IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-CA-00154-COA
OCEAN BLUE LAND & TIMBER CO., LLC, APPELLANTS AND PATRICK TERRELL
v.
TATIA MARSOLAIS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/15/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID SHOEMAKE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: JEFFREY LOEWER HALL
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: PAUL MANION ANDERSON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
RENDERED IN PART - 08/04/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.
McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Tatia Marsolais filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Jefferson Davis County
alleging that Robert Patrick Terrell (“Patrick”), through Ocean Blue Land & Timber Co. LLC
(“Ocean Blue”), fraudulently obtained certain parcels of land and contractual interests from
her while she was addicted to crack cocaine and financially unstable. Patrick subsequently
conveyed the property to Tall Pines Timber LLC (“Tall Pines”). Tatia sought to set aside the
conveyance and other related transactions concerning her interest in property held in a family
trust. The chancellor granted summary judgment in Tatia’s favor regarding her one-half
interest in 640 acres of the family trust property (“the trust property”). Following a bench trial on the remaining claims, the chancellor found that Patrick had committed fraud, and the
court voided a conveyance involving 131 acres of other land Tatia owned, awarded punitive
damages, and sua sponte pierced the corporate veils of the limited liability companies
involved in the transactions. The court assessed punitive damages against Patrick and David
Waits (“David”), the owner of Tall Pines, individually. On appeal, Ocean Blue and Patrick
argue that the chancellor erred by finding that (1) the properties were acquired by fraud, (2)
punitive damages were warranted and properly assessed, and (3) Ocean Blue’s corporate veil
should be pierced. After our review of record and the written and the oral arguments of
counsel, we affirm the chancellor’s finding of fraud, but we reverse the punitive damages
award and render judgment that punitive damages against Patrick individually are not proper.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Tatia is the only grandchild of Duthiel and Frenchie Fortenberry. Prior to their
passing away, Duthiel and Frenchie accumulated substantial assets, including real property,
timberland, and cattle in Jefferson Davis County. They conveyed 131 acres of land to Tatia
in fee simple. They also gifted Tatia a one-half interest and gifted Tatia’s mother, Frenchie
Marsolais, the other one-half interest in the 640 acres of land held in a trust. By February
2010, both grandparents had passed away, Tatia was forty years old, and the trust remained
in place. No evidence indicated that Tatia had requested a dissolution of the trust.
Moreover, Tatia received monthly trust distributions of approximately $2,000.
¶3. Between late 2009 and early 2010, Tatia became heavily addicted to crack cocaine.
During that time, Tatia resided on the trust property in Jefferson Davis County with her
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boyfriend, Michael Thornhill (“Toad”). Toad occasionally worked for Patrick, the owner and
manager of Ocean Blue. Through Toad, Tatia became acquainted with Patrick. Tatia had
an initial encounter with Patrick when he purchased her truck. She also testified that Patrick
supplied drugs either directly to her and Toad or that Patrick gave them money to purchase
the crack cocaine.
¶4. In November 2010, a transaction occurred between Tatia and Patrick involving her
131 acres of land. The parties disputed the nature of the transaction during the litigation.
Tatia maintained that she borrowed $25,000 from Patrick and intended to provide only a
limited portion of her land, ten acres, as collateral for the loan. Patrick maintained that he
outright purchased the entire 131 acres. The evidence further conflicted regarding the
amount Patrick paid Tatia, ranging from $25,000 to $45,000. Evidence of the $25,000 figure
was provided by a check and was the only amount that could be confirmed. Patrick
explained in his testimony that the remaining $20,000 was provided to Tatia in cash and other
assets.
¶5. On November 16, 2010, Patrick and Tatia met at the chancery clerk’s office in
Jefferson Davis County. Tatia testified that she believed she had signed documents giving
Patrick permission to survey ten acres of the land, which would have served as collateral for
the $25,000 loan. Instead, the document executed that day was a warranty deed conveying
the 131 acres of land to Ocean Blue. She further testified that Patrick concealed portions of
the document with his hand, rushed her through the signing process, and did not allow her
to review the document before signing, all while she was high on crack. Patrick, however,
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maintained that the transaction was a legitimate sale.
¶6. The evidence also showed that Patrick subsequently transferred the 131 acres in fee
simple approximately one week after obtaining title, conveying it on November 23, 2010, to
Tall Pines, which was owned by David, for approximately $60,000. David alleged that he
paid $111,000, but the only amount that could be traced was $60,000 written on a check.
Testimony established that Patrick and David had engaged in numerous prior land
transactions over many years.
¶7. The dispute expanded beyond the fee simple parcel containing 131 acres. On March
10, 2011, a deed purporting to bear Tatia’s signature conveyed her one-half interest in the
trust property (640 acres) to Ocean Blue. On June 24, 2011, a contract for the sale and
purchase of real estate, related to the sale of trust property, was purportedly signed by Tatia.
The contract assigned her interest in the trust to Ocean Blue upon dissolution of the Trust,
giving Ocean Blue the right to request final distribution. Tatia challenged those transactions
and asserted that all the documents related to the trust were invalid and/or forged and a
product of fraud.
¶8. Tatia filed her original complaint on March 30, 2011, and an amended complaint on
July 22, 2011. On November 11, 2011, Tatia filed a second amended complaint seeking to
set aside the conveyances and other transactions involving both the 131-acre fee simple
property and the trust property. According to the briefs and the parties at oral argument,
Tatia sued only the LLCs. However, there was trial testimony from Tatia’s original attorney
that she sued both LLCs and the owners of the LLCs. However, no copies of the complaint
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or amended complaints appear in the record. It is undisputed that Tatia sued Ocean Blue and
Tall Pines to set aside the allegedly fraudulent conveyances. Tatia was represented by
attorney Andrew Foxworth, who had previously handled her grandmother’s estate.
¶9. On September 26, 2016, Tatia filed a motion for partial summary judgment to set
aside the March 10, 2011 deed concerning the trust property. On March 10, 2020, the court
granted the motion and set aside the deed, finding it null and void.
¶10. The remaining issues concerning the validity of the 131-acre deed and the contract
concerning Tatia’s trust interest were litigated between June 2019 and December 2022. The
case proceeded over three days of trial, with the fourth day being canceled and the parties
opting only to submit evidence to the court.
Testimony of Foxworth
¶11. Foxworth testified that Tatia retained him after learning that she had signed a deed
conveying her 131 acres to Patrick rather than securing a loan by a deed of trust. Foxworth
testified that Tatia explained to him she believed the land served as collateral for the
borrowed funds.1 Prior to filing a lawsuit, Foxworth contacted Patrick, attempting to verify
the amount owed on the loan and to pay it off. Patrick initially stated that Tatia owed him
more than $25,000, but that he needed to “get with his business person.” Subsequent
communications from Patrick’s attorney, Jake Ritchie, indicated that the land was purchased
for $25,000 and paid in full. Ritchie also included a couple of checks written to Tatia, as
well as some receipts. But when Foxworth reviewed those purported check payments, he
1
During the litigation, Foxworth realized he would likely be a witness and that he needed to help Tatia obtain a new attorney. He represented Tatia until July 2011.
5
was unable to verify any payments other than the $25,000. Although the checks contained
Tatia’s purported endorsements, Tatia never received the money for the other checks.
Further, Foxworth testified that he learned Patrick never had the money in his bank account
to cover those other amounts listed on the checks, nor did the checks ever clear the bank.
Foxworth testified that eventually he filed a lawsuit on behalf of Tatia against Patrick, David,
and their respective companies.
¶12. Foxworth further testified that he was concerned about Tatia’s capacity to convey any
property and her vulnerability to manipulation. He described receiving letters purportedly
from Tatia terminating his representation, only for Tatia to later deny sending the letters. On
several occasions during this period, Tatia contacted him early in the morning, saying,
“[Y]ou’re going to get something in the mail from me that I was forced to sign, so throw it
in the garbage.” She would also ask him to continue representing her. Foxworth also
testified that a copy of those letters and Tatia’s checkbook were found in Patrick’s personal
files within his prison cell.2 Patrick did not dispute this and confirmed that he had the letters
to prepare for his deposition. Foxworth never sent Patrick a copy of those letters. Also,
according to Foxworth, Tatia showed “erratic and disturbing” behavior, associated with her
ongoing drug addiction.
Testimony of Patrick
¶13. Patrick also testified essentially to the facts as stated above. First, Patrick admitted
there was no written contract for the 131-acre transaction. During the trial, Patrick presented
2
Patrick was convicted of four felonies related to false pretense and real estate fraud and was serving a twenty-year sentence with the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
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various endorsed checks to “prove” that he paid Tatia more than $100,000 for the property.
However, except for the $25,000 check, none of the other checks Patrick presented had been
cashed. Corporate depositions of Regions Bank and Citizens National Bank taken under
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) were marked and received into evidence
without objection.3 Regions’ deposition testimony confirmed that the checks were never
cashed, and even if they were presented, Patrick did not have enough funds in his account
to cover the amounts of $15,000, $37,000, and $50,000. Citizens Bank also confirmed that
during the relevant time periods, Patrick lacked the funds in his account to cover check
payments from his Citizens Bank account.
Testimony of Tatia
¶14. Finally, Tatia testified that she never intended to sell her family land. She explained
that her grandfather gave her 131 acres of land when she was sixteen years old, with the
understanding that the land would remain in the family. He told her that it was fine for her
to sell timber but to never sell the land. Tatia maintained that she believed she was signing
documents connected to a loan transaction and did not discover that she had signed a deed
until approximately one year later. Tatia testified that she was surprised when she saw the
land conveyance because it was only supposed to be her permission for a survey. She denied
receiving the additional $20,000 in cash Patrick claimed to have paid her, and she disputed
the total amount received from Patrick. Tatia stated that she never attempted to fire
Foxworth as her attorney. Instead, Patrick typed and mailed the letters to Foxworth stating
3
These banks did business with Ocean Blue, which was solely owned by Patrick.
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that she had fired him. She also testified that she was heavily addicted to crack cocaine
during 2010, that she often remained awake for “multiple days at a time,” and that she was
under the influence during the time surrounding the transactions.
¶15. Following trial, the chancery court issued its judgment in which it found that Patrick
fraudulently obtained the properties at issue. The court voided the challenged transactions,
awarded Tatia $300,000 in punitive damages, and sua sponte pierced the corporate veils of
Ocean Blue and Tall Pines to award the punitive damages against Patrick and David,
individually. Ocean Blue, Patrick, Tall Pines, and David filed post-trial motions, which the
court denied. David died, and his estate and Tall Pines filed a notice of appeal, as did Patrick
and Ocean Blue. During the pendency of the appeal, David’s estate settled with Tatia and
conveyed the 131 acres back to her. Tatia filed an unopposed motion to dismiss Tall Pines
and David on August 6, 2025. On August 26, 2025, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted
the motion and dismissed Tall Pines and David as parties to the appeal. On appeal, Ocean
Blue and Patrick challenge the chancellor’s findings that the properties were acquired by
fraud, punitive damages were warranted and properly awarded, and Ocean Blue’s corporate
veil should be pierced.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16. “The award of punitive damages, along with the amount of such, are within the
discretion of the trier of fact.” Woodkrest Custom Homes Inc. v. Cooper, 108 So. 3d 460,
468 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Hurst v. SW Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 708 So. 2d
1347, 1350 (Miss. 1998)). This Court has “shown great deference to [triers of fact] that have
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awarded punitive damages.” Id. (quoting Am. Income Life Ins. Co. v. Hollins, 830 So. 2d
1230, 1242 (¶44) (Miss. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So.
3d 1154, 1166 (¶46) (Miss. 2010)).
¶17. We will not disturb a chancellor’s findings of fact “unless the chancellor’s decision
is manifestly wrong or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Wells v. Wells, 394 So. 3d
1011, 1018 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). “We always review a chancellor’s findings of fact,
but will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial
evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his
discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard.”
Allen v. Dickerson, 385 So. 3d 1209, 1218 (¶35) (Miss. 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Fraud is essentially a question of fact best left for the fact-finder.” In re Miss.
Medicaid Pharm. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 190 So. 3d 829, 835 (¶9) (Miss. 2015).
¶18. Accordingly, we review the chancery court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
to determine whether the ruling was supported by substantial credible evidence. Woodkrest
Custom Homes Inc., 108 So. 3d at 468 (¶33). If the amount awarded was “arbitrary or
unreasonable, against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,” we must reverse and
remand the award for further consideration. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶19. After thoroughly reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, this Court has
determined that the issue concerning the title ownership of the real property, i.e., the 131
acres and the 640 acres, was either correctly decided or resolved by settlement. First, the
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chancellor granted summary judgment in favor of Tatia regarding the trust property after
determining that the trust was the owner of the property, not Tatia. Therefore, the chancellor
found Tatia lacked the authority to convey the trust property. We agree. See Miss. Code
Ann. § 91-8-505.4
¶20. In addition, after the final order, Tatia and Tall Pines (i.e., David) and David’s estate
entered into a settlement agreement and mutual release on March 13, 2025, resolving their
disputes regarding the 131 acres. The settlement agreement required Tall Pines to execute
a quitclaim deed returning the 131 acres to Tatia. In return, Tatia dismissed her claims
against Tall Pines and David.
I. Whether Patrick committed fraud to obtain the title to the 131
acres and the trust property.
¶21. The chancellor found that the contract supposedly signed and entered into between
Tatia and Ocean Blue on June 24, 2011, for the sale of her one-half interest in the trust
property was obtained as a result of fraud. In addition, the chancellor found that Patrick
fraudulently obtained the deed to Tatia’s 131 acres and therefore set aside that deed. The
chancellor further found and ordered that “as a direct result of [Patrick’s] fraud, the deed to
the property which Patrick Terrell sold to David Waits is held to be void and is, likewise,
hereby set aside.” The chancellor ordered the Chancery Clerk of Jefferson Davis County to
“amend the deed books to reflect this order and return full title to the property to Tatia
Marsolais immediately.” Patrick challenges these findings of fraud.
4
Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-8-505(a)(1) (Rev. 2020), the rights of beneficiaries to a trust do not rise to the level of a property interest and, under section 91-8-505(a)(4), may not be transferred.
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¶22. Under Mississippi law, to prove fraud, a party must show by clear and convincing
evidence (1) a representation (2) that is false (3) and material, (4) which the speaker knew
was false or was ignorant of the truth, (5) the speaker’s intent that the listener act on the
representation in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the listener’s ignorance of the
statement’s falsity, (7) the listener’s reliance on the statement as true, (8) the listener’s right
to rely on the statement, and (9) the listener’s proximate injury as a consequence. Gray v.
Caldwell, 904 So. 2d 212, 215 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing In re Est. of Law, 869 So.
2d 1027 (¶4) (Miss. 2004)).
¶23. Here, the record supports the chancellor’s findings of fraud. Tatia testified that
Patrick concealed portions of the 131-acre deed and misrepresented it as permission for a
land survey. Various parties throughout the record admitted that Tatia was addicted to crack
cocaine. Tatia testified that Patrick supplied her with drugs, creating a relationship that made
her vulnerable to Patrick’s alleged schemes, manipulations, and lies. Patrick’s influence over
Tatia was shown by his admission that he had Tatia’s checkbook. Patrick’s business partner,
David, admitted that he was aware of Patrick’s reputation in the community as a drug dealer.
The evidence also showed that Patrick had years of experience in the land and timber
business, to the extent that he prepared his own deeds. Tatia, on the other hand, who had no
experience in land transactions, reasonably relied upon Patrick’s representations that she was
only signing a document to survey ten acres out of the tract to secure a $25,000 loan. Patrick
and David admitted that on previous occasions they were sued over land deals that involved
Patrick defrauding vulnerable landowners, including his own sister. Despite claiming to be
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experienced, legitimate business owners, Patrick maintained little to no documentation of his
transactions with Tatia, including receipts, payment records, or any reliable evidence of a
land purchase.
¶24. Further, although Patrick provided checks to the court that he alleged to be proof of
his payments to Tatia, the banks confirmed that the checks were never cashed and even if
they were presented, Patrick did not have enough funds in his account to cover them.
¶25. Additionally, testimony from Tatia’s first attorney, Foxworth, further supports the
chancellor’s findings of fraud. Foxworth testified that Tatia retained him after she learned
that she had signed a deed conveying her fee simple interest in the 131 acres to Patrick.
According to Foxworth, the circumstances surrounding Tatia’s behavior and the land
transaction were so troubling that he withdrew as her attorney in order to testify as a witness
on her behalf. Foxworth explained that he was mailed several letters from someone
purporting to be Tatia attempting to terminate his representation; however, Tatia would
follow up with a call telling him to destroy the letters because she did not send them. The
record reflects, and Patrick also admitted, that copies of those letters were found in Patrick’s
personal folders within his prison cell. But Foxworth had never provided Patrick with a copy
of those letters. Thus, the implication was that Patrick, not Tatia, wrote the letters.
Additionally, Foxworth stated that even Patrick’s attorney provided him two conflicting
amounts paid for the land.
¶26. The chancellor found that Tatia’s testimony was credible and convincing and that
even upon cross-examination, her testimony remained “unshaken.” However, the court
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found that Patrick and David, “despite having ten years to prepare for trial, could not provide
testimony that was credible.” The record reflects that Patrick and David provided conflicting
testimony. We defer to the chancellor, who was in a far better position to determine the
credibility of witnesses, and find no reversible error. Diaz v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 283 So.
3d 265, 268 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
¶27. Based on the record, we affirm the chancellor’s finding that the land transaction arose
from “fraudulent means.” “We will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when
supported by substantial evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that the
chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an
erroneous legal standard.” Allen, 385 So. 3d at 1218 (¶35) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor, who had the
opportunity during trial to view Ocean Blue’s and Tall Pines’ conduct holistically. Knights
Marine & Indus. Servs. Inc. v. Gulfstream Enters. Inc., 216 So. 3d 1164, 1171-72 (¶25)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]n determining whether punitive damages are appropriate, the
judge decides whether, under the totality of the circumstances and viewing the defendant’s
conduct in the aggregate, a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or
gross neglect/reckless disregard.”). Accordingly, we affirm the chancellor’s finding of fraud.
II. Whether the chancellor erred in sua sponte piercing the corporate
veil and awarding punitive damages against the owners of the
LLCs.
¶28. Patrick asserts that the chancery court erred in piercing the corporate veil of Ocean
Blue and awarding punitive damages against him personally. The parties agree that Patrick
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and David were not sued individually. Patrick further contends that Tatia did not plead or
prove what is required to pierce the corporate veil.
¶29. Due process rights protect individuals who have not been made parties to the litigation
from having a court enter a judgment against them. We have held that if a plaintiff does not
sue a third party in addition to a defendant, any responsibility that the third party may have
could not result in a judgment requiring payment by the third party. Brookhaven Funeral
Home Inc. v. Hill, 820 So. 2d 3, 5 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). In that case, Hill fell and was
injured while walking from a funeral home down a sidewalk toward the street. Id. at 4 (¶2).
Although the sidewalk was owned by the City of Brookhaven, id. at (¶4), Hill sued only the
funeral home. Id. at (¶6). In discussing who may be liable for damages, we stated, “[S]ince
Hill did not herself sue the City, any responsibility that the City might have had to Hill could
not have resulted in a judgment requiring a payment from the City to Hill.” Id. at (¶8) (citing
Est. of Hunter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 729 So. 2d 1264, 1275-76 (Miss. 1999)). In Mabry v.
Howington, 569 So. 2d 1165, 1166-67 (Miss. 1990), the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated
a judgment against a wife when only her husband was sued in a boundary dispute over their
homestead. The Court held, “As to her, the judgment was wholly void and without effect.”
Id. In a case involving damages assessed against the owner of a company, Nash Plumbing
Inc. v. Shasco Wholesale Supply Inc., 875 So. 2d 1077, 1082 (¶16) (Miss. 2004), the Supreme
Court reversed a judgment against an individual owner when the plaintiff “failed to make
sufficiently particularized allegations demonstrating the applicability of the veil piercing
doctrine to the facts of the case” and “failed to plead that the court should pierce the
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corporate veil of either corporation.” In the case at hand, Patrick was not sued individually;
thus, the circuit court erred in assessing punitive damages against him.
CONCLUSION
¶30. In this case, the title to the 131 acres at issue was restored to Tatia by settlement with
David, and the chancery court correctly determined she had no authority to convey her
interest in the trust property. We affirm the chancery court’s ruling that Patrick obtained the
property by fraud. However, because Patrick was not sued individually, the chancery court
erred in assessing punitive damages against him. Accordingly, we reverse and render the
punitive damages award.
¶31. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.
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