[Cite as State v. Bilal, 2026-Ohio-2974.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
CASE NO. CA2025-10-120
Appellee, :
OPINION AND
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
8/3/2026
LEVONTE JAMAAL BILAL, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2024-10-1502
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michele Temmel, for appellant.
OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Levonte Jamaal Bilal appeals his sentence for rape. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Butler CA2025-10-120
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Bilal worked as a door-to-door salesman for CleanSky Energy. On July 1,
2024, around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m., he knocked on the door of an apartment in Fairfield where
the victim lived. She had worked an overnight shift until noon that day and was asleep.
She answered in a robe, believing that her apartment complex had sent him, and let him
in. After he described the company's services, she signed an energy contract. The
agreement required a recorded confirmation call, and as that call neared its end Bilal
lowered his pants. When it concluded, the victim stood, backed away, and told him she
was not interested. Bilal exposed himself and followed her into the kitchen, where he
turned her to face away from him, placed her on her hands and knees on the floor, pulled
down her underwear, and penetrated her vaginally. He ejaculated, pulled up his pants,
and left.
{¶ 3} The victim wiped up the ejaculate with a napkin and, after calling her
boyfriend, went to the hospital, bringing the napkin, the robe she had worn, and a bottle
Bilal had left behind. There she underwent a sexual assault examination. Testing of the
swabs taken during that examination identified Bilal as a contributor to the recovered
DNA, such that the estimated probability of a match with a random unrelated individual
was rarer than one in a trillion.
{¶ 4} Bilal was indicted in November 2024 on a single count of rape in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony. Before trial, defense counsel obtained two
forensic evaluations directed at a possible defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Both examiners concluded that Bilal suffered from mental illness, with diagnoses that
included attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and schizoaffective disorder,
but that his conditions had not prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his
conduct. He did not qualify for the defense.
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{¶ 5} The case was tried to the court over two days in August 2025. Bilal testified.
He described his diagnoses and his history of residential mental-health treatment, and he
stated that he heard voices, that a voice had commanded him to assault the victim, and
that he had stopped taking his medication. The trial court found him guilty of rape.
{¶ 6} At the sentencing hearing on September 23, 2025, Bilal apologized and
attributed the offense to having gone too long without his medication. The trial court stated
that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11
and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, together with Bilal's record,
the trial testimony, the psychological reports, and a presentence investigation. It noted
his criminal history, which included attempted assault on a police officer, burglary, and
attempted robbery, as well as the emotional and psychological harm the offense inflicted
on the victim, and it found the protection of the public paramount. Acknowledging that
Bilal had "some mental health issues" but also a serious criminal history, the court
imposed a mandatory indefinite prison term with a minimum of 11 years and a maximum
of 16.5 years, advised him of postrelease control, and notified him of his lifetime duty to
register as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶ 7} Bilal appealed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Bilal raises a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
DEFENDANT WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
OVERRIDING PRINCIPLES OF FELONY SENTENCING
UNDER R.C. 2929.11 AND FACTORS UNDER R.C. 2929.12
WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR A
FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE.
{¶ 9} Bilal argues that the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court "was not
reasonably calculated to achieve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing under R.C.
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§2929.11 and failed to adequately take into account the seriousness and recidivism
factors under R.C. §2929.12." He contends that the trial court gave too little weight to his
mental illness and his remorse, and that the purposes of felony sentencing could have
been achieved with something less than the maximum.
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 10} We do not review felony sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10. Rather, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) "specifically and
comprehensively defines the parameters and standards" governing felony-sentencing
appeals. Marcum at ¶ 21. And it supplies the standard we apply here. State v. Napier,
2022-Ohio-1439, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). Under that statute, we may modify a sentence, or
vacate it and remand for resentencing, only if we clearly and convincingly find that the
record does not support the sentencing court's findings under certain enumerated
statutes, none of which is at issue in this appeal, or that the sentence is "otherwise
contrary to law." R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) and (b). Clear and convincing evidence is that
measure of proof that "will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction
as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
B. The Scope of Review Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
{¶ 11} Before applying the standard, we must resolve a threshold dispute about
what that standard permits, because the parties proceed from different premises. Bilal's
argument rests on Marcum, which stated that "an appellate court may vacate or modify
any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence,"
Marcum at ¶ 23. On that reading, we would examine the record ourselves and decide
whether the an 11-year minimum term is supported by it. The State counters that our
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review is far narrower, asking only whether the trial court considered the relevant statutes
and sentenced within the lawful range.
{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court settled this question in State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio6729. There, the Court held that the statements in paragraph 23 of Marcum "were made
only in passing and were not essential to this court's legal holding. The statements are
therefore dicta." Jones at ¶ 27. Jones then examined the text of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) and
found no room in it for the review Bilal requests. Division (G)(2)(a) permits review of the
record only for findings made under R.C. 2929.13(B) and (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) and
(C)(4), and 2929.20(I). "R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions
listed." Id. at ¶ 28. Nor does division (G)(2)(b) work, because "an appellate court's
determination that the record does not support a sentence does not equate to a
determination that the sentence is 'otherwise contrary to law.'" Id. at ¶ 32. The Court
observed that the General Assembly amended R.C. 2953.08(G) in 2000 to eliminate the
broad provision that once permitted review of whether "the record does not support the
sentence." Id. at ¶ 38-39.
{¶ 13} As we have said, "'[n]othing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate
court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12.'" Napier, 2022-Ohio-1439, at ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), quoting Jones at ¶
42. "The record must merely reflect that the trial court considered the relevant statutory
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 prior to issuing its decision." State v.
Murphy, 2021-Ohio-4541, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). Accordingly, a sentence is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the principles and purposes
of R.C. 2929.11 and the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease
control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible statutory range. Napier at ¶
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15; State v. Tillett, 2020-Ohio-3836, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 14} Bilal's reliance on State v. Foster, 2006-Ohio-856, and State v. Mathis,
2006-Ohio-855, does not alter this framework. Those decisions confirm that trial courts
must still consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, but they also make plain that trial courts
"have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range" and need not
make findings or give reasons for imposing a maximum sentence. Mathis at paragraph
three of the syllabus.
C. Application
{¶ 15} With the governing standard fixed, the application is straightforward. Bilal
was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony carrying a
mandatory prison term. The court was required to impose an indefinite term with a stated
minimum of 3 to 11 years, R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), and a maximum equal to the minimum
plus fifty percent of that term, R.C. 2929.144(B)(1). The trial court selected the 11-year
minimum, yielding a maximum of 16.5 years. The sentence therefore falls squarely within,
and at the upper limit of, the statutory range.
{¶ 16} The record likewise reflects the required statutory consideration. At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors
under R.C. 2929.12. It also considered the record, the charge, the statements made at
the hearing, the trial testimony, the psychological reports, and the presentenceinvestigative report. The court noted the emotional and psychological harm the offense
inflicted on the victim, a factor the statute directs courts to weigh as indicating more
serious conduct. R.C. 2929.12(B)(2). It recounted Bilal's criminal history, which included
attempted assault on a police officer, burglary, and attempted robbery, a factor bearing
on the likelihood of recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(D)(2). And it concluded that protecting the
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public was paramount in this case, echoing the first overriding purpose of felony
sentencing. R.C. 2929.11(A). Neither statute required the court to say more. There is "'no
language contained in R.C. 2929.11 which require[s] the trial court to make any specific
findings,'" and R.C. 2929.12 likewise demands no particular incantation. Napier, 2022-Ohio-1439, at ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Kane, 2020-Ohio-5152, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.).
The court here did considerably more than recite the statutes.
{¶ 17} Bilal's contrary arguments are, at bottom, requests that we reweigh the
evidence. He emphasizes his schizoaffective disorder, his history of hospitalization, his
testimony that he acted at the command of a voice, and his expressions of remorse, and
he argues that lifetime Tier III registration already protects the public without a maximum
term. These are legitimate mitigation arguments, and the place to make them was the
sentencing hearing, where they were in fact made. The record shows the trial court heard
them and weighed them. The court had before it two forensic evaluations, both of which
recognized Bilal's mental illness while concluding that it did not meet the criteria for a
defense, and the court expressly acknowledged at sentencing that Bilal has mental health
issues. That the court balanced this mitigation against the seriousness of the offense and
Bilal's criminal history, and found the latter weightier, is precisely the discretionary
judgment that R.C. 2929.12(A) commits to the sentencing court. Our disagreement, if we
had any, would supply no ground for relief, because we may not "independently weigh
the evidence in the record and substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court." Jones,
2020-Ohio-6729, at ¶ 42. The dispute in this case is not over whether the trial court
considered mental illness. It is over how much that consideration should have counted,
and that question is left in the sentencing court's discretion.
{¶ 18} Nor does Bilal identify any aspect of his sentence that is "otherwise contrary
to law" within the meaning of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). He does not contend that the
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sentence rests on an impermissible consideration such as race, ethnicity, gender, or
religion, see R.C. 2929.11(C), or that the court failed to impose postrelease control
properly, or that the term exceeds the statutory range. Because the trial court considered
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, properly advised Bilal regarding postrelease control, and
imposed a sentence within the permissible statutory range, the sentence is not clearly
and convincingly contrary to law. Napier at ¶ 15-16.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 19} The sole assignment of error is overruled. The trial court's judgment is
affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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