J-A18034-25 2026 PA Super 175
BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA :
O'DONNELL, DECEASED :
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. : No. 259 EDA 2024
:
:
VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON :
MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER, :
LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, :
IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, :
BM REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, :
LLC D/B/A BRINTON MANOR :
NURSING AND REHABILITATION :
CENTER, BH OPCO HOLDCO, LLC, :
IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, :
LLC, AND CHAIM STEG :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2020-008216
BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA :
O'DONNELL, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 260 EDA 2024
VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON :
MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER, :
LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, :
IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, :
BM REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, :
J-A18034-25
LLC D/B/A BRINTON MANOR :
NURSING AND REHABILITATION :
CENTER, BH OPCO HOLDCO, LLC, :
IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, :
LLC, AND CHAIM STEG :
:
:
APPEAL OF: BM REHAB AND :
NURSING CENTER, LLC D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHAB CENTER :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2020-008216
BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA :
O'DONNELL, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 284 EDA 2024
VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON :
MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL :
HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL :
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM :
REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC :
D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING :
AND REHABILITATION CENTER, :
LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, :
BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG :
:
:
APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR :
CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON :
MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024
-2-J-A18034-25
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2020-008216
BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA :
O'DONNELL, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 654 EDA 2024
VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON :
MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL :
HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL :
HEALTCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM :
REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC :
D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING :
AND REHABILITATION CENTER, :
LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, :
BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG :
:
:
APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR :
CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON :
MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2020-008216
BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA :
O'DONNELL, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 660 EDA 2024
:
-3-J-A18034-25
VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON :
MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A :
BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL :
HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL :
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM :
REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC :
D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING :
AND REHABILITATION CENTER, :
LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, :
BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG :
:
:
APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR :
CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON :
MANOR NURSING AND :
REHABILITATION CENTER
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2020-008216
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2026
In these cross-appeals, Appellants, Bevin Newlin and Stacey Loehrs, coadministrators of the Estate of Patricia O’Donnell (“Decedent”) (collectively,
“Estate”); Cross-Appellants, Vita Healthcare Group (“Vita”) and Brinton Manor
SNF, LLC f/d/b/a Brinton Manor Nursing & Rehabilitation Center (“BM-SNF”)
(collectively, “Vita Entities”); and Cross-Appellants, Imperial Healthcare
Group, LLC, Imperial Healthcare Services, LLC (“Imperial”), and BM Rehab
and Nursing Center, LLC d/b/a Brinton Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation
Center (“BM Rehab”) (collectively “Imperial Entities”), appeal from the June
7, 2024 judgment entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in
-4-J-A18034-25
this nursing home negligence action. During the relevant time, BM-SNF and
BM Rehab were the operators of the nursing home (collectively referred to as
“Operating Company Defendants”) and Imperial and Vita provided
management services (collectively referred to as “Management Company
Defendants”). After careful review, we:
1. Affirm the trial court’s grant of a motion for JNOV in favor of the
Management Company Defendants;1
2. Affirm the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants
Motion for JNOV on sufficiency of the evidence grounds;
3. Affirm the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’
Motion for a New Trial based on evidentiary challenges;
4. Reverse the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendant’s
Motion for a New Trial and remand for a new trial on compensatory
damages; and
5. Reverse the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’
Motion to Vacate the Punitive Damages Award. 2
1 We note that we are troubled by the poor care that the various entities provided to Decedent; we, however, are constrained, to affirm the trial court’s grant of a JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants because the Estate failed to establish corporate liability against them as a matter of law. This is not an indication, however, that we sanction the Management Company Defendants’ conduct.
2 Richard Scampone and The Pennsylvania Association of Justice have filed
amicus briefs regarding these cross-appeals.
-5-J-A18034-25
The relevant facts and procedural history, as gleaned from our review
of the record, are as follows. In early 2018, Decedent, who suffered from
health problems, began to experience increased difficulty in managing her
diabetes, resulting in decreased mobility and exposing her to an increased
risk of falling. Because of these safety concerns, on March 18, 2018,
Decedent became a resident of Brinton Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation
Center (“Brinton Manor”),3 which, at the time, was owned by an entity called
Genesis.4
On June 1, 2018, BM-SNF purchased Brinton Manor from Genesis and
contracted with Vita to manage the facility. On July 1, 2019, 21 days prior to
Decedent’s final day of residency at Brinton Manor, BM Rehab purchased
Brinton Manor from BM-SNF and Imperial assumed management
responsibilities.5 A licensed nursing home administrator was in place at
Brinton Manor at all relevant times.
3 Decedent remained a resident of Brinton Manor until July 21, 2019.
4 Genesis is not a party to this action.
5 By way of background, the management agreements required, inter alia, the
Management Company Defendants to prepare a budget for operating the facility for the Operating Company Defendants’ approval and to provide various services for the operation of the facility including pharmacy, consults, resident relations, maintaining visibility of a management presence, helping with personnel, and service contracts. See N.T., 1/18/23, at 123-25, 127-28. In exchange for providing these services, BN-SNF paid Vita more than $432,000 in management fees and for the fiscal year 2019, BM Rehab paid Imperial $484,000. Id. at 125-26, 128.
-6-J-A18034-25
In December 2018, Decedent fell, fractured her hip, and required
surgery. Brinton Manor staff documented the fall and created an event report
that Brinton Manor’s director of nursing, Bridget Alvanos, filed with the
Pennsylvania Department of Health that represented that the care plan in
place for Decedent was appropriate at the time of her fall. When Decedent
returned to Brinton Manor after her surgery, its staff evaluated Decedent and
updated her care plan.
Following her fall, Decedent’s general condition began to worsen,
including Decedent suffering from anxiety, depression, malnutrition, and skin
deterioration, which caused her to develop a painful stage-four sacral wound.
Decedent required extensive assistance from at least two staff members for
services such as bed mobility, turning and repositioning in bed, transferring
into and out of bed to a chair, toilet use, and personal hygiene. As a result of
Decedent’s increased level of anxiety and depression—conditions which
Brinton Manor’s nurses and physical therapists documented in Decedent’s
records—Decedent was transferred to an inpatient psychiatric facility for a
short period of time. She returned to Brinton Manor on March 12, 2019.
Brinton Manor’s records reflect that, after her return to Brinton Manor,
Decedent remained anxious, particularly about falling, and was incontinent of
bowel and bladder, but had no skin breakdown.
In April 2019, Decedent again suffered a fall. Around the same time, a
dietician noted in Brinton Manor’s records that Decedent was losing weight
and she had lost her dentures. Records also reflect that around June and July
-7-J-A18034-25
2019, Decedent required at least one skilled intervention because she did not
have dentures and, thus, was unable to chew certain foods. Brinton Manor’s
dietitian recommended that Decedent receive nutritional supplements, and a
staff member referred Decedent to speech and occupational therapy.
Meanwhile, in May 2019, Decedent developed pressure ulcers and
Brinton Manor’s records reflect, and Decedent’s family reported to staff, that
Decedent was in pain. A wound physician, who was an independent
contractor, saw Decedent weekly, and her pressure wounds had healed by
July 2, 2019.6
Decedent developed additional pressure wounds, however, and, on July
21, 2019, an ambulance transported her to Riddle Hospital for treatment for
an infected, stage-four sacral wound. Eventually, the pain caused by the
sacral wound became difficult to manage due to the wound’s location and
extent, resulting in Decedent’s placement on hospice on August 1, 2019, and
death on August 5, 2019. The Delaware County medical examiner concluded
that Decedent’s immediate cause of death was hydromorphone intoxication
due to the palliative care that she received while receiving hospice care, and
6The wound care physician who treated Decedent testified that he did not have any concerns that Brinton Manor had not taken proper steps to prevent Decedent from developing facility-acquired pressure wounds or that Decedent had not received proper care from the nursing staff. N.T., 11/18/23, at 321.
-8-J-A18034-25
the proximate cause of her death was complications from the sacral decubitus
ulcer.7
During the time Decedent resided at Brinton Manor, the facility received
citations for various deficiencies, including deficiencies for care planning,
nutrition, hydration, and pain management; none of the deficiencies,
however, were based on the care provided to Decedent.
On December 14, 2020, the Estate initiated this nursing home
negligence case, alleging that, while she was a resident Brinton Manor,
Decedent sustained a series of injuries that ultimately resulted in her death.
The Estate alleged that, inter alia, changes in ownership and management of
Brinton Manor, high turnover in administration and nursing staff, and lack of
implementation of nursing policies and procedures affected the continuity of
Decedent’s care. The Estate alleged claims of negligence (through vicarious
liability) and corporate negligence against all the Defendants. The Estate
sought compensatory and punitive damages under Pennsylvania’s wrongful
death and survival statutes.
Following discovery, the parties filed numerous motions in limine,
including, on December 1, 2022, the Defendants’ joint motions to preclude
the Estate from admitting into evidence certain Pennsylvania Department of
Health Survey Reports (“Survey Reports”) and the “Nursing Home Compare”
7 A Riddle Hospital doctor’s records reported Decedent’s cause of death as sepsis, osteomyelitis, and severe protein malnutrition.
-9-J-A18034-25
Five-Star Ratings Profile (“Profile Evidence”) derived from the Medicare.gov
website.
On January 3, 2023, the trial court entered orders denying both motions
in limine, explaining that the contested evidence was relevant to the Estate’s
corporate negligence claims. Trial Ct. Order, 1/3/23, at 2. The court further
agreed with the Estate that “any ‘unfair prejudice’ to [the Defendants] . . .
can be cured with a limiting instruction to the jury.” Id. at 3. Furthermore,
the court left open the opportunity for the Defendants to object on a different
basis at trial. Id.
Trial commenced with jury selection on January 17, 2023. Relevant to
the instant appeal, the Estate presented the testimony of numerous witnesses,
including expert testimony from nurse Suzanne Frederick, who testified
regarding standard-of-care and breaches thereof; Ernest Tosh, J.D., by
videotaped deposition, regarding staffing analysis and cost-reporting analysis
for nursing homes, and Dr. David Seignious, an expert in internal medicine
and geriatrics, regarding, inter alia, the cause of Decedent’s death.
On February 2, 2023, the jury returned a verdict of $4,000,000 in
compensatory damages in favor of the Estate. In particular, the jury awarded
the Estate:
$600,000 from BM-SNF
$2,400,000 from Vita
$800,000 from BM Rehab
$200,000 from Imperial.
- 10 -J-A18034-25
The jury also assessed $15,000,000 in punitive damages. In particular,
the jury imposed the following punitive damages:
$5,000,000 against BM-SNF
$6,500,000 against Vita
$2,000,000 against BM Rehab
$1,500,000 against Imperial.
On February 6, 2023, the Defendants filed post-trial motions raising
numerous grounds for relief.
On June 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the post-trial motions.
Notably, and crucial to our analysis, counsel for the Estate clarified which
theory of liability the Estate asserted against the Management Company
Defendants and which theory it asserted against the Operating Company
Defendants. In particular, counsel informed the court that the Estate was only
pursuing a theory of corporate negligence against the Management Company
Defendants and not pursuing a claim of negligence based on vicarious liability.
Against the Operating Company Defendants, the Estate informed the trial
court that it was only pursuing a claim of vicarious liability. See N.T., 6/6/23,
at 182-83.) (where the Estate’s counsel explains that “to be clear, the
[M]anagement [Company Defendants] were always just corporate negligence
or direct negligence and then the [Operating Company Defendants] had
vicarious [liability]. For punitives we had conceded we were only seeking for
the direct [(corporate)] negligence for all four [Defendants].”) In other words,
counsel for the Estate clarified that it was only pursuing a theory of vicarious
- 11 -J-A18034-25
liability against the Operating Company Defendants and a theory of corporate
negligence against the Management Company Defendants.
Following its consideration of the arguments presented in the parties’
motions and briefs, and the above clarification by the Estate’s counsel, the
trial court granted post-trial motions in part. In particular, the trial court
granted the motion for JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants
on the grounds that the Scampone cases8 precluded the Estate as a matter
of law from establishing corporate liability against the Management Company
Defendants. It found that, since counsel for the Estate informed the trial court
that it was not pursuing a theory of vicarious liability against the Management
Company Defendants, and the Estate could not as a matter of law pursue a
theory of corporate negligence against the Management Company
Defendants, the Estate failed to establish any legal liability against the
Management Company Defendants and, thus, the Management Company
Defendants were entitled to JNOV as a matter of law.
The court, however, denied the motions for JNOV that the Operating
Company Defendants filed, concluding that the Estate had established that
the Operating Company Defendants were vicariously liable for the negligence
of their employees.
8 Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012)
and Scampone v. Grane Healthcare, Co., 169 A.3d 600 (Pa. Super. 2017), discussed infra.
- 12 -J-A18034-25
The trial court also remitted the jury’s assessment of punitive damages
against BM Rehab from $2,000,000 to $385,000, based on its finding that “the
$2,000,000 punitive damages award . . . is grossly excessive and shocks the
[c]ourt’s sense of justice.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 41. The trial court
reasoned that since BM Rehab only provided services to the Decedent for 21
days, a reasonable punitive damage award should reflect the pro rata time
that BM Rehab provided services to the Decedent.9 Id.
On January 3, 2024, the trial court entered an order molding the verdict.
Following the entry of judgment, the parties filed appeals and cross-appeals.
The Estate raises the following three issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in granting [JNOV] on [the Estate’s]
negligence claims against Vita []?
2. Did the trial court err in granting [JNOV] on [the Estate’s]
negligence claims against Imperial []?
3. Did the trial court err in remitting the punitive damages award
against BM Rehab?
Estate’s Br. at 5.
The Vita Entities raise the following two issues as cross-appellants:
1. Did the trial court correctly grant JNOV in Vita’s favor on [the
Estate’s] negligence claims after [the Estate] renounced any
claim for vicarious liability, failed to prove that Vita owed, let
alone breached, a duty under Thompson v. Nason that
caused Decedent’s harm and, accordingly, failed to establish a
basis for corporate negligence against Vita?
9 The court also awarded the Estate $201,205.48 in delay damages.
- 13 -J-A18034-25
2. Did the trial court correctly grant JNOV in Vita’s favor on [the
Estate’s] negligence claims after [the Estate] failed to adduce
expert testimony to support a corporate negligence claim
against Vita?
Brief of Vita and BM-SNF (“Vita Entities’ Br.”) at 1-2.
Imperial raises the following two issues as cross-appellant:
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted JNOV and vacated the
judgment against Imperial after [the Estate]: (i) failed to prove
that Imperial was liable under a corporate negligence theory
and (ii) expressly renounced any vicarious liability claims
against this consulting company?
2. Whether the trial court correctly remitted the punitive damages
award against BM Rehab [] where the evidence did not support
the original excessive and shocking $2 million punitive
damages award, particularly where BM Rehab [] was only
involved with the facility for 21 days during Decedent’s stay?
Brief of Imperial and BM Rehab (“Imperial Entities’ Br.”) at 5.
BM-SNF raises the following issues as cross-appellant:
1. Did the trial court err in denying BM-SNF[’s] request for JNOV
in circumstances where [the Estate] waived and/or abandoned
any corporate negligence claim against this operator and also
failed to prove a basis for vicarious liability against it?
2. Did the trial court err in denying [BM-SNF’s] request to vacate
or dramatically reduce the punitive damages award in
circumstances where [the Estate] failed to establish the level
of wanton and willful conduct to justify an award of punitive
damages against this entity and where, in any event, the
amount of the punitive damages award was excessive?
3. Did the trial court err in denying [BM-SNF’s] request for a new
trial, either because two of four defendants were dismissed
from the case and the liability previously apportioned to those
dismissed defendants was reapportioned inconsistent with the
jury’s verdict, usurping its role, in a manner fundamentally
unfair to the two remaining [d]efendants, or else because the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the “Nursing Home
Compare” Five-Star Rating Profile and Department of Health
Survey Reports?
- 14 -J-A18034-25
Vita Entities’ Br. at 29-30 (emphasis omitted).
BM Rehab raises the following issues as cross-appellant:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request
for JNOV in circumstances where [the Estate] admitted that
they did not pursue a corporate negligence claim against BM
Rehab[] and failed to prove a basis for vicarious liability against
this entity?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request
to vacate the punitive damages award where [the Estate] failed
to establish the necessary wanton and willful conduct by BM
Rehab[] to warrant such extraordinary damages, and an
amount of punitive damages in any measure was not justified?
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request
for a new trial where the judgment against two of four
[d]efendants was vacated, and the trial court entered
judgment in the full compensatory amount against the
remaining two [d]efendants, thereby imposing on them a
higher judgment (dollar-wise) than that which the jury
intended?
4. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request
for a new trial to ameliorate the prejudice caused when the trial
court impermissibly admitted irrelevant, prejudicial, and
hearsay evidence of a “Nursing Home Compare” Five-Star
Rating Profile and Department of Health Survey Report that
was issued prior to BM Rehab’s operation of the facility?
Imperial Entities’ Br. at 39-40.
***
Standard of Review for Trial Court’s Grant and Denial of Motion for JNOV
Each of the parties raise issues challenging the trial court’s disposition
of the various motions for entry of JNOV. “We review the [grant or] denial of
a request for JNOV for an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case
or an abuse of discretion.” Caranci v. Monsanto Co., 338 A.3d 151, 160
- 15 -J-A18034-25
(Pa. Super. 2025). “In this context, an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial
court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
There are two bases upon which a movant is entitled to JNOV: “one, the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence
was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome
should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Rohm and Haas Co. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that the Management Company Defendants
were entitled to JNOV as a matter of law.
***
Entry of JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants
In this case, the Estate pursued only a theory of corporate negligence,
and not one of vicarious liability, against the Management Company
Defendants. The trial court granted JNOV in favor of the Management
Company Defendants, reasoning that as a matter of law, the theory of
corporate negligence only applies to the Operating Company Defendants and
not the Management Company Defendants. Since the Estate only pursued a
corporate negligence theory against the Management Company Defendants,
the trial court concluded that it properly granted the motion for JNOV in their
favor. We agree.
- 16 -J-A18034-25
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first adopted a theory of corporate
liability against a healthcare provider in Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591
A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991). The Supreme Court explained the concept as a “doctrine
under which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of
care owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being
while at the hospital.” Id. at 707. The Supreme Court categorized the scope
of that duty into four categories:
1. A duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and equipment;
2. A duty to select and retain only competent physicians;
3. A duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls
as to patient care; and
4. A duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies
to ensure quality care for the patients.
Id. (formatting altered and internal citations omitted) (the “Thompson
duties”). The Supreme Court highlighted that this “theory of liability creates
a nondelegable duty which the hospital owes directly to a patient.” Id.
In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the applicability of
corporate liability and the Thompson duties to a nursing home in Scampone
v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012) (“Scampone
II”). In Scampone II, the plaintiff attempted to extend corporate liability to
the operator of a skilled nursing facility and an affiliated management
company. The Supreme Court agreed that a nursing home could be subject
- 17 -J-A18034-25
to corporate liability, holding that “a nursing home and affiliated entities are
subject to potential direct liability for negligence, where the requisite residententity relationship exists to establish that the entity owes the resident a duty
of care.” Id. at 584. The Supreme Court found that if the “requisite residententity relationship” exists to create a duty, the scope of the duty includes
duties “such as duties to maintain safe facilities[] and to hire and oversee
competent staff.” Id. at 598.10 The Supreme Court remanded the case back
to the trial court to determine “whether the requisite relationship exists
between the respective parties” and “any specific duties owed by [the nursing
home operator] or [the nursing home management company] to residents like
Ms. Scampone.” Id. at 607.
Upon remand, the trial court, inter alia, re-entered a compulsory nonsuit in favor of Grane Healthcare Company, the management company, on the
grounds that the management company had only agreed to provide services
to the operating company and had not agreed to provide care and treatment
to the plaintiff; rather it was the nursing home operator that agreed to provide
services to the plaintiff and thus, the entity with the non-delegable duty to the
10 The Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff can also assert the theory
of vicarious liability against a nursing home entity in addition to a theory of corporate liability. Id. at 597-98. For a comprehensive and well-defined explanation of the differences between corporate liability and vicarious liability for a medical facility, see the concurring opinion issued by Judge Olson in Corey v. Wilks Barre Hospital Company, LLC, 307 A.3d 701, 716-28 (Pa. Super. 2023)(en banc)
- 18 -J-A18034-25
plaintiff. Scampone v. Grane Healthcare, Co., 169 A.3d 600, 609-10 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (“Scampone III”).
The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court first interpreted the Supreme
Court’s holding in Scampone II as “indicating that both Grane [the
management company] and Highland [the operating company] could not be
held liable under a direct corporate negligence theory . . . .” Id. at 609
(emphasis added). The Superior Court, in reaching this conclusion, relied on
the Supreme Court’s finding that the “inquiry [about the corporate entity’s
relationship to the plaintiff] is individual to each appellant, although the duties
of appellants may be similar. This type of individualized inquiry into
appellants’ duties of care ensures that multiple entities are not exposed to
liability for breach of the same non-delegable duties.” 11 Id. at 608 (citation
omitted).
Applying these principles to the facts of Scampone III, the Superior
Court found that the operating company was the licensed owner and occupier
of “the nursing home facility and, by virtue of its direct contractual
relationship with [the plaintiff] to render her care, [the nursing home
operator] could be subject to any applicable non-delegable duty for a cause
of action in direct corporate negligence as outlined in Thompson.” Id. at 621 ____________________________________________
11 We agree with the Court in Scampone III that the term “non-delegable
duties is a misnomer” because the nursing home operator may delegate the “performance” of its Thompson duties to another entity and, thus, the performance of the duty is delegable. Id. at 621. The term actually means that even if an entity delegates the performance of its duty, it is still liable if the other entity breaches that duty. Id.
- 19 -J-A18034-25
(emphasis added). This Court subsequently held, in Hopkins v. Compass
Point Healthcare System, LLC, a case where, as in the instant case, the
nursing home resident had a contractual agreement with only one entity, that
“Scampone II and Scampone III make clear that only one entity can be
liable in corporate negligence for a non-delegable duty to a nursing home
patient.” 2021 WL 3465831 at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 6, 2021) (nonprecedential decision) (citing Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 606-07; Scampone
III, 169 A.3d at 621). In other words, as a matter of law, when it is only the
operator of a nursing home that has the contractual relationship with the
plaintiff, only the operator of the nursing home can be held liable under a
theory of corporate liability, even if the operator delegates the performance
of its Thompson duties to a management company.12
In the instant case, it was the Operating Company Defendants who
contracted directly with Decedent. The Operating Company Defendants also
entered into management agreements with the Management Company
Defendants that required, inter alia, the Management Company Defendants to
prepare a budget for operating the facility for the Operating Company
Defendants’ approval and to provide various services for the operation of the
facility including pharmacy, consults, resident relations, maintaining visibility
12 We note that this principle does not preclude a management company from
being held liable under a theory of vicarious liability. Scampone II, 57 A.3d 597-98.
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of a management presence, helping with personnel, and service contracts.
See N.T., 1/18/23, at 123-25, 127-28.
In light of the Scampone holdings and the fact that it was only the
Operating Company Defendants that had a direct contractual relationship with
Decedent, we find that it was the Operating Company Defendants that
undertook the duties set forth in Thompson. Although the Operating
Company Defendants delegated the performance of those duties to the
Management Company Defendants through the management contracts, the
duties were “non-delegable,” and the Operating Company Defendants are still
liable for a breach of those duties. Scampone III, 169 A.3d at 621. Thus,
the trial court properly found that the Estate as a matter of law could not
establish a theory of corporate liability against the Management Company
Defendants because they did not have a direct contractual relationship with
Decedent.
The Estate argues that the trial court erred because its interpretation of
Scampone permits the imposition of corporate liability on both an operator
and management company of a nursing home. Appellants’ Brief at 14-61. In
support of this claim, the Estate asserts, inter alia, that the Scampone
decisions do not preclude the Management Company Defendants as a matter
of law from having potential liability to the Estate independent from the
Operating Company Defendants’ liability because the Estate proceeded
against the Management Company Defendants as joint tortfeasors and the
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Estate “produced ample evidence regarding the direct negligence of both
Management Entities.” Id. at 33, 50-52, 55-56, 58-60.
The Estate’s argument, however, ignores the Scampone holdings that
make clear that the corporate duties set forth in Thompson are imposed only
on the corporate entity with whom the plaintiff has a contractual relationship,
i.e., a direct relationship. Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 584, 606-07; Scampone
III, 169 A.3d at 620-21. Once that entity assumes those duties, that entity
is still liable even if it delegates the performance of those duties to a different
entity. Scampone III, 169 A.3d at 621. The Supreme Court clearly and
unequivocably held that it is necessary to determine which entity or entities
has the “requisite” relationship with the plaintiff and it is that entity or entities,
that can be held liable for a breach of the Thompson duties. Scampone II,
57 A.3d at 584, 607. Similarly, the Superior Court in Scampone III explicitly
imposed the Thompson duties on the operator of the nursing home because
it was the operator that had the contractual relationship with the plaintiff.
We further note that the Estate bases its argument on the premise that
“[w]hen entering jnov in favor of [Management Company Defendants], the
trial court acknowledged that the record contained evidence to sustain a duty
of care.” Estate’s Br. at 27. While this may be true, the Estate overlooks that
it admitted it only pursued a claim of corporate liability against the
Management Company Defendants and, as discussed above, as a matter of
law the Management Company Defendants cannot owe a duty to the Decedent
under a corporate liability theory absent a contractual relationship with
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Decedent. While the Management Company Defendants might have owed a
duty of care to the Decedent through a theory of vicarious liability, the Estate
ultimately chose not to pursue that theory and, thus, its joint tortfeasor
argument fails
In sum, we find that the trial court properly concluded that there is no
legal basis to impose corporate negligence against the Management Company
Defendants. Therefore, the court properly entered JNOV in favor of the
Management Company Defendants.
***
Denial of JNOV in favor of the Operating Company Defendants
We next address the contention of the Operating Company Defendants
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant JNOV in their favor. The
Operating Company Defendants first claim that they are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because the Estate either waived or abandoned their
corporate negligence claims and failed to prove that the Operating Company
Defendants were vicariously liable to the Estate. Vita’s Br. at 33-43, Imperial’s
Br. at 43-48. Although we agree that the Estate did not pursue a corporate
negligence claim against the Operating Company Defendants, it did pursue
one based on vicarious liability, and we find that the evidence supported a
verdict based on vicarious liability.
We will affirm the trial court’s order denying JNOV where the plaintiff
adduced sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. See Ruff v.
York Hosp., 257 A.3d 43, 48 (Pa. Super. 2021). A trial court may only grant
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JNOV “in clear cases where the facts are such that no two reasonable minds
could fail to agree that the verdict was improper.” Id. at 48-49. We resolve
any conflict in the evidence in the verdict-winner’s favor.” Id. at 48.
“An employer is held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his
employee which causes injuries to a third party, provided that such acts were
committed during the course of and within the scope of employment.”
D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 431 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
In other words, “the corporation’s liability is derivative of the agents’ breach
of their duties of care to the plaintiff.” Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 598. This
means that,
in its simplest form[], by reason of some relation existing between
A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B although
B has played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or
encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to
prevent it. Once the requisite relationship (i.e., employment,
agency) is demonstrated, the innocent victim has recourse against
the principal[.]
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In addition to establishing that a corporate agent or employee acted
negligently, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the employee owed a duty
to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s decedent, that the employee breached the duty,
that the breach proximately caused the harm suffered, and that the plaintiff’s
damages were a direct result of the harm. See Nigon v. Jewell, 313 A.3d
1124, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2024). Where, as here, the plaintiff raises claims of
medical or nursing home negligence, “there is also the added requirement that
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the plaintiff must provide a medical expert who will testify as to the elements
of duty, breach, and causation.” Id. (citation omitted).
In particular, the Operating Company Defendants claim that they are
entitled to JNOV because the Estate did not establish the identity of any
specific employees involved in Decedent’s care, show that they breached the
standard of care, demonstrate that the breach caused Decedent’s harm, or
present the requisite medical testimony to prove their claim. Vita Entities’ Br.
at 34-36; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 43, 45-48.
We reject this argument. This Court has held that a plaintiff can
establish her right to recovery on a vicarious liability claim even if she does
not base that claim on the actions of an individual, specific staff member. See
Sokolsky v. Eidelman, 93 A.3d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that
“[s]imply because employees are unnamed within a complaint or referred to
as a unit, i.e., the staff, does not preclude one’s claim against their employer
under vicarious liability if the employees acted negligently during the course
and within the scope of their employment”); see also Breslin v. Mountain
View Nursing Home, Inc., 171 A.3d 818, 828 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same).
Accordingly, the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the Estate failed
to establish their vicarious liability because the Estate did not specifically
identify which of their employees or agents acted negligently lacks merit. 13
13The trial court also aptly noted that the burden was on the Operating Company Defendants to request that the verdict slip contain line items for the (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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With respect to the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that
Appellants failed to prove the remaining elements of a successful vicarious
liability claim, the trial court found, and our review of the record confirms,
that two of the Estate’s expert witnesses—Ms. Frederick and Dr. Seignious—
testified extensively, either at trial or in depositions, regarding the duty of the
employees of Operating Company Defendants, their breach of their duty,
causation, and damages. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 13-22. In light of this
testimony, the trial court concluded that this evidence, “taken together, was
sufficient to provide a basis for the jury[’s] finding that each [d]efendant’s
negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm” suffered by
Decedent. Id. at 22. Simply, the court concluded that “[w]hen viewing the
experts’ testimony, the testimony of lay witnesses[,] and the documentary
evidence introduced at trial as further proof of various duties and breaches
thereof, and drawing all reasonable inferences from all of that evidence, there
was sufficient basis for a jury to have made its findings that [the Operating
Company Defendants’ agents or employees] were negligent and that their
negligence was the factual cause of [Decedent’s] harm and death.” Id. at 23. ____________________________________________
jury to identify the agents or employees of the Operating Company Defendants through whom liability could be imposed on them and to ask the jury to make particular findings as to agency. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 23 (citing Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d. 529, 556-57 (Pa. Super. 2021) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the burden is on the plaintiff to request a special interrogatory pertaining to agency and vicarious liability); Cowher v. Kodali, 283 A.3d 794, 804 (Pa. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that under the general verdict rule, “when a litigant fails to request a special verdict slip that would have clarified the basis for a general verdict, and the verdict rests upon valid grounds, the right to a new trial is waived”)).
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Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law
in the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’ motion for
JNOV as to its vicarious liability. Our review confirms that the Estate offered
ample evidence that agents or employees of the Operating Company
Defendants violated the requisite standard of care and that these violations
were the factual cause of Decedent’s death. See, e.g., N.T., 1/18/23, at 177-183, 194-195, 204-05, 207-11, 215, 218-220, 223, 227, 230-31, 239-69,
276-319, 329 (Ms. Frederick’s testimony); N.T., 1/20/23, at 15-17, 33, 55-57, 64, 85, 93 (Dr. Seignious’s Testimony). Viewing this evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Estate as the verdictwinners, we conclude that the Estate presented sufficient evidence to prove
each of the elements of a vicarious liability claim against the Operating
Company Defendants. The trial court, therefore, properly refused to enter
JNOV in their favor, and this claim does not merit relief.
***
Operating Company Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial
We next address the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the trial
court erred in certain of its evidentiary rulings and, thus, abused its discretion
in denying their motion for a new trial. In particular, the Operating Company
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in admitting two types of
evidence. First, the Survey Report, which is a survey that the Pennsylvania
Department of Health issues regarding a nursing home’s licensure and
certification, and second, the Profile Evidence, which is posted on the
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Medicare.gov website and whose purpose is “to ascertain that nursing homes
facilities are upholding the basic conditions of their licensure and certification”
through a “Nursing Home Compare” Five-Star Ratings Profile. Motion re:
Survey Reports, 12/1/22, at ¶ 5.
In particular, the Operating Company Defendants argue that this
evidence was not probative of the care and treatment rendered to Decedent, 14
unduly prejudicial, and constituted inadmissible hearsay because no one
involved in their production testified and the Estate did not corroborate their
contents.15 Vita Entities’ Br. at 62-66; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 61-65.
“We will reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial
only if the trial court abused its discretion.” Vetter v. Miller, 157 A.3d 943,
947 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). With respect to challenged
14 We note the Operating Company Defendants’ reliance on Temple v. Providence Care Ctr. LLC, 248 A.3d 464 (Pa. Super. 2021), which is a nonprecedential decision of this Court, in support of their general contention that, referring to Profile Evidence, “[c]ourts have held this type of general information about a nursing home is inadmissible as evidence in a claim against a nursing home and, when admitted, give[s] rise for grounds for a new trial.” Vita Entities’ Br. at 66; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 63. We reject this argument because the Temple Court did not analyze whether and in what context Profile Evidence is admissible.
15 The Operating Company Defendants also contend that the admission of this
evidence resulted in a violation of their due process rights. Vita Entities’ Br. at 62-64; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 61, 64-65. We find this argument waived as the Operating Company Defendants did not raise this as a ground for relief in their motions in limine. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[I]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also Jones v. Ott, 191 A3d 782, 787 (Pa. 2018) (“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant must place a timely, specific objection on the record.”).
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evidentiary rulings, a new trial is warranted where the rulings were in error
and the error prejudiced the moving party. Id.
Questions of evidentiary admissibility, including motions in limine, lie
within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not disturb the court’s
decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109
A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may not be found
merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion,
but requires a manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Keystone
Dedicated Logistics, Inc. v. JGB Enters., Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted).
Further, we note that, “[i]n order to find that the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings constituted reversible error, such rulings must not only have been
erroneous but must also have been harmful to the complaining party.”
Oxford Presbyterian Church v. Weil-McLain Co., Inc., 815 A.2d 1094,
1100 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). An appellant “must therefore
show error in the evidentiary ruling and resulting prejudice, thus constituting
an abuse of discretion by the lower court.” Id. (citations omitted).
The threshold inquiry in considering whether to admit evidence is
whether the evidence is relevant. Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if it
logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at
issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable inference or
presumption regarding a material fact.” Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131,
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137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 401. The court
may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, pointlessness, or presentation of cumulative evidence.
Pa.R.E. 403.
The trial court first explained that the Profile Evidence and Survey
Reports were relevant because they showed that Operating Company
Defendants had notice and actual or constructive knowledge “of the fact that
Brinton Manor was a low-performing facility based on various objective
metrics related to patient care and failed to correct the conditions that gave
rise to the low ratings,” which was pertinent to the Estate’s then-pending claim
of corporate negligence against the Operating Company Defendants. Trial Ct.
Op., 1/3/23, at 3. In particular, the trial court noted that this evidence reflects
that management-level agents or employees of the Operating Company
Defendants were familiar with, and, in fact, tracked Brinton Manor’s “star
ratings” and reviews because “that is an important thing for the quality of care
and ensuring that the residents are taken care of.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at
10. Thus, the trial court concluded that the evidence was more probative than
prejudicial and thus relevant pursuant to Pa.R.E.401. 16
16 The trial court further noted that, had the Operating Company Defendants
requested a limiting instruction, the trial court would have provided the opportunity to cure any potential prejudice with a limiting instruction. The Operating Company Defendants have not informed this Court whether they requested the trial court provide the jury with a limiting instruction regarding this evidence or if the trial court provided one sua sponte.
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Finally, the trial court explained that the Profile Evidence and Survey
Reports were not hearsay because Appellants did not seek their admission for
their truth of the matters stated, but rather to establish that the Defendants
had notice of the information in the publications. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/23, at 3.
Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Operating Company Defendants’ motion in limine
regarding the Profile Evidence and Survey Reports. It is clear from the record
that the trial court found the evidence relevant, and therefore admissible, to
address whether the Operating Company Defendants had notice of Brinton
Manor’s low ratings, which is relevant to establish knowledge of a breach of
the Thompson duties and, thus, corporate liability.17 Corey v. Wilkes Barre
Hospital, 307 A.3d 701, 709 (Pa. Super. 2023)(en banc).
Furthermore, we agree that the trial court properly found that the Profile
Evidence and Survey Reports were not hearsay, i.e., admitted to prove the
facts stated in the report. Rather, the trial court properly admitted them
because they addressed whether the Operating Company Defendants had
knowledge of the condition of the nursing home.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the evidence
and accordingly denied the Operating Defendant Company’s Motion for a New
Trial.
17 Although the Estate abandoned its corporate liability claim at the post-trial
motions stage, the Estate pursued a claim of corporate liability against all defendants during trial.
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***
Compensatory Damages
The Operating Company Defendants next claim that the trial court erred
in not ordering a new trial after entering JNOV in favor of the Management
Company Defendants. Vita Entities’ Br. at 57-62; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 57-61. They contend that the trial court should have ordered a new trial on
damages because, in nullifying 65% of the liability found against the
Management Company Defendants by entering JNOV in favor of them, “it
would be speculative to reapportion the liability originally apportioned to Vita
and Imperial[]” especially since “the injuries alleged by [the Estate] in this
case did not result from a single, identifiable act but from a series of alleged
acts by [the Operating Company Defendants] at distinctly different times.”
Vita Entities’ Br. at 60; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 60. In support of their claim,
the Operating Company Defendants rely on Maurer v. Trustees of Univ. of
Pennsylvania, 614 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. 1992) (en banc), Henze v. Texaco,
Inc., 508 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Super. 1986), and Kobylinski v. Hipps, 519 A.2d
488 (Pa. Super. 1986).
In Henze, the plaintiff was injured when a loose threshold caused her
to fall at David Rice’s Texaco station. The jury apportioned negligence as
follows: 35% to plaintiff; 52% to Texaco, the lessee; and 13% to Mr. Rice,
the sublessee. On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court should
have granted JNOV to Texaco because Texaco had neither actual nor
constructive notice of the unsafe condition at the Texaco station. Then, in
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analyzing the effect of the JNOV upon the findings that the plaintiff’s causative
negligence was 35% and the sublessee’s causative negligence was 13%, the
Court concluded that “an attempt by a court to reapportion negligence in this
case would be speculative[,]” but, because the issue of damages had been
“fairly tried” and no party suggested error with respect to the damages issue,
“[t]he only issue requiring a retrial is the apportionment of negligence” of the
plaintiff and the sublessee. Henze, 508 A.2d at 546-47.
In Kobylinksi, the executrix of the decedent’s estate brought a
wrongful death and survival action after the decedent fell to his death in an
unguarded exterior stairwell attached to a residence owned by the appellant,
a landlord, and leased to a tenant. Following a jury trial, the jury apportioned
negligence as follows: 5% to decedent, 20% to the tenant, and 75% to the
landlord. This Court reversed the judgment, however, and remanded the case
for entry of JNOV in favor of the landlord and for a new trial on the causative
negligence of the tenant and the decedent. Kobylinski, 519 A.2d at 493.
Similarly, in Maurer, a medical negligence action, this Court remanded
for entry of JNOV in favor of Dr. Gennarelli, a treating physician, who the jury
had determined was 25% liable for the plaintiff’s harm, and affirmed the
judgment in favor of another physician, Dr. Rogers, and the defendant hospital
system, HUP, who the jury had determined were 25% and 50% liable,
respectively. The Maurer Court then turned to the holdings in Henze and
Kobylinksi to determine the impact that the entry of JNOV had on the amount
and allocation of causative negligence against the remaining negligent parties.
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The Court found two factors that distinguished this case from Henze and
Kobylinski: (1) the entry of JNOV in Maurer “will not leave two parties each
of whom was independently negligent, as in the other cases, but rather one
party (Dr. Rogers) who was actively negligent and one party (HUP), whose
negligence derives from that of the other[;]” and (2) Maurer “presents a more
complicated case question of damages.” Maurer, 614 A.2d at 769. The court
further explained that in Henze and Kobylinski, “the entire extent of the
plaintiff’s injuries, and therefore the entire extent of his or her damages,
resulted from a single, identifiable action[,]” i.e., falling over a loose
threshold in Hinze and falling down an unguarded stairwell in Kobylinski.
Id. (emphasis added). The Maurer plaintiff, in contrast, alleged that he was
injured by two negligent courses of conduct, but the Court found that the
appellees failed to prove that one of the courses of conduct was negligent.
Given these differences, the Maurer Court, thus, found that it was not
appropriate to assume the amount of damages should remain the same and
simply either reapportion liability or mold the verdict, which would have the
effect of cutting in half the award of damages. Therefore, the Court concluded
that “the better course is to vacate the judgment and to remand the case for
entry of [JNOV] in favor of Dr. Gennarelli and for a new trial on the issue of
damages resulting from the negligence of [the remaining defendants]. Id. at
770.
Turning to the instant case, as noted above, the jury returned a
compensatory damages verdict of $4,000,000 for the Estate, and apportioned
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liability as follows: 60% to Vita, 5% to Imperial, 15% to BM-SNF, and 20% to
BM Rehab. The jury found from the evidence at trial that Decedent’s harm
arose not from a single incident of negligence, but from a course of negligent
conduct, which it attributed in part to the Management Company Defendants
and in part to the Operating Company Defendants.
The trial court then found that the Estate was only pursuing a corporate
liability theory against the Management Company Defendants but could not
do so as a matter of law. When addressing the impact of the removal of the
Management Company Defendants from the jury verdict, the trial court
assumed that the jury verdict would remain the same without the
Management Company Defendants and, thus, denied their request for a new
trial on damages. We disagree.
We find that, like in Maurer, it is reasonable to assume that had the
Management Company Defendants’ conduct not been an issue at trial, the
jury’s award against the Operating Company Defendants may have been
different. Thus, guided by the holdings in Maurer, Hinze, and Kobylinski,
we conclude that the trial court erred in declining to order a new trial on
damages. We, therefore, vacate the compensatory damages portion of the
judgment in favor of the Operating Company Defendants and remand for a
new trial on the issue of damages resulting from the Operating Company
Defendants’ negligence.
***
Punitive Damages
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All parties raise claims regarding punitive damages. We emphasize that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a party to
receive fair notice of the conduct that will subject him to punitive damages:
Pennsylvania juries enjoy discretion in the fixing of punitive
damages. That discretion is, however, subject to the limitations
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which
imposes limits on punitive awards based on elementary notions of
fairness . . . dictate that a person receive fair notice not only
of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also
to the severity of the penalty that may be imposed.
Caranci, 338 A.3d at 172 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
We review an award of punitive damages for an abuse of discretion.
Grossi v. Travelers Personal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1157 (Pa. Super.
2013). “Under Pennsylvania law the size of a punitive damages award must
be reasonably related to the State’s interest in punishing and deterring the
particular behavior of the defendant and not the product of arbitrariness or
unfettered discretion.” Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157.
Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his[, or her,] reckless
indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive
damages, the trier[-]of[-]fact can properly consider the character
of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause[,] and the
wealth of the defendant.
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Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 61 (Pa. 2023) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 908(2)); see also Hollock, 842 A.2d at 419 (citing cases
addressing Section 908(2); Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157 (same). “Punitive
damages awards must be tailored to each defendant.” Bert Co., 298 A.3d at
71.
We first address the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the trial
court erred in not vacating or dramatically reducing the punitive damages
award. Vita Entities’ Br. at 43-57; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 52-57. The
Operating Company Defendants first contend that, as a matter of law, there
is no legal basis to impose an award of punitive damages on them because
the Estate conceded that it was not pursuing a theory of corporate liability,
but only one of vicarious liability and at trial, only requested punitive damages
based on a theory of corporate liability. Vita Entities’ Br. at 44; Imperial
Entities’ Br. at 52. The Operating Company Defendants conclude that since
“the only basis upon which the jury could have imposed punitive damages on
the [Operating Company Defendants] was for their own, direct conduct,” and
not vicarious liability, there is no underlying theory to support a claim of
punitive damages. Vita Entities’ Br. at 44 ((citing N.T., 1/25/23, at 148 (where
the jury delivered its verdict in open court finding that the “conduct of [the
Operating Company Defendants] was willful and wanton or exhibited reckless
indifference to the rights of [Decedent] through their own direct conduct[]”)
(emphasis added); N.T., 1/25/23 at 37 (where the Estate argued in closing
arguments that “[t]here’s something else at play in this case, and it’s called
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punitive damages. Punitive damages are there to punish [the defendants] for
their corporate conduct.”) (emphasis added)); Imperial Entities’ Br. at 52
((citing the written Jury Verdict Sheet reflecting the jury’s answer in the
affirmative to the question asking: “Do you find that the conduct of any of the
following defendants was willful or wanton, or exhibited reckless indifference
to the rights of [Decedent] through their own direct conduct?”) (emphasis
added)). We are constrained to agree.
Our review of the record confirms that the jury was asked to consider
whether the Operating Company Defendants’ direct corporate conduct was
willful, wanton, or recklessly indifferent to Decedent’s rights. In addition, the
attorney for the Estate informed the court at the hearing on the parties’ posttrial motions that “[f]or punitives we had conceded we were only seeking for
the direct negligence for all four [Defendants].” N.T., 6/6/23, at 182-83
(emphasis added). Consequently, because the record also showed that the
Estate only pursued a vicarious liability theory of recovery—not a direct
corporate liability theory of recovery—against the Operating Company
Defendants, and the jury only considered whether punitive damages were
appropriate as a result of the Operating Company Defendants’ corporate
conduct, the Estate is precluded from obtaining punitive damages based on
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its theory of vicarious liability. We, thus, are constrained to vacate the award
of punitive damages against BM-SNF and BM Rehab. 18
Conclusion
In sum, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Management Company
Defendants. We also find that the trial court properly denied the Operating
Company Defendants’ Motion for JNOV on sufficiency of evidence grounds and
Motion for New Trial on the grounds of the evidentiary challenges. We,
however, vacate the judgment entered against the Operating Company
Defendants and order a new trial to determine the amount of compensatory
damages to which the Estate is entitled from the Operating Company
Defendants. Finally, we vacate the order of punitive damages against the
Operating Company Defendants. 19
Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Olson joins the opinion.
Judge McLaughlin files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
18 In light of our disposition of this claim, we need not address the Operating
Company Defendants remaining claims regarding punitive damages and the Estate’s claim that the trial court erred in remitting the punitive damages award against BM Rehab.
19 In the years since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court last addressed the corporate liability of a nursing home management company in 2012 in Scampone II, the corporate structures and financial arrangements of nursing homes and their management companies have evolved. Although the lower courts have addressed numerous issues arising after Scampone II, we urge the Supreme Court to provide updated guidance to the bench and bar regarding the application of the principles of corporate liability to nursing home management companies.
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Date: 8/4/2026
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