[Cite as J.P.C. v. S.T.C., 2026-Ohio-3021.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
J.P.C., :
Plaintiff-Appellee/ :
Cross-Appellant,
: No.115734
v.
:
S.T.C.,
Defendant-Appellant/ :
Cross-Appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 6, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DV-25-404458
Appearances:
Stafford Cruz Law Company and Kelley R. Tauring, for
appellee/cross-appellant.
Cavitch, Familo & Durkin Co., L.P.A., and Roger L.
Kleinman, for appellant/cross-appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
S.T.C. appeals from the judgment entry granting a domestic-violence
civil-protection order (“DVCPO”) concerning J.P.C. J.P.C. cross-appeals the duration of the DVCPO and its designation of only her as a protected person. After
a thorough review of the facts and the law, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On May 12, 2025, J.P.C. filed a petition for a DVCPO against S.T.C. in
the Domestic Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
(“Domestic Relations Court”), seeking protection for herself and her three minor
children (“the Children”). J.P.C.’s petition noted that S.T.C. is her former spouse
and the father of the Children.
Also on May 12, 2025, the trial court held an ex parte hearing, at
which S.T.C. was not present, regarding J.P.C.’s petition. That same day, the court
issued an “order of protection,” finding that J.P.C.
gave testimony that support[ed] findings that [S.T.C.] committed
domestic violence as defined by R.C. 3113.31(D)(1) and that [J.P.C]
and/or [her] household members are in immediate and present danger
of domestic violence. Petitioner’s testimony is found to be credible, and
immediate protection is necessary.
The trial court scheduled a full hearing on the issues raised by J.P.C.’s
petition, to take place on May 20, 2025. On May 20, 2025, the court issued a journal
entry continuing the hearing to May 27, 2025. The entry noted that S.T.C. objected
to the continuance of the hearing.
On May 27, 2025, the case proceeded to a full hearing, at which both
J.P.C. and S.T.C. were present. The parties elicited the following testimony.
A. Hearing Testimony
1. S.T.C.
At the outset of the hearing, J.P.C. called S.T.C. to testify as if on crossexamination. S.T.C. testified that he and J.P.C. had previously been married and are
the parents of the Children.
On May 10, 2025, S.T.C. was driving his motorcycle in Brunswick,
Ohio. S.T.C. turned right onto Pearl Road, at which point he observed J.P.C. sitting
in the driver’s seat of a car that was stopped in a turn lane. He pulled up to the
driver’s-side door of J.P.C.’s car and “yelled.” He was speaking loudly because
J.P.C.’s car window was closed and because he was on a motorcycle. He was “sad”
that J.P.C. had arranged for the first communion of one of the Children, L.C.,
without inviting him.
S.T.C. was aware that J.P.C. contacted law enforcement related to
these events. S.T.C. gave a statement to Officer James Keaveney (“Ofc. Keaveney”).
He agreed that he told Ofc. Keaveney that he “revved” his motorcycle’s engine while
alongside J.P.C.’s car. He testified that revving his engine was an easier way of
getting J.P.C.’s attention than using his motorcycle’s horn.
Later that day, S.T.C. attended a soccer game in which he believed
L.C. would be playing. L.C. was not there, so S.T.C. left the game early. He drove
his motorcycle to his parents’ house, which was “diagonal” from J.P.C.’s house. His
parents were not home, and he left within an hour. He did not specifically recall revving his motorcycle engine when arriving at or departing from his parents’ house
but testified that he “probably” had.
S.T.C. denied scratching his motorcycle against J.P.C.’s car. He
denied attempting to reach into the car through its driver’s-side window, which he
recalled had been rolled up from the time he first saw the car. He denied calling
J.P.C. a “stupid f****** b****” or being “mad.” He did not hear the Children or see
whether the Children were in the car because it had “tinted windows.” He denied
that he was attempting to intimidate or scare J.P.C. when he revved his motorcycle’s
engine. He denied observing J.P.C. call 9-1-1 while he was next to her car. He denied
completing a “U-turn” and following J.P.C.
Regarding his prior marriage with J.P.C., S.T.C. agreed that he had
created holes in the walls of their marital home. His testimony did not reveal how
these holes came to be. He denied routinely throwing things at J.P.C. He agreed
that he had discharged a firearm in the home in 2020 but maintained that he did so
accidentally.
2. Officer James Keaveney
Ofc. Keaveney testified that he worked for the Brunswick Police
Department. On May 10, 2025, while on duty, he spoke with J.P.C., who told him
that S.T.C. had “pulled up alongside of her in traffic and was yelling at her.”
According to Ofc. Keaveney, J.P.C. was upset and crying. Ofc. Keaveney observed
“very small, either scratches or scuff marks, on the driver side of [J.P.C.’s] car that she said could possibly be consistent with her ex-husband’s motorcycle.” He did not
observe S.T.C. following J.P.C.
Two days later, on May 12, 2025, Ofc. Keaveney spoke with S.T.C.
about this incident. S.T.C. told Ofc. Keaveney that he had asked someone,
presumably J.P.C., multiple times about when his son was going to make his first
communion, which he eventually determined on his own. He also told
Ofc. Keaveney that he was driving his motorcycle in the direction of the church at
which he believed the first communion was occurring when he encountered J.P.C.
3. J.P.C.
J.P.C. testified that, on May 10, 2025, after her son’s first communion,
she drove her Children from the church where the ceremony occurred, in the
direction of a soccer game in which L.C. was supposed to play. While J.P.C. was
stopped on Pearl Road, “suddenly, [S.T.C.] came up on his motorcycle.” He pulled
“right up to” the car’s window. J.P.C. “felt . . . some impact on [her] vehicle.” She
later discovered a scratch on her car that had not been there before.
When S.T.C. pulled up to J.P.C.’s car, her “window was down.” S.T.C.
“started reaching in” to the car, so she “quickly put the window up.” She did not
recall whether S.T.C.’s hand entered the car. S.T.C. started “pounding on the
window” with a “clenched fist” maybe “two or three” times. At the same time,
“obscenities were being sworn at me.” The Children were “yelling and crying and
screaming.”
J.P.C. called 9-1-1 and began driving to a police station. While doing
so, she saw S.T.C. “making a left, getting through traffic,” “appearing to either Uturn or pull into a business.” While J.P.C. feared that S.T.C. was attempting to follow
her, she did not testify that she saw his motorcycle proceed — in her direction or
otherwise — after initiating this turn.
At the police station, J.P.C. spoke to Ofc. Keaveney. She was scared
for herself and for the safety of her children. She testified that the encounter was
“terrifying,” “unexpected,” and that she “shook” for “three days after.”
On cross-examination, J.P.C. agreed that she did not tell S.T.C. when
or where the first communion would occur. She agreed that S.T.C. did not verbally
threaten her with physical violence or get off his motorcycle. She did not observe a
weapon during her interaction with S.T.C. on Pearl Road. J.P.C. returned to her
home on May 10, 2025, after which point S.T.C. did not interact with her.
Regarding her prior marriage with S.T.C., J.P.C. testified that, in
2017, S.T.C. created a hole in the wall of their marital home. J.P.C.’s testimony was
unclear as to how this happened. In 2020, while J.P.C. was upstairs in the home,
she heard “a shot go off.” She ran downstairs to S.T.C., who told her that he
“accidentally discharged a firearm.” In 2022, S.T.C. became “so enraged that he
threw his phone at me and it went through the wall.” Also in 2022, because L.C.
“wasn’t listening . . . [S.T.C.] began throwing objects at him on the couch.” J.P.C.
further testified that S.T.C. became “enraged,” “ripped [L.C.] off the floor with one
arm,” and “was hitting [the child] in the head repeatedly.”
4. Scott Taylor
Scott Taylor testified that J.P.C. was his “significant other” at the time
of this hearing. He was present on Pearl Road on May 10, 2025, during these events.
He saw a “motorcyclist approach the driver side window” of J.P.C.’s car. The
motorcyclist “struck the vehicle” and later “made a U-turn.”
5. S.T.C.
Near the conclusion of the hearing, S.T.C. testified for a second time,
on his own behalf. According to S.T.C., he was driving on Pearl Road on May 10,
2025, because he was “trying to make it to the First Communion ceremony for my
son.” He “looked up and saw [J.P.C.’s] vehicle.” His motorcycle was facing
northbound and her vehicle was “a few feet” away, facing southbound.
S.T.C. testified, “I came up to the vehicle, I revved my engine” and
“yelled, Shame on you, b****.” He denied coming in contact with the vehicle. This
interaction lasted a “split second or two,” after which J.P.C.’s car “began moving,”
and S.T.C. “proceed[ed] on my way.” He later went to his parents’ house. While
there, he did not interact with J.P.C.
B. Exclusion of GPS Evidence
During S.T.C.’s testimony, his attorney attempted to introduce an
exhibit described as a screenshot from a digital application that tracked S.T.C.’s
location on May 10, 2025. Counsel for J.P.C. objected, arguing that S.T.C. could not
authenticate the exhibit. The magistrate sustained the objection and excluded the evidence. Regarding this evidentiary ruling, the hearing transcript provides as
follows:
The Magistrate: What is it that you’re trying to show with this exhibit?
Counsel for S.T.C.: That he didn’t turn around. He went directly to the
church.
The Magistrate: Is this from that company that made this?
Counsel for S.T.C.: Can I lay a foundation, Your Honor?
The Magistrate: You are not the company. I don’t even know what app
this is.
The Magistrate: I’m not allowing this. He can testify that he did not
turn around.
C. Grant of DVCPO and Assignments of Error
Following the full hearing, on May 28, 2025, the trial court issued an
“order of protection,” finding that J.P.C.
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [S.T.C.] engaged in
domestic violence as defined by R.C. 3113.31 and that a [DVCPO] for
one year protecting Petitioner only is appropriate. The evidence
presented for the other requested parties did not rise to the level of
domestic violence as defined in R.C. 3113.31.
The DVCPO further provided, “[T]he terms of this Order shall be effective until
05/12/2026.”
Both parties filed objections, which covered all of the assignments of
error now before us. The trial court overruled both parties’ objections via a judgment entry issued on September 25, 2025, in which the court ordered that the
DVCPO that had been issued on May 28, 2025, would remain in effect. Regarding
the exclusion of GPS evidence, the court found that S.T.C. “did not present a witness
to properly authenticate the GPS data he was seeking to introduce.”
S.T.C. appealed, raising the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding Appellant committed an act of
domestic violence where the finding was not supported by sufficient,
credible evidence.
II. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by admitting
testimony and exhibits regarding an alleged history of domestic
violence.
III. The trial court abused its discretion and caused material prejudice
by excluding authentication testimony regarding a GPS screenshot and
by excluding the GPS screenshot as evidence.
IV. The Magistrate abused her discretion by granting J.P.C.’s oral
motion for continuance of the full hearing where J.P.C. was specifically
instructed at the ex-parte hearing that trial would commence on May
20, 2025, with or without her retention of counsel.
J.P.C. cross-appealed, raising the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in
granting the Cross-Appellant protection from the Cross-Appellee for
one (1) year.
II. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in
failing to designate the minor children as protected parties from the
Cross-Appellee.
D. J.P.C.’s Motion to Dismiss S.T.C.’s Appeal
On May 23, 2025, J.P.C. filed a motion to dismiss S.T.C.’s appeal as
moot. She noted that the DVCPO at issue was effective only until May 12, 2025, and
had expired before the May 26, 2025 oral argument in this case.
S.T.C. opposed the motion, arguing that his appeal was not moot
because it may result in collateral legal consequences in Cuyahoga C.P. No. DR 23-3967756 and 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 116110, involving a shared parenting plan
between S.T.C. and J.P.C (“Parenting Plan Case”). S.T.C. attached to his opposition
brief the magistrate’s decision and judgment entry from the Parenting Plan Case.
He also attached J.P.C.’s brief supporting her appeal of the trial court’s decision in
the Parenting Plan Case.
Pertinent to the motion to dismiss this appeal, the documents
provided by S.T.C. demonstrate the following events concerning the Parenting Plan
Case.
• The Domestic Relations Court modified an existing parenting
plan, reducing S.T.C.’s parenting time. In support of this
modification, the court evaluated the best interests of the
Children under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) and considered that a
DVCPO had been granted in this case.[1]
• Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s modification to
the parenting plan. Among them, S.T.C. asserted that the
magistrate erred by reducing his parenting time, and J.P.C.
posited that the magistrate erred by denying her request to
terminate the parenting plan.
• The court adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and modified
the parenting plan, ordering S.T.C.’s parenting time to be
reduced, although by a lesser amount than the magistrate had
recommended.
• Both parties appealed. Mother raised an assignment of error
asserting that the trial court erred by not terminating the
1 The magistrate determined that “[S.T.C] has shown to be volatile, including in
public, when angered.” In support of this conclusion, the magistrate’s decision provides, “The uncontroverted facts in which the DVCPO is based show” that S.T.C. “shout[ed] obscenities” at J.P.C. and “pound[ed] on her window at a busy city intersection.”
parenting plan, in part because of the DVCPO granted against
S.T.C. in the case underlying this appeal. The appeal of the
Parenting Plan Case remains pending at the time this opinion
was written.
E. S.T.C.’s Motion to Dismiss J.P.C.’s Cross-Appeal
In the present case, on June 5, 2026, S.T.C. filed a motion to dismiss
J.P.C.’s cross-appeal. He argued that if we found his appeal to be moot because the
DVCPO had expired, we should also find J.P.C.’s cross-appeal to be moot. J.P.C.
opposed the motion on the basis that she sought, in the proceeding below and on
appeal, a five-year DVCPO. J.P.C. argued that her appeal was not moot because less
than two years had passed since the trial court issued the DVCPO.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Mootness and S.T.C.’s Appeal
In light of the parties’ motions to dismiss, we first address whether
the DVCPO’s expiration renders moot each assignment of error that S.T.C. raised.
Ohio courts may “decide only actual controversies where the judgment can be
carried into effect.” Maurent v. Spatny, 2025-Ohio-5002, ¶ 9, citing Travis v. Pub.
Util. Comm., 123 Ohio St. 355, 359 (1931). “[J]udicial power does not extend to moot
cases, because when a case becomes moot, there is no longer any controversy for a
court to decide.” Id. at ¶ 10. “A case becomes moot when the issues presented are
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” that
is, when it becomes impossible for a court to grant effectual relief. (Cleaned up.) Id.
at ¶ 11.
We do not find, as J.P.C. posits in her motion to dismiss, that S.T.C.’s
assignments of error are moot. S.T.C. demonstrated that the DVCPO, though
expired, presents collateral legal consequences for him.
Ohio courts have recognized the collateral-consequences exception to
the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 227 (1994)
(holding that “an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire
sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal,” in part because
“[t]he Ohio Revised Code contains numerous examples of restrictions imposed upon
convicted felons”). In that context,“‘“[a] collateral disability is an adverse legal
consequence of a conviction or judgment that survives despite the court’s sentence
having been satisfied or served.”’” State v. Landers, 2025-Ohio-5143, ¶ 7, quoting
State v. Pizzo, 2025-Ohio-2790, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), quoting In re S.J.K., 2007-Ohio2621, ¶ 10.
The Ohio Supreme Court has found that “in the absence of
demonstrated legal collateral consequences, the collateral-consequences exception
to the mootness doctrine does not apply to an expired domestic-violence civil
protection order.” Cyran v. Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 7. “Speculation is insufficient
to establish a legally cognizable interest for which a court can order relief using the
collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id. at ¶ 11.
This court has recognized that, where continuing legal consequences
have been demonstrated – not merely speculated about – an appeal of an expired
DVCPO will not be considered moot. J.M. v. D.H., 2020-Ohio-108, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.). In that case, an expired DVCPO was not moot where appellant “filed with the trial
court a notice of continuing legal collateral consequences with an affidavit in
support” that addressed the DVCPO’s impact on “her ability to serve as a guardian
ad litem or court-appointed special advocate.” Id.
S.T.C. has demonstrated that the expired DVCPO has subjected him
to collateral legal consequences. S.T.C.’s arguments on this point are not merely
speculative, as were the appellant’s in Cyran, because S.T.C. supplemented the
record with documents that show he retains a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of this case. The magistrate’s decision and judgment entry from the
Parenting Plan Case show that the trial court did consider the DVCPO underlying
this appeal as evidence to support its reduction of S.T.C.’s parenting time, over
S.T.C.’s objection. 2 S.T.C. has also shown that J.P.C. asserted on appeal in the
Parenting Plan Case that the DVCPO constituted cause to terminate the parenting
plan. Unlike in Cyran, where collateral consequences were hypothetical, here we
find that S.T.C. demonstrated that the expired DVCPO had collateral legal
consequences and that his challenges to the grant of the DVCPO are not moot.
Consequently, J.P.C.’s motion to dismiss S.T.C.’s appeal is denied.
2 R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides that, “in determining a child’s best interest in the
context of a motion to modify a prior decree, a court ‘shall consider all relevant factors.’” In re G.M., 2026-Ohio-841, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). The statute provides that this consideration includes, “but is not limited to” certain factors set forth by statute. “[E]vidence of physical violence giving rise to a [civil protection order] . . . may be properly considered as other relevant evidence for [a] trial court’s custody determination” under R.C. 3109.04. Sovern v. Sovern, 2016-Ohio-7542, ¶ 45 (3d Dist.).
We next address S.T.C.’s assignments of error contesting the DVCPO.
In so doing, we address certain assignments of error out of order and together.
B. DVCPO Elements and Review Standard
R.C. 3113.31 sets forth requirements related to the issuance of a
DVCPO. “After an ex parte or full hearing, the court may grant any protection
order,” which may, among other consequences, direct a respondent to take or refrain
from taking certain actions. R.C. 3113.31(E)(1). See R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(a)-(k). “The
statutory criterion to determine whether or not to grant a . . . protection order
pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 is the existence or threatened existence of domestic
violence.” R.E.S. v. M.J.M., 2025-Ohio-546, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting Tyler v. Tyler,
2016-Ohio-7419, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). As used in R.C. 3113.31, domestic violence means
“[p]lacing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical
harm.” R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii). The person placed in fear of imminent serious
physical harm must be a “family or household member.” R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a).
“Family or household member” includes “a former spouse of the respondent.”
R.C. 3113.31(A)(3)(a)(i).
To be granted a DVCPO, a petitioner must prove his or her case “by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Y.H. v. C.C., 2019-Ohio-2922, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.),
citing Croone v. Arif, 2014-Ohio-5546, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79
Ohio St.3d 34 (1997). “‘“Preponderance of the evidence” means the greater weight
of the evidence, or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.’” Id., quoting id., quoting
State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 (1987).
“Explicit threats of domestic violence are not required” to support the
grant of a DVCPO; rather, “statements, conduct, and actions, taken with all
surrounding facts and circumstances, can constitute a threat.” R.E.S. at ¶ 17. The
“critical inquiry . . . is whether a reasonable person would be placed in fear of
imminent . . . serious physical harm.” E.A. v. A.A., 2024-Ohio-2807, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.),
citing Strong v. Bauman, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2272, *4 (2d Dist. May 21, 1999).
In an appeal attacking the grant of a DVCPO, this court must determine “whether
there was sufficient, credible evidence to support a finding that the respondent
engaged in . . . acts of domestic violence.” S.M. v. T.G., 2025-Ohio-1448, ¶ 26 (8th
Dist.).
C. S.T.C.’s Second Assignment of Error — the Trial Court’s
Admission of Evidence Regarding Past Domestic Violence
With his second assignment of error, S.T.C. asserts that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that he had undertaken prior acts of domestic violence
against J.P.C. While S.T.C. does not claim that the trial court violated any specific
evidentiary rule, he posits that admitting the evidence in question was an abuse of
discretion. S.T.C.’s supports this assignment of error with arguments about the
probative value of J.P.C.’s testimony, none of which we find availing. See
Evid.R. 403(A) (Relevant evidence “is not admissible if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the
issues, or of misleading the jury.”). See also State v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-2774, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (“A determination under Evid.R. 403(A) rests within the discretion of the
trial court.”).
In particular, S.T.C. disputes the probative value of the past acts at
issue, characterizing them as “remote in time from the incident” that occurred on
May 10, 2025, and inclusive of accidental conduct. He argues that there was no
evidence corroborating J.P.C.’s testimony regarding his past behavior. He also
argues that the Domestic Relations Court issued a shared parenting plan despite
being aware of his past conduct, meaning that conduct should not be of concern in
this case. We find no merit in this assignment of error.
“‘It is permissible in certain circumstances for a court to consider past
behaviors when determining whether there is a present threat of domestic
violence.’” E.A. at ¶ 39 (8th Dist.), quoting Tyler v. Tyler, 2016-Ohio-7419, ¶ 20 (2d
Dist.). A petitioner’s fear and reasonableness thereof should be determined with
reference to a petitioner’s history with the respondent. Id., citing id. See M.D. v.
M.D., 2018-Ohio-4218, ¶ 74 (8th Dist.) (Trial court erred by limiting testimony to
events that occurred during the year before a petition for a DVCPO was filed and, in
so doing, “prevented the Petitioner from presenting evidence regarding events that
occurred between her and the Respondent that could have helped her establish that
her fear of imminent serious physical harm was reasonable.”).
In light of the foregoing, we decline to find, as S.T.C. proposes, that
the trial court should have concluded from the fact that the parties have a parenting
plan that S.T.C.’s prior acts were not probative of possible future domestic violence.
We are, likewise, not persuaded that the age of the conduct in
question demanded its exclusion. In E.A., the trial court did not err by considering
evidence of prior domestic violence despite victim’s acknowledgement that no
physical altercation had occurred for more than two years prior to hearing. Id. at
¶ 15. Similarly, in this case, J.P.C. testified during the 2025 hearing concerning acts
that allegedly occurred as recently as three years prior, in 2022. While other
incidents addressed in the testimony were more remote in time from the events that
gave rise to the DVCPO, we find that the trial court was in the best position to
attribute weight to that testimony and that it was not an abuse of discretion to
consider it. See State v. Tegarty, 2023-Ohio-1369, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing State v.
DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus (“The trial court,
as finder of fact, can give evidence and testimony the weight it deems appropriate.”).
As for S.T.C.’s contention that no corroborating evidence supported
J.P.C.’s testimony about prior domestic violence, we find no error in the trial court’s
admission of J.P.C.’s testimony. Corroboration was not required. See Cleveland v.
Watson, 2020-Ohio-3284, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.) (“[A] victim’s testimony, alone, if found
credible, can provide sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction” in a criminal case,
which requires a higher standard of proof than grant of a DVCPO.). In essence,
S.T.C. argues J.P.C. was not credible. However, as addressed below, we decline to
second-guess any assessment of witness credibility that the trial court made in this
matter.
Finally, S.T.C. argues that admission of testimony about the
purportedly accidental 2020 firearm discharge was in error. S.T.C. reasons that
J.P.C. agreed that the firearm discharge was not intentional, meaning that testimony
about it was prejudicial and irrelevant to the possibility that he would engage in
future domestic violence. This argument misstates J.P.C.’s testimony. J.P.C.
testified that she had not observed the firearm discharge and explained that after
the incident, S.T.C. told her that he had fired the gun accidentally. Notably, the
DVCPO in this case arose from a bench trial. It was within the court’s purview to
decide whether this explanation — which S.T.C. also provided during his testimony
— was credible and weigh it accordingly. We do not find that the possibility that
S.T.C. accidentally discharged the firearm required the court to exclude testimony
about this event. Nor do we find that S.T.C.’s past possession and handling of
firearms was an inappropriate topic for the court to consider in evaluating whether
a threat of force and reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm existed in
this case.
In light of the foregoing, we do not find that the court erred in
admitting evidence of S.T.C.’s past acts, offered to support J.P.C.’s petition for the
DVCPO. Accordingly, S.T.C.’s second assignment of error is overruled.
D. S.T.C.’s First Assignment of Error — the Trial Court’s Grant of
the DVCPO
With his first assignment of error, S.T.C. asserts that the evidence did
not support the trial court’s grant of the DVCPO. We disagree, finding that a
preponderance of sufficient, credible evidence supported the court’s decision. Again, for her petition to succeed, J.P.C. needed to demonstrate that S.T.C. placed
her by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm.
First, we do not find that the trial court erred in determining that
J.P.C. feared imminent serious physical harm. J.P.C. testified that, following her
encounter with S.T.C. on May 10, 2025, she was scared for herself and for the safety
of the Children. She drove to a police station following the interaction and spoke
with Ofc. Keaveney, who testified that J.P.C. was upset and crying. According to
J.P.C., her interaction with S.T.C. was “terrifying” and “unexpected” and she “shook”
for “three days after.”
We also do not find that the trial court erred in concluding that
J.P.C.’s fear of imminent serious physical harm was reasonable under the
circumstances. The evidence before the court included S.T.C.’s conduct during the
interaction on May 10, 2025, the circumstances leading up to that interaction, and
S.T.C.’s past acts. Regarding S.T.C.’s conduct on the day of the incident, J.P.C.
testified that S.T.C. started to reach through the car window, which was open at the
beginning of their interaction. Further, there was evidence that S.T.C. demonstrated
emotional distress with J.P.C. during the Pearl Road interaction. Both parties
testified that S.T.C. yelled expletives at J.P.C. Both parties testified that S.T.C.
revved his motorcycle’s engine while it was stopped alongside J.P.C.’s car. J.P.C.
testified that, after she closed her car’s window, S.T.C. pounded on it two or three times with a closed fist. She also testified that S.T.C. scratched his motorcycle
against her car, which startled her.3
The court could also have reasonably determined that the
circumstances preceding the interaction on Pearl Road indicated that a threat of
force existed. The parties testified that S.T.C. pulled his motorcycle up to J.P.C.’s
car while the car was stopped at an intersection. The vehicles were traveling in
opposite directions, suggesting that— in pulling alongside J.P.C.’s vehicle — S.T.C.
stopped in the road for no legitimate purpose. Also supportive of the court’s finding
that a threat of force existed was evidence that S.T.C. was angry with J.P.C. over her
failure to include him in their son’s first communion service. See State v. Lucas,
2020-Ohio-1602, ¶ 88 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompson, 2003-Ohio-3939, ¶ 24
(8th Dist.), citing State v. Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d 6 (2001) (strained relationship,
including evidence of domestic violence, between a defendant and victim is
admissible to show motive, intent to harm victim). The testimony of multiple
witnesses suggested that, immediately prior to getting on his motorcycle on May 10,
2025, S.T.C. attempted to determine when his son was making his first communion.
Despite asking about the first communion, S.T.C. was not invited and J.P.C. was
driving away from the ceremony when S.T.C. encountered her. Also, as discussed
above, J.P.C. testified about three prior instances in which S.T.C. acted aggressively
towards J.P.C. or the Children or put them at risk of physical harm.
3 During her testimony, J.P.C. did not indicate whether she believed that S.T.C.
purposefully caused any collision that may have occurred between their vehicles.
Lastly, we are not persuaded by S.T.C.’s argument that that J.P.C.’s
testimony lacked credibility because she altered her recitation of events multiple
times between May 10, 2025, and the full hearing. At trial, the factfinder is in the
“best position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections that are critical observations in determining the credibility of a witness
and his or her testimony.” State v. Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.).
Though S.T.C. claims that J.P.C. provided five different versions of events, many of
the purported differences that he identifies – for example, whether S.T.C. did or did
not take off a motorcycle helmet that he was wearing while on Pearl Road – do not
undermine the trial court’s conclusion that J.P.C. demonstrated that a threat of force
placed her in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm.
Given the foregoing, we find that sufficient, credible evidence
supported the trial court’s grant of the DVCPO. Accordingly, S.T.C.’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
E. S.T.C.’s Third Assignment of Error — The Trial Court’s
Exclusion of GPS Evidence that S.T.C. Attempted to Introduce
With his third assignment of error, S.T.C. asserts that the trial court
erred in excluding GPS evidence that would have shown that he did not follow J.P.C.
on his motorcycle after their initial encounter on Pearl Road. Though we find that
excluding this evidence amounted to harmless error, we agree that the court’s
rationale for doing so was contrary to law.
Evid.R. 901(A) establishes that evidence may be authenticated, as a
condition precedent to admissibility, by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” According to
Evid.R. 901(B), evidence may be authenticated via “[t]estimony that a matter is
what it is claimed to be.” Authentication under Evid.R. 901(A) “does not require
conclusive proof.” Cleveland v. Greear, 2020-Ohio-29, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing State
v. Toudle, 2013-Ohio-1548, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). This court has upheld the admissibility
under Evid.R. 901 of photos taken from a defendant’s Facebook page. State v. Ivery,
2026-Ohio-2542, ¶ 107-109 (8th Dist.); State v. Young, 2022-Ohio-3132, ¶ 68-69
(8th Dist.); State v. Inkton, 2016-Ohio-693, ¶ 78, 84 (8th Dist.). In each of the
preceding cases, the court found that the testimony of a detective — not of a
Facebook employee — was sufficient to support a finding that Facebook photos were
what they were claimed to be and admissible evidence.
The magistrate’s ruling that S.T.C. could not authenticate location
data recorded by a digital application because he “was not the company” that created
or maintained it has no basis in Evid.R. 901. The record also belies the court’s
conclusion in overruling S.T.C.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision that S.T.C.
“did not present a witness to properly authenticate the GPS data he was seeking to
introduce.” S.T.C. was not permitted to explain his knowledge of the exhibit that his
attorney attempted to introduce. The magistrate prevented S.T.C.’s attorney from
asking questions about that topic upon realizing that the exhibit pertained to the
contents of a digital application.
However, as Civ.R. 61 states, “[N]o error or defect in any ruling or
order . . . is ground . . . for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice.” The rule further provides, “The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.” See R.C. 2309.59 (“In every stage of an
action, the court shall disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings
which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.”). “‘Under the
concept of harmless error, it is neither prudent nor appropriate for this court to
order a trial court to remedy an error that does not affect the outcome of the case;
i.e., the appellate court may not reverse the trial court unless a substantive right is
affected.’” Luri v. Republic Servs., 2014-Ohio-3817, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting
Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. S. Lorain Merchants’ Assn., 2006-Ohio-2407, ¶ 7 (9th
Dist.).
Even if we assume to be true what S.T.C. intended for the GPS
evidence to show — that he did not follow J.P.C. from the Pearl Road intersection —
as discussed above, sufficient, credible evidence supported the trial court’s decision.
Again, S.T.C.’s conduct while pulled alongside J.P.C.’s car on May 10, 2025, the
circumstances leading up to that interaction, and S.T.C.’s past acts were enough to
support the grant of the DVCPO.
Given the foregoing, we find that the court erred in excluding the GPS
evidence for lack of authentication, but do not find that doing so affected the
outcome of this case.4 Accordingly, S.T.C.’s third assignment of error is overruled.
F. S.T.C.’s Fourth Assignment of Error — The Trial Court’s Grant
of a One-Week Continuance
With his fourth assignment of error, S.T.C. asserts that the trial court
erred in continuing the full hearing on the DVCPO from May 20, 2025, to May 27,
2025. We disagree.
“‘A trial court has the discretion to schedule and continue hearings.’”
Broadview Hts. v. Vukotic, 2025-Ohio-5855, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Calhoun v.
Calhoun, 2010-Ohio-2347, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). “In so doing ‘[t]he trial court must
balance its own interests of maintaining its docket with the potential prejudice to
the parties.’” Id., citing id. Also, in a case involving a DVCPO, “the court may grant
a continuance of the full hearing to a reasonable time determined by the court”
where “continuance is needed to allow a party to obtain counsel.”
R.C. 3113.313(D)(2)(a)(iii).
We find no merit in S.T.C.’s assertion that the court erred in
continuing the full hearing on the DVCPO by one week. As
R.C. 3113.313(D)(2)(a)(iii) permits, the court continued the case to allow J.P.C. to
retain legal counsel. S.T.C. provides no support for his accusation that “J.P.C.’s
conduct [in seeking a continuance to retain a lawyer] was dilatory, purposeful and
4 We make no decision about any other grounds for admitting or excluding the
evidence at issue.
contrived.” Further, S.T.C. does not claim that the continuance harmed his ability
to present his case.
In his reply brief, S.T.C. declares that “delay of even a day harms a
Respondent subject to an Ex Parte DVCPO.” We are not persuaded. While a party
subject to an ex parte DVCPO that was issued contrary to law may be harmed by an
unreasonable delay of his or her opportunity to present a case at a full hearing, as
discussed above, we do not find that the DVCPO that S.T.C. contests was erroneously
granted. In light of the foregoing, we do not find that the court abused its discretion
in granting J.P.C.’s request for a one-week continuance.
Accordingly, assignment of error No. 4 is overruled.
G. Mootness and J.P.C.’s Cross-Appeal
We next address J.P.C.’s cross-appeal. With her first crossassignment of error, J.P.C. challenges the duration of the DVCPO. She argues that
a five-year, rather than a one-year, DVCPO was appropriate. With her second crossassignment of error, J.P.C. asserts that the DVCPO should have covered the
Children.
As an initial matter, we again note that S.T.C. moved to dismiss
J.P.C.’s appeal, arguing that the issues it raises are moot. We do not agree with this
argument as relates to J.P.C.’s first assignment of error about the duration of the
DVCPO. “Where [a protection] order may have expired during the pendency of an
appeal by a petitioner challenging the duration of the order, the appeal is not moot.”
Elmurr v. Makdessi, 2019-Ohio-1437, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). J.P.C. sought a five-year DVCPO, and less than two years have passed since the issuance of the one-year
DVCPO that she contests. As such, J.P.C. has a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of this case. Consequently, we deny S.T.C.’s motion to dismiss.
H. J.P.C.’s First-Cross Assignment of Error — The Trial Court’s
Decision to Issue a One-Year, Rather Than a Five-Year, DVCPO
We next address the merits of J.P.C.’s first cross-assignment of error.
Courts are “authorized ‘to craft protection orders that are tailored to the particular
circumstances.’” Elmurr at ¶ 15, quoting M.D., 2018-Ohio-4218, at ¶ 45 (8th Dist.).
“[C]hallenges to the scope of a protection order are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Elmurr at ¶ 15. A DVCPO remains effective until a date certain “not later than five
years from the date of its issuance or approval.” R.C. 3113.31(E)(3)(a).
In support of her challenge to the duration of the DVCPO, J.P.C.
attempts to compare this case to E.A., 2024-Ohio-2807 (8th Dist.), in which this
court affirmed a five-year DVCPO. The E.A. Court noted that, at hearing, the
petitioner identified “specific instances of physical abuse.” Id. at ¶ 51. This included
testimony that petitioner’s husband “pinned [her] up against the kitchen counter,”
“dug his fingers into the back of [her] hand,” “put his hands around [her] throat,”
“grabbed [her] by her head, and shoved [her] in the closet.” Id. at ¶ 6-7.
We do not find that the court abused its discretion in issuing a oneyear DVCPO here. Unlike in E.A., there was no evidence that S.T.C. came in contact
with J.P.C.’s person on May 10, 2025. For their entire interaction on Pearl Road,
S.T.C. was on his motorcycle and J.P.C. was in her car. The only bodily contact that
J.P.C. described was between S.T.C.’s closed fist and her closed car window. She testified that S.T.C. pounded on the window two or three times. J.P.C. also denied
that S.T.C. made an explicit verbal threat to physically harm her. She denied that
she saw a weapon during the interaction with S.T.C.
Further, J.P.C.’s testimony about S.T.C.’s conduct during the former
couple’s marriage did not include allegations of harmful physical contact or verbal
threats of physical harm. We acknowledge that J.P.C. testified about incidents in
which she could have been physically harmed because of S.T.C.’s behavior, namely,
when he discharged a firearm in their home and when he threw his cell phone.
However, S.T.C. testified that the firearm discharge occurred accidentally — which
J.P.C. did not dispute in her testimony — while J.P.C. was on another floor of their
home. The gunfire and thrown cell phone each damaged a wall but did not hit or
injure J.P.C. The most recent of these events occurred in 2020, approximately five
years before the incident that gave rise to S.T.C.’s petition for the DVCPO at issue.
In light of the foregoing, we do not find that the trial court’s decision to issue a oneyear DVCPO, rather than the five-year DVCPO requested by J.P.C., amounted to an
abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, J.P.C.’s first cross-assignment of error is overruled.
I. J.P.C.’s Second Cross-Assignment of Error – The Trial Court’s
Decision Not to Protect the Children Under the DVCPO
Having overruled J.P.C.’s first cross-assignment of error, we find that
J.P.C.’s second assignment of error — that the DVCPO should have covered the
Children — is moot. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that the DVCPO would remain effective for a one-year period, which has elapsed, modifying the DVCPO to cover the Children would be of no
consequence.
Accordingly, J.P.C.’s second cross-assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR