UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ANGELA D. SIMMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) Civil Case No. 24-1605 (RJL)
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, 1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
_ ___ _____ _ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
August ~.,..., 2026 [Dkt. #9, 12]
Plaintiff Angela D. Simms ("plaintiff') seeks judicial review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying plaintiff's application for
disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge ("ALJ")
who reviewed her application should have included additional mental limitations in the
determination of plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Upon a careful review of the
record, I conclude that plaintiff's argument is without merit and the denial of disability
insurance benefits was supported by substantial evidence. I will therefore DENY
plaintiff's motion for judgment of reversal and GRANT the Commissioner's motion for
judgment of affirmance.
1
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Frank J. Bisignano was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. He is therefore automatically substituted for former Acting Commissioner Carolyn Colvin as the defendant in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Framework
To receive disability insurance benefits, a claimant must establish that she is
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(l)(E). The
Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months." Id. § 423(d)(l)(A). To be eligible for benefits, a
claimant must have "[a] physical or mental impairment ... of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot ... engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Social Security Administration
("SSA") follows a five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404. l 520(a)(4). First, the
claimant must show she is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must show she has a "severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment," id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), that "significantly
limit[s]" her ability to perform "basic work activities," id. § 404.1520(c). Third, the
claimant must show that her impairment meets or equals one of the conditions listed in the
regulations. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairment is not listed, then the
ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Id. § 404.1520(e).
The RFC assessment determines "the most [the claimant] can still do" after accounting for
any limitations from her medical impairments. Id. § 404.1545(a)(l). Fourth, the claimant
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must show that, given her RFC, she is nonetheless incapable of performing her "past
relevant work." Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is able to make the requisite
showing, the burden shifts to the agency. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C.
Cir. 2004). Fifth and finally, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is still capable of
"mak[ing] an adjustment to other work" available in the national economy given her RFC.
Id.§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
II. Factual Background
Plaintiff Angela Simms was born in August of 1973. Admin. R. ("A.R. ") [Dkt. #6]
221. She alleges that she became disabled on September 29, 2020 due to post-traumatic
stress disorder, anxiety, mood disorder, migraines, arthritis, neuropathy, degenerative disc
disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, chronic pain, and hypertension. A.R. 218, 264-65.
Simms has previously worked as a cashier, restaurant server, and security clerk,
A.R. 36, and she most recently worked as a store associate at a CVS Pharmacy. A.R. 265-66. Plaintiff quit her job at CVS because, in her words, it became "too overwhelming."
A.R. 51. Plaintiff explained that "[ w]hen things happen, I hold them in and after a couple
times, it's really hard for me to hold in my reactions and things like that." Id. Plaintiff
testified that she "just couldn't deal with it anymore" and resigned. Id.
Plaintiff has a history of physical limitations and mental health challenges. Between
2019 and 2023, plaintiff "sought treatment at Hillcrest Children and Family Center for
mood disturbances, depression, and anxiety." Def. 's Mot. for J. of Affirmance ("Def. 's
Mot.") [Dkt. #12] at 5; A.R. 310-52. However, plaintiff has repeatedly declined
medication for mental health symptoms, preferring therapy. Def.' s Mot. at 5; A.R. 439.
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In January 2021, plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Patricia Cott, a state agency mental
health consultant. A.R. 113. Dr. Cott found that plaintiff had moderate limitations in
understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others;
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing herself. Id.
Based on these limitations, Dr. Cott opined that plaintiff could "complete a standard work
day and week performing tasks that are not overly demanding or stressful and interacting
adequately with others at least on a superficial level." A.R. 117.
In April 2021, plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Nancy Heiser, another state agency
mental health consultant. A.R. 122-23. Like Dr. Cott, Dr. Heiser found that plaintiff had
moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting
with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing
herself. Id. Dr. Heiser concluded that plaintiff could "sustain attention and pace to carry
out simple instructions on a regular basis to complete a normal workweek" and could
"interact with others to perform routine tasks with occasional interaction with the public."
A.R. 126.
III. Plaintiff's Application for Benefits
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on December 9, 2020.
A.R. 221. She also filed an application for supplemental security income on May 7, 2021.
A.R. 22 8. The agency denied her claims initially and upon reconsideration. A.R. 13 2, 141.
Plaintiff then filed a request for a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on April
4, 2023. A.R. 43. Plaintiff testified about her last job as a cashier at CVS and stated that
she quit because of her difficulty containing her "reactions" to other people. A.R. 51. She
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testified that since her alleged onset date, she had begun selling plants on Facebook
Marketplace, but she was not making much money. A.R. 55. She acknowledged her
difficulties with containing her "outbursts" but said she was working on breathing exercises
and talking with family to help her when feeling irritable. A.R. 65. She described her
outbursts as consisting of facial expressions, saying things under her breath, and talking
back to customers. A.R. 67-68.
On July 27, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. See A.R. 19-38. The
ALJ evaluated plaintiff's application using the five-step sequential evaluation process
described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had "not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 29, 2020, the alleged onset date."
A.R. 21. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
"degenerative disc disease, right upper extremity carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis,
bilateral hallux valgus and pes planus deformity, migraines, affective disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and anxiety disorder." A.R. 21. At step three, the ALJ found
that plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or equaled the severity of one of the
impairments in the SSA's regulations. A.R. 22.
The ALJ then determined, based on the evidence presented, that plaintiff retained
"the residual functional capacity to perform light work" with several limitations:
[T]he claimant can frequently push and pull with the right upper extremity, and she
can frequently push/pull with the bilateral lower extremities. The claimant can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant
can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The claimant can frequently handle
and finger with her right upper extremity. The claimant must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme heat and cold; wetness; vibration; and hazards, such as
dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. The claimant can tolerate noise at
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no more than the moderate intensity level per the Selected Characteristics of
Occupations (SCO). The claimant can perform simple, routine tasks, requiring no
more than occasional changes in the work setting, occasional judgment or decisionmaking, and no production rate for pace of work (e.g., assembly-line work). The
claimant can tolerate occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers,
and supervisors.
A.R. 25 (emphasis added).
The ALJ supported the RFC finding with a lengthy review of the medical evidence
and testimony. A.R. 25-35. This included consideration of the 2021 opinions provided by
Dr. Cott and Dr. Heiser. As summarized by the ALJ, Dr. Cott concluded that plaintiff could
"complete a standard workday and week performing tasks that were not overly demanding
or stressful and to interact adequately with others at least on a superficial level." A.R. 34.
Dr. Heiser concluded, similarly, that plaintiff could "interact with others to perform and/or
routine tasks with occasional interaction with the public." Id. The ALJ found these
opinions "persuasive," "supported by the evidence they reviewed," and "consistent with
other evidence." Id.
Having determined plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ then concluded, at step five, that
plaintiff was "unable to perform any past relevant work." A.R. 35. The ALJ finally
concluded, considering plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, that there
were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could
perform, including mail sorter, marketer, and office helper. A.R. 36-37. Accordingly, the
ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. A.R. 37-38. On January 22, 2024, the SSA
Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, making that decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. A.R. 8-13.
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IV. This Lawsuit
On May 31, 2024, plaintiff filed suit in this Court, seeking federal judicial review
of the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Compl. [Dkt. #1]. Plaintiff
filed a motion for judgment of reversal on September 6, 2024. See Pl.'s Mot. for J. of
Reversal ("Pl.'s Mot.") [Dkt. #9]. The Commissioner filed a response and motion for
judgment of affirmance on December 4, 2024. See Def. 's Mot. Plaintiff filed her reply in
support of her motion on December 18, 2024. See Reply [Dkt. #14]. The motions are now
ripe for decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a disability decision by the Commissioner of Social Security, the
district court must affirm the decision if it "is based on substantial evidence in the record
and correctly applies the relevant legal standards." Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)). The test "requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less
than a preponderance of the evidence." Grantv. Kijakazi, 619 F. Supp. 3d 128, 135 (D.D.C.
2022) (quoting Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
"The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner's decision
[was] not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied."
Cunningham v. Colvin, 46 F. Supp. 3d 26, 33 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). While the
court should "carefully scrutinize the entire record," it must not "replace the
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[Commissioner's] judgment concerning the weight and validity of the evidence with its
own." Mitchellv. Berryhill, 241 F. Supp. 3d 161,166 (D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff challenges the Commissioner's decision on a single ground: that the ALJ's
mental RFC determination should have reflected additional limitations based on the
opinion from Dr. Cott. Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. ("Pl.'s Mem.") [Dkt. #9-1] at 9-13.
Plaintiff argues that while the ALJ "recognized" Dr. Cott's opinion that plaintiff could
maintain only "superficial interaction" with others, the ALJ ultimately "included only a
limitation to occasional interaction with the general public." Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly accounted for Dr. Cott's opinion by
limiting plaintiff's RFC to occasional interaction with others. See Def. 's Mot. at 11. I
agree with the Commissioner and find that the decision denying benefits is supported by
substantial evidence.
An RFC is a determination of "the claimant's uppermost ability to perform regular
and continuous work-related physical and mental activities in a work environment."
Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000. It involves a "'function-by-function' inquiry based on all of the
relevant evidence" and "must contain a 'narrative discussion' identifying the evidence that
supports each conclusion." Id. (citation omitted). The ALJ must "explain the basis of the
restrictions" listed in the RFC with "citations to 'specific medical facts ... and nonmedical
evidence"' relied on. Mitchell, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). The ALJ "cannot simply pronounce the claimant's RFC after summarizing the
record evidence." Id. But rather he must "build an accurate and logical bridge from the
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evidence to [his] conclusion[s]." Williams v. Colvin, 134 F. Supp. 3d 358, 364 (D.D.C.
2015) (citation omitted).
The opinion at issue here is Dr. Cott's conclusion that plaintiff should have
superficial contact with the public. Based on her evaluation, Dr. Cott opined, among other
things, that plaintiff could "complete a standard work day and week performing tasks that
are not overly demanding or stressful and interacting adequately with others at least on a
superficial level." A.R. 117 (emphasis added).
The ALJ adequately accounted for this opinion in the RFC determination. The
ALJ's RFC determination included an exhaustive review of the record evidence. See
A.R. 25-35. This review included Dr. Cott's January 2021 opinion that plaintiff could
"interact adequately with others at least on a superficial level," A.R. 34, as well as Dr.
Heiser's April 2021 opinion that plaintiff "has moderate limitations as to interacting with
the general public, but she can interact with others to perform routine tasks with occasional
public interaction," id. The ALJ found both of these opinions "persuasive," "supported by
the evidence they reviewed," and "consistent with other evidence." Id. Accordingly, the
ALJ incorporated the opinions into the overall RFC determination, which noted that
plaintiff "can tolerate occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers, and
supervisors." A.R. 25.
To be sure, the ALJ did not use the exact same language as Dr. Cott when describing
the limitations on plaintiff's RFC. Dr. Cott limited plaintiff to "superficial" interaction
with others, A.R. 34; the ALJ limited plaintiff to "occasional" interaction with others,
A.R. 25. But the ALJ did not need to "repeat [Dr. Cott's] remarks verbatim" in order to
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"sufficiently capture[] the essence" of her opinion. Mitchell, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 172
(quoting Carver v. Colvin, 600 Fed. App'x 616,620 (10th Cir. 2015)). TheALJ adequately
captured Dr. Cott's (and Dr. Heiser's) conclusion that plaintiff could tolerate some
interaction with other co-workers and the public but only on a limited basis. Plaintiff's
insistence that the ALJ "us[e] the same words" as Dr. Cott sets the bar far too high. Id.;
Oxner v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 17370199, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2022) (rejecting argument
that "RFC was flawed due to slight word variations" between RFC and state agency
limitation findings).
Plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that "occasional" and "superficial" have different
meanings. See Pl. 's Mem. at 10. According to plaintiff, "occasional" interaction speaks to
the quantity of interaction, while "superficial" interaction speaks to the quality of
interaction. Id. However, plaintiff "fails to explain why these distinctions would lead to a
different result." Oxner, 2022 WL 17370199, at *9; see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.
396, 409 (2009) (discussing burden to show that error resulted in prejudice). Based on the
ALJ's RFC determination, the vocational expert in this case identified six jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. A.R. 37. All but
one of these jobs require the lowest level of interpersonal interaction based on the ratings
in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). 2 And none of these jobs require contact
2
Appendix B of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") provides a rating of the amount of interaction with other people for each of the identified jobs. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, https://occupationalinfo.org/appendxb_l.html (last visited on July 10, 2026). Of the six jobs identified by the ALJ in this case, five require a degree of interaction rated as Level 8, described as "Taking InstructionsHelping: Attending to the work assignment instructions or orders of superior." Id.; see also A.R. 37 (listing the DOT occupational codes for the six identified occupations). This is the designation for jobs with the
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with the public. 3 As such, any error in failing to further limit plaintiff's RFC to
"superficial" interaction was "inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination"
and therefore "harmless." Davis v. Berryhill, 272 F. Supp. 3d 154, 180 (D.D.C. 2017)
(cleaned up); see also, e.g., Goforth v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1364992, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Apr.
6, 2014) (holding that "any error at step four in failing to include limits on superficial
contact with co-workers and no contact with the public" was harmless because "none of
the job descriptions require any contact with the general public").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I will DENY plaintiff's motion for judgment of reversal
and GRANT the Commissioner's motion for judgment of affirmance. A separate order
will accompany this opinion.
RJ~J.LEON
United States District Judge
lowest level of interpersonal interaction. See Goforth v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1364992, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2014) (describing Level 8 jobs as "consistent with superficial contact with supervisors and co-workers"). 3
The descriptions of these jobs are available in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles: Mail Sorter, DOT 209.687-022; Marketer, DOT 209.587-034; Office Helper, DOT 239.567-010; Final Inspector, DOT 727.687-054; Racker, DOT 735.687-026; Inspector, DOT 733 .687-062. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, https://occupationalinfo.org/dot_search.htrnl (last visited July 10, 2026).
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