Opinion issued July 28, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00856-CR
JAVIER ARMANDO PEREZ MEJIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 174th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1843664
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Javier Armando Perez Mejia, guilty of the thirddegree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely,
methamphetamine, weighing more than one gram but less than four grams.1
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See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(c).
Following the punishment hearing, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment
at five years’ confinement. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to conduct a sua sponte informal inquiry into his
competency to proceed with trial.
We affirm.
Background
On November 10, 2023, Officers D. Guerra, A. Parnell, and R. Bellard of the
Bellaire Police Department responded to a call of criminal trespass at the Bellaire
Recreation Center (the “center”). When the officers arrived, appellant was sitting
on the ground by the center’s exit doors. Officer Guerra testified that he recognized
appellant because he had been dispatched to the same location on November 2, 2023,
to issue a verbal trespass warning to appellant.
Officers arrested appellant for the offense of criminal trespass and transported
him to jail. Appellant told the officers that he had “ice” in the upper left pocket of
his jacket. Officer Guerra testified that “ice” means methamphetamine. When
appellant was asked where he got the methamphetamine from, he stated that he had
found it in a laundromat. The substance field-tested positive for methamphetamine,
and appellant was charged with the offense of possession of a controlled substance.
The results of a chemical analysis that was later conducted on the substance showed
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it to be methamphetamine “with a net weight of 1.734, plus or minus 0.037 grams,
with a 95.45 percent level of confidence.”
Appellant testified that he was homeless and the center allowed him to shower
and charge his cell phone. On redirect examination, when defense counsel asked
appellant why he was at the center on the date of his arrest, appellant testified, “I
was homeless because I live by the Ten Commandments, to have dreams with God.
That made my dad mad because I’m rebuilding the temple in Israel until the rapture.”
At the bench, the prosecutor argued that appellant’s testimony about “living
by the Ten Commandments” opened the door to the admission of evidence about his
prior conviction of assault-family member. After further discussion, the following
exchange took place:
[The Court]: [Appellant has] put his character in issue. He’s put his
character in issue by saying he follows the Ten Commandments.
[Defense Counsel]: Yeah. And I told him not to do that.
[The Court]: He can always ask him what he means by that, but I don’t
know about that can of worms. You may not -- don’t ever ask an openended question on cross-examination.
[Defense Counsel]: I told him not to mention that at all.
[The Court]: Well, he’s put his character in issue. So that’s the only
character that’s relevant. So if he’s saying that he’s a law-abiding
citizen -- I don’t know what he means by that, about the Ten
Commandments.
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[Defense counsel]: I don’t either.
[The Court]: It’s kind of tangentially the issue, but it is out there for the
jury to consider, unless you want -- and it’s kind of late. Nobody stood
up and objected to it.
[Defense Counsel]: Well, he caught me off guard because I told him
not to, but of course, he doesn’t pay me any attention.
When the prosecutor asked appellant to clarify what he meant when he testified that
“he lived by the Ten Commandments,” appellant replied, “That means I keep the
Sabbath. So Saturday, I wouldn’t do any drugs. I don’t do drugs, coffee. Saturdays.
I don’t work, sell Saturdays.”
After both sides rested, the jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense
of possession of a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, weighing more
than one gram but less than four grams.
At the punishment hearing, the State called appellant’s father, Rene Armando
Perez-Aguilar, to testify. Perez-Aguilar testified that, on May 14, 2024, he picked
appellant up from the hospital. According to Perez-Aguilar, he had taken appellant
to the hospital because appellant told him that he “didn’t feel well and that he wanted
some attention.” After they returned home and went to bed, appellant turned the
volume all the way up on his cell phone. Perez-Aguilar testified that when he
scolded appellant and told him to turn down the volume, appellant hit his father with
the phone, breaking his nose. According to Perez-Aguilar, appellant “looked like he
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was crazy” and “was kind of out of his mind.” Perez-Aguilar testified that appellant
drew a cross on his forehead with his father’s blood.
Perez-Aguilar testified that he thought the medication appellant had taken at
the hospital put him in that state because he “[did not] usually behave that way.”
According to Perez-Aguilar, appellant told him that one of the medications he
received at the hospital made him “very upset” and another “made him feel very
down.” He further testified that appellant wrote in a Facebook post that he had hit
his father because he had killed his cat. Perez-Aguilar denied killing appellant’s cat.
At the conclusion of the punishment hearing, the trial court assessed
appellant’s punishment at five years’ confinement.
Discussion
In his sole issue, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to conduct
a sua sponte informal inquiry into his competency to proceed with trial. According
to appellant, he was denied due process and is entitled to an abatement for
proceedings consistent with Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting
an informal competency evaluation because there was no suggestion that appellant
was incompetent to stand trial.
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A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
“As a matter of constitutional due process, a criminal defendant who is
incompetent may not stand trial.” Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018); see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (“We have
repeatedly and consistently recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an incompetent
defendant violates due process.’” (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453
(1992))). To ensure that “legally incompetent criminal defendants” do not stand trial,
the Texas Legislature has enacted “a substantive and procedural framework for
making competency determinations.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563.
Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
framework for making competency determinations. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ch.
46B. This statutory scheme codifies the constitutional standard for competency to
stand trial and describes the circumstances that require—and procedures for
making—a determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. Turner
v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 689 (2014); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 46B.001–
.055. Article 46B.003(a) provides that “[a] person is incompetent to stand trial if the
person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.” TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 46B.003(a).
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Procedurally, a trial court employs two steps for making competency
determinations: the first is an informal inquiry; the second, if applicable, is a formal
competency trial. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts.
46B.004(c), 46B.005(b). An informal inquiry is triggered upon a suggestion from
any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at
563; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(a)–(c-1). At the informal inquiry, the
trial court must determine “whether there is some evidence from any source that
would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c); see Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. Code of Criminal
Procedure article 46B.004(c-1) provides:
A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate the [informal]
inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about
the competency of the defendant. Evidence suggesting the need for an
informal inquiry may be based on observations made in relation to one
or more of the factors described by Article 46B.024 or on any other
indication that the defendant is incompetent within the meaning of
Article 46B.003.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c-1). The article 46B.024 factors include the
capacity of the defendant during criminal proceedings to (1) rationally understand
the charges against him and the potential consequences of those pending charges;
(2) disclose to his defense counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (3)
engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the
adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom
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behavior; and (6) testify. Id. art. 46B.024(1)(A)–(F); see Laflash v. State, 614
S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, order). The considerations
for competency evaluations set out in article 46B.024 “contemplate a defendant who
is at least minimally able to interact with his trial counsel in a ‘reasonable and
rational’ way (even if they do not necessarily agree) in formulating decisions how
most effectively to pursue his defense.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 689–90.
In making a competency determination, “a trial court must consider only that
evidence tending to show incompetency, ‘putting aside all competing indications of
competency, to find whether there is some evidence, a quantity more than none or a
scintilla, that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency.’” Id. at 692
(quoting Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). The
“some evidence” standard “is not a particularly onerous one.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d
at 564 (internal quotations omitted).
If, during the informal inquiry stage, the trial court finds more than a scintilla
of evidence supporting a rational finding of fact that the defendant is incompetent to
stand trial, then the trial court is required to do three things: (1) “stay all other
proceedings in the case,” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(d); (2) appoint an
expert to conduct a competency examination (if it has not already done so), id.
art.46B.021(b); and (3) move forward with a formal competency trial. Id. art.
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46B.005(a)–(b). The relevant time frame for determining competency is at the time
of the proceedings. Laflash, 614 S.W.3d at 432.
We review a trial court’s decision whether to conduct sua sponte an informal
inquiry into a defendant’s competency for an abuse of discretion. See id; see also
Pleasant v. State, No. 01-23-00144-CR, 2024 WL 3350254, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Under this standard, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court. Laflash, 614 S.W.3d at 432–33. Instead, we determine whether the trial
court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
B. Whether the Trial Court Should Have Conducted an Informal
Competency Inquiry
Appellant asserts that the record in this case “presents evidence of
incompetence from multiple sources and numerous missed opportunities for
inquiries.” According to appellant, evidence of his incompetence can be found in
the clerk’s record, the State’s motion in limine, the facts of the incident, defense
counsel’s frustration, and the testimony at the punishment hearing.
Appellant asserts that the question of his competency was documented in the
Collection of Information Form for Mental Illness and Intellectual Disability. The
form notes appellant’s diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, depressive type, and
mood disorder, as well as prior diagnoses of unspecified psychotic disorder,
substance-induced psychotic disorder, and substance-induced psychosis vs.
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schizophrenia. The form also reflects that appellant self-reported multiple
hospitalizations and received inpatient and outpatient treatment for psychosis,
depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideations/attempt. Appellant further asserts that
the matter of his competency was also raised directly by the State in an oral motion
in limine regarding “any mention of mental health or mental health issues”
immediately preceding voir dire. According to appellant, the State’s motion in
limine, coupled with the information contained in the form, shows that the trial court
should have conducted an informal inquiry.
“The fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not by itself mean he is
incompetent.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691. A defendant’s mental illness, past or
present—absent credible evidence that because of it, he lacks “(1) sufficient present
ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against [him],” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a)—does not by itself
equate to a suggestion of incompetency. See Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564 (“[T]here
must be some evidence indicating that the defendant’s refusal to rationally engage
with counsel is caused by his mental illness.”); Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 928
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (concluding trial court did not abuse its
discretion by finding defendant competent even though defendant had mental illness
and failed to cooperate with counsel); see also Pleasant, 2024 WL 3350254, at *9
10
(holding no abuse of discretion where trial court did not conduct informal
competency inquiry based on evidence of defendant’s mental health concerns and
ongoing psychoactive medication at the time of trial); Dusenbery v. State, No. 02-16-00125-CR, 2018 WL 4025078, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2018,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding defendant’s
alleged pedophilia, depression, and suicidal ideations did not suggest that he was
incompetent to stand trial). Here, although the record contains evidence that
appellant had a history of mental health issues, he does not explain how his mental
illness impeded his present ability to communicate with his attorney or affected his
understanding of the proceedings against him. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
46B.003(a); Baldwin v. State, 227 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007,
no pet.) (concluding that to present some evidence of incompetence, defendant
needed to show that his past depression or childhood abuse somehow interfered with
his present ability to communicate with his attorney or with his understanding of
proceedings against him).
Appellant also asserts that the facts of the incident for which he was charged,
although not available to the trial court until the witnesses testified, were “another
cue.” He states, in conclusory fashion, that “[i]t is highly unusual behavior for an
adult person to lie or sit in front of a community center doorway long enough for a
concerned staffer to call police.” Appellant further suggests that his testimony—i.e.,
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“I was homeless because I live by the Ten Commandments, to have dreams with
God. That made my dad mad because I’m rebuilding the temple in Israel until the
rapture”—is evidence of intrusive thoughts and emotions.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that a defendant’s
statements “which suggest some irrationality” do not necessarily show that the
defendant is unable to rationally consult with counsel or understand the proceedings
against him. Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (concluding
defendant’s statements to his mother and to co-counsel “which suggested some
irrationality,” and fact that appellant did not want to have witnesses called on his
behalf at punishment phase, did not necessarily show appellant’s inability to
rationally consult with his lawyer or to understand proceedings against him); see
also Pleasant, 2024 WL 3350254, at *9 (concluding trial court did not abuse
discretion by not conducting informal competency inquiry where defendant offered
“rambling, tangential, and delusional” answers during testimony which were
intermixed with other responses that were appropriate to questions asked); Lindsey
v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d)
(concluding although some of defendant’s statements may have been irrelevant to
proceedings, none of his statements indicated he did not understand or appreciate
what was going on or was unable to communicate and function rationally); Johnson
v. State, 429 S.W.3d 13, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)
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(“Bizarre, obscene, or disruptive comments by a defendant during court proceedings
do not necessarily constitute evidence supporting a finding of incompetency.”);
Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 427–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
pet. ref’d) (concluding trial court did not err in failing to conduct informal
competency inquiry for defendant who was found competent to stand trial, but who
had been diagnosed with mental illnesses, asked to be called “Paramount Security
Interest Holder,” and disrupted trial with screaming). Moreover, a review of the
record shows that appellant’s testimony was not incoherent, disjointed, or
delusional. He testified that he was at the center because he was homeless, and he
took showers and charged his cell phone there. The facts of the incident and
appellant’s statements at trial do not show his inability to rationally consult with his
lawyers or to understand the proceedings against him.
Appellant argues that defense counsel’s obvious frustration over appellant’s
testimony that he “live[d] by the Ten Commandments . . . and [was] rebuilding the
temple in Israel until the rapture” is evidence of incompetency that should have
triggered an informal inquiry. We disagree.
During an exchange concerning whether appellant’s testimony about “living
by the Ten Commandments” had opened the door to the admission of evidence about
his prior conviction of assault-family member, defense counsel informed the trial
court that he had told appellant “not to mention that at all.” When the trial court
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pointed out that nobody had objected to appellant’s testimony, counsel stated, “Well,
he caught me off guard because I told him not to, but of course, he doesn’t pay me
any attention.” To the extent that appellant disagreed with his counsel on “how most
effectively to pursue his defense” by testifying as he did despite his attorney’s
admonishment, this is not evidence of incompetency. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at
689–90; Laflash, 614 S.W.3d at 432.
Appellant also points to his father’s testimony during the punishment hearing
as evidence of his incompetence to stand trial. Perez-Aguilar testified about the
circumstances surrounding appellant’s prior assault of him in May 2024, and the
booking photo admitted into evidence depicting a red cross on appellant’s forehead
that he had drawn with his father’s blood. Perez-Aguilar also testified about
appellant’s Facebook post in which he alleged that his father had killed his cat.
Although this may be evidence of appellant’s mental state at that time, the relevant
time frame for determining competency is at the time of the proceedings. Laflash,
614 S.W.3d at 432. Therefore, Perez-Aguilar’s testimony about these events is not
evidence of appellant’s incompetence at the time of trial. See id.; see also Ex Parte
Brimmer, No. 02-25-00369-CR, 2026 WL 478946, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Feb. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that
defendant’s reliance on evidence of his mental state to show incompetency to stand
trial—including previous diagnosis of depression and “deluded thinking and
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paranoia” surrounding his prior arrest—ignored relevant time frame); Casares v.
State, No. 13-23-00561-CR, 2025 WL 1464524, at *13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg May 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding defendant failed to connect matters that occurred several months prior
to his trial to evidence of his incompetence that was observed by trial court at time
of trial).
We conclude that although the record contains evidence that appellant had
mental health issues for which he received treatment and medications, the record
contains no evidence that his mental health issues prevented him from having (1) a
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a); Turner, 422
S.W.3d at 691. We therefore hold that the trial court, which was in the position to
view appellant’s demeanor during trial, did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua
sponte conduct an informal inquiry into appellant’s competency to stand trial. See
McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding trial court
did not err by failing to perform competency inquiry and noting it “cannot ignore the
trial court’s first-hand factual assessment of [the defendant’s] mental competency”
and that trial court’s factual findings “are entitled to great deference”).
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
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Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Kristin M. Guiney
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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