UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ASHLEY EARLY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 26 - 6 (SLS)
v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
ACE CASH CHECKING, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ashley Early worked at ACE Cash Express (ACE) for roughly two months before
resigning. 1 She brought this lawsuit against her former employer to challenge certain events related
to her employment. During her onboarding at ACE, however, Ms. Early electronically signed an
arbitration agreement, agreeing to resolve any claims arising from her employment through
binding arbitration. Ms. Early now contends that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and
unconscionable. But that agreement contains a clause delegating disputes concerning its formation,
validity, or enforceability to arbitration. Thus, the Court must send this dispute to an arbitrator.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws all justifiable inferences in Ms. Early’s favor, as the nonmoving party,
and accepts her evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); United
States ex rel. Milestone Tarant, LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2009).
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In her filings, Ms. Early identifies the Defendant as ACE Cash Checking. But the correct name of her former employer is Populus Financial Group, Inc., d/b/a ACE Cash Express. The Court deems all references to ACE Cash Checking in Ms. Early’s filings to refer to ACE Cash Express.
ACE is a financial services company incorporated in Texas with its principal place of
business in Irving, Texas. Notice of Removal ¶ 9, ECF No. 1; Notice of Removal Ex. C, ECF
No. 1-4. ACE hired Ms. Early, a Washington, D.C., resident, in October 2025 as a part-time Sales
Associate. McWilliams Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 6-2. During her onboarding process, ACE presented
Ms. Early with a mandatory, electronic arbitration agreement. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9; see McWilliams Decl.
Ex. (Arb. Agreement), ECF No. 6-2.
The agreement directs “any and all claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of or
relating in any way to [an] application for employment, [an employee’s] employment with ACE,
and/or the termination of [an employee’s] employment” to mandatory arbitration and selects the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) as a default arbitral forum. Arb. Agreement 1. The
agreement also delegates to the arbitrator the “authority to resolve any disputes concerning the
formation, validity or enforceability of [the] Arbitration Agreement.” Arb. Agreement 2. Towards
the end of the agreement, there is a “Special Note” emphasizing that the agreement and AAA Rules
“are important documents that affect [the signatory’s] legal rights.” Arb. Agreement 3. The
agreement says that signatories “should familiarize [themselves] with and understand [the
agreement and rules]” and “may wish to seek legal advice before signing[.]” Id. Below the
signature lines, there is an opt-out procedure for signatories with a 30-day deadline to deliver
written notification of their decision to opt-out of the agreement. Id. Ms. Early signed the
agreement on October 22, 2025, and there is no evidence in the record of her exercising her right
to opt-out within the 30-day window. Id.
Ms. Early alleges that during her training, she was “repeated[ly] mistreat[ed] [by] her
trainer” who “humiliated [her] in front of customers, spoke to her in a belittling manner, and failed
to provide proper guidance.” Pl.’s Opp’n 3, ECF No. 11. She also alleges that her manager, Omar
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Sneed, failed to sufficiently communicate with her concerning her training schedule and
assignments. Id. In November 2025, Ms. Early reported her trainer’s alleged behavior to ACE’s
Human Resources Department. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1-2. After making the report, she was removed
from ACE’s work schedule and Mr. Sneed stopped responding to her messages. Pl.’s Opp’n 3–4.
When Ms. Early followed up with Human Resources, she was “told she needed to ‘accept
feedback.’” Pl.’s Opp’n 4. She was later placed on a new work schedule, Compl. 15, and attended
a training completion meeting on December 9, 2025. Not. of Evid. 24, ECF No. 10. Ms. Early
claims that at that meeting, ACE Regional Vice President Bee Rowles told her that she overreacted
to the situation with Mr. Sneed and needed to learn how to accept feedback. Compl. 15–16. Feeling
“targeted, isolated, and retaliated against,” Ms. Early submitted her two-week resignation notice
that same day. Pl.’s Opp’n 4; McWilliams Decl. ¶ 8.
B. Procedural Background
In December 2025, Ms. Early sued ACE and Mr. Sneed in the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia alleging claims of constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and retaliation. Compl. 9, 15–16; see also Pl.’s Opp’n 5–7. She seeks at least $250,000 in damages.
Compl. 9. In January 2026, the Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. Notice of Removal. Ms. Early has since opposed the Defendants’ removal. See Notice
of Removal Opp’n, ECF No. 9; Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 13. And the Defendants have filed a
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative to Compel Arbitration. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 6-1. Both
motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision. Pl.’s Opp’n; Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 14. 2
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Ms. Early filed a Sur-Reply opposing dismissal, ECF No. 15, which the Defendants moved to strike over Ms. Early’s opposition. See ECF Nos. 16, 18. Because Ms. Early’s Sur-Reply does not change the Court’s conclusions, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to strike it as moot.
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DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Starting with jurisdiction, Ms. Early opposes removal to this Court. See Notice of Removal
Opp’n. She argues that the Defendants’ removal was procedurally defective under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a), and that her claims, which arise under District of Columbia law, belong in D.C. Superior
Court. Id. at 2–4. The Court construes Ms. Early’s filing as a motion to remand, see Leitner v.
United States, 679 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2010) (taking the same approach), and denies it.
There is no procedural defect in the Defendants’ removal. The Defendants timely filed their
Notice of Removal, which complied with Section 1446 in all respects. See Notice of Removal;
Notice of Removal Exs. A–C, ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4. And Ms. Early identifies no specific defects
in the Notice of Removal.
Removal was also proper. Defendants “in a civil action brought in state court may remove
the action to a federal district court if the action is one over which the federal district courts have
original jurisdiction—including diversity jurisdiction.” Walker v. 2100 2nd St SW, LLC,
No. 24-cv-677, 2024 WL 3887395, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2024) (cleaned up). Diversity
jurisdiction arises (1) when the two parties are “citizens of different states,” and (2) the “matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The removing defendant
“bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Downey v. Ambassador Dev.,
LLC, 568 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2008) (cleaned up). Here, the Defendants have met their
burden.
As for the first prong, courts use the “domiciles of the parties” to determine citizenship for
purposes of diversity. Prakash v. Am. Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Domicile
depends on “physical presence in a state” and “intent to remain there for an unspecified or
indefinite period of time.” Id. Ms. Early is domiciled in Washington, D.C., where she resides.
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Compl. 9. ACE is a citizen of Texas, where it has its principal place of business and was
incorporated. Notice of Removal ¶ 9; Notice of Removal Ex. C; see also Farar v. Coffield,
No. 17-cv-2072, 2019 WL 329597, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2019) (“To determine the citizenship of
a corporate entity, courts look to the corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of
business.” (citing Novak v. Cap. Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906–07 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
And Mr. Sneed is domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Notice of Removal ¶ 10. Thus,
there is complete diversity among the parties in the case.
The second prong is met when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “[W]hen assessing whether the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, ‘the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is
apparently made in good faith.’” Goldman v. Fiat Chrysler Autos. US, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 322,
325 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288
(1938)). Ms. Early seeks $250,000 in monetary relief for her claims. Compl. 9. Nothing suggests
that she pled that amount in bad faith, so the amount-in-controversy requirement is also satisfied.
Accordingly, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over Ms. Early’s claims and must deny
her motion to remand the case to D.C. Superior Court.
B. Motion to Compel Arbitration
Turning to the Defendants’ request to compel arbitration, they argue that Ms. Early agreed
to resolve all her claims exclusively before an arbitrator. Defs.’ Mot. 5. The Court agrees. 3
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Recall that the Defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Early’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. It is unclear whether this Court could dismiss Ms. Early’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) given the Defendants’ alternative request to compel arbitration of those same claims. See Jin v. Parsons Corp., 966 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“The arbitrability of a dispute is a ‘gateway’ issue, meaning that ‘a court should address the arbitrability of the plaintiff’s claim at the outset of the litigation.” (quoting Reyna v. Int’l Bank of Com., 839 F.3d 373, 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2016))); Kindig v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 (D.D.C. 2011)
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A motion to compel arbitration is evaluated under the summary-judgment standard
prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Aliron Int’l, Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., 531
F.3d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (characterizing a motion to compel arbitration as effectively “a
request for summary disposition of the issue of whether or not there ha[s] been a meeting of the
minds on the agreement to arbitrate” (cleaned up)). “Under this standard, the party seeking to
compel arbitration must first present ‘evidence sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable agreement
to arbitrate.’” Fox v. Comput. World Servs. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Hill v. Wackenhut Servs. Int’l., 865 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. 2012)). The burden then moves to
the opposing party “to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the making of the
agreement[]” that would prevent the court from deciding the motion as a matter of law. Haire v.
Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2013). To sustain its burden, the
nonmoving party must do more than rely on “mere unsupported allegations or denials”; it must
support its position with “affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” McMullen v. Synchrony Bank, 164
F. Supp. 3d 77, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2016) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); and then citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
Here, the Defendants contend that Ms. Early agreed to resolve her current claims before an
arbitrator when she signed the arbitration agreement. Defs.’ Mot. 5. They are correct. The
(refusing to “override” an arbitration agreement by deciding a motion to dismiss and instead construing and granting the motion as a motion to compel arbitration (cleaned up)); Skrynnikov v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 943 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179–80 (D.D.C. 2013) (declining to “override” an arbitration agreement by resolving under Rule 12(b)(6) a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and/or compel arbitration (cleaned up)); see also Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford, Inc., 593 F. App’x 108, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a district court erred in dismissing a motion to compel arbitration without prejudice to first resolve a pending motion to dismiss). Because the Court grants the Defendants’ request to compel arbitration without reaching the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it need not weigh in on that question.
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agreement includes an “agree[ment] to resolve any and all claims, disputes, or controversies arising
out of or relating in any way to [Ms. Early’s] application for employment, [her] employment with
ACE, and/or the termination of [her] employment, exclusively by arbitration.” Arb. Agreement 1.
That seems to resolve the matter.
In urging otherwise, Ms. Early claims that the arbitration agreement is invalid, because the
Defendants “buried [it] in a fast onboarding portal” and she did not knowingly sign it. Pl.’s
Opp’n 7. And she argues that the agreement is unconscionable because it was presented to her on
a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” and it “limits discovery, restricts rights, and favors [ACE].” Id. The
Court understands Ms. Early’s frustrations regarding the circumstances under which she signed
the arbitration agreement. But the agreement prevents the Court from deciding even those disputes.
The agreement contains a “delegation provision,” which states that “[t]he Arbitrator shall have
authority to resolve any disputes concerning the formation, validity or enforceability of [the]
Arbitration Agreement.” Arb. Agreement 2; see also Andresen v. IntePros Fed., Inc., 240
F. Supp. 3d 143, 149 (D.D.C. 2017) (“A written agreement memorializing the parties’ agreement
to arbitrate the threshold question of arbitrability has come to be known as a ‘delegation
provision.’”). When a valid and enforceable delegation provision exists, “a court is prohibited from
reaching the gateway question of arbitrability and must reserve that question for” the arbitrator.
Andresen, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 149. In general, before sending a dispute to arbitration, the court
must “consider any challenges to the validity of the delegation provision.” Mercadante v. XE
Servs., LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2015). But the Supreme Court has held that unless
a party seeking to avoid an arbitration agreement “challenge[s] the delegation provision
specifically,” a court “must treat it as valid . . . and must enforce it . . . , leaving any challenge to
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the validity of the [arbitration] [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.” Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010).
Ms. Early does not dispute the validity of the delegation provision. She makes only the
challenges to the agreement discussed above. Because she does not “challenge[] the delegation
provision specifically,” the Court “must treat it as valid . . . and must enforce it . . . , leaving” her
“challenge[s] to the validity of the [arbitration] [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.” Id.; see
N-Bar Trade, Inc. v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 807 F. Supp. 3d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2025) (applying
Rent-A-Center to channel unconscionability arguments to arbitration); Cureton v. Duke, 272
F. Supp. 3d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2017) (“If the nonmoving party fails to proffer relevant evidence, the
moving party may succeed on summary judgment.”). Again, the Court recognizes that this may
seem unfair to Ms. Early. But this Court’s hands are tied. It must send her claims, including her
challenges to the arbitration agreement, to an arbitrator.
Because the Court must submit the Parties’ dispute to arbitration and the Defendants have
requested a stay pending arbitration, see Defs.’ Mot. 7, Section 3 of the FAA compels this Court
to stay these proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601
U.S. 472, 478 (2024).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Notice of Removal, ECF No. 9, which the Court construes as a motion to remand; grants in part
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Compel Arbitration,
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ECF No. 6; denies the Defendants’ Motion to Strike, ECF No. 16; and stays this case pending the
outcome of arbitration.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: August 3, 2026
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