to amend
“one day prior to the date upon which the case had been noticed or scheduled for
trial” where plaintiff failed to demonstrate “extreme prejudice or abuse of
discretion”). Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion.
- 17 -Dismissal of Juror
Eighth, Galindez argues that the trial justice’s dismissal of a sympathetic juror
without adequate justification violated her right to a fair trial. RIPTA argues that
the trial justice acted within her discretion in excusing the juror based on concerns
that the juror needed to leave deliberations early due to childcare issues. RIPTA
contends that plaintiff’s counsel’s objection to the juror’s dismissal “was based
solely upon pure conjecture that the position of the juror was sympathetic to his
client, and not based upon any legitimate legal argument or authority.”
Toward the end of the trial a juror, Juror 170, requested to speak with the trial
justice. The trial justice then conducted a chambers conference with Juror 170 and
the attorneys. Juror 170 explained that she would have to leave early the following
day to pick up her husband from a medical appointment and retrieve her children
from school. The trial justice explained that there was a chance the trial may resolve
in time for Juror 170 to depart early, but that if it did not, she would excuse her. The
next day, the trial justice summoned Juror 170 to discuss whether she needed to be
excused. Galindez objected to the potential dismissal of Juror 170, explaining that
“I think she’s sympathetic to my case * * *.” Juror 170 affirmed that she had to
leave for the day by “1:30, 2:00 max.” Accordingly, the trial justice dismissed Juror
170 to avoid any undue burden on Juror 170 and to avoid the rest of the jurors rushing
- 18 -their deliberations. Even absent Juror 170, seven jurors remained. We discern no
error.
We agree with RIPTA that Galindez presents no cogent legal basis in support
of her argument that the trial justice erred in excusing Juror 170. Rather, Galindez
relies on her supposition that Juror 170 was sympathetic to her case. Before this
Court, Galindez cites a slew of cases in support of her argument that the trial justice
must have found partiality before excusing Juror 170. We are not persuaded.
“[T]he determination of the disqualification of a juror for cause is left to the
discretion of the trial justice.” State v. Montero, 339 A.3d 1055, 1083 (R.I. 2025)
(quoting State v. Hazard, 785 A.2d 1111, 1122 (R.I. 2001)); see State v. Berberian,
118 R.I. 413, 416-17, 374 A.2d 778, 781 (1977). We deem it axiomatic that “cause”
as it relates to excusing jurors, does not always require a showing of bias. There are
several factors other than prejudice that may necessitate the dismissal of a juror. For
example, the comments to Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
governs the excusal of jurors in the federal context, list sickness or family emergency
as appropriate grounds for excusing a juror. Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(c) advisory
committee’s note to 1991 amendment. Here, the trial justice exercised sound and
appropriate discretion in dismissing Juror 170. See Thornley v. Community College
of Rhode Island, 107 A.3d 296, 303 (R.I. 2014) (“Absent a clear abuse of discretion,
we are reluctant to restrain a trial justice’s authority to excuse a juror in the midst of
- 19 -trial before, so to speak, ‘the hurlyburly’s done, when the battle’s lost and won.’”)
(brackets omitted) (quoting William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 1, scene 1); United
States v. Johnson, 117 F.4th 28, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2024); United States v. Alexander,
48 F.3d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, Galindez fails to articulate any prejudice resulting from Juror 170’s
dismissal, relying on the purely conjectural suggestion that the juror was sympathetic
to her case. See Hazard, 785 A.2d at 1122 (“In any event, defendant has failed to
show how he was prejudiced by the removal of this particular juror.”). Accordingly,
we discern no error.
Prejudicial Answer to Juror Question
Ninth, Galindez contends that the trial justice’s response to a jury question
“mischaracterized critical facts surrounding the incident, skewing the narrative
presented to the jury.” In response, RIPTA argues that the trial justice made no error
of law regarding the jury’s question as to spoliation of evidence. RIPTA contends
that the trial justice merely clarified the instruction but did not change its meaning.
“Our review of jury instructions is de novo.” Armour, 316 A.3d at 1173
(quoting Mangiarelli v. Town of Johnston, 289 A.3d 560, 566 (R.I. 2023)). “This
Court examines jury instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a
jury of ordinarily intelligent lay people would have understood them.” Mangiarelli,
289 A.3d at 566 (quoting Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I. 2006)). “We do
- 20 -not examine single sentences or selective parts of the charge; rather, the challenged
portions must be examined in the context in which they were rendered.” Id. (quoting
Riley, 900 A.2d at 1092-93).
“In a situation in which a jury poses a question to the trial justice after the
commencement of deliberations, due process requires the justice to ‘answer the
jury’s specific questions.’” State v. Martino, 642 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 1994) (quoting
State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006, 1013 (R.I. 1982)). “If an inquiry discloses that the
jury ‘does not understand an element of the offense charged or some other matter of
law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the justice is obligated to clarify
the matter for the jury in a concrete and unambiguous manner.’” Id. (quoting State
v. Gomes, 590 A.2d 391, 394 (R.I. 1991)). “The trial justice may respond by
repeating relevant portions of his original charge or by providing a supplemental
instruction.” Id.
During deliberations, the jurors sent a note to the trial justice which read:
“Your Honor, if we find that the bus driver was not negligent, but find that RIPTA
was deficient in not keeping a copy of the video of this incident, is that evidence of
fault?” The attorneys and the trial justice agreed that they should refer the jury to
the original spoliation instruction but clarify or simplify the instruction for the jurors.
After discussing the matter with counsel and noting Galindez’s objection, the trial
justice recalled the jury and gave the following instruction:
- 21 -“The spoliation of evidence may give rise to an inference
that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the
position of the party who destroyed it. In other words, the
doctrine of spoliation permits the jury to make an
inference that the destroyed video evidence would be
unfavorable to RIPTA. In other words, that the video
would have supported the plaintiff’s version of events.
But this is not conclusive.
“If you decide that RIPTA was deficient in not keeping a
copy of the video, then you may decide to infer, but you
are not required to infer, that the video supports plaintiff’s
testimony. If you make this inference, that is a factor that
you may, but are not required to consider, when deciding
whether or not the bus operator was negligent in this case.
“I know that this can be a little confusing. I urge you to
think about the answer that I have just given you and to go
back and reread carefully the instruction on spoliation in
the jury instructions.”
Our review of the trial justice’s response to the jury question reveals no error.
The trial justice merely restated the law. The trial justice in no way altered the
meaning of the prior instruction and her response to the jurors’ question was
consistent with the law. See Threadgill, 338 A.3d at 320 (“[T]he doctrine of
spoliation merely permits an inference that the destroyed evidence would have been
unfavorable to the despoiler, but does not make that inference conclusive.”) (quoting
State v. Barnes, 777 A.2d 140, 145 (R.I. 2001)).
Moreover, less than an hour after the trial justice’s supplemental response, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of RIPTA, evidencing that the jurors’ confusion had
been dispelled. See Martino, 642 A.2d at 682 (“Indeed, that the jury returned its
- 22 -verdict within an hour of this inquiry indicates that any putative confusion in the
minds of the jurors had been effectively clarified.”). Contrary to Galindez’s
assertion, we perceive no mischaracterization of facts or skewing of the narrative.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Improper Jury Instruction
Tenth, Galindez argues that the trial justice’s jury instruction misstated
RIPTA’s duty of care. Specifically, Galindez argues that as a common carrier
RIPTA has a heightened duty of care, and that the trial justice’s failure to instruct
the jury to that effect necessitates a new trial. RIPTA argues that because Galindez
did not raise this issue in her motion for new trial, the issue is waived.
“Errors of law not first presented to the trial justice in a jury tried case in a
motion for new trial will not be permitted to be later raised in this Court for the first
time on appeal.” Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Tashjian, 703 A.2d 93, 97
(R.I. 1997). “It is not necessary, however, to itemize at the Rule 59 juncture each
and every non-legal error that counsel believes may have been committed during the
trial * * *.” Mead v. Papa Razzi, 899 A.2d 437, 445 (R.I. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
Galindez asserts before us an error of law that she did not raise in her motion for
new trial, and we therefore deem it waived.
Galindez contends that the relevant inquiry for this Court is not whether the
error was raised at the Rule 59 juncture, but rather whether she “protected the record
- 23 -by making a contemporaneous objection during the trial itself.” Even if we agreed
with Galindez on that point, we would still deem the issue unpreserved. During the
discussion of proposed jury instructions, the trial justice inquired into Galindez’s
requested instruction regarding “special relationships,” noting that counsel for
Galindez had not explained what that meant nor provided any law supporting a
“special relationship instruction.” Counsel for Galindez explained that “in my view,
the bus driver has a special relationship to his passengers. * * * So they have a
heightened duty of care to make sure their passengers are transmitted safely.” The
trial justice again inquired whether counsel had any case law to support his proposed
instruction, which he answered in the negative. The trial justice declined to give the
instruction, noting that without any support, she was unwilling to give that
instruction. Ultimately, during her jury instructions, the trial justice explained that
“the bus operator in this case must exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily
prudent bus operator would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”
“[T]he raise-or-waive rule imposes upon litigants a duty to raise all their
claims for relief in the trial court and properly articulate them to a judge for a ruling.”
State v. Mosley, 320 A.3d 942, 976 (R.I. 2024) (quoting State v. Cahill, 196 A.3d
744, 753 (R.I. 2018)). We have noted that the raise-or-waive rule “is not some sort
of artificial or arbitrary Kafkaesque hurdle.” DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance
Company, 26 A.3d 585, 628 n.55 (R.I. 2011). “[T]he requirement that parties may
- 24 -raise on appeal only issues which have been presented to the trial court maintains
the efficiency, fairness, and integrity of the judicial system for all parties.” Id. at 629
n.55 (brackets omitted) (quoting Boyers v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc., 848
F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Although Galindez meaningfully argues this issue before us, she failed to do
so at the trial court level. Despite the trial justice’s multiple requests, Galindez did
not provide the trial justice with any legal support for her argument. We decline to
find that the trial justice erred in her decision not to grant Galindez’s unsupported
request. Therefore, even focusing on her contemporaneous objection rather than her
motion for new trial, Galindez has failed to preserve this issue for our review. See
State v. Wiggins, 919 A.2d 987, 990 (R.I. 2007) (“[A]llegations of error committed
at trial are considered waived if they were not effectively raised at trial, despite their
articulation at the appellate level.”) (quoting State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992,
1018 (R.I. 2005)).
Procedural Error in Motion for New Trial
Finally, Galindez argues that the trial justice overlooked the substantive issues
raised in her motion for new trial, denying the motion based on procedural errors.
RIPTA contends that Galindez’s motion for new trial was denied based on a
substantive analysis, not because of a procedural issue.
- 25 -“On appeal, a trial justice’s decision on a motion for new trial will not be
disturbed, assuming he or she performed the appropriate analysis, unless the party
challenging that decision can show that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived
material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Armour, 316 A.3d at 1172
(quoting Baker v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, 268 A.3d 1165, 1168
(R.I. 2022)).
The trial justice rendered a bench decision on the motion for new trial. At the
outset, she acknowledged that the parties disputed whether the motion had been
timely filed, noting that although plaintiff’s counsel had emailed a copy of the
motion to defense counsel by the filing deadline, plaintiff’s counsel claimed that, as
a result of e-filing issues, the motion had not been formally served until four days
after the deadline. Realizing the motion had not actually been submitted, plaintiff’s
counsel filed a motion to enlarge time. The trial justice determined that, contrary to
Galindez’s assertion, no glitch had caused the delay, but rather human error caused
the motion not to be submitted. Despite the trial justice’s statement that she was
“hard pressed to find that excusable neglect is present here[,]” she exercised her
discretion and granted Galindez’s motion to enlarge time. The trial justice then
moved on, addressing the motion for new trial on the merits, ultimately denying the
motion.
- 26 -Galindez inexplicably overlooks this, arguing that the trial justice denied her
motion based only on procedural errors. Our review of the record reveals that the
trial justice addressed the substantive errors raised in Galindez’s motion for new
trial. Galindez does not challenge the trial justice’s substantive findings on the
motion for new trial, therefore we affirm.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The
record may be remanded thereto.
Justice Long did not participate.
- 27 -STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Yohaira Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit
Title of Case
Authority et al.
No. 2024-219-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 17-1105)
Date Opinion Filed July 30, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Indeglia
Justices
(ret.), JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melissa E. Darigan
For Plaintiff:
Lawrence P. Almagno, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
Kathleen Wyllie, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)