[Cite as State v. Ranieri, 2026-Ohio-3013.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 25CA4157
v. :
NICHOLAS RANIERI, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES
Christopher Bazely, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant1.
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Willis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________ CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:7-29-26
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas
Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Nicholas Ranieri,
defendant below and appellant herein, raises the following
assignment of error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED RANIERI’S
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.”
1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings. Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 2
{¶2} The present appeal concerns appellant’s right to a
speedy trial. In April 2024, a Scioto County Grand Jury
returned an indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count
of rape of a child under 13 in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first-degree felony, (2) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (3) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, and (4) one count of
disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C.
2907.31(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony. Appellant’s arrest
occurred on February 26, 2024. Appellant pleaded not guilty.
{¶3} Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to continue the
trial. On May 16, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to
continue and scheduled the matter for an August 12, 2024 jury
trial. On August 6, 2024, appellant filed a second motion to
continue the trial. On August 19, 2024, the court granted the
motion to continue and rescheduled the matter for September 30,
2024.
{¶4} On August 30, 2024, a Scioto County Grand Jury
returned a superseding indictment that charged appellant with
(1) one count of rape of a child under 13 in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first-degree felony, (2) one count of Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 3
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (3) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (4) one count of
disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C.
2907.31(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony, (5) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (6) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (7) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (8) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree felony, (9) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree
felony, (10) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree felony, (11) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 4
felony, (12) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (13) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (14) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree felony, (15) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree
felony, (16) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree felony, (17) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (18) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (19) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (20) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (21) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 5
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (22) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A0(5), a fourth-degree felony, (23) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (24) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (25) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (26) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (27) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (28) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (29) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (30) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (31) one count of Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 6
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (32) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree felony, (33) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree
felony, (34) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree felony, (35) one count of
illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented
material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a
fifth-degree felony, (36) one count of illegal use of a minor or
impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance in
violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (37)
one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired person in
nudity-oriented material or performance in violation of R.C.
2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (38) one count of illegal
use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or
performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree
felony, (39) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (40) one count of
illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 7
material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a
fifth-degree felony, (41) one count of pandering sexuallyoriented matter involving a minor or impaired person in
violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree felony, (42)
one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a
minor or impaired person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), a
fourth-degree felony, (43) one count of pandering sexuallyoriented matter involving a minor or impaired person in
violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree felony, (44)
one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired person in
nudity-oriented material or performance in violation of R.C.
2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (45) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (46) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (47) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (48) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth degree felony, (49) one count of
illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented
material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 8
fifth-degree felony, (50) one count of illegal use of a minor or
impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance in
violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (51)
one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired person in
nudity-oriented material or performance in violation of R.C.
2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (52) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (53) one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired
person in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation
of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (54) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree
felony, (55) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree felony, (56) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree
felony, (57) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(1), a second-degree felony, (58) one count of
pandering sexually-oriented matter involving a minor or impaired
person in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), a fourth-degree
felony, (59) one count of pandering sexually-oriented matter Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 9
involving a minor or impaired person in violation of R.C.
2907.322(A)(6), a second-degree felony, (60) one count of
illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented
material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a
fifth-degree felony, (61) one count of illegal use of a minor or
impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance in
violation of R.C. 2907.323 (A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, (62)
one count of illegal use of a minor or impaired person in
nudity-oriented material or performance in violation of R.C.
2907.323(A)(3), a fifth-degree felony, and (63) one count of
illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented
material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3), a
fifth-degree felony. Appellant pleaded not guilty.
{¶5} On September 16, 2024, appellant filed a motion for
competency evaluation. The trial court granted the request on
October 8, 2024.
{¶6} On November 19, 2024, appellant filed (1) a pro se
“request for dismissal and release from incarceration pursuant
to speedy trial,” (2) a pro se “request to dismiss 61 counts
pursuant to speedy trial violation,” and (3) a pro se request to
terminate appointed counsel. On December 3, 2024, the trial
court issued an entry and stated in part:
This Court finds the defendant, Nicholas Ranieri, is
represented by counsel and this Court does not accept
filings from a defendant who has an attorney
Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 10
representing him/her. This Court will not allow hybrid
representation and a copy of this entry and request will
be forwarded to the defendant’s attorney, R. Shawn
Stratton.
{¶7} On December 12, 2024, appellant filed a motion to
continue the competency hearing due to a scheduling conflict.
On December 20, 2024, the trial court granted the continuance
and rescheduled the competency hearing for January 30, 2025. On
January 7, 2025, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
and advised the court that appellant wished to represent
himself.
{¶8} After the January 30, 2025 competency hearing, the
trial court concluded that appellant “is presently competent to
stand trial,” and further found that appellant “does not meet
the criteria for Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity plea.”
{¶9} On February 25, 2025, appellant waived his right to
representation, and the trial court appointed standby counsel.
In addition, appellant signed a R.C. 2945.71 speedy trial time
waiver.
{¶10} On March 24, 2025, appellant filed (1) a motion to
order release and inspection of Children’s Services records
regarding victim B.H, (2) a motion to compel a specific bill of
particulars, and (3) a motion for a forensic evaluation of B.H.
The trial court overruled these motions on August 13, 2025. On Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 11
September 8, 2025, appellant filed a motion to sever counts 5
through 63 of the August 30, 2025 superseding indictment.
{¶11} On October 10, 2025, the trial court held a change of
plea/sentencing hearing. At the hearing, standby counsel
informed the court that appellant wished to discontinue their
relationship. When questioned, counsel explained that appellant
became upset when counsel refused to file several frivolous
motions regarding speedy trial and suppression. The court
denied appellant’s request and, after some discussion, appellant
entered a no contest plea to 3 counts of second-degree R.C.
2907.322(A)(1) pandering (Counts 5, 21, and 25). The joint
sentencing recommendation included a 5-year sentence on each
count, for an aggregate sentence of 15-17 ½ years, and credit
for 593 days served.
{¶12} The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy and
advised appellant of his rights and the effects of his decision
to plead no-contest, reviewed the signed plea form and jury
waiver, reviewed the facts and charges, and asked appellant if
any drugs, alcohol, or mind-altering substances influenced him.
The court advised and reviewed with appellant the constitutional
rights he waived with his plea, including (1) the right to a
jury trial, (2) the right to confront one’s accusers, (3) the
right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, (4) the right
to require appellee to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 12
and (5) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The court also explained the maximum penalties, postrelease
control, and Tier II sex offender registration and notification
requirements. Appellant expressed his understanding and
agreement at each stage of the plea colloquy and affirmed his
execution of the written plea form. In addition, “for the
purposes of this [proceeding],” the court verified that
appellant discussed the plea with his counsel and appellant
acknowledged his satisfaction with counsel. Thus, appellant
entered a no-contest plea to Counts 5, 21, and 25.
{¶13} During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the
trial court stated that consecutive sentences are necessary to
protect the public and to punish the offender, are not
disproportionate to the conduct or the danger that appellant
posed, and that the harm was so great or unusual that no single
term would reflect the seriousness of the conduct. The trial
court then sentenced appellant to (1) serve a 5 to 7 ½ year
prison term on Count 5, (2) serve a 5-year prison term on Count
21, (3) serve a 5-year prison term on Count 25, with each
sentence to be served consecutively to each other for a total
intended sentence of 15-17 ½ years, (4) serve a mandatory 5-year
postrelease control term, (5) register as a Tier II sex
offender, and (6) pay costs. The court specified that all other Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 13
counts not specifically resolved in this entry are hereby
dismissed. This appeal followed.
I.
{¶14} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional
rights to a speedy trial. Specifically, appellant contends that
the trial court violated his speedy trial rights by allowing the
case to remain pending for 593 days between his arrest and the
entry of his plea.
{¶15} Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a
speedy trial under the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (an “accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial”); Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 10 (an accused has the right to
“a speedy public trial by an impartial jury”). The speedy-trial
guarantee “minimize[s] the possibility of lengthy incarceration
prior to trial,” “reduce[s] the lesser, but nevertheless
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while
released on bail,” and “shorten[s] the disruption of life caused
by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.”
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); accord State
v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 568 (1997).
{¶16} Ohio's speedy-trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 to
2945.73, “constitute a rational effort to enforce the
Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 14
constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused
charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor.”
State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218 (1980), syllabus; accord
State v. Martin, 2019-Ohio-2010, ¶ 15; see Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (states “are free to prescribe a reasonable
period consistent with constitutional standards”). To that end,
R.C. 2945.71 designates specific time requirements for the State
to try an accused. State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425
(1999).
{¶17} In general, courts must “strictly construe the speedy
trial statutes against the [S]tate,” Brecksville v. Cook, 75
Ohio St.3d 53, 57 (1996), and must “strictly enforce the
legislative mandates evident in these statutes.” Pachay, 64
Ohio St.2d at 221; e.g., State v. Parker, 2007-Ohio-1534, ¶ 15.
Consequently, “[t]he prosecution and the trial courts have a
mandatory duty to try an accused within the time frame provided
by the statute.” State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 14. If an
accused is not brought to trial within the time limits set forth
in the speedy-trial statutes, and if an exception does not
apply, R.C. 2945.73(B) requires the court, upon motion at or
before trial, to discharge the accused. “Review of a speedytrial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact.
Therefore, we defer to the trial court's factual findings if
they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 15
review the application of the law to those facts de novo.”
State v. Long, 2020-Ohio-5363, ¶ 15; accord State v. Smith,
2023-Ohio-1504, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.).
{¶18} Relevant in the case at bar, R.C. 2945.71(C)(2)
requires a person accused of a felony to be brought to trial
within 270 days of the individual's arrest. “When computing how
much time has run against [the State] under R.C. 2945.71, we
begin with the day after the date [the defendant] was arrested.”
State v. Davis, 2013-Ohio-5311, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), citing R.C.
1.14 and Crim.R. 45(A). Also, when calculating speedy-trial
time, courts ordinarily count “ ‘each day during which the
accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge
... as three days.’ ” Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, at ¶ 15, quoting
R.C. 2945.71(E).
{¶19} However, R.C. 2945.72 specifies the circumstances
under which the 270-day speedy trial period may be extended.
Relevant here, the period of any reasonable continuance that the
accused requests will extend the 270-day time period. Smith,
supra, 2023-Ohio-1504 at ¶ 17. Moreover, a defendant may waive
their speedy trial rights pursuant to R.C. 2945.71.
{¶20} In the case sub judice, appellant’s arrest occurred on
February 26, 2024. Appellant filed his first motion to continue
on May 15, 2024. Therefore, as of May 14, 2024, 79 days had
elapsed and, under the triple-count provision, that amounted to Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 16
237 days. The first continuance tolled the speedy trial clock
until August 12, 2024 (90 days). On August 6, 2024, appellant
filed his second motion to continue, which tolled the speedy
trial clock until September 30, 2024 (56 days). On September
16, 2024, appellant filed a motion for a competency evaluation,
which tolled the speedy trial clock until February 25, 2025,
when the trial court determined appellant’s competence to stand
trial (163 days).
{¶21} On February 25, 2025, appellant waived his right to
representation by counsel, the trial court appointed standby
counsel, and appellant filed a R.C. 2945.71 general time waiver.
On March 24, 2025, appellant filed a motion to release
Children’s Services records, a motion to compel a specific bill
of particulars, and a motion for forensic evaluation of the
victim. The trial court denied all three motions on August 13,
2025, tolling 143 days. However, this tolling overlapped
appellant’s R.C. 2945.71 waiver, which tolled 228 days until
appellant changed his plea on October 10, 2025. Thus, appellee
contends that a total of 514 days should be tolled when
calculating speedy trial time.
{¶22} Appellant, however, argues that the 27 days between
August 13, 2025, the date the trial court ruled on appellant’s
three motions, and September 8, 2025, the date appellant filed a
motion to sever, did not toll the speedy trial clock. Although Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 17
appellee argues that the February 25, 2025 waiver tolled these
27 days, appellant maintains that the R.C. 2945.71 waiver “was
not for an indefinite period.”
{¶23} As noted above, the time requirements within which an
accused must be brought to trial may be tolled by certain
events. R.C. 2945.72. Specifically, the speedy trial period
may be tolled for “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by reason
of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action
made or instituted by the accused[.]” R.C. 2945.72(E).
Further, R.C. 2945.72(H) provides that the time within which an
accused must be brought to trial may be extended by the period
of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion, and the
period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the
accused’s own motion. Finally, an accused may waive his or her
rights to a speedy trial, provided that the waiver is knowingly
and voluntarily made. State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9
(1987), citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. 514. Such a waiver must
be in writing or expressly made on the record in open court.
State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158 (1994), syllabus, citing
O’Brien, supra, and State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6 (1982).
{¶24} We recognize that a time waiver may be limited or
unlimited in duration. “[A] waiver that expressly waives the
accused’s right to a speedy trial under the statute without
mentioning a specific time period is unlimited in duration.” Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 18
State v. Kovacek, 2001 WL 577664, *4 (9th Dist., May 30, 2001),
citing O’Brien, supra, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, at paragraph two of the
syllabus; State v. Miller, 2017-Ohio-5728, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.).
Once an accused has executed an express, written waiver of
unlimited duration, “the accused is not entitled to a discharge
for delay in bringing him to trial unless the accused files a
formal written objection and demand for trial, following which
the state must bring the accused to trial within a reasonable
time.” O’Brien, supra, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, at paragraph two of the
syllabus; State v. Battle, 2010-Ohio-4327, ¶ 77 (5th Dist.);
Miller, id.
{¶25} In the case sub judice, appellant filed a waiver of
his speedy trial rights on February 25, 2025. Appellant does
not assert his waiver was unknowing or involuntary. Instead,
appellant appears to assert that, in spite of the waiver, he
nevertheless intended to raise a speedy trial challenge,
pointing out that his no-contest plea is evidence of such an
intention to appeal the alleged speedy trial violation.
However, appellant’s February 25, 2025 written waiver exhibits
no such limitation: “Now comes defendant and waives time
provisions of Ohio Revised Code Section 2945.71 for the purpose
of further investigation and trial preparation until the further
Order of this Court.”
Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 19
{¶26} After our review in the case at bar, we recognize that
appellant filed various motions for continuances and his request
for a competency evaluation. These requests, coupled with
appellant’s plain language of the waiver indicates a waiver of
unlimited duration. See State v. Bray, 2004-Ohio-1067, ¶ 9 (9th
Dist.)(“in failing to give a date certain for the beginning and
ending points for tolling purposes, the waiver was effective
from the date of [the defendant’s] arrest and was unlimited in
duration.”); Miller, 2017-Ohio-5728 at ¶ 31 (“[a]ppellee argues
various time waivers executed in this case were limited in
duration, but we find no evidence in the record to support the
assertion.”). Thus, we find nothing in the record that supports
appellant’s contention that he expressly limited his R.C.
2945.71 speedy trial time waiver. Although appellant contends
that he made various statements to indicate that he did not wish
to waive speedy trial, as appellee points out, both the plain
language of the waiver and appellant’s continued filings tolled
appellant’s speedy trial rights. Therefore, as appellee
maintains, appellant’s time waivers properly tolled speedy trial
time until appellant entered his October 10, 2025 no-contest
plea.
{¶27} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 20
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4157 21
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that
appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail
has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.