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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 24-11069
DAVITA M. KEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HYUNDAI ENGINEERING AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant,
DYNAMIC SECURITY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00767-ECM-SMD
No. 24-11126
DAVITA M. KEY,
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11069
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, LLC,
HYUNDAI ENGINEERING AMERICA, INC.,
DYNAMIC SECURITY, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00767-ECM-SMD
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit
Judges.
KIDD, Circuit Judge:
Davita Key is a Black woman who wears her hair in a natural
style colloquially known as “dreadlocks” (“locs”). Key claims that
the defendants, who were her employers, racially discriminated
against her because she wore her hair in locs. She also claims that
they retaliated against her for complaining about that discrimination. After the district court dismissed some of Key’s claims, she
went to trial solely against Dynamic Security on her retaliation
claim. A jury awarded her a total of $811,264 in damages.
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Dynamic Security appeals the judgment against it, and Key
appeals the district court’s orders dismissing some of her claims
against Dynamic Security and all of her claims against the other
defendants.
We affirm the district court’s judgment as to Hyundai Motor
Manufacturing Alabama and Hyundai Engineering America. As to
Dynamic Security, we affirm the district court’s judgment against
Key’s § 1981 race discrimination claim. But we find that the district
court should not have presumed at the summary judgment stage
that Key received notice of her right to sue. As a result, the district
court should not have ruled that her Title VII claims were untimely.
We also find that the district court abused its discretion when it did
not instruct the jury to determine whether Dynamic Security discriminated against Key on the basis of her race. So we reverse the
district court on these issues, vacate the judgment against Dynamic
Security, and remand the case against Dynamic Security for a new
trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
Key submitted a job application to work for Dynamic Security, Inc. (“Dynamic”), in the mailroom at the Hyundai Motor
Manufacturing Alabama (“HMMA”) plant in Montgomery, Alabama. Among other things, Dynamic provides security services to
HMMA. Dynamic has a grooming policy that applies to all uniformed security officers assigned to HMMA, including those
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assigned to the mailroom. Dynamic’s grooming policy prohibits
locs and similar hairstyles.
On July 19, 2017, Key interviewed for the mailroom job.
Gloria Robinson, an employee of Dynamic, and Cassandra Williams, an employee of Hyundai Engineering America (“HEA”), attended Key’s interview. During the interview, Robinson told Key
that her locs might be a problem. After some discussion, Key
showed Robinson and Williams a picture of her locs styled in a
manner called an “updo,” and both women said “okay.” Dynamic
hired Key for the mailroom position.
During Key’s training, Dynamic provided her with the Security Officer’s Handbook (“Handbook”). The Handbook included a
section titled “Waiver of Trial By Jury Policy.” Key admits that she
skimmed parts of the Handbook and signed an “Acknowledgement
and Receipt of Employee Handbook” form, confirming she had received the Handbook and was bound by its policies. But at trial,
Key testified that she could not recall whether she read the jury trial
waiver before or after starting her job in the mailroom.
Key appeared for her first day of work with her hair styled
in locs. She was sent home before the end of the workday because
of her hair. Key testified that Robinson told her that “the Koreans”
at Hyundai “send these memos, and they don’t want African Americans wearing their hair like this because . . . you have people like
Todd Strange, who . . . was the mayor at that time . . . he doesn’t,
like, basically want to see me and my hair like this.” Key thought
the statement was racist.
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The next day, Key’s hair remained in locs, but she wore a
hat to work. When Key’s trainer asked why she left early the prior
day, Key said that she was sent home because management had an
issue with her hair. Later that day, Key had a meeting with Robinson and another manager, Maurice Chambliss. During the meeting, Robinson stated: “So I heard that you feel like you been discriminated against.” Key responded that she was wearing a hat, as
instructed. Robinson replied, “This is going to be a problem.
You’re going to be a problem.” When Key again said she was wearing a hat covering her hair, as instructed, Robinson said, “This is
not about your hat, like, this is not about your hat. This is not about
your hair.” After the meeting, Key went back to the mailroom and
asked whether her trainer had told management that “[she] felt discriminated against.” The trainer responded, “Yes, because that’s
what you said.”
Key then told Chambliss she would like to speak with someone in human resources so that she could make an official complaint of discrimination. Chambliss told Key she would have to
speak to Robinson. When Key asked if there was anyone else with
whom she could speak, Chambliss called Robinson and asked what
to do. Key made an official, written complaint of discrimination
and gave the complaint to Chambliss. Key complained that she
“was being discriminated against because [she had her] hair in
dreadlocks, and also because [she] was pregnant.” Key testified that
she viewed her complaint as alleging race discrimination.
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Key then asked Chambliss if she could leave to speak with
Ray Cureton at Dynamic’s office. Key thought Cureton was in Dynamic’s human resources department, but, in fact, he was Dynamic’s district manager and acting operations manager with authority over security at the Montgomery plant. Chambliss confirmed that if Key left to speak with Cureton, she would be able to
return to work, so Key left to meet with Cureton. When Key spoke
with Cureton, he asked Key if she was going to sue them. After Key
disclosed the events of her first day, Cureton told Key that she
could not return to work.
B. EEOC Charges
Key completed a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) intake questionnaire on August 2, 2017, the
day after her last day of work. She named “Cassandra Williams,
AMCO” and Gloria Robinson as the persons responsible for the alleged discrimination. “AMCO” was the previous name for HEA.
On August 3, 2017, the EEOC issued a charge of discrimination
against Dynamic Security, which Key signed. The EEOC issued a
second charge against HMMA, which Key also signed. Once Dynamic responded, the EEOC mailed Key a copy of Dynamic’s statement. The EEOC also mailed Key a conciliation letter on her
HMMA charge.
On March 1, 2019, the EEOC issued Key a right-to-sue letter
for her charge against Dynamic. But Key claims she never received
this right-to-sue letter. On July 12, 2019, the EEOC also issued Key
a right-to-sue letter against HMMA, which she received.
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C. The District Court Litigation
On October 10, 2019, Key filed a complaint against Dynamic, HEA, and HMMA, alleging race discrimination, pregnancy
discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII. Key subsequently
filed an amended complaint against the same parties alleging five
claims against all three defendants: (1) pregnancy discrimination
under Title VII, (2) race discrimination under Title VII, (3) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (4) retaliation under Title VII,
and (5) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
All three defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The district court granted in part and denied in part the motions, dismissing the disparate-impact race discrimination claims
under Title VII and § 1981 against all three defendants and all the
Title VII claims against HEA. Each of the defendants then moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims Key brought against HEA and HMMA, and it
granted summary judgment on all claims Key brought against Dynamic except the § 1981 retaliation claim, which proceeded to trial.
Dynamic then filed a motion to strike Key’s demand for a
jury trial, arguing that Key had signed an agreement that included
an express waiver of a right to trial by jury. The district court denied Dynamic’s motion to strike without an explanation. Dynamic
then moved to certify an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
denial of its motion to strike the jury demand. The district court
denied this motion as well. But in its order denying the motion, the
district court also explained that it denied Dynamic’s previous
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motion to strike the jury demand because “it did not find evidence
that Key ‘knowingly and intentionally’ waived her Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury.”
During the trial for Key’s § 1981 retaliation claim, Dynamic
proposed a jury instruction regarding the first element of the retaliation claim—protected activity. But the district court declined to
use Dynamic’s proposed instruction and, instead, used its own instruction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Key and awarded
compensatory backpay damages of $85,200, compensatory emotional pain and suffering damages of $214,864, and punitive damages of $511,200, plus interest.
Dynamic appeals the district court’s judgment against it
while Key appeals the district court’s orders on her other claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo.” Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284,
1290 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Acevedo v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 476
F.3d 861, 865 (11th Cir. 2007)). “In conducting our review, we apply
the same legal standards as the district court . . . [and] review the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw
all reasonable inferences in [its] favor.” Id. (citation modified).
“We [also] review jury instructions de novo to determine
whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice
of the objecting party.” Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet–Tampa, Inc.,
375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
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Palmer v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 208 F.3d 969, 973 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
Finally, “[w]e review only for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction.” Pensacola Motor
Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). “In refusing to give a requested jury instruction,
‘[a]n abuse of discretion is committed only when (1) the requested
instruction correctly stated the law, (2) the instruction dealt with
an issue properly before the jury, and (3) the failure to give the instruction resulted in prejudicial harm to the requesting
party.’” Id. (quoting Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330,
1333–34 (11th Cir. 2011)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Key’s Claims Against Dynamic Security, Inc.
1. Summary Judgment
The district court granted summary judgment on Key’s Title
VII claims on timeliness grounds, finding that Key sued Dynamic
more than ninety days after the presumed date that she received
the right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Key maintains
that she never received in the mail the EEOC’s letter notifying her
of her right to sue Dynamic. Nevertheless, the district court found
that the circumstances of this case raised “a presumption that the
EEOC properly mailed notice of Key’s right to sue Dynamic on
March 1, 2019.” It relied on evidence that Key received mail from
the EEOC at the same address prior to the alleged failure to receive
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demonstrating there may have been a flaw in the mailing procedure.” Thus, the district court presumed that Key received the letter on March 4, 2019—three days after the EEOC mailed it—and
that Key was at that point on notice of her right to sue Dynamic.
With that presumption, the deadline for Key to sue Dynamic was
June 2, 2019. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Because she filed suit on
October 10, 2019—more than three months after the presumed
deadline—the district court granted summary judgment based on
lack of timeliness.
Key argues that the district court should have credited her
testimony at the summary judgment stage and sent the timeliness
question to the jury. In her view, because there was no indication
that she should be held at fault for the failure to receive the notice,
the district court should not have presumed that she received it
within three days of mailing. We agree.
Typically, when we consider whether a person has exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC, “statutory notification is complete only upon actual receipt of the right to sue
letter.” Kerr v. McDonald’s Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir.
1974), rev’d on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976)). But instead of “a
rule determining when a complainant has received notice of the
right to sue,” we have “imposed upon complainants some ‘minimum responsibility . . . for an orderly and expeditious resolution’
of their claims.” Id. (quoting Zillyette v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d
1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation modified)). We analyze the
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ninety-day limitations period for a person to sue after receiving a
right-to-sue letter “on a case-by-case basis to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of each case, one that would require plaintiffs to assume some minimum responsibility . . . without conditioning a claimant’s right to sue . . . on fortuitous circumstances or events beyond [their] control.” Zillyette, 179 F.3d at
1340 (citation omitted). We have “applied a presumption of three
days for receipt by mail, akin to the time period established in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(e).” Kerr, 427 F.3d at 953 n.9 (citing Zillyette, 179 F.3d at
1342). “Receipt is presumed when a complainant is unable to show
that her failure to receive [a right-to-sue] letter was in no way her
fault.” Id. at 952.
In her deposition, Key testified to the following: (1) Key had
never seen the Dynamic right-to-sue letter before, (2) no one except Key and her husband retrieved their household mail (3) she
received three other letters from the EEOC within a few months,
and (4) Key believed her charges against Dynamic and HMMA
were combined and that the right-to-sue letter she received regarding HMMA was also her right-to-sue letter regarding Dynamic. She
also testified that she engaged in email communications with the
investigator at the EEOC, but in those emails, the EEOC never notified her that it had dismissed the charge against Dynamic. Absent
any evidence of negligence on Key’s part, we find that Key has met
her burden to establish that the failure to receive the right-to-sue
letter was in no way her fault and that she took “minimum responsibility . . . for an orderly and expeditious resolution of [her]
claims.” Id. (citation modified).
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The Third Circuit addressed a similar situation. Hayes v. N.J.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 108 F.4th 219 (3d Cir. 2024). In Hayes, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC but, after deciding not to pursue
the case, the EEOC mailed the right-to-sue letter to the plaintiff on
March 11, 2020. Id. at 220. The plaintiff claimed that she did not
receive the letter in the mail or otherwise see the letter until August
27, 2020. Id. at 221. The plaintiff filed her lawsuit on November 24,
2020—“more than eight months after the mailing date listed on the
EEOC’s letter but fewer than 90 days after [the plaintiff] . . .
claim[ed] to have received it.” Id. at 221. To determine the date that
the ninety-day filing period began, the Third Circuit applied a
three-day presumption of receipt by mail. Id. at 224 (citing
Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir.
1999)). The court then determined whether the plaintiff provided
sufficient evidence to rebut the three-day presumption of receipt.
See id.
The Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiff “introduced
enough evidence to rebut the three-day presumption and defeat
summary judgment.” Id. The court considered the plaintiff’s sworn
declaration that “she never received the right-to-sue letter by mail
and first saw it after her lawyer obtained it from the EEOC on August 27,” and the sworn statement from her lawyer’s office manager “that the law office never received the letter by mail, despite
having scanned and documented all incoming correspondence.” Id.
Because the plaintiff’s declarations “create[d] a dispute of material
fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment on timeliness,” the
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court determined that “[a] jury therefore must resolve when [the
plaintiff] first received the right-to-sue letter.” Id.
We adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Hayes. Because
Key “introduced enough evidence to rebut the three-day presumption” and “create[d] a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat
summary judgment on timeliness,” the district court erred by using
the presumption to grant summary judgment in favor of Dynamic
on Key’s Title VII claims. See id. Therefore, at trial, the jury must
determine the date by which Key was on notice of her right to sue
Dynamic. See id.
2. Jury Trial Waiver
Dynamic moved to strike Key’s jury demand, but the district
court denied the motion. Dynamic argues that the district court
erred because Key waived her right to a jury trial. We disagree.
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial
in civil cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. A party may waive the right
to a jury trial if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. See
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (“[F]or a waiver [of constitutional rights] to be effective it must be clearly established that there
was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938))). Because the right to a jury trial is fundamental, courts
“must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation modified).
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The district court declined to strike Key’s jury demand because it could not find that Key made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of her right to a jury trial. Key did not sign the portion of
the Handbook where the waiver language was located or any other
page of the Handbook. Instead, she signed a separate form agreeing
to be bound by the “rules, regulations, and policies set forth in th[e]
[H]andbook.” But a waiver is not a rule, regulation, or policy, and
the signed form did not specifically mention the right to trial by
jury. So a signature expressing agreement to be bound by the many
“rules, regulations, and policies set forth in th[e] [H]andbook” does
not evince Key’s intent specifically to waive her fundamental right
to a jury trial. Additionally, Key testified that she did not remember
whether she read the jury waiver before beginning work at Dynamic.
We conclude that Dynamic failed to establish that Key read
and understood the meaning of the Handbook’s jury waiver provision before signing the acknowledgement form. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision on this issue.
3. Jury Instruction Challenge
At trial, the district court gave the following instruction regarding protected activity:
For the first element, protected activity, Ms. Key
claims that she engaged in protected activity when
she complained to Dynamic that she felt discriminated against based on her race. That action is “protected activity” if it was based on Ms. Key’s goodUSCA11 Case: 24-11069 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 08/05/2026 Page: 15 of 16
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faith, reasonable belief that she was discriminated
against because of her race. Ms. Key had a “good
faith” belief if she honestly believed that she was discriminated against because of her race. Ms. Key had
a “reasonable” belief if a reasonable person would,
under the circumstances, believe that she was discriminated against because of her race. Ms. Key does not
have to prove that she was actually discriminated
against because of her race. But she must prove that
she had a good-faith, reasonable belief that discrimination occurred.
Dynamic argues that the district court abused its discretion by
charging the jury with this instruction over its objection. We agree.
“An employee’s complaint about discrimination constitutes
protected activity if the employee could ‘reasonably form a good
faith belief that the alleged discrimination existed.’” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Taylor v.
Runyon, 175 F.3d 861, 869 (11th Cir. 1999)). Additionally, the plaintiff must “explicitly or implicitly communicate [the] belief that the
[challenged] practice constitutes unlawful employment discrimination.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir.
2016) (citation modified) (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 8–
11–B(2) (2006)).
The district court’s protected activity instruction omitted
the second requirement: It failed to instruct the jury to determine
whether Key explicitly or implicitly communicated her belief that
she had been discriminated against because of her race. Instead, the
court’s instructions erroneously presumed that Key had met her
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burden on this issue: “[S]he complained to Dynamic that she felt
discriminated against based on her race.”
Because the jury was not properly instructed on protected
activity, we reverse the district court, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial. Since we are remanding the case for
a new trial, we need not address the remainder of the arguments
related to the previous trial.
B. Key’s Claims Against HMMA and HEA
Key asks us to reverse the district court’s dismissals of her
Title VII and § 1981 claims against HEA and HMMA and her § 1981
race discrimination claim against Dynamic at both the motion-todismiss and summary-judgment stages. After careful consideration
of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral
argument, we find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusions. Accordingly, we affirm as to these issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissals and grants of
summary judgment on Key’s claims against HEA and HMMA and
Key’s § 1981 race discrimination claim against Dynamic. But as to
Key’s other claims against Dynamic, we REVERSE the district
court’s rulings as set forth above, we VACATE the district court’s
judgment, and we REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.