J-S23028-26 2026 PA Super 173
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.B.A.-B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.B.A.-B., MINOR :
:
:
:
: No. 706 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Dispositional Order February 11, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-JV-0000012-2026
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2026
C.B.A.-B. (Appellant), a juvenile, appeals from the dispositional order
adjudicating him delinquent for theft by unlawful taking – immovable
property, and ordering his placement in a secure treatment facility. 1 After
careful review, we affirm.
At the relevant time, 17-year-old Appellant lived with his sister and legal
guardian (I.B.), as well as I.B.’s nine-year-old son. The juvenile court detailed
Appellant’s previous encounters in the juvenile justice system:
At the time the theft occurred, [Appellant] … was already
involved with our Juvenile Probation Department. Specifically,
[Appellant] had three additional pending cases, two of which had
been docketed in [the juvenile court]. In Case No. 133 [JV] 2025,
in which [Appellant] was charged with criminal trespass,
[Appellant] was on consent decree supervision. In Case No. 218 ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(b).
J-S23028-26
JV 2025, [Appellant] made an admission to possession of a small
amount of marijuana in Northampton County, after which the case
was transferred to [the juvenile court following the Northampton
juvenile court made] a finding of fact based on the admission. In
the third case, which has not yet made its way to [the juvenile
court], [Appellant] was charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia in Northampton County.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 2 (some capitalization modified).
The instant case arises from a report made by I.B., alleging that
Appellant stole money from I.B.’s PNC bank account using the Greenlight cell
phone application (Greenlight App). The juvenile court detailed I.B.’s
testimony concerning her use of the Greenlight App:
[I.B.] is the primary account holder, and [Appellant] is the
secondary cardholder. [I.B.] uses the Greenlight App to
electronically send money to … [Appellant], on [his] Greenlight
prepaid debit card[]…. The money is withdrawn from [I.B.’s]
linked PNC bank account, placed in her Greenlight account, and
then transferred by [I.B.] to the prepaid debit card[].
Greenlight is a[ mobile] app[lication] for parents to designate
debit cards to their children, and it allows for the transfer of funds
from the parent’s wallet to the kid’s debit card when the parent
deems that it’s been earned. So, it could be rewards, or it could
be used for trading stocks, or whatever the parent authorizes. So
the parent will have the Greenlight [A]pp. [A p]asscode will be
set up, whether it be Face ID or pin code, and at that time, the
parent will need to source the debit cards by adding funds to their
wallet. So, that wallet is connected to my PNC bank account…,
and it’s [an] instant transfer from my account to the Greenlight
[A]pp, and then I would have to transfer the money again from
th[e Greenlight A]pp onto the [debit] card.
Id. at 3 (quoting N.T., 2/10/26, at 9-10) (footnote and some paragraph
breaks omitted).
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I.B. had previously deactivated Appellant’s prepaid debit card based on
his “ongoing behavioral issues.” Id. at 4.
On January 18, 2026, [I.B.] checked her Greenlight account to
[Appellant’s] debit card and noticed several transactions, totaling
$1,122, from her Greenlight account to [Appellant’s] prepaid debit
card between January 15th and 17th. [I.B.] did not make or
approve these transactions, and no one else, aside from
[Appellant], had the means and opportunity to access [I.B.’s]
Greenlight account. Exhibits 1 and 2, the screenshots of [I.B.’s]
Greenlight [A]pp[, which detailed the account activity on
Appellant’s prepaid debit card], were admitted during [I.B.’s]
testimony …, and were used to show the transfer of money from
her PNC bank account to the Greenlight account and the pass
through to [Appellant’s] prepaid debit card. Since [Appellant’s]
card had been deactivated, reactivating it would require a change
in the settings of the primary account holder, and [I.B.] did not
make such changes. [I.B.] tried to recall the transfer of money to
[Appellant’s] prepaid card. However, the recall did not work
because the prepaid card had already been encumbered.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted; some capitalization modified).
After her discovery of this unauthorized Greenlight activity, I.B.
discovered that her PNC bank card was missing. I.B. contacted Appellant’s
juvenile probation officer, and ultimately, the police. Appellant was arrested
based upon I.B.’s report. During a search incident to his arrest, police found
I.B.’s missing bank card, which “was issued by the bank from which [I.B.’s]
money was stolen but was attached to a different account from which the
money was taken.” Id. at 2.
On January 28, 2026, the Commonwealth submitted written allegations
against Appellant, alleging Appellant committed delinquent acts in violation of
the Crimes Code (i.e., unlawful use of a computer, computer theft, criminal
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use of a communication facility, and identity theft 2). On January 30, 2026,
the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition. In addition to the offenses
previously identified, the delinquency petition alleged Appellant committed the
delinquent acts of access device fraud3 and theft by unlawful taking.
The juvenile court described what next transpired:
Given the consent decree and other pending charges,
[Appellant’s] behaviors, the theft, [Appellant’s] unlawful taking of
[I.B.’s] bank card, and the fact that the incident was the proverbial
last straw for [I.B.], [Appellant] was placed in detention.
Following a hearing, [Appellant] was continued in detention, and
an adjudication hearing was scheduled for February 10, 2026.
Id.
I.B. and Appellant’s probation officer testified during the adjudicatory
hearing. Relevantly, as detailed above, I.B. testified regarding her use of
Greenlight to transfer money to Appellant’s prepaid debit card. Through I.B.’s
testimony, the Commonwealth introduced as exhibits the above-described
screenshots taken from I.B.’s Greenlight account. Additionally, I.B. testified
that Appellant called her while he was in detention and apologized to her for
stealing money.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant admitted that he called
I.B. to apologize “for all of the chaos,” N.T., 2/10/26, at 33, but he specifically
denied acknowledging that he stole money from I.B.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7611(a)(1), 7613(a), 7512(a), 4120(a).
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1)(ii).
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At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court found the Commonwealth
had presented sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant committed the
delinquent act of theft by unlawful taking. Thereafter,
[s]ince [Appellant] and his history were known to [the juvenile
c]ourt and [the] Juvenile Probation Office, [the court] moved
immediately to disposition in this case and in case No. 218 [JV]
2025[,] in which … [Appellant] had previously made an admission.
… Specifically, after hearing from counsel for [Appellant], the
attorney for the Commonwealth, [Appellant’s] probation officer,
and [Appellant;] and following a review of the court memo
prepared by our Juvenile Probation Office, a Youth Level of Service
assessment, and records from [Appellant’s] alternative school,
[the juvenile court] adjudicated [Appellant] delinquent in this
case…. [The court’s disposition] placed [Appellant] at North
Central Secure, a state juvenile facility.
Id. at 5-6 (some capitalization modified).4, 5 Further, the juvenile court
ordered Appellant to pay I.B. $1,122.00 in restitution. Appellant did not file
a post-dispositional motion.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 12, 2026. Appellant
did not file a contemporaneous concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The following day, noting this
defect, the juvenile court issued an order granting Appellant an extension of
time in which to file his concise statement. Appellant filed his concise
4 Additionally, the juvenile court adjudicated Appellant delinquent at case No.
218 JV 2025. At case No. 133 JV 2025, upon petition by the Commonwealth, the court removed Appellant from the consent decree program and scheduled an adjudicatory hearing.
5 The dispositional order was docketed on February 11, 2026.
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statement on the same date the court issued its order. The juvenile court
subsequently filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether it was error to admit hearsay through [I.B.] regarding
account activity of the Greenlight App, in violation of Pa.R.E.
802….?
2. Whether it was error to admit the testimony of [I.B.] regarding
account activity of her PNC bank account, in violation of Pa.R.E.
1002 …, where no exhibits related to the PNC account were
presented?
3. Whether it was error to adjudicate [Appellant] delinquent based
on the alleged admission in the absence of any admissible
corroborating evidence, in violation [of] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6338(b)
…?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first claim, Appellant argues the juvenile court improperly
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 (screenshots taken from I.B.’s Greenlight App), and
I.B.’s testimony about the exhibits. Id. at 20. According to Appellant, the
exhibits and I.B.’s related testimony6 constituted inadmissible hearsay. Id.
Appellant claims “[t]he Commonwealth offered the screenshots precisely to
6 The juvenile court correctly points out that Appellant lodged a hearsay objection only regarding the exhibits themselves, and did not challenge I.B.’s testimony regarding the exhibits. Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 10; see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 213 A.3d 307, 309 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“The absence of a contemporaneous objection below constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal.”) (citation omitted). Granting a liberal interpretation of Appellant’s hearsay objection, the juvenile court limited its analysis of this issue to “the exhibits to which objections were specifically made and directly corresponding testimony.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 10. We will do the same.
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establish that these transfers occurred, that the funds reached [] Appellant,
and that, therefore, he was the one who made them.” Id. at 21.
Appellant also asserts the juvenile court misinterpreted our Supreme
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 289 A.3d 894 (Pa. 2023),
and the court incorrectly cited Wallace for the proposition that any computergenerated evidence contained in digital form is not hearsay. Appellant’s Brief
at 22. Instead, Appellant argues that the Greenlight account transaction
history depicted in the exhibits “reflected transfers initiated by a user,
identified account holders, and label indicating that funds were sent to []
Appellant’s account.” Id. at 23; see also id. at 24 (“Appellant maintains …
those entries were created only because a human being affirmatively entered
instructions into the application to move money from [I.B.’s] linked PNC
account to another Greenlight account.”). Appellant claims that in light of her
theft claims, I.B. had no personal knowledge regarding the transfers. Id. at
28.
Further, Appellant contends the exhibits contained hearsay within
hearsay. Id. at 29 (citing Pa.R.E. 805 (providing that “[h]earsay within
hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”)). According
to Appellant, both steps in the transfer process (i.e., funds being withdrawn
from I.B.’s PNC account, and the funds being transferred to Appellant’s
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account using the Greenlight App) required the Commonwealth to establish
the applicability of an exception to the rule against hearsay. Id.7
We adhere to the following standard of review:
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the
sound discretion of the trial court[,] and we will not reverse a trial
court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a
conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law,
discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court
to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
As defined by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, hearsay is “a
statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). Additionally, a statement
is “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the
person intended it as an assertion.” Pa.R.E. 801(a). Hearsay is not admissible
absent the applicability of a delineated exception. Pa.R.E. 802.
7 Appellant did not object on the basis of Rule 805 during the adjudicatory hearing, and therefore, any hearsay within hearsay argument is waived. See Smith, 213 A.3d at 309; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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As our Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace is central to both
Appellant’s argument and the juvenile court’s reasoning, we begin by
summarizing the decision. In Wallace, surveillance video recovered during
an investigation into a shooting placed the appellant and his co-defendant in
the area before the shooting. Wallace, 289 A.3d at 896. The video also
depicted the appellant retrieving a firearm from a vehicle. Id. Significantly,
the co-defendant was wearing a GPS ankle monitor on the date of the
shooting, and police used data recovered from the monitor to “piec[e]
together the whereabouts” of the appellant and his co-defendant during the
relevant time period. Id.
Prior to trial, the appellant unsuccessfully litigated a motion in limine to
exclude the GPS data from evidence. Id. When the Commonwealth
introduced the GPS data during trial, the appellant objected, arguing the data
constituted inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 897.8 The trial court overruled the
objection, concluding the GPS records were admissible under the business
records exception to the rule against hearsay. Id. Alternatively, the trial
8 Outside the presence of the jury, the Commonwealth offered testimony from
the co-defendant’s parole officer, as well as David Dethlefsen (Dethlefsen), an employee for the company that supplied the GPS monitoring equipment to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Wallace, 289 A.3d at 897. Dethlefsen testified that the company maintains records generated from its GPS tracking equipment. Id. at 898. Dethlefsen also explained that the records are generated without human intervention and compiled in the regular course of business. Id.
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court opined that the GPS data did not constitute hearsay because it is not an
assertion made by a person. Id. at 899.
Ultimately, our Supreme Court held the GPS data “is not hearsay
because it does not constitute a statement made by a declarant, as outlined
in Rule 801, as it is not an assertion (or the nonverbal conduct) of a person.”
Id. at 895; see also id. at 908. The Wallace Court explained that “the
language in Rule 801 is clear: a statement is a written or oral assertion of a
person.” Id. at 904 (emphasis in original). Defining the relevant “assertion”
as the GPS location data, the Court concluded the assertion was collected
electronically rather than by a person. Id.
Moreover, the Wallace Court reasoned that its
conclusion that GPS data is not hearsay comports with the
purpose of the rule against hearsay, especially as it pertains to a
defendant’s right to confrontation. … [H]earsay statements are
generally inadmissible because their introduction robs a defendant
of his ability to cross-examine the declarant to test his
truthfulness or challenge his statements—but a machine cannot
be cross-examined. Accordingly, the best way to advance the
truth-seeking process with respect to such statements is not
through cross-examination of the machine operator, but through
the process of authentication.
Id. at 907 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In the instant case, Appellant generally objected to the admission of the
screenshots as hearsay.9 See N.T., 2/10/26, at 11 (Appellant’s counsel
9 Appellant did not challenge the authentication of the exhibits, nor did Appellant object on the grounds that I.B.’s testimony concerning the exhibits required specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by a lay witness.
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stating, “I will object as hearsay. While [I.B.] may be able to authenticate her
account history, I think the facts of these transfers are something that would
be beyond her personal knowledge.”).
As the juvenile court reasoned, “the challenged documents—
screenshots of the Greenlight App—are not hearsay because … the data was
collected electronically and the transaction histories were generated by a
computer, not a person, in the ordinary course of business.” Juvenile Court
Opinion, 4/17/26, at 14. The screenshots merely depict the transaction
history related to Appellant’s Greenlight account. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertions, the screenshots do not, by themselves, suggest that Appellant is
the individual who made the transfers. We agree with the juvenile court that
the exhibits were automatically generated records, much like those at issue in
Wallace. The transaction history was not made or compiled by a person, but
rather was generated electronically through a cell phone application.
Therefore, the exhibits do not constitute statements as defined in Rule 801,
and are not hearsay. See Wallace, 289 A.3d at 899; see also
Commonwealth v. Grubbs, 330 A.3d 444, 451 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(concluding that cell-site location information, which is compiled electronically
and not made by a person, cannot be hearsay).
Further, the juvenile court aptly considered and rejected Appellant’s
argument that I.B.’s testimony regarding the exhibits constituted hearsay:
[I.B.’s corresponding] testimony itself was not hearsay. It
covered only matters about which [I.B.] had personal
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knowledge[,] as she set up, used, and owned the PNC bank
account, Greenlight account, and Greenlight App, and prepaid
[debit] cards[. I.B. also] independently determined that the
amounts shown on the exhibits had been withdrawn from her bank
account and then passed through to … [Appellant’s] prepaid
[debit] card, without her knowledge or permission. The account
histories captured by the screenshots were produced
autonomously by the Greenlight App. [I.B.] did not testify as to
the details of a specialized or technical procedure. Further, as in
Wallace, [Appellant] did not raise an authentication challenge
and did not otherwise dispute the authenticity of the documents.
Indeed, counsel for [Appellant] conceded, or all but conceded,
that [I.B.] could authenticate her account history.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 14-15 (citations omitted; some
capitalization modified).
Upon review, we discern no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion in
admitting the exhibits. We further agree with the court’s application of the
Wallace decision to the instant case. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim
merits no relief.
In his second claim, Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by
permitting I.B. to testify that the funds identified in the Greenlight App were
taken from her PNC bank account. Appellant’s Brief at 31. Appellant argues
that the best evidence rule required the Commonwealth to offer I.B.’s PNC
account records and statements. Id. (citing Pa.R.E. 1002). According to
Appellant, “the PNC bank records were closely related to a controlling issue
because the Commonwealth was required to show that [I.B.] was deprived of
the money in order to prove its case for theft by unlawful taking.” Id. at 32
(some capitalization modified).
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Appellant claims the fact that the funds were withdrawn from I.B.’s PNC
account could only be established through production of her electronic
statements or transaction history. Id. at 34. Appellant also argues the
exhibits cannot satisfy Rule 1002 because Greenlight is a third-party
application which summarizes transactions. Id. Additionally, Appellant
contends the Commonwealth failed to establish that the original PNC records
were unavailable. Id. In sum, Appellant argues, permitting I.B. to testify
that the funds at issue were taken from her PNC bank account “effectively
permitted the Commonwealth to prove the contents of an unproduced writing
through oral testimony, the precise practice Rule 1002 prohibits.” Id. at 35.
As set forth above, we review the juvenile court’s evidentiary ruling to
determine whether the court abused its discretion. See LeClair, supra.
The best evidence rule provides that “[a]n original writing … is required
in order to prove its content unless,” inter alia, “the writing … is not closely
related to a controlling issue.” Pa.R.E. 1002, 1004(d). Under our Rules of
Evidence, “[a] ‘writing’ consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent
set down in any form.” Pa.R.E. 1001(a). An “original” writing is defined as
“the writing … itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by
the person who executed or issued it. For electronically stored information,
‘original’ means any printout—or other output readable by sight—if it
accurately reflects the information.” Id. 1001(d).
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Copies of an original writing may be designated as “counterparts” or
“duplicates.” “[A] ‘counterpart’ is included within Rule 1001(d)’s definition of
an ‘original’ when it is ‘intended to have the same effect as the writing or
recording itself.’” Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d 485, 531 (Pa. 2021)
(quoting Pa.R.E. 1001(d)). By contrast, a “duplicate” is “a copy produced by
a mechanical, photograph, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process
or technique that accurately reproduces the original.” Pa.R.E. 1001(e).
“Despite its subordinate designation, duplicates are not disfavored under the
modern rule….” Talley, 265 A.3d at 531. “A duplicate is admissible to the
same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the
original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the
duplicate.” Pa.R.E. 1003.
Here, there is no dispute the transaction histories depicted in the
exhibits constitute “writings” under Rule 1001(a). Thus, the best evidence
rule applies if the writings are “closely related to a controlling issue.” Pa.R.E.
1004(d). “[A] close relation under Rule 1004(d) exists when the content of a
writing is ‘operative,’ or when the content is ‘dispositive’ of a controlling issue.”
Talley, 265 A.3d at 533 (citing Pa.R.E. 1002, Cmt.); see also id. (“A writing’s
mere relevance to a controlling issue is not enough.”). “In the context of a
criminal case, this often means that the best-evidence rule applies to a writing
only if the Commonwealth must prove the contents of the writing … to
establish the elements of its case.” Id. (citation omitted).
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We pause briefly to revisit the content of Appellant’s argument. The gist
of Appellant’s claim is that the exhibits were inadmissible under the best
evidence rule, because the Commonwealth instead should have offered I.B.’s
PNC records. Appellant then analyzes whether the PNC records, not the
proffered exhibits depicting the Greenlight App transaction histories, are
closely related to a controlling issue. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 34
(asserting that the Commonwealth was required to produced I.B.’s PNC
account transaction history or electronic statements, “not [her] paraphrase of
what they allegedly showed”). Appellant fails to address whether the exhibits
are counterparts or duplicates of the original Greenlight transaction histories.
In sum, Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth should have offered an
entirely different form of evidence is not a proper best-evidence challenge.
Importantly, the Commonwealth did not offer the exhibits to establish
that the funds transferred to Appellant’s prepaid debit card were withdrawn
from I.B.’s PNC account. Instead, the exhibits detailed the series of
withdrawals from and deposits to Appellant’s Greenlight account. The fact
that the funds had been withdrawn from I.B.’s PNC account was not
established until she provided additional testimony to confirm that the
amounts of those withdrawals mirrored the amounts taken from her personal
bank account, and which she did not authorize.
As the juvenile court concluded,
there was simply no need for records from [I.B.’s] PNC bank
account because the Commonwealth was not trying to prove the
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content of [I.B.’s] PNC bank statements. The issue was whether
[Appellant] stole money from [I.B.], not whether funds were in
[I.B.’s] bank account, what funds were there, or what her bank
statements showed. [I.B.] opened, owned, and controlled her
PNC bank account (and Green[l]ight account and the Greenlight
[A]pp) and was competent, capable, and qualified to testify,
without any documentary backup, that money was taken from
that account without her knowledge or permission. The best
evidence rule does not require … that [I.B.] or the Commonwealth
provide bank statements to demonstrate that money was
removed from her account. At most, the absence of supporting
or backup documents goes to the weight of [I.B.’s] testimony …,
not its admissibility.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 15-16. We agree with the juvenile court’s
analysis and conclusion. Because Appellant’s argument (i.e., the
Commonwealth was required to offer additional evidence) is not consistent
with the best evidence rule, his second claim lacks merit.
In his third claim, Appellant argues the juvenile court failed to apply the
corpus delicti rule. See Appellant’s Brief at 36-41. Citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6338, Appellant asserts that I.B.’s testimony concerning Appellant’s alleged
apology during a phone call was not, in itself, sufficient to support his
adjudication. Appellant’s Brief at 39-40. Appellant characterizes the
statements he made during the phone call as “ambiguous” at best. Id. at 39-40.
Appellant again challenges the exhibits’ admissibility, and contends that
without proper documentary evidence establishing the unauthorized transfer
of funds from I.B.’s PNC bank account to an account controlled by Appellant,
the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of theft by unlawful taking.
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Id. at 39. Further, Appellant points out that the debit card found during the
search incident to his arrest—though belonging to I.B.—was not the card
related to the alleged delinquent acts. Id. at 40.
Application of the corpus delicti rule is an evidentiary ruling. See
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410 (Pa. Super. 2012). As
such, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See
LeClair, supra.
Section 6338(b) of the Juvenile Act provides as follows:
A child charged with a delinquent act need not be a witness
against or otherwise incriminate himself. An extrajudicial
statement, if obtained in the course of violation of this chapter or
which could be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal
proceeding, shall not be used against him. Evidence illegally
seized or obtained shall not be received over objection to establish
the allegations made against him. A confession validly made by
a child out of court at a time when the child is under 18 years of
age shall be insufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency
unless it is corroborated by other evidence.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6338(b). “Simply put, the Commonwealth cannot convict a
defendant [or adjudicate a juvenile delinquent based] solely upon their
confession.” Interest of K.D.-Z., 330 A.3d 831, 838 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(citation omitted).
This Court has explained the corpus delicti rule as follows:
The corpus delicti rule places the burden of proof on the
Commonwealth to introduce extrajudicial admissions into
evidence. To do so, the Commonwealth must establish by
independent evidence that a crime has in fact been committed.
The commission of the crime must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence in order for a confession to be admissible.
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The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against the
hasty and unguarded character which is often attached to
confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a
conviction where no crime has in fact been committed. Where the
requirements of the corpus delicti rule have not been met, a case
cannot be submitted to the finder of fact.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Dewald, 317 A.3d
1020, 1035 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“The corpus delicti is literally the body of the
crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred because of the
criminal conduct of someone.” (citation omitted)).
Further,
[e]stablishing the corpus delicti rule in Pennsylvania is a two-step
process. The first step concerns the trial judge’s admission of the
accused’s statements, and the second step concerns the fact
finder’s consideration of those statements. For the statement to
be admitted, the Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti by
a preponderance of the evidence. For the statement to be
considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must establish
the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dewald, 317 A.3d at 1035 (citation and brackets omitted).
Instantly, as the juvenile court states in its opinion, Appellant did not
raise a corpus delicti objection, at his adjudicatory hearing, when I.B. testified
concerning Appellant’s alleged confession. Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26,
at 18; see also Pa.R.E. 103(a) (providing that to preserve a claim of error
regarding the admission of evidence, the record must reflect a timely
objection, motion to strike, or motion in limine, and the specific ground must
be stated); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Indeed, Appellant lodged
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no objections during the relevant portion of I.B.’s testimony. In his closing
argument, Appellant’s counsel argued the alleged confession had a “severe
credibility issue,” N.T., 2/10/26, at 36, but did not argue I.B.’s testimony was
inadmissible under the corpus delicti rule. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Chambliss, 847 A.2d 115, 121 (Pa. Super. 2004) (concluding the appellant
did not waive his challenge under the corpus delicti rule by failing to raise a
timely objection, where the appellant’s counsel challenged the admissibility of
the confession during closing argument, prior to the fact finder’s
deliberations). We therefore agree with the juvenile court that Appellant’s
final issue is waived.
Even if Appellant had properly preserved his claim, we would conclude
it lacks merit for the reasons stated by the juvenile court:
The corpus delicti of theft by unlawful taking is that a person
unlawfully took property of another with the intent to deprive the
owner of the property—the unlawful taking of property due to
criminal conduct. The Commonwealth satisfied this showing
before [I.B.] testified that [Appellant] apologized for stealing her
money.
… [B]efore the apology/admission was admitted, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that without the knowledge,
permission, consent, or approval of [I.B.], money had been
unlawfully taken from her PNC bank account and passed through
her Greenlight account via the Greenlight App to the prepaid debit
card she had set up for [Appellant], and then spent. Standing
alone, this evidence established the corpus delicti of theft. But
this evidence did not stand alone. In addition, the prepaid card,
which had been deactivated, was reactivated to allow the theft to
occur. This also occurred without the knowledge or consent of
[I.B.] Moreover, at the time the money was taken, the only other
person who had the means and opportunity to access [I.B.’s]
phone, through which the Greenlight App could in turn be
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accessed[,] … was [Appellant]. Further, when [Appellant] was
arrested[, I.B.’s] missing PNC bank card was found in his jacket
pocket. He did not have permission to have or use that card. This
evidence was clearly sufficient [to establish,] beyond a reasonable
doubt[,] that the crime of theft by unlawful taking had occurred.
It was also strong circumstantial evidence that [Appellant]
committed the crime.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 19 (citations omitted; some capitalization
modified).
We additionally emphasize that Section 6338(b) prohibits sole reliance
on a juvenile’s confession. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6338(b) (“A confession validly made
by a child out of court … shall be insufficient to support an adjudication of
delinquency unless it is corroborated by other evidence.”) (emphasis
added); see also Interest of K.D.-Z., 330 A.3d at 838. As the juvenile court
aptly noted, Appellant’s adjudication was supported by more than just his
confession to I.B., and we have rejected Appellant’s evidentiary challenges to
the corroborating evidence. Accordingly, even if Appellant had preserved a
corpus delicti challenge before the juvenile court, it would lack merit.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional
order adjudicating Appellant delinquent and ordering his placement in a secure
facility.
Order affirmed.
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Date: 8/4/2026
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