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Watts v. Sawadogo

2026-08-06

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

[Cite as Watts v. Sawadogo, 2026-Ohio-3024.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MIGUEL STEPHAN WATTS, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

No. 115853

v. :

FATOUMATA SAWADOGO, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 6, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Domestic Relations Division

Case No. DR-24-401703

Appearances:

Miguel Stephan Watts, pro se.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

Plaintiff-appellant Miguel Stephan Watts (“Watts”), pro se, appeals

the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce, which designated defendant-appellee

Fatoumata Sawadogo (“Sawadogo”) the residential parent and legal custodian of the

parties’ children after adopting the magistrate’s findings of fact regarding their best

interests. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In October 2024, Watts filed a complaint for annulment and

Sawadogo filed an answer. Watts acted pro se throughout the underlying

proceedings and filed various motions, notices, and briefs, including motions for

custody of the parties’ minor children. Watts later amended his complaint, seeking

an annulment based on marriage fraud; an emergency order for the children’s

immediate return to his custody; the assistance of local police; restoration of the

children’s education and healthcare; and punitive relief for breach-of-fiduciary duty.

After retaining counsel, Sawadogo filed an amended answer and counterclaim

seeking a divorce; an equitable division of marital assets, property, and debt;

designation as the children’s sole legal custodian and residential parent; child,

medical, and spousal support; attorney fees; court costs; and any other relief

deemed just and equitable. Watts responded to the answer and counterclaim and

proceeded to make several filings.

After pretrials were held and mediation was unsuccessful, a trial was

scheduled for August 2025, and the matter was referred to family evaluation services

(“FES”) for a forensic evaluation. In July 2025, a parenting-plan-evaluation report

(“FES Report”) was filed by the court-appointed evaluator (“FES Evaluator”). Watts

filed a “formal objection to [the FES Report], notice of non-consent, challenge to

constitutional validity, and demand for federal abstention.” Therein, Watts argued

that the FES Report should not be considered by the trial court. Watts claimed that

any reliance on FES Report “lack[ed] due process” because it “was relied upon without proper notice, opportunity to be heard, or verifiable evidentiary

safeguards.” Watts further claimed that the FES Report violated federal civil rights,

involved religious discrimination, presented a conflict of interest, and amounted to

collusion. Watts also claimed that the FES Evaluator “lacked proper credentials.”

In August 2025, Watts’s amended complaint for annulment and

Sawadogo’s amended counterclaim for divorce proceeded to trial before a

magistrate, Sawadogo filed closing arguments, and Watts filed a “notice of nonparticipation in closing argument by special appearance under restricted signature.”

While a transcript of the proceeding is not a part of this court’s record, the following

information can be gleaned from the magistrate’s decision issued in September

2025.

Watts, Sawadogo, and Sawadogo’s counsel were present at the trial.

Watts, who appeared late and represented himself pro se, was informed that he

would be held to the same standards as an attorney. The magistrate noted, “At trial,

presentation of [Watts’s] evidence was extremely limited due to his inability to

effectively represent himself. [Watts] struggled to effectively question or crossexamine witnesses, argue positions, and present exhibits.” Watts called Sawadogo

and himself as witnesses on direct examination and neither party offered any

documents or exhibits. The FES Report was entered into evidence.

The magistrate then discussed his findings of fact and conclusions of

law. The magistrate granted Sawadogo’s crossclaim for divorce on the grounds that

the parties were incompatible and denied Watts’s complaint after finding that he did not prove he was entitled to an annulment. Relevant to this appeal, the magistrate

also designated Sawadogo the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties’

minor children.

The magistrate detailed the extensive analysis that led to Sawadogo’s

residential-parent and legal-custodian designations. First, the magistrate explained

that the matter was referred to FES to determine a parenting plan that would be in

the best interests of the children and the FES Report was prepared as a result. The

FES Report was admitted into evidence and was considered the direct testimony of

the FES Evaluator. The magistrate noted Watts’s objection to the FES Report and

advised that the filing was denied to the extent that it constituted a motion. The

magistrate stated, “[Watts] failed to subpoena the [FES E]valuator, call him to

testify, or otherwise prosecute this motion.” Next, the magistrate discussed the FES

Evaluator’s recommendations and the parties’ testimony and filings. After applying

the evidence presented to the relevant statutory provisions, the magistrate

concluded that it was in the children’s best interests that parental rights and

responsibilities be allocated primarily to Sawadogo with Watts receiving parenting

time consistent with the recommendations of the FES Evaluator.

Watts objected to the magistrate’s decision and any reliance on the

FES Report. Watts claimed that the FES Report was not subject to crossexamination or an evidentiary hearing and its “unfounded conclusions” were based

on prejudicial bias and speculation. Watts did not request or file the trial transcript.

On November 12, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry

overruling Watts’s objection to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court conducted

an independent review of the record available — which did not include a transcript

or an affidavit of the evidence submitted to the magistrate — and analyzed Watts’s

claims. The trial court found:

[Watts] contends that the FES Report was not properly relied upon by

the Magistrate because it was not subject to cross-examination and

because his “objections” to the FES Report were adjudicated without

an evidentiary hearing. However, [Watts] failed to subpoena the FES

[E]valuator for trial pursuant to Loc.R. 39(I)(2), which states “[a] party

challenging the report must subpoena the evaluator to appear for crossexamination not less than fourteen days before the hearing or trial.”

The FES Report and [E]valuator would have been subject to crossexamination had [Watts] followed the requirements of Loc.R. 39(I)(2).

[Watts’s] failure to adhere to the rules does not render the FES Report

inadmissible or unreliable.

[Watts] points to several statements in the FES Report that he

interprets as “biased” or “speculative.” The FES Report merely makes

observations as to [Watts’s] behavior and beliefs that the [FES

E]valuator believed were important in making a custody

recommendation to the Court. The Court does not find that any of the

observations offered in the FES Report display any bias against

[Watts].

As [Watts] argues in his Objection, the Court is required to consider the

factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) in allocating parental rights

and responsibilities. The FES Report also includes an analysis of the

best interest factors. While the FES Report provides some guidance for

the Court in evaluating the best interest factors, the Magistrate also

independently evaluated the best interest factors in the Magistrate’s

Decision based on the evidence presented at trial. Because there is no

transcript for this Court to review, it is limited to a review of the

conclusions of law made by the Magistrate and must adopt the

Magistrate’s factual findings. The Court does not find any error with

the Magistrate’s allocation of parental rights and responsibilities based

on the findings of fact made in the Magistrate’s Decision.

On November 13, 2025, the judgment entry of divorce was

journalized.1 The entry granted Sawadogo a divorce and dissolved the marriage

contract existing between the parties. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s

findings regarding the children’s best interests and allocated parental rights and

responsibilities primarily to Sawadogo, who was designated the residential parent

and legal custodian of the parties’ minor children.

Watts appealed the judgment entry of divorce, indicated that a

transcript would be part of the record, and filed his brief prior to the record being

due. Watts raised three assignments of error for this court’s review.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court abused its discretion and deprived [Watts] of due

process by relying on the [FES] Report, refusing to conduct an

evidentiary hearing, and subsequently destroying the underlying

CCDCFS records necessary for meaningful appellate review.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court violated Civ.R. 53(d)(4)(e) by failing to rule on [Watts’s]

timely objections to the magistrate’s decision before adopting it as the

judgment entry.

Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court abused its discretion in its allocation of parental rights

and responsibilities by awarding sole custody to [Sawadogo] based on

an evidentiary record that has been rendered unreliable due to the

destruction of evidence.

1 Two nunc pro tunc entries were subsequently issued to correct the omission of

an exhibit referenced in the divorce decree and a clerical error in the parties’ marriage date.

This court sua sponte amended the record to an App.R. 9(A) record since (1) a

transcript was not filed with Watts’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and (2)

Watts filed his brief prior to the record being due and the filing of a transcript.

II. Law and Analysis

As an initial matter, we note that Watts acted pro se in the

proceedings below and is acting pro se in the instant appeal. It is well settled that

“‘pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures

and . . . are held to the same standards as litigants who are represented by counsel.’”

State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept.

of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001). Indeed, “‘[p]ro

se litigants are not entitled to greater rights, and they must accept the results of their

own mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria, 2008-Ohio-4586, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting

Williams v. Lo, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). With these concepts in mind,

we address Watts’s assignments of error.

For ease of analysis, we begin with Watts’s second assignment of

error. Therein, Watts argues that the trial court committed reversible error by

failing to rule on his objections to the magistrate’s decision before journalizing the

judgment entry of divorce. However, our review of the record reveals that Watts’s

challenge is misguided. The trial court did, in fact, issue a journal entry overruling

Watts’s objections to the magistrate’s decision prior to the filing of the final divorce

decree. This entry appears on the trial court’s docket on November 12, 2025, while the judgment entry of divorce was docketed on November 13, 2025. Aside from

Watts’s mistaken contention that his objections were never ruled upon, Watts does

not challenge the merits of the trial court’s decision overruling those objections.

Therefore, Watts’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Next, we turn to Watts’s first and third assignments of error, which

we review together. In both assignments of error, Watts challenges the trial court’s

custody determination, claiming that it “was based almost exclusively on the

findings and recommendations contained in the FES Report.” Watts argues that the

trial court’s reliance on the FES Report was erroneous and in violation of his dueprocess rights since (1) the FES Evaluator was not subject to cross-examination; (2)

Watts was unable to review the records that were provided to the FES Evaluator for

in camera inspection during the course of his investigation; and (3) the evidentiary

record is unreliable because of the destruction of evidence.2

Insofar as Watts asserts due-process challenges to the admissibility

of the FES Report and the records relied upon in its preparation, we find that any

purported inability to cross-examine the FES Evaluator or review the records

2 Watts argues that, after his appeal was filed in November 2025, the trial court

abused its discretion, structurally erred, and denied him meaningful appellate review when it destroyed the records that were produced to the FES and relied upon by the FES Evaluator in his preparation of the FES Report. Watts’s claim is based upon a January 2026 judgment entry that states: “[A]ll records that Cuyahoga County Division of Child and Family Services produced and delivered, in camera, to the Court’s [FES] in connection with its investigation, were destroyed.” Watts filed a motion with this court, requesting that the appellate record be supplemented or the trial court be directed to reconstruct the destroyed materials. We denied Watts’s motion, explaining that the documents were not presented at the August 2025 trial and, therefore, were not part of the record.

associated with the FES Report were created by Watts’s own failures. Cuyahoga

C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R. 39(I) provides:

1. The court will admit the custody evaluator’s report into evidence on

the court’s motion. The admitted report will be considered the

direct testimony of the custody evaluator.

2. A party challenging the report must subpoena the evaluator to

appear for cross-examination not less than fourteen days before the

hearing or trial.

3. The court will notify the evaluator as soon as a hearing or trial date

is set. The evaluator must be available to testify on crossexamination regarding the report if timely subpoenaed by a party.

Thus, a procedural mechanism exists for the very purpose of challenging the FES

Report. However, Watts did not avail himself of that procedural mechanism. Nor

did Watts file a motion seeking release of the records or their filing under seal.

Indeed, Watts had the opportunity to challenge the FES Report and underlying

records, cross-examine the FES Evaluator, admit relevant evidence, and make a

record of his contentions. However, Watts failed to issue a subpoena in compliance

with the local rule or seek to review or admit the records. Therefore, the trial court

did not err in admitting and considering the FES Report.

To the extent that Watts’s assignments of error present factual

challenges to the FES Report and the trial court’s findings, Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii)

provides: “An objection to a factual finding . . . shall be supported by a transcript of

all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an affidavit

of that evidence if a transcript is not available.” Cuyahoga C.P., Domestic Relations

Loc.R. 27(A)(3) also mandates the filing of a transcript or affidavit when a party is objecting to factual findings in a magistrate’s decision. If the objecting party does

not comply with these filing requirements, “‘[t]he absence of a transcript or affidavit

of evidence restricts the scope of review at both the trial court and appellate levels.’”

James v. My Cute Car, LLC, 2017-Ohio-1291, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting Cargile v.

Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., 2012-Ohio-2470, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.); see also Cuyahoga

C.P., Domestic Relations Loc.R. 27(B)(5) (“If a party fails to file the transcript, the

Court will treat the objection as if no transcript was ordered or submitted.”). As

noted in the judgment entry overruling Watts’s objections to the magistrate’s

decision, the trial court must adopt the magistrate’s factual findings and limit its

review to the legal conclusions drawn from those facts when an objecting party fails

to file a transcript or affidavit. In re G.J.A., 2019-Ohio-1768, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.); James

at id.

Similarly, where there is no transcript submitted on appeal, there is a

presumption that the trial court’s proceedings were validly conducted, and an

appellate court must presume that the trial court’s decision is correct. James at id.,

citing Barksdale v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2017-Ohio-395, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).

“‘The duty to provide transcripts for appellate review falls upon the appellant’” since

appellants are required to show the errors they claim the trial court made and bear

the burden of demonstrating those errors by reference to matters in the record. Bd.

of Edn. v. Murphy, 2025-Ohio-1199, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting Eubanks v. Simons,

2018-Ohio-519, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.), and citing Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio

St.2d 197, 199 (1980). “When portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass

upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume

the validity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm.” Knapp at 199; see also

Univ. Hts. v. Johanan, 2022-Ohio-2578, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Smith v. Smith,

2019-Ohio-114, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (“‘We cannot substitute our judgment for that of

the trial court, presume evidence not offered, or facts not proved. Without a

transcript, we must presume the regularity of the trial court’s proceedings and

affirm its judgment on appellate review.’”).

Here, the duty to provide transcripts for review — at both the trialcourt and appellate levels — falls squarely upon Watts. The omission of transcripts

significantly limited the trial court’s ability to assess his objections to the

magistrate’s decision and continues to limit our ability to evaluate Watts’s

assignments of error on appeal. Indeed, we are unable to review any witness

testimony or on-the-record discussions concerning the FES Report. Aside from

information gleaned from the magistrate’s decision, we are left to guess as to how

and what extent testimony and evidence was utilized or objected to throughout the

course of trial. Without trial transcripts, this court must presume the validity of the

lower court’s proceedings. This presumption is not undermined by any evidence in

the record before this court.

Watts’s failures to (1) subpoena the FES Evaluator — to properly

challenge the FES Report and make a record of his contentions — and (2) file the

necessary transcripts — to enable the trial court to review the magistrate’s findings and this court to evaluate the trial court’s judgment — cannot be excused on the basis

that he is acting pro se. Based on the foregoing analysis, and without a transcript to

support Watts’s claims, we affirm the trial court’s decision and overrule his first and

third assignments of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that the appellant pay the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and

TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR