[Cite as State v. Wilkins, 2026-Ohio-2971.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 25CA4126
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RAYMOND H. WILKINS, : ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
: RELEASED: 07/21/2026
APPEARANCES:
George L. Davis, IV, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay S. Willis, Assistant Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal of a Scioto County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry
in which Raymond H. Wilkins (“Wilkins”) was convicted of trafficking in a fentanyl-related
compound, trafficking in cocaine, and having weapons while under disability. On
appeal, Wilkins submits that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we find
Wilkins’s sole assignment of error lacks merit and therefore affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} On November 7, 2023, U.S. Marshals and the Southern Ohio Organized and
Major Crimes Task Force attempted to serve an indictment on Michael Spradlin at 1603
7th Street, Portsmouth. Also with the task force was Scioto County Probation Officer
Gearhart. The task force surrounded the home and then approached the front door. Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 2
Task force member Craig Martin, the team leader, knocked on the door. Sergeant
Randy Walters of the task force was right behind Martin. Mitchell Waring—described as
a “very nervous white male,”—opened the door, and Gearhart recognized him as a
felony probationer. Waring opened the door in such a way that he was partially in the
door, partially out of the door, with his hand behind his back, which raised officer-safety
concerns that he might have a firearm. Gearheart told the task force members that
Waring needed to be detained because Waring was not compliant with probation.
{¶3} Once task force members detained Waring, Martin began talking to Wilkins.
Wilkins, an African American male, identified himself as somebody who had lawful
permission to be at the residence. Wilkins gave Martin consent for task force members
to enter the residence to look for Spradlin. Based upon Wilkins’s consent to search for
Spradlin, task force members entered the residence and did a limited search, searching
for the person of Spradlin.
{¶4} Walters, who has extensive experience in investigating drug possession and
drug trafficking, immediately noticed a trash can with a “decent amount” of currency on
top of the trash. In addition, the marshals and task force noticed in plain view, digital
scales containing residue on a table, multiple clear plastic baggies, a small spoon with
residue, and other drug paraphernalia. As a result, task force members secured an
affidavit for a search warrant, which was signed by a judge. Subsequently, the search
warrant was executed, which led to the seizure of a significant amount of contraband,
including narcotics, criminal tools, a firearm, and U.S. currency.
{¶5} On October 1, 2024, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an indictment
alleging Wilkins committed the following offenses:
Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 3
Count 1: trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, F1, with forfeiture and
firearm specifications
Count 2: possession of a fentanyl-related compound, F1, with forfeiture and
firearm specifications
Count 3: trafficking in cocaine, F2, with forfeiture and firearm specifications
Count 4: possession of cocaine, F2, with forfeiture and firearm specifications
Count 5: aggravated trafficking in drugs, F3 (methamphetamine)
Count 6: aggravated possession of drugs, F3 (methamphetamine)
Count 7: having weapons while under disability, F3
Count 8: having weapons while under disability, F3
Count 9: having weapons while under disability, F3
Count 10: having weapons while under disability, F3
Count 11: having weapons while under disability, F3
Count 12: possessing criminal tools, F5
On October 16, 2024, Wilkins was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Wilkins
filed a motion to suppress on November 20, 2024, and a supplemental memorandum in
support on December 23, 2024. On February 24, 2025, the State filed a response to
the motion to suppress.
{¶6} The trial court held a suppression hearing on February 26, 2025. The State
called two witnesses –Gearheart and Walters. The State did not, however, call Martin—
the task force member who specifically asked Wilkins for consent to search for Spradlin.
Instead, the State presented testimony about the consent through Walters, who was
standing directly behind Martin during the incident. Walters heard the “African
American” male, who was on the porch of the residence, give consent. Walters testified
that he unequivocally remembers the “African American” male as “not uncooperative.”
However, at the time of the hearing, Walters candidly admitted he could not conclusively
identify Wilkins as the person who gave the consent, citing the long passage of time
between the incident and the hearing.
{¶7} In addition to the State’s witnesses, the trial court heard from two defense
witnesses – the landlord who owned the premises, and Wilkins himself. Wilkins testified Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 4
that he was renting the 7th Street property at the time of the incident and was present
along with Waring. Wilkins acknowledged that he had a conversation with the task
force members at the residence but denied consenting to a search for Spradlin. He also
denied that the items (other than a scale) that the officers claimed they saw in “plain
view,” were sitting out in the open.
{¶8} The trial court denied the motion to suppress by judgment entry on
February 28, 2025. Wilkins then plead no contest to Count 1, trafficking in fentanylrelated compound, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(9)(f) (with
forfeiture specification); Count 3, trafficking in cocaine, a second-degree felony, in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(4)(e) (with forfeiture specification); and Count 10,
having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of
R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) and 2923.13(B). The trial court sentenced Wilkins to 8-12 years in
prison.
{¶9} Wilkins submitted a timely notice of appeal with one assignment of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Wilkins contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained after officers secured a search
warrant as fruit of the poisonous tree, as he declares that he did not consent to the task
force members entering his home to search for Spradlin. Very specifically, he lists the
issue as, “[d]oes competent, credible evidence support the trial court’s finding that the
Appellant consented to the search of his residence?” The State responds that the task
force members did, indeed, obtain consent before entering the residence to search for Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 5
Spradlin and that it presented sufficient evidence at the hearing to demonstrate Wilkins
gave officers consent to search for Spradlin.
A. Law.
{¶11} “Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Tidwell, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 18,
citing State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “An appellate court must accept the trial
court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “The appellate court must decide
questions of law de novo, without deference to the lower court's legal conclusions.” Id.,
citing Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶12} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:
When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions
and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court
must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate
court must then independently determine, without deference to the
conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal
standard.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 61 (4th Dist.), quoting Burnside
at ¶ 8.
{¶13} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
as well as Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, protect individuals against
unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
662 (1979). “[S]earches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 6
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “Once the defendant
demonstrates that he was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden
shifts to the state to establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally
permissible.” State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-5400, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.) citing State v. Roberts,
2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 98; Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999); Xenia v.
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶14} One of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement is if a proper person
consents to the search. “Police officers do not need a warrant, probable cause, or even
a reasonable, articulable suspicion to search when a suspect voluntarily consents to a
search.” State v. Prater, 2024-Ohio-5367, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 211 (1990).
“Consent to a search is ‘a decision by a citizen not to assert Fourth Amendment
rights.’ ” Id., citing Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure (2004 Ed.), 341, Section 17:1.
Additionally, “the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle that ‘[p]olice officers act in
full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent.’ ” Id., quoting United States
v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
{¶15} “To establish the consent exception to the probable cause and warrant
requirements of the federal and Ohio constitutions, the State has the burden to establish
by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that ‘consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.’ ”
Prater at ¶ 29, quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); State v. Posey,
40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988). “ ‘Clear and positive evidence’ is the substantial
equivalent of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” State v. Stephenson, 2024-Ohio-624, Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 7
¶ 32 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Debrossard, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 39 (4th Dist.). “Clear and
convincing evidence” has been defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio as follows:
The measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.
It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the
extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.
Id., quoting In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-104 (1986). “In reviewing
whether the lower court's decision was based upon clear and convincing evidence, ‘a
reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’ ” Id., quoting
Debrossard at ¶ 39.
{¶16} Further, “whether consent to search is voluntary or the product of duress or
coercion is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances.” Prater, 2024-Ohio-5367, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 219, 248-249. The question is one of “objective” reasonableness- what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect? Id. citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), citing Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-189 (1990).
{¶17} The United States Supreme Court set forth a list of factors for courts to
consider in determining whether consent is voluntary, which has long been used by
Ohio courts: (1) the suspect's custodial status and the length of the initial detention; (2)
whether the suspect gave consent in public or at a police station; (3) the presence of
threats, promises, or coercive police procedures; (4) the suspect's words and conduct;
(5) the extent and level of the suspect's cooperation with police; (6) the suspect's Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 8
awareness of his right to refuse to consent and his status as a “newcomer to the law”;
and (7) the suspect's education and intelligence. Prater at ¶ 30, quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-249 (1973); State v. Ellis, 2025-Ohio-1014, ¶ 30 (11th
Dist.); State v. Hartfield, 2023-Ohio-4708, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.); State v. Sexton, 2020-Ohio4179, ¶ 36, fn. 2 (12th Dist.); State v. Fry, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.); see also,
City of Westlake v. Dudas, 2020-Ohio-31, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.) and State v. Moore, 2019-Ohio-648, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.) (where Eighth and Second Districts also consider “the
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.”).
B. Analysis
{¶18} The instant case involves a very narrow issue – whether competent,
credible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Wilkins consented to the search
of his residence. We therefore limit our discussion accordingly.
{¶19} The trial court made the following findings, after hearing evidence from four
witnesses:
I’ve had the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of the
witnesses who have testified, considered their consistency and credibility
as I’ve listened to the testimony.
Some observations about credibility. Certainly, the testimony of Sergeant
Walters was somewhat general in nature when it came to the circumstances
of the consent, and made it clear that he had limited recollection based on
the passage of time, two years since the time of approaching this residence
and looking for Michael Spradlin. But also made it clear he had a limited
purpose for being there, which was to look for Michael Spradlin, although,
ultimately that turned into some other actions that was turned over to
another agency.
{¶20} The trial court went on to consider the Bustamante factors as set forth in
State v. Fry, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). Specifically, the trial court found: Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 9
The consent was given in a public place, not at the police station. There’s
no indication of threats, promises, or any coercive activity to obtain that
consent. That the Defendant, Mr. Wilkins, was cooperative during his
exchange with law enforcement there. That he’s had previous involvement
with the criminal justice system. * * *And the [c]ourt[’s] * * * been unable to
consider his exact words and conduct because of the general nature of the
consent, as described by Sergeant Walters.
The trial court went on to say that not only has the State shown there was consent, but
also shown by “clear and positive” evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily
given, and that police officers did not exceed the scope of the consent, but instead
waited on the search warrant and local law enforcement to seize the contraband and to
actually search the residence for that contraband.
{¶21} A review of the record shows that the State presented testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress that officers requested limited entry into the
residence in order to search for the person in their felony warrant. The State inquired
as follows:
State: Okay. Did you later have a conversation with an individual regarding
your ability to go in and look for Mr. Spradlin?
Task Force Member Walters: I myself, personally, did not have the
conversation. My team leader, who was literally standing next to me, was
talking to Mr. Wilkins—
State: Okay.
Task Force Member Walters: --about the residence.
State: Do you see Mr. Wilkins in the courtroom today?
Task Force Member Walters: To be honest with you, it’s been two years. I
can’t positively identify Mr. Wilkins today as we sit here.
State: Okay.
Task Force Member Walters: I had very brief interaction with him that day. Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 10
State: Okay.
Task Force Member Walters: And I just want to be completely transparent
and honest.
State: Sure. We understand that. Can you describe this individual that you
saw as far as was this a – a Caucasian male, was it an African American
male?
Task Force Member Walters: This was [an] adult African American male.
State: Okay. And as you look in the courtroom, does it look to—if you look
at the gentlemen who’s seated there in the yellow coat, does that appear to
be Mr. Wilkins from the best of your recollection?
Task Force Member Walters: From the best of my recollections, it was an
African male was [sic] talking to at the door.
State: Okay.
Task Force Member Walters: So, yes.
State: And did that—
Task Force Member Walters: Or on the porch, I apologize.
State: --did that African American individual identify himself as somebody
who had lawful permission to be there at the residence?
Task Force Member Walters: As I recall, yes.
State: Okay. And do you recall there being a conversation between
Mr. Martin and this African American individual about the ability to go in and
look for Mr. Spradlin?
Task Force Member Walters: Yes.
State: Do you recall that African American individual giving his consent for
you all to make entry into the residence and look for Mr. Spradlin?
Task Force Member Walters: Yes.
State: That he did give consent is your testimony?
Task Force Member Walters: Yes, he did.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 11
During his testimony, Walters emphasized he did not remember verbatim what was said
because his focus was trained on the door where a potential threat could lie in the
residence. Later, during cross-examination the following exchange between Wilkins’s
trial counsel and Walters took place:
Wilkins’s Trial Counsel: When you say consent was given, was that
because you heard it from Mr. Wilkins or because someone else told you
that that’s what he conveyed?
Task Force Member Walters: In my recollection, as I’m standing literally
just feet away, but understand I’m trained, I’m trying to do multitask, and I
do recall that there was consent given, sir[,] by Mr. Wilkins.
Wilkins’s Trial Counsel: Okay. Thank you.
Task Force Member Walters: He was not uncooperative.
{¶22} After the State rested, Wilkins presented testimony that he himself was the
tenant of the property, that he was there at the time that the task force came, and that
he had a written lease. He also categorically denied giving consent.
{¶23} “Because a reviewing court should generally defer to a trial court when it
acts as the trier of fact, an appellate court should generally defer to a trial court's finding
regarding whether a defendant voluntarily consented to a search.” State v. Miller, 2012-Ohio-1901, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Fry, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.). “Thus,
appellate courts generally review trial court findings that a defendant voluntarily
consented to a search under the weight of the evidence standard set forth in State v.
Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990).” Id. “Even though the state's burden of proof is
‘clear and convincing,’ this standard of review is highly deferential and the presence of
‘some competent, credible evidence’ to support the trial court's finding requires us to
affirm it.” Id., citing Schiebel at 74.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 12
{¶24} Here, the record contains some competent, credible evidence to support
the trial court’s finding. We would note that Wilkins’ primary contention is not that any
consent was coerced; rather, he claims he never gave consent in the first instance. As
the transcript reflects, while Walters did not himself ask Wilkins for consent to search for
Spradlin, he was standing right beside task force member Martin, who did ask for
consent to search for Spradlin.
{¶25} At the hearing, Walters testified that an African American male at the
residence identified himself as having lawful permission to be there and was
cooperative during the interaction—facts consistent with Wilkins being the tenant on the
scene. What could be gleaned by the trial court from the State’s evidence was the fact
that two persons were at the residence—Waring (“very nervous white male”) and
Wilkins, who is African American. Task force member Walters was certain that the
African American male gave consent and was “not uncooperative.” Wilkins himself
testified that he was at the residence when the task force came and provided testimony
from the landlord that he had a written lease. He also categorically denied giving
consent to search for Spradlin. And while Wilkins disputes giving consent, the overlap
between his asserted lawful presence and the officer’s description of the male who
claimed lawful permission places Wilkins as the likely participant in the consent
exchange. Further, the trial court applied the relevant Schneckloth factors to arrive at
the conclusion that the consent was voluntary. Accordingly, we cannot find error.
{¶26} We find the sole assignment to be without merit. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4126 13
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.