In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00025-CV
CARLOS SARMENTO, APPELLANT
V.
WHITESTONE SHOPS AT STARWOOD, LLC, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas 1
Trial Court No. 471-03366-2025, Honorable Bryan Gantt, Presiding
July 30, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
In this restricted appeal, appellant Carlos Sarmento claims that the no-answer
default judgment against him obtained by Whitestone Shops at Starwood, LLC, was
improperly granted because Whitestone failed to properly effect service of process. We
reverse and remand.
1 Originally appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket-equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001.
BACKGROUND
Whitestone sued Bionic Sport USA, Inc., and Sarmento in May of 2025 alleging
that Bionic Sport breached a commercial lease agreement and Sarmento breached a
guaranty agreement. Whitestone requested issuance of citation to serve defendant
Bionic Sport “by serving its registered agent, Carlos F. Crispim Sarmento” and to serve
defendant Sarmento individually. An affidavit was filed stating the petition was served via
hand-delivery to “Bionic Sport USA, Inc. c/o its registered agent, Carlos F. Crispim
Sarmento, c/o its current registered agent, Republic Registered Agent, LLC, by delivering
to its agent for service, Lovette Dobson . . . Houston, Harris County, TX 77064, in person.”
The record reflects that citation directed to Sarmento individually was issued but never
served, and no executed return of service for Sarmento appears in the record.
Neither Bionic Sport nor Sarmento filed an answer. On July 3, 2025, the trial court
granted Whitestone’s motion for default judgment and signed a default judgment in
Whitestone’s favor. On December 8, Sarmento filed a notice of restricted appeal alleging
the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him.
ANALYSIS
To prevail on his restricted appeal, Sarmento must establish: (1) he filed his notice
of restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) he was a party
to the underlying suit; (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment
complained of and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or request findings of
fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. TEX. R.
APP. P. 26.1; Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004).
2
Sarmento satisfies all four requirements. He was a named defendant below, did not
participate in the proceedings, timely filed his notice of restricted appeal, and error is
apparent on the face of the record.
In the context of a restricted appeal, there are no presumptions in favor of valid
issuance, service, and return of citation. Fid. and Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Const. Co.,
186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). If proper service is not affirmatively
shown, there is error on the face of the record, and the default judgment must be set
aside. Primate Const., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).
Here, the record does not reflect that Whitestone effectuated valid service of
process on Sarmento. 2 A trial court does not have personal jurisdiction over a defendant
unless the defendant was properly served. See Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316
(Tex. 2020) (per curiam); Pro-Fire & Sprinkler, L.L.C. v. Law Co., 637 S.W.3d 843, 849
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.). Given the absence of valid service, the trial court did
not acquire personal jurisdiction over Sarmento, and the default judgment against him
cannot stand. Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 318.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s default judgment against Sarmento and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice
2 Whitestone has filed a motion acknowledging this error.
3