Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-26-00086-CV
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children
On appeal from the
County Court at Law No. 1 of Johnson County, Texas
Judge David A. Barkley, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. CC-D20240156
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to B.L.H. and
Mother’s parental rights to B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., and D.R.D.S, after a
bench trial.1 Mother appeals from the portion of the trial court’s order
appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services as the children’s
managing conservator, contending that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to overcome the parental presumption in section 153.131 of the
Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131. Father’s attorney has filed
1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the father of M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., and D.R.D.S.,
who signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights to each child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(K). He does not appeal.
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California contending that his appeal is frivolous,
along with a motion to withdraw as counsel. See generally Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Mother’s Appeal
Mother does not challenge the portion of the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights. In her sole issue, she invokes the parental
presumption in section 153.131 of the Family Code in challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s appointment of the
Department as the managing conservator of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.131(a).
Section 153.131(a) of the Family Code provides that a parent must be
appointed as managing conservator of a child unless the court finds that
appointment of the parent would not be in the child’s best interest because it
“would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional
development[.]” Id. The portion of the trial court’s termination order
addressing conservatorship includes this finding.
An order terminating the parent-child relationship divests a parent of
legal rights and duties with respect to the child. In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839,
856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children Page 2 ANN. § 161.206(b)). When an order terminating parental rights is affirmed,
the trial court’s appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator
may be considered a “consequence of the termination.” J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d at
856.
Here, the unchallenged termination order divested Mother of her legal
rights and duties related to all four children. See id. Consequently, Mother
does not have standing to challenge the portion of the order appointing the
Department as the children’s managing conservator. See id. We overrule
Mother’s sole issue on appeal.
Father’s Appeal
Father's court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw and
an Anders brief, stating his professional opinion that the appeal is without
merit and that there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See In re
A.S., 653 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.).
Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a
professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to
advance on appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). Counsel has provided us with the appropriate facts of the case and
its procedural history, and has discussed why, under controlling authority,
there is no reversible error in the trial court's termination order. See In re
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children Page 3 Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Further, counsel
has informed us that he served Father with a copy of his brief, provided a copy
of the appellate record to Father, and notified Father of his right to file a pro
se response to his Anders brief. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly v. State, 436
S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re A.S., 653 S.W.3d at 299-300.
By letter, we informed Father of his right to review the appellate record and to
file a response to the Anders brief filed by his appellate counsel. Father did
not file a pro se response.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of
the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Arguments are frivolous when they “cannot
conceivably persuade the court.” McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436
(1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief and agree that
the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). We affirm the order of the trial court terminating Father’s
parental rights to B.L.H.
Counsel's motion to withdraw as Father's counsel is premature and is
denied. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Accordingly, if Father
desires to file a petition for review, his appellate counsel remains appointed in
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children Page 4 this case through any proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless
otherwise relieved of his duties. See id.
Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s sole issue, and having found that Father’s
appeal is frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s termination order. We deny
Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.
STEVE SMITH
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: July 30, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed; Motion denied
Do not publish
CV06
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children Page 5