SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
J.H. v. Warren Hills Board of Education (A-77-24) (090726)
Argued March 3, 2026 -- Decided August 4, 2026
JUSTICE HOFFMAN, writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the elimination of the “within the household” requirement from the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA) through a provision of the Child Victims Act (CVA) applies retroactively to acts of sexual abuse that occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date of December 1, 2019.
In November 2021, plaintiff J.H. filed a complaint alleging that, between 1976 and 1978, when he was twelve and thirteen years old, F.M. was employed as a custodian and wrestling coach at Warren Hills Junior High School. Plaintiff asserts that F.M. sexually abused him on school grounds and that the school permitted F.M. to transport him from the school to F.M.’s residence, where additional acts of sexual abuse occurred. In addition to several common law claims, plaintiff raised statutory claims, including under the CSAA.
Defendants Warren Hills Junior High School and the Warren Hills Board of Education moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court held that the removal of the “within the household” requirement applied to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019, irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred, and denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. 481 N.J. Super. 536, 540-41 (App. Div. 2025). The Court granted leave to appeal. 261 N.J. 156 (2025).
HELD: Pursuant to the plain language of the CVA and the Legislature’s unequivocal statement that the amendment operates prospectively, the Court holds that the removal of the “within the household” requirement applies only to instances of sexual abuse committed on or after December 1, 2019.
1. In 1992, the Legislature enacted the CSAA, thereby establishing the first statutory cause of action for sexual abuse in New Jersey. The new law set forth the procedures to be followed in civil actions for injury based on child sexual abuse, which the CSAA defined as “an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between a child under the age of 18 years and an adult.” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 (1992). In addition to persons who inflict the abuse, the statute addressed “passive abusers,” or
1
those persons who know of the abuse and fail to protect the child. Under the 1992 statute, “[a] parent . . . or other person standing in loco parentis within the household who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse.” Ibid. Whether an entity was deemed “within the household” was a fact-sensitive determination, considering the particular qualities and characteristics of the relationship between the entity and the individual alleging abuse. (pp. 3 n.1; 12-13)
2. In 2019, the Legislature overhauled the CSAA and other existing legislation through a series of amendments collectively referred to as the Child Victims Act. The Court reviews the amendments. As to the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse, the CVA removed the requirement that passive abusers be “within the household” of the victim. The second sentence of the definition, which addresses passive abusers, now reads: “A parent, resource family parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse.” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(a)(1). The removal of the “within the household” requirement permits “any individual person, or private or public entity, who takes custody and control of children even on a limited, temporary basis to potentially be liable as a passive abuser.” S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477 5 (Mar. 7, 2019). The Legislature specified that this amendment “[was] intended to only apply prospectively.” Id. at 6. (pp. 13-15)
3. With regard to whether legislative enactments should apply prospectively or retroactively, courts have established a distinction between substance and procedure. Procedural statutes regulate the litigation process and are generally applied to all actions and proceedings -- those which have accrued or are pending, as well as those yet to be brought. Because substantive statutes, in contrast, impact vested rights, courts generally look to the event giving rise to the claim and construe such statutes prospectively. To determine whether a substantive statute should instead be applied retroactively, New Jersey courts employ a two-part test. First, a court considers whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application. There are three situations that support a finding that the Legislature intended for a statute to apply retroactively: (1) when the Legislature explicitly or implicitly expresses an intent that a law be retroactive; (2) when an amendment is ameliorative or curative; or (3) when the parties’ expectations warrant retroactive application. The second part of the test considers the results of retroactive application. (pp. 15-17)
4. The Court explains that the removal of the “within the household” requirement from the CSAA is a substantive change, not a procedural one. The “within the household” amendment does not simply remove a procedural obstacle; rather, it imposes new legal burdens and expands substantive liability. It alters “substantive rights” by creating new liability where none previously existed. (pp. 18-20)
2
5. Turning to whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application, the Court first considers any explicit or implicit expression of such intent. The plain language of the statute of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2c provides that the amendments of the CVA “shall take effect on December 1, 2019.” This phrase has consistently been interpreted to provide for prospective and not retroactive application of a statutory provision. Other sections of the CVA, unlike the amendment at issue here, expressly call for retroactive application through reference to circumstances “that occurred prior to” the CVA’s effective date. That distinction further evinces the Legislature’s intent that the elimination of the “within the household” requirement operates only prospectively: when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. The Court finds further support for the conclusion that the amendment was intended to apply prospectively in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Statement and in the reasoning of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Small, 654 F.Supp.3d 376, 383-84 (D.N.J. 2023), which reached the same conclusion the Court reaches here. (pp. 21-26)
6. Turning to the nature of the legislative enactment, the Court explains that the Legislature may signal its intent for a statute to apply retroactively when it is “ameliorative” or “curative” in nature. Plaintiff does not raise this argument or address this part of the test, and the Court finds that the amendment alters the substantive scope of the CSAA, rather than cures a “perceived imperfection” or “misapplication” of the statute. Turning to the last consideration for determining the retroactivity of statutes -- the parties’ expectations -- the Court notes that the expectation of retroactive application should be strongly apparent to the parties in order to override the lack of any explicit or implicit expression of intent for retroactive application. Stressing the well-established presumption that statutory amendments apply prospectively, the Court explains why the general statements found in the CVA’s legislative history on which plaintiff relies do not satisfy that standard. Having found no support for a legislative intent that the amendment removing “within the household” from the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse apply retroactively, the Court does not reach the second part of the retroactivity test. (pp. 26-29)
REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE HOFFMAN’s
opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-77 September Term 2024
090726
J.H.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Warren Hills Board of
Education and Warren
Hills Junior High School,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
The Estate of F.M.,
Defendant.
On appeal from the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
481 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2025).
Argued Decided
March 3, 2026 August 4, 2026
Cherylee O. Melcher argued the cause for appellants (Hill
Wallack, attorneys; Cherylee O. Melcher, on the briefs).
Jeffrey M. Russo argued the cause for respondent (Russo
Law Offices, attorneys; Jeffrey M. Russo, on the briefs).
Marie Cepeda Mekosh, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
1
Jersey (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney;
Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Benjamin M.
Shultz, Assistant Attorney General, and Marie Cepeda
Mekosh, on the brief).
Eric G. Kahn argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks
Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Eric G. Kahn and
Annabelle M. Steinhacker, of counsel and on the brief).
Craig J. Hubert argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar
Association, attorneys; Christine A. Amalfe, of counsel,
and Craig J. Hubert and Thomas J. Manzo, on the brief).
William F. Cook submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae New Jersey Municipal Excess Liability Fund
(Brown & Connery, attorneys; William F. Cook and Ryan
J. Kelly, on the brief).
Peter J. Pizzi submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
New Jersey Defense Association (Walsh Pizzi O’Reilly
Falanga, attorneys; Peter J. Pizzi, Eric S. Padilla, and
Carmen I. Abrazado, on the brief).
Robert E. Levy submitted a brief on behalf of amici
curiae the Northfield Board of Education, Northfield
School District, Northfield Community School, Lincoln
Park Board of Education, Lincoln Park School District,
and Lincoln Park Elementary School (Scarinci
Hollenbeck, attorneys; Robert E. Levy, of counsel and on
the brief, and Seraphema Menna, on the brief).
Adam S. Weiss submitted a brief on behalf of amici
curiae School Alliance Insurance Fund, DIPLOMA Joint
Insurance Fund, and School Excess Liability Joint
Insurance Fund (The Busch Law Group, attorneys; Adam
S. Weiss, of counsel and on the brief, and David B. Rubin
and Caitlin W. Lundquist, on the brief).
2
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted the Child Victims Act (CVA), which
implemented “landmark amendments to the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA),
Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), and Tort Claims Act (TCA)” by extending the
statute of limitations and creating a two-year filing window for previously
time-barred actions. See W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 510-11 (2023); see
also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1), -2b. One amendment to the CSAA, which is at
issue here, “expand[ed] the categories of potential defendants” by removing
the requirement that a passive abuser be “within the household” of the victim;
this amendment now makes non-resident individuals and entities potentially
liable for child sexual abuse. 1 S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. Comm.
Sub. for S. 477 1 (Mar. 7, 2019).
In this case, we consider whether the amendment eliminating the “within
the household” requirement applies retroactively to acts of sexual abuse that
1
“The CSAA . . . establishes two classes of abusers:” (1) “active abusers” are “those persons who inflict the abuse”; and (2) “passive abusers” are “those persons who . . . know of the abuse and who fail to protect the child.” Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 86 (2006). Prior to being amended in 2019, the CSAA required that a passive abuser be “(1) a person (2) standing in loco parentis (3) within the household.” Ibid. “In loco parentis” is defined as “relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caregiver of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.” Id. at 91 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004)).
3
occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date of December 1, 2019.
Pursuant to the plain language of the CVA and the Legislature’s unequivocal
statement that the amendment operates prospectively, we reverse the judgment
of the Appellate Division and hold that the removal of the “within the
household” requirement applies only to instances of sexual abuse committed
on or after December 1, 2019.
I.
A.
This matter arises from allegations of sexual abuse occurring between
1976 and 1978, when plaintiff, J.H., was twelve and thirteen years old and
F.M. was employed as a custodian and wrestling coach at Warren Hills Junior
High School. Plaintiff asserts that F.M. sexually abused him on school
grounds, including in the custodian supply room, bathrooms, and the basement
boiler room. Plaintiff further alleges that the school permitted F.M. to
transport him from the school to F.M.’s residence, where additional acts of
sexual abuse occurred. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of the abuse, he
suffered mental and physical harm, including anxiety, severe emotional
distress, extreme trauma, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
addiction.
4
B.
On November 29, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against Warren Hills
Junior High School, the Warren Hills Board of Education, and the estate of
F.M., who passed away in 1995. Plaintiff raised: (1) common law claims of
negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring and
retention; (2) claims under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD); and (3)
claims under the CSAA.
Warren Hills Junior High School and the Warren Hills Board of
Education (collectively, defendants) moved for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s CSAA claim. 2 In support of their motion, defendants argued that
“the unmistakable legislative intent expressed in the Senate Judiciary
Committee Statement” clearly establishes that the elimination of the “within
the household” requirement for passive abuser liability under the CSAA is to
be applied prospectively to acts of sexual abuse occurring on or after the
2
Defendants also moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s LAD and common law claims, specifically arguing that the common law claims were barred for failure to comply with the TCA’s notice requirement. The trial court denied defendants’ motion as to both claims. Defendants later withdrew their request for summary judgment on the LAD claim and moved for leave to appeal the denial of summary judgment on the common law claims, raising the issue of whether plaintiff’s common law claims are subject to the TCA’s notice requirement.
5
amendment’s December 1, 2019 effective date. Thus, defendants contended
they could not be held liable as passive abusers because they were not “within”
plaintiff’s “household” at the time of the abuse.
In its statement of reasons, the trial court granted defendants’ motion,
finding that plaintiff’s CSAA claim was “not cognizable against the school
board” because public day schools do not fall “within the definition of
‘household.’” However, in the corresponding order, the court, inconsistent
with the statement of reasons, denied defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to this claim.
Defendants moved for reconsideration and modification of the trial
court’s findings on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court clarified that its
intent was for its order, not the accompanying statement of reasons, to control.
It affirmed the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court relied on W.S., which held that the
elimination of the TCA’s notice requirement to actions for injuries resulting
from sexual abuse applies to all CSAA claims filed on or after the statute’s
effective date. The trial court similarly construed the removal of the “within
the household” requirement to apply to all claims filed on or after December 1,
2019, irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred.
6
The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal
and affirmed the trial court’s orders denying defendants’ motions for summary
judgment and reconsideration. J.H. v. Warren Hills Bd. of Educ., 481 N.J.
Super. 536, 540-41 (App. Div. 2025). The appellate court found that
restricting application of the “within the household” amendment to sexual
abuse occurring on or after its effective date would contradict the CSAA’s
plain language and purpose to provide for liability for non-resident entities as
“passive abusers.” Id. at 547-48. The Appellate Division acknowledged that
“changes to the law that are procedural rather than substantive” are treated
differently, citing Maia v. IEW Construction Group, 257 N.J. 330, 348 (2024),
but relied on W.S. to conclude that the removal of the “within the household”
requirement is akin to removing the TCA’s notice requirement for CSAA
actions and applies to all complaints filed on or after the amendment’s
effective date. 3 Id. at 550.
This Court granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. 261 N.J. 156
(2025). We also granted motions by the Attorney General; New Jersey
3
The Appellate Division further held, consistent with the rationale this Court applied in W.S., that the 2019 amendment to the TCA -- removing its procedural requirements from actions for injuries resulting from sexual abuse -- applies to common law claims. J.H., 481 N.J. Super. at 547. Defendants did not appeal that aspect of the Appellate Division’s judgment, and plaintiff’s common law claims remain.
7
Municipal Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund; New Jersey Defense
Association; Northfield Board of Education and School District and Lincoln
Park Board of Education and School District (School Districts); School
Alliance Insurance Fund, Diploma Joint Insurance Fund, and School Excess
Liability Joint Insurance Fund (Joint Insurance Funds) to appear as amici
curiae. The New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) and the New Jersey
Association for Justice (NJAJ), who participated as amici curiae before the
Appellate Division, continue to participate.
II.
A.
Defendants contend that the Appellate Division erred in applying the
“within the household” amendment to plaintiff’s claim of sexual abuse, which
occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date. They argue that such
retroactive application of a change in substantive law is unsupported by the
plain language and legislative history of the CVA and is inconsistent with this
Court’s precedent. The Attorney General echoes these arguments,
emphasizing that a substantive amendment is one that alters a party’s liability
for tortious conduct. Thus, because the “within the household” amendment
rendered passive abuse occurring outside the household actionable for the first
8
time under the CSAA, the Attorney General asserts that it must be applied
prospectively.
The New Jersey Municipal Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund, in
urging this Court to adopt defendants’ position, highlights the insurance and
risk management consequences of applying the amendment retroactively to
public entities, who never contemplated or insured themselves against this
unforeseen liability. Similarly, the New Jersey Defense Association cautions
that the retroactive application of the “within the household” amendment could
unjustly expose numerous entities to new liability and disrupt the resolution of
many pending cases by drastically reducing the likelihood of settlement.
The School Districts assert that applying the “within the household”
amendment retroactively to allegations of abuse occurring prior to December
1, 2019, “would be an expansion of liability against public entities which the
[L]egislature did not contemplate, and surely did not intend for.” Such
application, they argue, would “place public entities at risk for limitless
litigation for matters which are decades old.” The Joint Insurance Funds add
that this would “irreparably harm hundreds of school districts,” compelling
them to “exhaust immeasurable financial resources” on CSAA lawsuits. This
unanticipated increase in litigation expenditures, the Joint Insurance Funds
9
submit, will have a “negative effect on school district budgets,” requiring
schools to divert funds from student programming and educational services.
B.
Plaintiff maintains that the Appellate Division correctly applied the
“within the household” amendment to all claims filed on or after December 1,
2019, regardless of when the sexual abuse occurred. Plaintiff contends that
such application aligns with this Court’s reasoning in W.S. and is necessary to
effectuate the Legislature’s intent in enacting the CVA as expressed in its
legislative history: namely, “to vastly expand the opportunities of child sexual
abuse victims to seek long overdue justice.” Plaintiff asserts that a cause of
action under the CSAA provides for “significant . . . damages not otherwise
available to victims under common law” and argues that common law claims
are insufficient to remedy the societal harm caused by child sexual abuse.
The NJSBA urges adoption of plaintiff’s interpretation that the “within
the household” amendment applies to all actions timely filed under the CSAA,
irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred. The NJSBA submits that
applying the amendment only to sexual abuse arising on or after its effective
date would undermine the Legislature’s remedial intent to “keep[] the
courthouse doors open for all sexual assault victims.”
10
The NJAJ argues that the Legislature’s intent in enacting the “within the
household” amendment -- that “all victims of sexual abuse should be given
broad access to our courts” -- is “obvious” such that the amendment must
apply to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019. The NJAJ also asserts
that defendants’ proposed application, limiting the “within the household”
amendment to conduct occurring on or after its effective date, “disenfranchises
a small subset of sexual abuse victims from judicial review.”
III.
A.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Whether the trial court and
Appellate Division properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment
in this case turns on the application of the “within the household” amendment,
“‘a purely legal question of statutory interpretation’ that also requires de novo
review.” Maia, 257 N.J. at 342 (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC,
226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)); see also Affrunti v. Reed Smith LLP, 483 N.J.
Super. 133, 143 (App. Div. 2025) (“Our review of whether the [legislation at
issue] applies retroactively or prospectively is de novo because it involves an
issue of statutory interpretation.”).
11
In interpreting a statute, our objective is to effectuate the Legislature’s
intent by “constru[ing] and apply[ing] the statute as enacted.” DiProspero v.
Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch.,
83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)). “[G]enerally, the best indicator of [legislative]
intent is the statutory language.” Ibid. Therefore, we look first to the statute’s
plain language, giving the enacted “words their ordinary meaning and
significance and read[ing] them in context with related provisions so as to give
sense to the legislation as a whole.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
B.
Here, the legislative language we interpret is a 2019 amendment to the
CSAA.
“Prior to 1992, victims of sexual abuse were limited to common-law
theories of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 85. Such actions were constrained by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which provided that “an action at law” for these injuries must be
“commenced within two years.”
In 1992, the Legislature enacted the CSAA, L. 1992, c. 109, § 1
(codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1), thereby “establish[ing] the first statutory
cause of action for sexual abuse in New Jersey.” Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 84.
12
The new law set forth the procedures to be followed in civil actions for injury
based on child sexual abuse, which the CSAA defined as
an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between
a child under the age of 18 years and an adult. A parent,
foster parent, guardian or other person standing in loco
parentis within the household who knowingly permits
or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also
commits sexual abuse.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 (1992) (emphasis added).]
Whether an entity was deemed “within the household” was a factsensitive determination, considering the particular qualities and characteristics
of the relationship between the entity and the individual alleging abuse.
Compare Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 94 (concluding that a private residential
school providing “amenities characteristic of both a school and a home” was
“within the household” for purposes of its students), with J.P. v. Smith, 444
N.J. Super. 507, 524 (App. Div. 2016) (finding that the term “within the
household” “connotes a degree of ‘residential’ custody” not present in the
students’ relationship with their public school).
In 2019, the Legislature “overhauled” the CSAA, CIA, and TCA by
enacting a series of amendments collectively referred to as the Child Victims
Act, effective December 1, 2019. See W.S., 252 N.J. at 511; see also N.J.S.A.
2A:14-2c. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Statement to Senate Bill 477
(Committee Statement), the bill enacting the CVA, set forth the purpose,
13
scope, and rationale underlying the legislation. The Committee Statement also
provided a comprehensive section-by-section analysis, describing the intended
effect of each provision of the bill.
Section 2 of the bill, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a, expanded the statute
of limitations for claims of child sexual abuse by permitting survivors “to file
a claim any time before reaching the age of fifty-five, or seven years after
discovering the harm, whichever is later.” W.S., 252 N.J. at 511. The
Legislature explicitly provided for the retroactive application of the extended
statute of limitations, thereby “reviving claims that would have been barred
under the prior two-year statute of limitations” prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Ibid. As the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated, “some [civil] actions
permit retroactive application.” Comm. Statement 1.
Section 9 of the bill, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b, established a twoyear filing window. That provision allowed certain victims whose claims for
injuries arose from sexual abuse occurring prior to December 1, 2019, to
commence an action so long as it was filed by December 1, 2021.
Section 4 of the bill amended the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse.
First, it replaced the term “foster parent” with “family resource parent” in the
list of individuals who may be held liable as passive abusers. Second, it
14
removed the requirement that passive abusers be “within the household” of the
victim. The CSAA’s definition for sexual abuse now reads as
an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between
a child under the age of 18 years and an adult. A parent,
resource family parent, guardian or other person
standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or
acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also
commits sexual abuse.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(a)(1).]
The removal of the “within the household” requirement permits “any
individual person, or private or public entity, who takes custody and control of
children even on a limited, temporary basis” to potentially be liable as a
passive abuser. Comm. Statement 5. The Legislature specified that this
amendment “[was] intended to only apply prospectively.” Id. at 6.
The Legislature’s fiscal estimate expected the CVA to “expose the State,
school districts, and local units of government to civil claims that may result in
. . . substantial settlements and judgments against affected governments.”
Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 477 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2019). School districts, in
particular, may be more “exposed to the filing of additional tort claims . . .
given the nature of their responsibilities.” Id. at 3.
When the CVA was enacted into law on May 13, 2019, Governor Philip
D. Murphy stated that the amendments were intended to provide “victims the
ability to seek redress in court for sexual abuse that often leaves trauma lasting
15
a lifetime.” See Governor’s Statement on Signing S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477
(May 13, 2019).
C.
Established principles guide the determination of whether the 2019
removal of the “within the household” requirement from the definition of
sexual abuse in the CSAA should be applied retroactively to conduct that
occurred prior to the CVA or prospectively to conduct occurring on or after the
enactment of the CVA.
“With regard to whether legislative enactments should apply
prospectively or retroactively, our courts have established a distinction
between substance and procedure[.]” State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op. at 15).
Procedural statutes regulate the litigation process. Ibid.; see also State
Bar Ass’n v. State, 387 N.J. Super. 24, 48 (App. Div. 2006). We generally
apply procedural statutes “to all actions and proceedings -- those which have
accrued or are pending, as well as those yet to be brought.” Hoek v. Bd. of
Educ. of Asbury Park, 75 N.J. Super. 182, 191 (App. Div. 1962). That is
because the relevant date for a procedural statute is the invocation of the
procedure, rather than the conduct giving rise to the claim. W.S., 252 N.J. at
522. Thus, even when procedural statutes are applied to matters that arise
16
from conduct that occurred prior to the statutes’ enactment, their application is
prospective, not retroactive. Edelweiss Fund, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 17);
W.S., 252 N.J. at 522.
Substantive statutes, in contrast, affect “substantive rights,” such as by
creating “new causes of action, defenses, and damages.” Maia, 257 N.J. at
352. Because substantive statutes impact vested rights, we generally look to
the event giving rise to the claim and construe such statutes prospectively. In
re Registrant J.D-F., 248 N.J. 11, 22 (2021); accord Edelweiss Fund, ___ N.J.
at ___ (slip op. at 15) (holding that the prospective application of substantive
statutes “ensures individuals have advance notice of the substantive liability
rules that will attach to their underlying conduct” (citing Lombardo v. Revlon,
Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 484, 489 (App. Div. 2000))); Maia, 257 N.J. at 349.
However, this rule “is not to be applied mechanistically.” Gibbons v. Gibbons,
86 N.J. 515, 522 (1981). To determine whether a substantive statute should be
applied retroactively, we employ a two-part test. Maia, 257 N.J. at 349.
First, we must determine “whether the Legislature intended to give the
statute retroactive application.” James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552,
563 (2014) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50 (1996)). There are three
situations that support a finding that the Legislature intended for a statute to
apply retroactively: “(1) when the Legislature explicitly or implicitly
17
expresses an intent that a law be retroactive; (2) when an amendment is
ameliorative or curative; or (3) when the parties’ expectations warrant
retroactive application.” Maia, 257 N.J. at 350. The second part of the test is
“whether retroactive application . . . [would] result in either an
unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.”
James, 216 N.J. at 563 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. at 50).
IV.
To apply the foregoing principles to the legislation before us, we begin
by noting that the removal of the “within the household” requirement from the
CSAA is a substantive change, not a procedural one.
Two recent decisions illustrate the differences between procedural and
substantive amendments. In W.S., this Court addressed whether a procedural
amendment to the TCA applied to plaintiff’s CSAA claim, which accrued in
2016, alleging that his sixth-grade teacher sexually abused him. 252 N.J. at
510-12. The amendment at issue, effective December 1, 2019, removed “a
procedural requirement[] of the TCA” that required plaintiffs “to file a notice
of claim with a public entity within ninety days after accrual of the cause of
action.” Id. at 522 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The
Court explained that the plain language of the amended TCA provides that its
“procedural requirements” no longer apply to “‘action[s] at law for an injury
18
resulting’ from sexual abuse.” Id. at 513 (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:8-3(b)).
Accordingly, “child sexual abuse survivors who file a CSAA complaint against
a public entity after December 1, 2019 -- even if their cause of action accrued
much earlier -- need not file a TCA notice of claim before filing suit.” Id. at
511, 519. In so holding, we “applied the law in effect at the time” plaintiff
filed his complaint. Id. at 521.
The following year, in Maia, this Court determined whether amendments
to the Wage and Hour Law (WHL) and Wage Payment Law (WPL) applied to
plaintiffs’ allegations of violative conduct arising both before and after the
amendments’ effective date. 257 N.J. at 337, 344-45. Prior to the
amendments, the WPL permitted aggrieved employees to recover only the full
amount of wages improperly withheld by their employer, and the WHL
authorized an award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 344-45. The amendments,
effective August 6, 2019, expanded the available relief to include liquidated
damages under both statutes, and attorney’s fees under the WPL. Id. at 345-46.
We observed that the determination of “whether a statute’s application is
retroactive . . . focus[es] on any changes to the legal consequences created by a
statute or statutory amendment.” Id. at 342. “By adding liquidated damages . .
. to both the WPL and WHL, [and] attorneys’ fees to the WPL,” we concluded
19
that the amendments “impose[d] new legal consequences to events that
occurred prior to [their] enactment.” Id. at 347. We held that the amendments
were “substantive.” Id. at 352. The Legislature, however, did not express an
intent for these amendments to apply retroactively, either in the statutory text
or legislative history, nor did it characterize them as ameliorative or curative,
and there was no evidence that the parties expected retroactive application. Id.
at 351-52. Therefore, we held that the amendments were “to be applied
prospectively to conduct that occurred on or after August 6, 2019 . . . not
retroactively to conduct that occurred before the effective date.” Id. at 351.
At oral argument, plaintiff asserted that the “within the household”
amendment is procedural rather than substantive, contending that it merely
removes a “barrier” to suit. Plaintiff relied on W.S. to argue that the removal
of the “within the household” requirement must be treated similarly. However,
the amendment at issue in W.S., which indeed eliminated a procedural
“barrier” by removing the requirement that plaintiffs file notice within ninety
days of their CSAA claim accruing, is distinguishable from the amendment
before us.
The “within the household” amendment does not simply remove a
procedural obstacle; rather, it imposes new legal burdens and expands
substantive liability. Just as the amendments at issue in Maia impacted
20
“substantive rights” by adding “new causes of action, defenses, and damages
to the WPL and WHL,” 257 N.J. at 352, the “within the household”
amendment alters “substantive rights” by creating new liability where none
previously existed.
We therefore turn to the established two-part test for determining the
retroactivity of substantive amendments.
V.
Applying that two-part retroactivity analysis, we hold that the removal
of the CSAA’s “within the household” requirement for passive abuser liability
operates prospectively and applies only to instances of sexual abuse occurring
on or after December 1, 2019.
A.
The first prong of the analysis requires the Court to ascertain “whether
the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application.” James,
216 N.J. at 563. In making that determination, we consider any explicit or
implicit expression of such intent, the nature of the legislative enactment, and
the reasonable expectations of the parties. Maia, 257 N.J. at 352.
1.
The Legislature may convey its intent that a statute operate retroactively
by explicitly stating so “in the language of the statute or in the pertinent
21
legislative history.” Id. at 350 (quoting Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522). Both the
text of the CVA amendments and the legislative statement accompanying the
CVA -- which expressly states that the “within the household” amendment
applies “only . . . prospectively,” Comm. Statement 6 -- support a clear
Legislative intent that the amendment be applied “only” in that manner.
We begin with the plain language of the statute. Here, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2c provides that the amendments of the CVA “shall take effect on December 1,
2019.” This phrase has consistently been interpreted to provide for
prospective and not retroactive application of a statutory provision. See Maia,
257 N.J. at 352 (“[L]anguage stating that a provision is . . . ‘effective
immediately on a given date’ . . . signal[s] prospective application . . . .”); see
also Edelweiss Fund, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 16) (“[T]he commonly used
phrase ‘shall take effect immediately’ has been interpreted to ‘bespeak an
intent contrary to, and not supportive of, retroactive application.’” (quoting
Pisack v. B & C Towing, Inc., 240 N.J. 360, 371 (2020)); State v. Rosado, 475
N.J. Super. 266, 276 (App. Div. 2023) (“Our Supreme Court has consistently
held that an amendment that is to take effect immediately is to be applied only
prospectively.”). We see no reason -- and plaintiff offers no support -- to
depart from this consistent line of precedent.
22
Moreover, in construing a statute, we read each provision in tandem with
the others, so as “to provide a harmonious whole.” Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J.
210, 224 (2008). The Legislature’s amendments to related statutes within the
CVA, which, unlike the amendment at issue here, expressly call for retroactive
application, further evince the Legislature’s intent that the elimination of the
“within the household” requirement operates only prospectively.
For example, the CVA’s amendments to the CIA “appl[ies] to all civil
actions for an injury resulting from an act that occurred prior to the effective
date of L. 2019, c. 120 ([N.J.S.A.] 2A:14-2a et al.).” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.5(b)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the CVA’s extension of the statute of limitations
applies to “[e]very action at law for an injury resulting from the commission of
sexual assault . . . that occurred prior to, on or after the effective date of L.
2019, c. 120 ([N.J.S.A.] 2A:14-2a et al.).” N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1) (emphasis
added). And, the CVA’s initiation of a two-year filing window for previously
time-barred claims likewise applies to “action[s] at law for an injury resulting
from the commission of sexual assault . . . that occurred prior to the effective
date of L. 2019, c. 120 ([N.J.S.A.] 2A:14-2a et al.).” N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b(a)
(emphasis added). The Legislature’s distinct use of the phrase “prior to” in
these provisions indicates legislative intent to provide for retroactive
application.
23
On the other hand, the Legislature does not use such “prior to” language
in reference to the removal of the “within the household” requirement, leaving
only the general instruction that the CVA amendments “shall take effect on
December 1, 2019”; this is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. See
In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 470
(2013) (“When ‘the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’” (quoting
Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419 (1999))).
The corresponding legislative history, as articulated in the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s Statement, unequivocally confirms what the plain
language reveals: the Legislature’s intent that the “within the household”
amendment applies “only . . . prospectively.” Comm. Statement 6.
Section 4 of the Committee Statement, which specifically discusses the
“within the household” amendment, is direct and explicit:
[A] cause of action under this section based on the
expanded liability against a “passive” abuser, removing
the “household” setting as a requirement for liability, is
not listed in section 2 or section 9 concerning the
retroactive application of certain newly created forms
of liability to lawsuits brought under the new, extended
statute of limitations or, as further detailed below,
during a two-year filing window available for otherwise
time-barred claims . . . and is intended to only apply
prospectively.
[Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).]
24
In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Small, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey relied upon the Committee Statement to reach the same
conclusion we reach on the issue we address here: whether the elimination of
the “within the household” requirement applied to plaintiff’s CSAA claim for
sexual abuse against a substitute teacher for conduct alleged to have occurred
from early 2016 to April 2019. 654 F.Supp.3d 376, 383-84 (D.N.J. 2023).
The plaintiff in Small “concede[d] that the [“within the household”]
[a]mendment is not retroactive but argue[d] that the Court should treat the
amendment as retroactive for policy reasons.” Id. at 402. Applying the twopart test for retroactivity described by Maia, and quoting the above Committee
Statement, the District Court concluded “that the removal of ‘in the household’
from the CSAA is ‘intended to only apply prospectively.’” Ibid. (quoting
Comm. Statement 6). Because the effective date of the amendment was
December 1, 2019, and “the alleged misconduct occurred before the 2019
effective date, the Court . . . appl[ied] the pre-amendment version of the CSAA
to Plaintiff’s CSAA claim against [defendants].” Ibid. We agree with the
District of New Jersey, which found that the Committee Statement’s express
reference to the prospective application of the “within the household”
amendment “shows conclusively that the Legislature intended for the [‘within
the household’] amendment to apply prospectively only.” Ibid.
25
Our holding is also consistent with the Legislature’s statement that only
“some actions permit retroactive application of standards of liability to past
acts of abuse for which liability did not previously exist.” Comm. Statement 1
(emphasis added). The Legislature’s intent, again, is clear -- “some actions”
apply retroactively and “some” do not. And, when determining whether a
statute should be given retroactive or prospective effect, each provision must
be evaluated independently. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
280 (1994) (“[T]here is no special reason to think that all the diverse
provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly for . . . purposes” of
determining whether a provision “should govern cases arising before its
enactment.”).
The Committee Statement elaborates upon this distinction. Section 2 of
the Statement addresses the extended statute of limitations and makes clear
that the amendment is “retroactive to cover past acts of abuse.” Comm.
Statement 2 (emphasis added). And section 9 repeats the same intent with
regard to the two-year filing window: “The same retroactive application of the
amended [CIA] . . . would also apply to . . . suits filed during the two-year
window established by this section.” Id. at 7-8. On the other hand, the
Committee made its express intent crystal clear regarding section 4: The
26
“within the household” amendment “is intended to only apply prospectively.”
Id. at 6.
2.
Having established that neither the statutory text nor the legislative
history indicates an intent for the “within the household” amendment to apply
retroactively, we next consider the nature of the amendment itself. The
Legislature may signal an intent for a statute to apply retroactively when it is
“ameliorative” or “curative” in nature, that is “when ‘its purpose is “to remedy
a perceived imperfection in or misapplication of a statute and not to alter the
intended scope or purposes of the original act.”’” Maia, 257 N.J. at 351
(quoting Johnson, 226 N.J. at 388). Plaintiff does not raise this argument or
address this part of the test.
The “within the household” amendment provides for a new and
expanded scope of liability under the CSAA, especially as applied to public
schools. Because this amendment alters the substantive scope of the CSAA,
rather than cures a “perceived imperfection” or “misapplication” of the statute,
it is neither ameliorative nor curative. Ibid.
3.
Finally, we turn to the last consideration for determining the
retroactivity of statutes: the parties’ expectations. Only “if there is no ‘clear
27
expression of legislative intent’ concerning retroactivity” will the court “‘look
at the controlling law at the relevant time and consider the parties’ reasonable
expectations as to the law,’ which may warrant retroactive application.” Ibid.
(quoting Johnson, 226 N.J. at 388-89). “The expectation of retroactive
application should be strongly apparent to the parties in order to override the
lack of any explicit or implicit expression of intent for retroactive application.”
James, 216 N.J. at 573.
Here, the removal of the “within the household” requirement for passive
abuser liability was in effect when plaintiff filed his claim on November 29,
2021. Even absent the clear statutory language and express legislative intent,
retroactive application of this amendment could not have been strongly
apparent to the parties, as such application would contravene the wellestablished presumption that statutory amendments apply prospectively.
Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 521 (“The courts of this State have long followed a general
rule of statutory construction that favors prospective application of statutes.”);
see also Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 543 (1996) (“It is
‘presumed that provisions added by [an] amendment affecting substantive
rights are intended to operate prospectively.’” (quoting Schiavo v. John F.
Kennedy Hosp., 258 N.J. Super. 380, 385 (App. Div. 1992))).
28
Any contrary expectations held by plaintiff could only be based upon an
errant interpretation of the legislative history. Plaintiff cites the Governor’s
Signing Statement, which anticipated an increased ability for “victims of
sexual abuse to pursue justice through the court system.” See Governor’s
Statement on Signing S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477. Plaintiff also cites the
Legislature’s fiscal estimate, which similarly projected that schools would be
“exposed to the filing of additional tort claims” -- to assert that the parties
expected that the “within the household” amendment would apply to all
actions filed on or after its effective date. See Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S.
477 3.
These predictions regarding an increase in litigation, however, were not
made only with reference to the impact of the “within the household”
amendment. Rather, they were general statements referring to the anticipated
impact of the legislation as a whole, including those amendments that were
expressly retroactive in nature. Plaintiff, at oral argument, acknowledged that
he raised common law claims pursuant to the CVA. Those types of common
law claims, together with claims brought under the TCA and CSAA for alleged
sexual abuse occurring prior to December 1, 2019 against entities “within the
household,” as well as for alleged sexual abuse arising on or after December 1,
2019, both “within” and outside of the “household,” account for the potentially
29
significant expansion of litigation. The general statements relied upon by
plaintiff bear little, if any, significance to the retroactive application of one
singular provision of the CVA.
B.
Having examined the relevant statutory text and legislative history, the
nature of the “within the household” amendment, and the parties’ expectations,
we find no support for its retroactive application. Therefore, we need not
reach the second part of the retroactivity test -- whether retroactive application
would “result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a
manifest injustice.” James, 216 N.J. at 563 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. at
50). 4
VI.
Our courts operate under the presumption that substantive statutory
amendments apply prospectively. Strasenburgh, 146 N.J. at 543. This case --4
In James, this Court applied the two-part test for retroactive application to determine whether such application was appropriate for a new statute. 216 N.J. at 556. We determined that the first part of the test was not satisfied and therefore we did not reach the second part of the test. See id. at 565. Here, we likewise need not reach any aspect of the second part of the test for retroactive application because we conclude that the first part of the test is not satisfied. Before determining whether retroactive application would result in “manifest injustice,” ibid., “we would need to address an open question about the manifest injustice standard left unresolved,” Maia, 257 N.J. at 349 n.4 (citing Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 193 N.J. 558, 572 (2008)).
30
where the Legislature is abundantly clear that the “within the household”
amendment should be afforded prospective application only -- does not
warrant a departure from this well-settled presumption. We thus hold that the
removal of the “within the household” requirement from the Child Sexual
Abuse Act applies only prospectively to acts of sexual abuse occurring on or
after December 1, 2019.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRELOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
HOFFMAN’s opinion.
31