IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-624
Filed 5 August 2026
Guilford County, No. 21CRS072509-400
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
J’MARIUS DESHAW HOWZE
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 8 December 2023 by Judge
Stephanie L. Reese in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
8 April 2025.
Michelle Abbott, for defendant-appellant.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Michael
Bulleri, for the State.
STADING, Judge.
J’Marius Deshaw Howze (“Defendant”) appeals from a jury verdict finding him
guilty of first-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant maintains the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress that asserted an illegal search and seizure.
After careful review, we hold the trial court did not err.
STATE V. HOWZE
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
This case is about the search and seizure of evidence that was obtained for
purposes of an unrelated, earlier criminal investigation. The record tends to show
that around 2:00 a.m. on 23 May 2019, law enforcement officers of the High Point
Police Department responded to a “shots-fired” call at an apartment complex.
Officers Snider and Trew responded to the scene. Upon arrival, Officer Snider began
talking to witnesses and Officer Trew observed a parked vehicle with visible exterior
bullet holes. Officer Trew approached the vehicle and found Cameron Owens lying
back in the driver’s seat, unresponsive, with a gun in his right hand. Officer Trew
noticed a gunshot wound in Mr. Owens’s hip and quickly determined he was deceased.
The medical examiner who subsequently performed Mr. Owens’s autopsy determined
that he died from multiple gunshot wounds.
Upon examination of the scene, law enforcement officers found a HiPoint ninemillimeter carbine rifle located in a wooded area near the apartment complex.
Numerous bullet casings were collected from around the vehicle. Ms. Hudson, a crime
scene technician with the High Point Police Department, testified to having collected
nine-millimeter and .40 caliber casings. She noted the gun found in Mr. Owens’s
right hand was a .40 caliber. Based on the scene and bullet holes in the vehicle, the
responding officers concluded that Mr. Owens drew his weapon in response to
someone else firing a weapon. The officers also found two cell phones inside the
vehicle: one underneath Mr. Owens’s body and one in the backseat. The phone
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Opinion of the Court
located underneath Mr. Owens belonged to him and the phone in the back seat
belonging to Iyanna Brown.
Officer Moss extracted the contents of Mr. Owens’s cell phone. He found a text
message conversation between Mr. Owens and an unknown number on the night of
his death that stated, “I’m trying to have a threesome. My home girl with me, but you
can pull up on me or I can come to you.” Mr. Owens was then sent an address and
replied, “I can pull up.” At 1:34 a.m., Mr. Owens texted that he was ten minutes
away. At 1:47 a.m., Mr. Owens received a message saying, “We outside waiting on
you in the apartments.” The last message in the conversation was a text sent to Mr.
Owens at 1:50 a.m. asking for an update on his location.
Detective Buben of the High Point Police Department traced the unknown
number and linked it to a “TextMe” account. Detective Buben described “TextMe” as
“an application that . . . you can text people for free using WiFi.” The account was
registered to Justice McLaurin, who was Defendant’s girlfriend. Additionally, since
the application operates over WiFi, Detective Buben was able to track the origin of
the text messages using WiFi signal data. He determined that the signals originated
from a home shared by Defendant and Ms. McLaurin.
With the evidence collected, Detective Buben began his investigation into Ms.
Brown, the owner of the other phone that was found in Mr. Owens’s vehicle. Detective
Buben learned that shortly after the shooting, Ms. Brown was arrested for possession
of marijuana by the Raleigh Police Department and her boyfriend checked into a
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Opinion of the Court
hospital in Raleigh for treatment of a gunshot wound to his hand. Another individual,
Carrie Graves, was also a person of interest in Detective Buben’s investigation. At
some point, Ms. Graves was at the hospital with Ms. Brown and her boyfriend.
Detective Buben further learned that Ms. Brown, Ms. McLaurin, and Defendant were
all employed by the same company in High Point. Detective Buben interviewed Ms.
Brown. Ms. Brown told Detective Buben that she and Ms. Graves met Mr. Owens at
the apartment complex to have a threesome. However, “two suspects approached and
announced a robbery.”
Detective Buben subsequently interviewed Defendant and Ms. McLaurin.
Defendant stated he did not know about the death of Mr. Owens and appeared
surprised that a homicide occurred in his neighborhood. Defendant informed
Detective Buben that on the night of Mr. Owens’s death, he was at home smoking
marijuana with Ms. Graves and Ms. Brown. Defendant added, eventually, Ms.
Graves and Ms. Brown left, and he did not see them again that night.
Detective Buben received the data extracted from Ms. Brown’s phone. He
found a text message Ms. Brown had sent to Defendant two days before Mr. Owens’s
death. It stated, “Who’s a good person you know to set up that got bands?” From
Detective Buben’s experience, “a setup would be a robbery, and bands would be a
thousand dollars.”
Detective Buben continued his investigation and focused on the HiPoint ninemillimeter gun recovered from the crime scene. He suspected the gun may contain
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Opinion of the Court
traceable DNA. He also found a report from 2016 when Defendant sustained a
gunshot wound and sought medical treatment at a nearby hospital. In that instance,
while Defendant was at the hospital, Officer Presnell, also of the High Point Police
Department, “[w]ent to the hospital for a shots-fired call” to investigate the incident.
During his interview of Defendant, Officer Presnell noticed blood on Defendant’s shirt
and directed a crime scene technician to collect Defendant’s shirt as evidence. That
crime was never solved, and the shirt remained sealed, in an evidence locker.
Detective Buben retrieved Defendant’s shirt from the 2016 incident and sent
it to the State Crime Lab for DNA analysis. He also sent DNA swabs taken from the
gun found at the scene for comparison. Detective Buben received the results which
“found [Defendant’s] DNA on almost every sample that we sent them.” Based on his
investigation, Detective Buben obtained a warrant for the arrest of Defendant for
first-degree murder.
Detective Buben again interviewed Defendant. During this interview,
Defendant stated that Ms. Brown, Ms. Brown’s boyfriend, and Ms. Graves were
hanging out at his house. The group discussed “robbing Mr. Owens.” Defendant told
them he did not want to participate but ultimately agreed to “hold the backpack out”
as they robbed Mr. Owens. After Mr. Owens arrived at the apartment complex, Ms.
Graves and Ms. Brown sat in Mr. Owens’s vehicle and smoked marijuana. Ms.
Brown’s boyfriend then handed Defendant the gun and they approached the car.
When they reached Mr. Owens’s vehicle, “shots started ringing out” and Defendant
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fired two shots in return, with one hitting the door of Mr. Owens’s vehicle and the
other going across the parking lot. Defendant fled from the scene and threw the gun
in the woods.
On 12 July 2021, the Guildford County Grand Jury returned a true bill of
indictment for Defendant for first-degree murder. Before trial, Defendant moved to
suppress the DNA sample collected from the shirt he was wearing while receiving
medical treatment in 2016. Defendant argued this evidence was the product of an
illegal search and seizure, in violation of his rights under the state and federal
constitutions.
The trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion on 4 December 2023. At
the hearing, Officer Presnell, the officer who spoke with Defendant at the hospital in
2016, testified he noticed blood on Defendant’s clothing and requested that his clothes
be collected for evidence. He stated that the shirt had evidentiary value because
another individual’s DNA could be found on the shirt.
Ms. Wilde, the forensic manager with the High Point Police Department,
testified it is “standard” to collect items like Defendant’s shirt, and they would not
allow someone to retain such items because “[t]hey may have evidence for the case,
and we’re going to collect it for analysis.” She added, “there’s a lot of evidence we can
glean from that shirt.”
Lieutenant Blackman of the High Point Police Department was assigned to the
2016 case involving Defendant. He testified, “any biological evidence on the shirt is
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evidence” and the shirt itself is evidence that “an assault took place.” He noted that
the case remained unsolved and the evidence would not have been released for this
very reason. Additionally, despite attempts to contact Defendant after the incident,
Lieutenant Blackman was unable to procced with the investigation because of
Defendant’s failure to respond as of “April 2018.”
After hearing this evidence, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to
suppress, made oral findings of fact, and concluded:
One, the defendant had reported -- or had gone to the
hospital to receive medical attention for a gunshot wound
to his head.
Two, either the defendant or the hospital -- it is unclear
which -- called the Highpoint Police Department to indicate
that, in addition to the defendant, there was another victim
of a gunshot wound.
Next, the High Point Police Department responded, as they
were required to do, to a report of not only violence, but
that two individuals were harmed as a result of a firearm
incident.
Four, when officers arrived, they attempted to speak to
both of the individuals who were injured as a result of
gunshot fire.
Next, Officer Presnell testified that he talked to the
defendant. He said he could visibly see the injury on the
defendant as well as blood seemingly from the defendant’s
injury on his clothes. As a result of that plain view scene of
evidence of a violent crime that was committed, Officer
Presnell requested that one of the CSI lab personnel report
to the hospital to collect that evidence.
One of the CSI personnel from the High Point Police
Department came to the hospital, photographed both
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Opinion of the Court
victims of the gunshot violence as well as taking clothes.
The clothes, the blood could be visibly seen without any
assistance from the defendant’s pants, shoes, and both
shirts he had on.
CSI Wilde indicated that the initial reports of incidents are
not the controlling facts in whether evidence is seized
because time may change people’s memories or perceptions
or willingness to cooperate, so all evidence has to be seized
at that time.
Next, that all the officers testified that it is not only
standard practice, but they could think of no particular
case when bloody clothes in connection to a violent crime
are not seized as part of the collections process. This
indicates that the defendant’s situation was not unique or
that he was singled out or specifically targeted. It was just
part of the standard practice of collecting evidence as part
of an investigation into a violent crime.
Detective Blackman -- next, Detective Blackman indicated
that he had conducted numerous follow-ups, including
attempts to get the defendant to cooperate, but after
eighteen months was unable to proceed further with the
investigation.
Both CSI Wilde and Detective Blackman indicated in their
testimony that that does not mean that the case is
permanently closed, that other evidence or things may
come along years later that will require the testing or use
of the evidence to establish who may have perpetrated the
violent crime that injured both the defendant and the
person he came to the hospital with.
Based on the foregoing findings of facts, I would find that
the clothes were in plain view of the initial responding
officer, Officer Presnell, and Officer Presnell, without any
further steps or investigation on his part, could in plain
view see evidence of the defendant’s apparent wounds on
his clothes, that those wounds as well as that of the other
person who came to the hospital with the defendant were
alleged to have been caused by being shot by other
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Opinion of the Court
individuals. And at the time of that report, it was an
ongoing investigation into a violent crime.
Next, I will find that it’s a standard of practice and
procedure to take items of evidence that are found in plain
view, collect them, and store them as part of the
investigative process; that that process may take days,
weeks, or even years, but that evidence needs to be
acquired at that time so it cannot be altered, changed, or
lost.
Therefore, I will conclude that the items of clothing taken
from the defendant on December 15th of 2016 were
lawfully seized and taken as part of a reasonable practice
and procedure in investigating a violent crime that the
defendant indicated was perpetrated on him and that
pursuant to State versus Barkley, 144 N.C. App. (2001),
the defendant can no longer assert privacy claims or
unreasonable searches on items that have been lawfully
seized, including any samples of blood.
Based on that, I will respectfully deny the defendant’s
motion. I will note the defendant’s exception to both my
rulings in both my motions for the record.
Thereafter, Defendant’s case proceeded to trial, and the jury found him guilty
of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment
without parole. Defendant entered his notice of appeal in open court.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues the trial court committed error by denying his motion to
suppress. He claims the initial seizure of his clothing at the hospital was unlawful.
Alternatively, he argues that even if the seizure was lawful, the analysis of his DNA
was an unlawful search because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy over his
genetic material located on the shirt.
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Opinion of the Court
A. Seizure of the Shirt under the Plain View Doctrine
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress,
alleging “[t]he trial court’s findings do not support its conclusions of law because the
conclusions of law were legally erroneous.” He posits that the bloody shirt “did not
possess immediately apparent evidentiary value, as is required under the plain view
doctrine,” and “the trial court’s findings were insufficient to support a conclusion that
officers had a legal right to be present during [his] medical treatment.” Defendant
thus maintains, “under no theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was the
government entitled to conduct a warrantless search of [his] DNA.”
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is
whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167–
68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court’s findings of fact
are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting.” State v. Womble, 277 N.C. App. 164, 173–74, 858 S.E.2d 304, 312 (2021)
(citation omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed to be supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo and are subject to full review.” State v. Stanley, 259 N.C. App. 708, 711, 817
S.E.2d 107, 110 (2018) (citation omitted).
“The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is afforded great deference
upon appellate review as it has the duty to hear testimony and weigh the evidence.”
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State v. Wiles, 270 N.C. App. 592, 595, 841 S.E.2d 321, 325 (2020) (citation omitted).
The trial court may make oral findings and conclusions of law when ruling on a
defendant’s motion to suppress. See State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 268, 732 S.E.2d
571, 574 (2012) (“While written determination is the best practice, nevertheless [N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (2025)] does not require that these findings and conclusions
be in writing.”).
The state and federal constitutions provide freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.C. Const., art. 1 §§ 19, 20. “The
object of the Fourth Amendment is to protect reasonable expectations of privacy.”
State v. Wynn, 45 N.C. App. 267, 270, 262 S.E.2d 689, 692 (1980) (citation omitted).
Generally, to fall under the Fourth Amendment’s protections, an “individual relying
on immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures [must] have a ‘reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion’ in the place or property
searched.” State v. Ysut Mlo, 335 N.C. 353, 378, 440 S.E.2d 98, 110 (1994) (citations
omitted). A warrantless search is unreasonable where an individual has
“ ‘manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’ ” Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042–43 (2001) (citing California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986)).
Generally, warrantless seizures are unconstitutional, but a permissible
exception to the warrant requirement is the seizure of items under the plain view
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doctrine. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 756, 767 S.E.2d 312, 316 (2015). To comply
with this exception, the State carries the burden to establish: “First, ‘that the officer
did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the
evidence could be plainly viewed’; second, that the evidence’s ‘incriminating character
. . . [was] immediately apparent’; and third, that the officer had ‘a lawful right of
access to the object itself.’ ” Id. at 756–57, 767 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (1990)). Our state appellate
courts have similarly noted, the police may seize contraband or evidence under the
plain view doctrine if the State establishes: “(1) the officer was in a place where he
had a right to be when the evidence was discovered; (2) the evidence was discovered
inadvertently;1 and (3) it was immediately apparent to the police that the items
observed were evidence of a crime or contraband.” State v. Graves, 135 N.C. App.
216, 219, 519 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1999); see also State v. Mickey, 347 N.C. 508, 516, 495
S.E.2d 669, 674 (1998) (citations omitted) (explaining, “a seizure is lawful under the
plain view exception when the officer was in a place where he had a right to be when
the evidence was discovered and when it is immediately apparent to the police that
the items observed constitute evidence of a crime,” and “[t]he North Carolina General
Assembly has imposed an additional requirement, not mandated by the Constitution
of the United States, that the evidence discovered in plain view must be discovered
1 Defendant does not argue this requirement.
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inadvertently.”).
1. Immediately Apparent Evidentiary Value
We first consider Defendant’s contention that “it was not immediately
apparent to police that [his] clothing was evidence of a crime.”
“Our courts have defined the term immediately apparent as being satisfied
where the police have probable cause to believe that what they have come upon is
evidence of criminal conduct.” State v. Hunter, 286 N.C. App. 114, 117, 878 S.E.2d
676, 679 (2022) (quoting State v. Green, 146 N.C. App. 702, 706, 554 S.E.2d 834, 836
(2001)); see also Graves, 135 N.C. App. at 219, 519 S.E.2d at 772. And “in the case of
‘mere evidence,’ probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing,
consideration of police purposes will be required.” State v. Howard, 274 N.C. 186,
201–02, 162 S.E.2d 495, 505 (1968) (quoting Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 306–07, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650 (1967)).
A review of the record highlights the feebleness of this particular argument by
Defendant. Here, Officer Presnell went to the hospital for “a shots-fired call” to “get
[Defendant’s] story of what happened that day.” And so, the trial court found, “the
High Point Police Department responded, as they were required to do, to a report of
not only violence, but that two individuals were harmed as a result of a firearm
incident.” Officer Presnell saw that Defendant “had a gunshot wound to the head”
and “bloodstain was on his clothes.” Accordingly, the trial court found Officer
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Presnell “could visibly see the injury on the defendant as well as blood seemingly from
the defendant’s injury on his clothes.” As Officer Presnell noted, “the evidentiary
value that could come off the clothes is . . . it could have DNA from somebody else if
they were struggling,” “somebody else’s blood,” or “powder . . . something from the
gun itself could match up later on down the road.” Moreover, Ms. Wilde, the forensic
manager, testified that Defendant’s clothing may contain “gunshot residue,” “hairs
and fibers.” The trial court thus found, “it is not only standard practice, but [the
witnesses] could think of no particular case when bloody clothes in connection to a
violent crime are not seized as part of the collections process.”
These findings show Officer Presnell had probable cause to believe the bloody
shirt was evidence of criminal conduct. See Hunter, 286 N.C. App. at 117, 878 S.E.2d
at 679. The trial court’s findings therefore support its conclusions that Officer
Presnell “could in plain view see evidence of the defendant’s apparent wounds on his
clothes, that those wounds as well as that of the other person who came to the hospital
with the defendant were alleged to have been caused by being shot by other
individuals,” and “the items of clothing taken from the defendant . . . were lawfully
seized and taken as part of a reasonable practice and procedure in investigating a
violent crime that the defendant indicated was perpetrated on him.” See State v.
Ashworth, 248 N.C. App. 649, 658, 790 S.E.2d 173, 179–80 (2016). We therefore
dismiss, as meritless, Defendant’s argument that the evidentiary value of the clothing
was not immediately apparent.
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2. Legal Right to be Present
We next consider Defendant’s challenge that “[t]he trial court’s findings were
insufficient to support a conclusion that officers had a legal right to be present during
[his] treatment.”
First, we note that Defendant cites State v. Nance, 149 N.C. App. 734, 562
S.E.2d 557 (2002) for the general proposition that “[i]f the seized item is not located
in a public place, officers may still have a lawful right of access to the item to justify
its seizure if they entered the private property by consent, pursuant to a warrant, or
under exigent circumstances.” But that case contains highly distinguishable facts
and analysis. The officers in Nance entered the defendant’s private property,
removed fencing, and seized horses absent a warrant or exigent circumstances. Id.
at 742–44, 562 S.E.2d at 563–64. However, interestingly, the Nance Court restated
the proposition that “law enforcement officers have the right to approach a person’s
residence to inquire as to whether the person is willing to answer questions, and do
not trespass when they enter an individual’s property for the purpose of a general
inquiry or interview.” Id. at 742, 562 S.E.2d at 563 (cleaned up).
Finding of Fact No. 3 provides that the High Point Police Department officers
responded, “as they were required to do, to a report of not only violence, but that two
individuals were harmed as a result of a firearm incident.” Finding of Fact No. 4
reinforces the officers’ purpose in being at the hospital—to investigate a report of
violent crime. It provides the officers attempted to speak with both victims “who were
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injured as a result of gunshot fire.” These findings support the determination that
Officer Presnell was in a place where he had a right to be when the evidence was
discovered. See, e.g., Graves, 135 N.C. App. at 219, 519 S.E.2d at 772 (“In this case,
the first prong of this plain view test is clearly met, as Officer Davis was rightfully in
the emergency room trying to gather evidence concerning the shooting of
defendant.”). Defendant’s argument as to this issue is likewise overruled.
B. DNA Analysis
Next, Defendant argues that even if the initial seizure of his shirt was lawful,
the subsequent warrantless search of his DNA was unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy “over his genetic
material.” Defendant specifically maintains that the plain view doctrine cannot serve
as a basis for a warrantless search of his clothing because he “did not knowingly
expose his DNA to the public.”
This Court has previously addressed the testing of genetic material that was
warrantlessly, but lawfully seized, in State v. Barkley, 144 N.C. App. 514, 518, 551
S.E.2d 131, 134 (2001), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial constitutional
question, 354 N.C. 221, 554 S.E.2d 646 (2001). In that case, the defendant voluntarily
consented to a blood draw while at the hospital, intending to exonerate himself in
connection with a murder investigation. Barkley, 114 N.C. App. at 518, 551 S.E.2d
at 134. Law enforcement later used DNA analysis from that blood sample to connect
him to an unrelated crime. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that this secondary
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use of his blood sample violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
In Barkley, this Court acknowledged “that the taking of blood from a person
constitutes a search under both constitutions.” Id. However, “once a person’s blood
sample has been obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy claims or
unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to the use of that sample.”
Id. at 519, 551 S.E.2d at 135 (citation omitted). This is so because “[p]rivacy concerns
are no longer relevant once the sample has already lawfully been removed from the
body, and the scientific analysis of a sample does not involve any further search and
seizure of a defendant’s person.” Id. (citation omitted). This Court noted, “[a]lthough
human blood, with its unique genetic properties, may initially be quantitatively
different from [ ] evidence [such as a gun or controlled substance], once constitutional
concerns have been satisfied, a blood sample is not unlike other tangible property
which can be subject to a battery of scientific tests.” Id. Applying this principle, this
Court determined the use of the DNA analysis of the defendant’s blood “required no
additional chemical analysis which might infringe any privacy interest he might have
in the blood; rather, it involved only a comparison of the characteristics of his blood
with the evidence in this case.” Id. at 520, 551 S.E.2d at 135. Thus, this Court held
that the defendant “suffered no additional intrusion,” and the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by the secondary use of his blood for the DNA
analysis. Id.
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant proffers several arguments that seek to distinguish his case from
Barkley. We find his arguments unpersuasive. Having determined that the clothing
containing blood evidence was lawfully obtained by law enforcement under the plain
view doctrine, the principle of Barkley remains applicable. Here, the sample was
lawfully obtained, and the scientific analysis of that sample did not infringe on
Defendant’s state and federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See id. at 519, 551 S.E.2d at 135; see also U.S. Const. amend.
IV; N.C. Const., art. 1, §§ 19, 20. Defendant suffered no additional intrusion which
might infringe any privacy interest he might have in the blood; instead, “it involved
only a comparison of the characteristics of his blood with the evidence in this case.”
Id. at 520, 551 S.E.2d at 135. Defendant’s arguments on this issue fail as his rights
were not violated by the secondary use of his blood for the DNA analysis.
C. Other Arguments
Defendant makes additional arguments about the doctrines of abandonment
and inevitable discovery, but we need not consider them as our analysis does not rest
on these exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the trial court did not commit error by denying
Defendant’s suppression motion.
NO ERROR.
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Judges STROUD and MURRY concur.
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