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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-11128
ESTELLA CURRY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00591-TFM-MU
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit
Judges.
KIDD, Circuit Judge:
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11128
Estella Curry filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court
to challenge her state conviction for reckless murder. The district
court denied Curry’s petition but allowed her to appeal the denial.
Curry claims on appeal that the state trial court improperly denied
her the right to represent herself, that the state presented insuffi-cient evidence to permit the jury to convict her, and that she should
be allowed to challenge whether her trial counsel provided effective
representation.
Under our statutorily limited review, we affirm the district
court’s denial of habeas relief.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Crime and Pretrial Proceedings
In 2014, Richard Walker was driving home in Escambia
County, Alabama, when Estella Curry sped toward him from behind and crashed into him. Walker’s vehicle flipped off the road,
which threw Walker from the vehicle and killed him. Curry was
charged with one count of reckless murder. The indictment stated:
Estella Curry, whose name to the Grand Jury is otherwise unknown, did recklessly engage in conduct
which manifested extreme indifference to human life
and created a grave risk of death to a person other
than herself, and did thereby cause the death of another person, to-wit: Richard Harmon Walker, by towit: driving at a high rate of speed and, while under
the influence of one or more controlled substances,
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hit another vehicle causing the death of Richard Harmon Walker, in violation of §13A-6-2(a)(2) of the
Code of Alabama.
Prior to trial, Curry sent pro se motions to the state court to
request removal of her appointed counsel because she was dissatisfied with his services. The clerk subsequently issued a letter informing Curry that the court would consider only motions filed by
her counsel. Later, the court issued an order denying a motion entitled “Motion to Remove Attorney from Case.” According to
Curry, the court held a hearing on the motion, but the transcript of
the hearing is not in the state court record.
Curry’s pro se motions nevertheless continued. She requested the removal of counsel and the recusal of the judge because he “[d]enied [her] Sixth Amendment rights, forced representation by appointing attorney not requested . . . [and] [d]enied [her]
request for self[-]representation.” The state court denied these motions.
On the morning of trial, Curry’s counsel filed a motion requesting a mental health evaluation of Curry. In court, counsel addressed the motion and explained the cooperation issues he had
faced with Curry, making his representation of her “impossible.”
Counsel also expressed Curry’s desire to represent herself, though
he disagreed with that request due to Curry’s alleged incompetence. The state responded that Curry “chooses not to assist her
attorney . . . [as] [s]he has played games ever since the beginning of
this case.”
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The court examined Curry directly: “You want to be your
own lawyer and represent yourself in this trial?” Curry answered,
“I said that from the beginning.” But then she provided conflicting
responses. To clarify, the court asked Curry, at least ten separate
times, what she wanted the court to do and whether her request
was to represent herself. In response, Curry expressed dissatisfaction with her counsel, explained she wanted to go through a vetting
process to obtain new counsel, and requested additional time to
decide whether she wanted to represent herself. The court then explained Curry’s rights and examined Curry’s competence and ability to represent herself in accordance with Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975). Thereafter, the court asked Curry: “Are you still
telling me that you want to be your own lawyer?” Curry responded,
“I’m telling you I need time to make an informed and intelligent
decision.”
Once the court finished its discussion with Curry, her counsel moved to withdraw in the interest of Curry’s Sixth Amendment
right to represent herself. The court denied counsel’s request because Curry did not make a “formal” self-representation request.
The court asked Curry a final time: “[Y]ou’re saying you want to
be your own lawyer?” She replied, “No. At this time I’m telling you
I can’t make an informed or intelligent decision because I asked in
January[,] and it was denied.” The court scheduled Curry’s trial for
the next day, with Curry represented by counsel.
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B. The Trial
Curry proceeded to a three-day jury trial. The state presented testimony from the traffic homicide investigator who responded to the car crash. Next, an accident reconstruction expert
opined that Curry was driving between 112 and 123 miles per hour
prior to the collision. The emergency room nurse who tended to
Curry after the crash testified that she collected two blood samples
and one urine sample from Curry. An analysis of the urine sample
revealed opiates and tricyclic antidepressants.
A forensic toxicology expert testified that Curry’s blood
sample tested positive for several drugs, including a tricyclic antidepressant, a muscle relaxer, a sleep aid, and a medication used to
treat irritable bowel syndrome. He explained that the side effects
of these drugs included drowsiness, dizziness, confusion, blurred
vision, slurred speech, and decreased reaction time. Moreover,
some of these drugs came with labels warning against driving a
motor vehicle and combining the drugs with other drugs. The expert opined that “[l]ooking at the combination of these drugs and
knowing the effects each one of them individually have, the
chances of [Curry’s] impairment being there is much more likely
than not.”
The jury also heard testimony from Walker’s spouse, a witness to the car crash, and a forensic pathology expert who conducted Walker’s autopsy. Additionally, the state presented several
exhibits, including photographs and reports of the car crash, as well USCA11 Case: 24-11128 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 6 of 18
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as Curry’s hospital records, blood and urine samples, and toxicology report.
Once the state rested, Curry moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the court denied the motion. In her defense, Curry
called the Director of the Escambia County Emergency Communication District as a witness to testify about the 911 calls received
on the day of the car crash. She also presented an exhibit about her
car’s speedometer. The defense rested and moved again for a judgment of acquittal, which the court again denied.
The court instructed the jury on the crimes of reckless murder and the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and criminally
negligent homicide. When instructing the jury on reckless murder,
the court stated:
To convict, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the following elements of murder.
One, that Richard Harmon Walker is dead. Two, that
the defendant, Estella Curry, caused the death of
Richard Harmon Walker by – and the alleged act is
what’s actually contained in the indictment – driving
at a high rate of speed and while under the influence
of one or more controlled substances, hit another vehicle causing the death of Richard Harmon Walker.
And next, that in committing the act which caused the
death of Richard Harmon Walker, the defendant
acted with extreme indifference to human life.
The jury found Curry guilty of reckless murder, and the
court sentenced Curry to life in prison.
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C. The Post-Trial Proceedings
Curry sought new counsel and appealed her conviction to
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Curry challenged the trial
court’s rulings on her competency to stand trial, her right to represent herself, and the sufficiency of the evidence. After reviewing
Curry’s claims on the merits, the state appellate court affirmed the
trial court.
Curry subsequently obtained new counsel and filed in the
trial court a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court dismissed
Curry’s petition because Curry’s legal arguments “were or could
have been raised on appeal.” The state appellate court affirmed,
and the Alabama Supreme Court denied her petition for certiorari.
D. The Federal Habeas Proceedings
In 2020, Curry obtained new counsel and filed a habeas corpus petition in the Southern District of Alabama. The magistrate
judge recommended that the district court deny Curry’s habeas petition and grant her a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on three
issues. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and this appeal followed.
Before filing her initial brief on appeal, Curry moved this
Court to supplement the record and to expand the COA to include
a fourth issue. Curry wanted to supplement the record with the
missing transcript of a pretrial hearing that occurred in the state
court. We denied the request to supplement because Curry failed
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to show that the transcript “could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
As to the COA, we allowed the expansion because the fourth issue
was related to the second issue. The final version of Curry’s COA
specifies these issues:
1. Does Curry qualify for the Martinez [v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12–
17 (2012)] exception to establish cause for the procedural default of her ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims?
2. Was the Alabama courts’ ruling that Curry never made a
clear and unequivocal request for self-representation based
on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence?
3. Was Curry’s conviction for reckless murder based on insufficient evidence when the indictment and the jury instructions alleged that Curry was under the influence of “controlled substances” at the time of the offense, but the evidence at trial suggested she was under the influence of prescription medications that were not technically “controlled
substances”?
4. Whether, in denying Curry’s claim that she was deprived of
her constitutional right to self-representation, the state court
reasonably applied clearly established federal law, namely
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), in concluding that
Curry was not entitled to relief ?
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a court’s decision to deny a § 2254 petition de
novo, applying a de novo standard to legal conclusions and a clear
error standard to factual findings.” Carruth v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of
Corr., 93 F.4th 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 2024).
When a state court’s adjudication of a petitioner’s claim was
on the merits, our review is further governed by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Id. AEDPA
prohibits relief unless the state court’s decision was: (1) “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “If a state court unreasonably applied federal law or unreasonably determined the
facts in a case, we review the underlying claim de novo.” King v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 69 F.4th 856, 867 (11th Cir. 2023) (emphasis omitted).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state court’s decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law” when it “appl[ies] a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case
law,” or when it “reach[es] a different result from the Supreme
Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts.” Davis v.
Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 120 F.4th 768, 788 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). An “unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), occurs when “the state USCA11 Case: 24-11128 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 10 of 18
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court correctly identifies the governing legal principles from the
Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular case.” Davis, 120 F.4th at 788 (citation modified).
“A state court unreasonably applies federal law only if no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s determination or
conclusion.” King, 69 F.4th at 867 (citation modified).
For our review of habeas corpus petitions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a state court’s factual determinations are ‘presumed to be correct,’” and that presumption can be overcome only
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic
Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Still, “[e]ven if the state court made a clearly
erroneous factual determination, that doesn’t necessarily mean the
state court’s ‘decision’ was ‘based on’ an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). “Depending on
the importance of the factual error to the state court’s ultimate ‘decision,’ that decision might still be reasonable even if some of the
state court’s individual factual findings were erroneous—so long as
the decision, taken as a whole, doesn’t constitute an ‘unreasonable
determination of the facts’ and isn’t ‘based on’ any such determination.” Id. (citation modified).
Finally, “in an appeal brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the
COA.” Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998). USCA11 Case: 24-11128 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 11 of 18
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III. DISCUSSION
We will first discuss Curry’s claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel and whether they were procedurally defaulted. Then we
will turn to Curry’s right to self-representation, followed by the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her.
A. Procedural Default of the Ineffective Assistance Claims
The district court found that Curry procedurally defaulted
several of her habeas claims because she failed to raise them in the
state court. A federal court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes one of two exceptions. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749–50 (1991). First, the
petitioner may show cause for the default and prejudice from it.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81–88 (1977). One way to do this is
under Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12–17, which allows a habeas petitioner
to establish that counsel at the initial collateral-review proceeding
was ineffective for failing to preserve a claim that the petitioner’s
trial counsel was ineffective. Carruth, 93 F.4th at 1359. The second
procedural default exception applies if a petitioner can show that
failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 749–50.
For Curry’s ineffective assistance claims, the district court
granted a COA on the following issue: “Does Curry qualify for the
Martinez exception to establish cause for the procedural default of
her ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims?” But Curry does
not address Martinez in her briefs on appeal, so she forfeits the issue. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.
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2022) (en banc) (holding “that the mere failure to raise an issue in
an initial brief on direct appeal should be treated as a forfeiture of
the issue”); Landers v. Warden, Att’y Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1296–
97 (11th Cir. 2015). While Curry addresses the exception for a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that argument goes beyond the
scope of the COA. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1251 (“[I]n an appeal brought
by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is limited to
the issues specified in the COA.”).
B. Self-Representation
In the state appellate court, Curry claimed that the trial
court denied her Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
The state appellate court ruled that Curry had not preserved the
claim for appellate review, but that it would nevertheless fail because she never “clearly and unequivocally” stated that she wanted
to represent herself. Curry contends that this denial of her self-representation claim “involved an unreasonable application of . . .
clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2).
The district court concluded that Curry failed to show that
the denial of her self-representation claim “involved an unreasonable application” of federal law, or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). We agree with
the district court’s conclusion.
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1. Self-Representation: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
Curry argues that her case is “nearly identical” to Faretta,
and the state appellate court unreasonably applied Faretta in determining that she did not “clearly and unequivocally” request to represent herself.
In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense.” 422 U.S. at 819. First, a defendant must assert the right to
self-representation “clearly and unequivocally, understandable to
the trial court by the reasonable person standard.” Stano v. Duer,
921 F.2d 1125, 1144 (11th Cir. 1991). Then the trial court must ensure that the defendant “competently and intelligently” chooses
self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. And only if the trial
court is satisfied at step two must it permit self-representation. Id.
at 835–36. Importantly, we have explained that “[w]hether Faretta’s
invocation of his right to counsel was ‘clear and unequivocal’ was
not a disputed issue in the case.” Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1293
(11th Cir. 2011).
Despite receiving several opportunities to “clearly and unequivocally” invoke her right to self-representation, Curry never did
so. Compare id. at 1295–96 (finding the self-representation request
equivocal where the defendant’s statements “were qualified and
conditioned” and the defendant “vacillated between self-representation and being represented by counsel”), with United States v. DaUSCA11 Case: 24-11128 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 14 of 18
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vis, 130 F.4th 1272, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2025) (finding the self-representation request clear and unequivocal where the defendant filed
a motion to proceed pro se that cited Faretta, counsel filed a separate motion confirming the request, and at the subsequent hearing,
the defendant stated, “I would like to represent myself ”). Based on
this record, the state appellate court’s denial of Curry’s self-representation claim did not “involve[] an unreasonable application of ”
Faretta. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
2. Self-Representation: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
Curry also argues that the state appellate court’s denial of
her self-representation claim was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” because the state appellate court addressed only the hearing that occurred immediately prior to trial
and failed to consider other pretrial motions and hearings relevant
to her claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Most of Curry’s arguments pertain to a hearing that occurred on January 31, 2017. Curry attempted to supplement the
record before us with the transcript of this hearing, but we denied
that request. In our limited review of this issue, we cannot consider
matters that were not presented to the state court, and Curry concedes that this hearing was not in the record before the state appellate court. Landers, 776 F.3d at 1295 (highlighting the “explicit textual restriction to evaluate the state court ruling only ‘in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding’” (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2))).
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Curry also relies on a series of pretrial motions and hearings
in which she requested removal of her counsel, expressed dissatisfaction with her counsel and the trial court, and rejected court-appointed counsel. But Curry never requested to represent herself in
any of these motions and hearings, and she does not contend that
she did so.
Because the state appellate court’s focus on the final hearing
was not unreasonable, we cannot say that its denial of Curry’s selfrepresentation claim was “based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Curry maintains that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support her conviction for reckless murder. The state appellate
court determined that the “evidence presented by the State was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of reckless murder and was
sufficient for the jury to find Curry guilty of that offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The district court denied habeas relief on this
claim because Curry failed to show that the state court’s decision
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). We reach the same conclusion as the district court.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
Neither the COA nor Curry’s briefing explicitly reference
§ 2254(d)(1). A generous reading of the briefing shows that Curry
potentially relies upon Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), to contend USCA11 Case: 24-11128 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 16 of 18
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that the state appellate court’s denial of her sufficiency of the evidence claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). But
Miller deals with false evidence, not sufficiency of the evidence, so
even under a generous reading, Curry does not identify the correct
law governing the issue.
The proper legal standard for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 654 (2012). Under Jackson, courts evaluate whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at
319. In doing so, courts review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and refrain from substituting their
judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id. at 318–19.
Because the state appellate court properly applied the Alabama equivalent of this standard, its denial of Curry’s sufficiency
of the evidence claim was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485, 489 (Ala. Crim. App.
1984), aff’d sub nom., Ex parte Faircloth, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985);
Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 817 n.41 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that
§ 2254(d)(1) “does not require citation of the [Supreme Court’s]
cases . . . so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them” (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.
3, 8 (2002))).
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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
Curry argues that, without the use of the terms “opiates”
and “controlled substances,” the remaining evidence was insuffi-cient to support her conviction for reckless murder. We must determine whether the state appellate court’s denial of Curry’s claim
was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We conclude that it was not.
We first “look to state law for the substantive elements of
the criminal offense.” Johnson, 566 U.S. at 655 (citation modified).
Under Alabama law, “[a] person commits the crime of murder if
. . . [u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he or she recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to a person other than himself or herself, and
thereby causes the death of another person.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-2(a)(2) (1975).
Curry contends that the references to opiates and controlled
substances misrepresented the record and that, without this misrepresentation, the jury would not have convicted her of reckless
murder. Yet, Curry does not dispute that her urine sample tested
positive for opiates. Moreover, as the state appellate court explained, while being “under the influence of a controlled substance
. . . may be presented as evidence that the defendant’s conduct was
reckless, . . . [it] is not a statutory element of reckless murder as that
crime is defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(2).” Chambers v. State, 644 So. 2d
1294, 1296–97 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (citation modified).
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We will assume, for a moment, that the references to opiates
and controlled substances did not exist. The remaining evidence
showed that Curry was driving at an excessive rate of speed at a
time when she had a mixture of drugs in her system that “more
likely than not” led to her impairment. The state appellate court
determined that this remaining evidence was “sufficient to establish a prima facie case of reckless murder and was sufficient for the
jury to find Curry guilty of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” And while Curry maintains that this determination was incorrect, “the question is not whether a federal court believes the
state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Landers, 776 F.3d at 1293–94 (citation modified). We find that
the state appellate court’s determination was not unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.