[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2026-Ohio-2957.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250408
TRIAL NO. C/25/TRD/2941
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
DESAREE CRAWFORD, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant is discharged.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/31/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2026-Ohio-2957.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250408
TRIAL NO. C/25/TRD/2941
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
DESAREE CRAWFORD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 31, 2026
Connie M. Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Angela Chang, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant,
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, for Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.
[Cite as State v. Crawford, 2026-Ohio-2957.]
ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Desaree Crawford was charged with standing on a highway for the
purpose of soliciting contributions from a vehicle occupant in violation of R.C.
4511.51(B)(1). Crawford sought to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute violated
her First Amendment rights. When the court overruled her motion Crawford entered
a no-contest plea and was found guilty. In two assignments of error, Crawford
contends that the trial court erred by overruling her motion to dismiss and by finding
her guilty of a fourth-degree misdemeanor where the facts as read by the prosecutor
were insufficient to support a fourth-degree misdemeanor. For the following reasons,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court and discharge Crawford from further
prosecution.
Factual Background
{¶2} Desaree Crawford was charged with violating R.C. 4511.51(B)(1), which
states, “Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, no person shall stand on
a highway for the purpose of soliciting employment, business, or contributions from
the occupant of any vehicle.” Crawford filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of her right to free speech.
The State did not file a response, and the matter proceeded to a hearing.
{¶3} Crawford first argued that under Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155,
163 (2015), the court should apply a strict-scrutiny standard because the law applies
to a particular speech due to the topic and message, and is therefore, content based.
The statute includes the language “for the purpose of” then specifies certain types of
speech, requiring strict scrutiny. Crawford referenced Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867,
870 (6th Cir. 2013), a Sixth Circuit decision which found Michigan’s panhandling law
to be unconstitutional.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} The State argued that the statute had a compelling interest, on its face,
to maintain public safety for both motorists and pedestrians. The statute prohibits
entering a roadway, as opposed to standing on a sidewalk, for purposes of public
safety.
{¶5} A Springdale police officer testified that he observed Crawford speaking
to the driver of a car at the end of the ramp from eastbound 275 and Princeton Pike.
Crawford held a sign that stated, “Struggling. Homeless. Please help,” and referred to
a family. Crawford was standing on the highway at the end of the exit ramp. His first
observation of Crawford was her standing at the roadside speaking with the driver of
a vehicle. Her conduct and sign indicated to the officer that she was soliciting help,
and when he asked her what she was doing, she responded, “Making money.” The
officer testified that the sign verbiage contributed to his conclusion that she was
soliciting contributions.
{¶6} The officer testified that if her sign had stated, “Vote for Donald Trump”
or “Go Reds,” he would not have charged her because it would not appear that she was
asking for anything. The officer further testified that he did not need to read her sign
to determine that she was violating the statute. Crawford attempted to show the officer
various photos of signs and ask if these particular signs would have resulted in
criminal charges. The State objected, and the court sustained the objection because
the focus of the hearing was the charge that Crawford faced. After hearing the officer’s
testimony, the court continued the matter.
{¶7} At the next hearing, Crawford argued that the statute prohibited
standing on the side of a highway for specific purposes, with a sign. The specific
prohibitions are soliciting employment and soliciting contributions. Crawford agreed
that the statute prohibits some conduct but also regulates speech that has been
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
deemed inappropriate. Crawford argued that a strict-scrutiny review was necessary
because the statute required solicitation, content-based speech, for a violation. Under
R.C. 4511.01(B), a highway is the equivalent of a street, so the statute applied to all
roads and streets in Ohio. She further argued that there may be a compelling
governmental interest that could be shown, but the State failed to do so.
{¶8} The State argued that Crawford’s facial challenge failed because the
statute is content neutral and regulates conduct not speech. The statute serves the
public-safety interest in preventing pedestrians from stepping into traffic. The statute
is limited to highways and not broadly applicable to all public places. The statute is a
time, place, and manner restriction that is content neutral and serves significant
governmental interests such as public safety.
{¶9} The court agreed that the State had a compelling interest in the safety
of drivers on the road and the persons engaged in soliciting. Crawford responded that
even assuming a compelling interest, the court must look to the means the statute
employs and argued that the State could maintain safety without impacting the
content of a person’s speech.
{¶10} The State countered that soliciting requires some interaction between a
motorist and the person soliciting. A violation requires entering the roadway to accept
money from a motorist in a lane of traffic. And in this case, the officer testified that
Crawford entered the roadway.
{¶11} The court determined that there is a compelling public interest in the
safety of motorists and pedestrians and found the statute to be constitutional.
{¶12} At the next setting, Crawford waived her right to a jury trial and changed
her not-guilty plea to no contest. The State read the following facts into the record,
On or about January 28, 2025, around 2:50 in the afternoon, the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
defendant was standing on the exit ramp of Interstate 275 eastbound
expressway at the intersection of Princeton Pike for the purpose of
soliciting contributions from occupants of vehicles.
All of this was witnessed by Springdale Police Officer [K.L.], and
he saw the defendant soliciting funds at this location, and this location
is located in Hamilton County.
{¶13} When the court asked Crawford if she had anything on the facts, she
responded, “Yes, Judge. I think the State has accurately stated the elements of a minor
misdemeanor of this, and so I’d ask that you treat this like the minor misdemeanor
that’s been put on the record.” The court asked the prosecutor what aggravating factor
was required for a fourth-degree misdemeanor, and the prosecutor stated that within
the past year, Crawford had been found guilty of a predicate motor-vehicle or traffic
offense on February 6, 2025. The court found Crawford guilty.
{¶14} Crawford now appeals, and in two assignments of error, she argues that
the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss and found R.C. 4511.51(B)
was constitutional and when it found her guilty of a fourth-degree misdemeanor where
the facts as read by the prosecutor established that she did not have a qualifying
conviction at the time she committed the instant offense.
Content-Based Regulation
{¶15} An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.
State v. Campbell, 2013-Ohio-5612, ¶ 3 (1st Dist.). An appellate court also reviews
constitutional challenges de novo. Id.
{¶16} Crawford contends that R.C. 4511.51(B) facially violates the First
Amendment because it is a content-based regulation of protected speech in a public
forum. Specifically, the statute prohibits a person from “stand[ing] on a highway for
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the purpose of soliciting employment, business or contributions from the occupant of
any vehicle.” The State argues that the statute is a content-neutral regulation that
restricts unsafe conduct on highways.
{¶17} Both parties correctly agree that solicitation is protected speech. The
First Amendment protects “charitable appeals for funds,” Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980), including begging or
panhandling. See McCraw v. Oklahoma, 973 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that “begging” is a form of protected speech); Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d
451, 456 (8th Cir. 2019) (asking for charity or gifts is protected speech); Gresham v.
Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Schaumburg suggests little reason to
distinguish between beggars and charities in terms of the First Amendment protection
for their speech”); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015) (“There
is no question that panhandling and solicitation of charitable contributions are
protected speech.”); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.
1999) (“like other charitable solicitation, begging is speech entitled to First
Amendment protection,” citing Schaumburg at 632); Speet, 726 F.3d at 870 (holding
that “begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects”).
{¶18} It is well settled that streets are quintessential public forums. See Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (a public street is a traditional public forum);
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (“quintessential public forums” include
streets); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (public streets are “traditional
public fora”).
{¶19} The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech in a public forum provided the regulation is content
neutral, narrowly tailored, and leaves open ample alternatives for communication.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). However, content-based
regulations “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
{¶20} Therefore, to determine the degree of scrutiny to which the statute will
be subjected, this court must first determine whether the statute is content neutral or
a content-based regulation. See id. at 163-166; Portage Cty. Educators Assn. for Dev.
Disabilities-Unit B v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 2022-Ohio-3167, ¶ 13.
{¶21} The Supreme Court’s decision in Reed delineated that a “crucial first
step” in determining whether a law is content-based or content-neutral is to
“determine[] whether the law is content neutral on its face.” Reed at 165. The law
must be evaluated on whether it expressly draws distinctions based on communicative
content without regard to a government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification,
or lack of “animus towards the ideas contained in the regulated speech.” Id. “Some
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by
particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its
function or purpose.” Id. Both are subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
{¶22} The State refers to numerous cases for the proposition that panhandling
ordinances are content neutral or conduct-based regulations. Unfortunately, the State
provided no citations for those cases. However, all of the cases predate Reed, and
“Reed makes earlier cases, which had split over what forms of regulation of
panhandling were content-based, of limited continuing relevance.” McLaughlin v.
City of Lowell, 140 F.Supp. 3d 177, 185-186 (D.Mass 2015). See, e.g., Norton v. City
of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (initially finding anti-panhandling
ordinance content-neutral, but on rehearing after the Reed decision, finding the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
ordinance content-based); Champion v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 331, 337-338
(Ky. 2017) (explaining that Reed rejected the analysis set forth in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), that “an otherwise content-based regulation of
speech may be content-neutral (and subject to less-exacting scrutiny) simply if the
purpose and justification for the law are neutral.”).
{¶23} The State also argues that the statute restricts conduct, standing on a
highway, and is content-neutral because the speech is incidental to the restricted
conduct. The solicitation itself is merely a “non-exhaustive list” of motivations for the
offensive conduct.
{¶24} However, the statute regulates standing on a highway only when the
purpose is to solicit employment, business, or contributions. On its face, the statute
distinguishes solicitation from all other speech and applies the restriction only to
solicitation of employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of the vehicle.
As Crawford points out, the statute allows a person to approach the occupant of a
vehicle to collect signatures for petitions, collect charitable contributions with a
permit, or distribute information. Even the Attorney General, in its amicus brief,
concedes that the statute would not bar a person from seeking signatures on political
petitions. The statute defines the regulated speech by its purpose, which is a contentbased restriction. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 165; R.C. 4511.51(B)(1) (“no person shall stand
on a highway for the purpose of soliciting employment, business, or compensation”
(Emphasis added.)).
{¶25} Moreover, a regulation is content-based if it requires “enforcement
authorities to examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine
whether a violation has occurred.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 479 (2014)
(quoting F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the officer admitted that the sign Crawford
held indicated she was soliciting, but he testified that the arrest was based on her
statement that she was “[m]aking money.” He further conceded that if Crawford were
holding a sign saying “Vote for Donald Trump” or “Go Reds,” she would not be charged
because it would not “appear that she’s asking for something at that point.” Thus, an
enforcement authority must examine the message conveyed to determine whether a
violation occurred. See id., Portage Cty. 2022-Ohio-3167, at ¶ 18.
{¶26} Because R.C. 4511.51 (B)(1) is a content-based restriction, it is subject to
strict scrutiny. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 165, 171; Portage Cty. at ¶ 23. Strict scrutiny
“requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Reed at 172. When a statute
regulates speech based on its content, “it must be the least restrictive means readily
available to serve that interest.” Portage Cty. at ¶ 24. “To meet the requirement of
narrow tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that
burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests.”
McCullen, 573 U.S. at 495.
{¶27} The State has not demonstrated that its anti-solicitation statute is
narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interest in the least-restrictive way. The State
argues that the law furthers its compelling interest in public and pedestrian safety.
The State has a compelling interest in roadway safety. See State v. Hochhausler, 76
Ohio St.3d 455, 467 (1996).
{¶28} However, the State provided no evidence that the dangers of roadway
solicitation is prevalent on all state roads or that this statute is narrowly tailored to
achieve its stated goal. Although the State argues that roadway solicitation threatens
the safety of pedestrians and vehicles, it provided no evidence to support this
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
contention. See Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 231 (4th Cir. 2014) (the county
provided no evidentiary support of a county-wide problem to support its argument
that the danger caused by roadside solicitation is present on all roads); McCraw v.
City of Oklahoma City, 973 F.3d 1057,1072 (10th Cir. 2020) (City provided no
evidence of accidents involving vehicles and pedestrians to support its panhandling
ordinance); Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657
F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting
solicitation on “all streets and sidewalks in the City” in the absence of evidence
supporting the existence of a threat to public safety and traffic flow posed by
solicitation on all streets and sidewalks in the city). Consequently, the State failed to
meet its burden to establish the harms due to solicitation in the streets or that the
statute alleviates those harms in the least-restrictive way.
{¶29} Accordingly, we sustain the first assignment of error, rendering the
second assignment of error moot.
Conclusion
{¶30} Having sustained Crawford’s first assignment of error, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and discharge Crawford from further prosecution.
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
CROUSE and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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