[Cite as State v. Stith, 2026-Ohio-2988.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 9-25-41
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MICHAEL RAY STITH, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 23-CR-093
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 3, 2026
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Allison M. Kesler for Appellee
Case No. 9-25-41
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Ray Stith (“Stith”), appeals the
December 1, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Marion County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On March 15, 2023, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Stith on
seven counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), first-degree felonies.
This case stems from allegations that Stith engaged in sexual conduct with multiple
victims between 1997 and 2022. Specifically, the indictment set out the following
timeframes: Counts One through Three alleged conduct from 1997 and 1998 against
victim B.D.; Counts Four and Five alleged conduct from June 2011 through June
2013 against victim B.M.; and Counts Six and Seven alleged conduct from July
2022 through September 2022 against victim J.H. On March 20, 2023, Stith
appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the indictment.
{¶3} On April 26, 2023, under a supplemental indictment, the Marion
County Grand Jury indicted Stith on three additional counts of rape in violation of
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), first-degree felonies.1 Counts Eight through Ten alleged
conduct from December 1997 through December 1999 against victim D.B. Stith
1
The State filed a motion to amend the indictments on September 30, 2025 to correct a clerical error regarding one of the victims’ dates of birth, which the trial court granted.
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appeared for arraignment on May 1, 2023 and pleaded not guilty to the supplemental
indictment.
{¶4} On September 13, 2023, Stith filed a motion contesting both his
competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offenses. On October 3,
2023, the trial court accepted the motion as a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
and granted the accompanying request for a competency evaluation. On February
8, 2024, Stith filed a motion requesting a second competency evaluation, as well as
an evaluation of his mental state at the time of the offenses, which the trial court
granted. Following a hearing on November 1, 2024, Stith withdrew his not guilty
by reason of insanity plea, and the trial court determined that he was competent to
stand trial.
{¶5} On December 2, 2024, Stith filed a motion to sever the counts relating
to the different victims for purposes of trial, which the State opposed. On December
10, 2024, Stith filed two motions to dismiss. First, he moved to dismiss Counts Six
and Seven—pertaining to victim J.H.—arguing that the appropriate venue was in
Crawford County, Ohio. Second, he moved to dismiss Counts One through Three
(pertaining to victim B.D.) and Counts Eight through Ten (pertaining to victim
D.B.), arguing that the charges were barred by the statute of limitations. The State
filed memoranda in opposition to the motions to dismiss on December 30, 2024.
On January 22, 2025, the trial court denied all three motions.
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{¶6} On September 29, 2025, Stith filed a motion to dismiss Counts One
through Five, alleging preindictment delay, which the State opposed. Prior to the
commencement of the change of plea hearing, the trial court denied Stith’s motion
to dismiss. That same day, Stith withdrew his pleas of not guilty and pleaded no
contest to Counts One through Five. In exchange for his change of plea, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The trial court accepted Stith’s no contest
pleas, found him guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶7} On November 24, 2025, prior to being sentenced, Stith orally moved
pro se to withdraw his no contest pleas. After allowing the parties to present their
arguments, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court then sentenced Stith to
ten years in prison on each of Counts One, Two, and Three, and to life in prison
with the possibility of parole after ten years on each of Counts Four and Five. The
trial court ordered Stith to serve the prison terms consecutively, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of 50 years to life in prison. Additionally, the trial court
classified Stith as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶8} Stith filed his notice of appeal on December 29, 2025. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s Due Process rights under the state and federal
constitutions were violated by lengthy, prejudicial preindictment
delay.
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{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Stith argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss based on preindictment delay. Specifically, he
contends that the delay in bringing the indictment—over 25 years for the offenses
alleged in Counts One through Three, and over 12 years for the offenses alleged in
Counts Four and Five—made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial.
Furthermore, he emphasizes that all evidence relating to these counts was gathered
and available to prosecutors in 2013, yet charges were not filed until 2023.
Consequently, he asserts that this unjustifiable ten-year delay violated his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
Standard of Review
{¶10} When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an
indictment for preindictment delay, an appellate court applies a mixed standard of
review. The reviewing court affords great deference to the trial court’s factual
findings, accepting them if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but
examines the legal issues and the application of the law to those facts de novo. State
v. Porter, 2021-Ohio-2539, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). See also State v. Hahaj, 2025-Ohio-52,
¶ 12-17 (1st Dist.) (clarifying that preindictment delay claims are reviewed under a
mixed standard, rather than for an abuse of discretion, due to the constitutional rights
at stake).
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Analysis
{¶11} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
every person charged with a crime the right to a speedy trial. Porter at ¶ 8.
Likewise, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n any
trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed . . . to have . . . a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury.” The Sixth Amendment, however, relates only to the time
between a person being charged with an offense and the time the individual is
brought to trial. Porter at ¶ 8. That is, “the Sixth Amendment provides no
protection to those who have not yet been accused; it does not ‘require the
Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular
period of time.’” State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 11, quoting United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). Instead, “[s]tatutes of limitations provide the
ultimate time limit within which the government must prosecute a defendant—a
definite point ‘beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s
right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.’” Id., quoting Marion at 322.
{¶12} “However, ‘when unjustifiable preindictment delay causes actual
prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial despite the state’s initiation of
prosecution within the statutorily defined limitations period,” both the Federal
Constitution’s Due Process Clause and the Ohio Constitution’s Due Course of Law
Clause provide a backstop.” Hahaj at ¶ 19, quoting Jones at ¶ 11. A preindictment
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delay violates a defendant’s rights under these provisions only when the delay is
unjustifiable and causes actual prejudice. Jones at ¶ 12.
{¶13} “To adjudicate such preindictment-delay claims, Ohio courts have
‘firmly established a burden-shifting framework.’” Hahaj at ¶ 20, quoting Jones at
¶ 13. “First, the defendant must present evidence that the State’s delay has caused
‘actual prejudice’ to the defense, as even ‘unjustifiable delay does not violate due
process unless it results in actual prejudice.’” Id., quoting Jones at ¶ 13, 16. “[O]nce
the defendant has shown prejudice, ‘the burden shifts to the state to produce
evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay.’” Id., quoting Jones at ¶ 13.
{¶14} “‘Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or unavailable
testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize
or eliminate the impact of the state’s evidence and bolster the defense.’” Porter,
2021-Ohio-2539, at ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), quoting Jones at ¶ 28. “‘“Proof of actual
prejudice to the defendant must be specific and non-speculative; the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating the exculpatory value of the evidence of which he was
deprived due to the delay.”’” Id., quoting State v. Mapp, 2011-Ohio-4468, ¶ 42 (3d
Dist.), quoting State v. Tullis, 2005-Ohio-2205, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
{¶15} “Determining whether a defendant has experienced ‘actual prejudice’
from a delay ‘involves a delicate judgment and a case-by-case consideration of the
particular circumstances.’” Hahaj at ¶ 21, quoting Jones at ¶ 20. “‘A court must
“consider the evidence as it exists when the indictment is filed and the prejudice the
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defendant will suffer at trial due to the delay.”’” Porter at ¶ 12, quoting Jones at ¶
20, quoting State v. Walls, 2002-Ohio-5059, ¶ 52. However, “the Ohio Supreme
Court has cautioned that the ‘burden upon a defendant seeking to prove
preindictment delay violated due process is nearly insurmountable, especially
because proof of prejudice is always speculative.’” Hahaj at ¶ 21, quoting State v.
Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 100.
{¶16} In this case, Stith contends that the State’s preindictment delay caused
him actual prejudice because the allegations are over twenty years old and the
alleged victims are now adults. He argues that this “passage of time was bound to
result in memory loss, and there was no telling what helpful testimony or evidence
may have been lost over the years,” ultimately preventing his counsel from
providing a proper defense. (Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).
{¶17} “Ordinarily, the mere ‘possibility that memories will fade, witnesses
will become inaccessible, or evidence will be lost is not sufficient to establish actual
prejudice.’” Hahaj at ¶ 22, quoting Adams at ¶ 105. “But that ‘does not mean . . .
that demonstrably faded memories and actually unavailable witnesses or lost
evidence cannot satisfy the actual-prejudice requirement.’” Id., quoting Jones at ¶
21. “Such losses become prejudicial where particular lost evidence ‘would
minimize or eliminate the impact of the state’s evidence and bolster the defense.’”
Id., quoting Jones at ¶ 28.
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{¶18} While Stith argues that the sheer passage of time inevitably resulted in
faded memories and the loss of helpful evidence, his demonstration of actual
prejudice is insufficient. To show that evidentiary loss or degradation prejudiced
his defense, a defendant must identify with specificity both what missing evidence
or unavailable testimony the State’s delay deprived him of, and how that missing
evidence would minimize or eliminate the impact of the State’s evidence and bolster
the defense. Id. at ¶ 23. Although a defendant need not prove exactly what the lost
evidence or testimony would have disclosed, he must do more than simply point to
the passage of time. Id.
{¶19} Here, Stith’s argument relies entirely on speculation. He generally
asserts on appeal that memories were “bound” to have faded and there was “no
telling” what evidence might have been lost over the past twenty years. Indeed, in
his motion and at the motion hearing, Stith did not present any evidence
demonstrating what specific evidence he claimed was degraded or lost, nor did he
provide any synopsis of what exculpatory value that suspected evidence might have
held. See State v. Porter, 2021-Ohio-2539, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.) (rejecting an actual
prejudice claim where the defendant presented no evidence demonstrating an
inability to locate witnesses and provided no synopsis of expected exculpatory
testimony); see also Hahaj at ¶ 28 (finding no actual prejudice where the defendant
proved records were lost but failed to explain what those records would have
disclosed or how they would have aided her case).
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{¶20} The mere possibility that memories will fade or witnesses will become
inaccessible due to a lengthy preindictment period does not establish actual
prejudice unless the defendant can identify the exculpatory evidence that was lost
and show it could not be obtained by other means. Porter at ¶ 16. Therefore,
because Stith failed to identify specific missing evidence or explain how it would
have bolstered his defense, his arguments are merely speculative. Accord id.
(emphasizing that “speculation does not satisfy the defendant’s burden”).
{¶21} Ultimately, since Stith has failed to demonstrate an inability to identify
potential witnesses or explain what exculpatory evidence they might have offered,
he has not established actual prejudice. Accord id. at ¶ 17. Consequently, the
burden never shifted to the State to demonstrate the delay was justifiable. Id.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Stith’s motion to dismiss based on
preindictment delay.
{¶22} Stith’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶23} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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