UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GALLO HOLDINGS LLC – SERIES 1,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-1358 (CRC)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Some landlords bristle at rent control, but not every frustration with the system amounts
to a constitutional wrong. Gallo Holdings LLC owns a rent-controlled apartment building in
Washington, D.C. The LLC was purportedly losing money on one of its units, so it petitioned
the city’s Rent Administrator for a rent increase. After the Administrator denied the petition, the
LLC appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings. With the appeal pending for roughly
two years, Gallo went to court, alleging a Takings Clause claim and several procedural due
process claims against the District of Columbia and the Administrator. But the Takings claim is
not ripe, the due process claims are not well pleaded, and the Defendants are shielded from suit
in any event. The Court will therefore grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. Background
The Court draws the following factual background from Plaintiff’s amended complaint,
taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, as it must on a motion to dismiss. Peek v.
SunTrust Bank, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 201, 203 (D.D.C. 2018) (Cooper, J.). Gallo Holdings LLC
(“Gallo”) owns a rent-controlled apartment building in the nation’s capital. See Am. Compl. ¶ 1.
In 2023, Gallo filed a hardship petition with the D.C. Rental Accommodations Division
requesting a rent increase on one of the units. Id. ¶ 10. The petition was not contested by the unit’s tenant, and an internal audit report recommended granting it. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 23. Yet the
Rent Administrator denied the petition because the increase would have violated a settlement
agreement between the tenant and the unit’s former owner that capped rent hikes. Id. ¶ 16;
Compl., Ex. 3 at 2–3. Gallo appealed the denial of the petition to the Office of Administrative
Hearings (“OAH”), Am. Compl. ¶ 18, and Gallo’s principal, Alexander Gallo, filed suit pro se
after two years without an answer from that body, see Compl. ¶ 19.
Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Gallo’s complaint on various grounds, including that he
lacked Article III standing because Gallo Holdings LLC—not Mr. Gallo himself—owns the
property. Defs.’ First Mot. at 1–2, 5. The Court agreed, but with a twist: Mr. Gallo merely
lacked prudential standing, rather than constitutional standing, as he was not the party in interest
(the LLC was). Gallo v. District of Columbia, No. 25-cv-1358, 2025 WL 3123727, at *2–3
(D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2025). The Court thus allowed Mr. Gallo thirty days to substitute the LLC and,
because corporate entities cannot represent themselves, to hire counsel. Id. at *3–4. He did so,
despite the Court indicating that his claims faced an uphill battle. See id. at *4–5.
In its amended complaint, Gallo brings four claims against the Rent Administrator and
the District.1 The first three claims allege that Defendants violated Gallo’s procedural due
process rights by denying an uncontested hardship petition, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–28; denying the
petition sua sponte, id. ¶¶ 30-31; and engaging in “ex parte communication with an unidentified
respondent to obtain the facts on which to base its sua sponte dismissal,” id. ¶ 35. The final
claim alleges that Defendants violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by depriving
1
The amended complaint is not a model of clarity. For instance, the complaint fails to specify which claims target whom. Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, however, the Court presumes each claim is brought against both the District and the Rent Administrator in her individual capacity.
2
Gallo of “entitled rents.” Id. ¶ 41. As for redress, Gallo seeks: (1) compensatory damages from
the District; (2) nominal and punitive damages from the Administrator; and (3) an order
compelling the Administrator to grant its hardship petition or, in the alternative, a declaration that
it should be granted. Id. at 5–6.
Defendants now seek dismissal of the amended complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, failure to state a claim, failure to establish municipal liability, and
qualified immunity. Defs.’ Second Mot. at 2.
II. Legal Standards
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if its well-pleaded facts, taken as
true, plausibly establish a claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
plausible if the pleaded facts allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Id. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). The Court must make every reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s
favor at this stage, considering the alleged facts, “documents attached . . . or incorporated by
reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.”
Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002).
III. Analysis
Gallo asserts a Takings claim and a trio of procedural due process claims. The Court
addresses them in turn.
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A. Takings Claim2
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from taking
private property for public use “without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Before
reaching the merits of Gallo’s Takings claim, the Court must ensure that the issue is ripe for
judicial review. See Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)
(“[E]ven in a case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered
on a court’s own motion.”). A Takings claim is not ripe unless “the government has reached a
‘final’ decision” about the property. Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474, 475
(2021). So Gallo must show that “there [is] no question . . . about how the ‘regulations at issue
apply to the particular [property] in question.’” Id. at 478 (quoting Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997)).
Gallo has not made that showing. To the contrary, several “avenues still remain for [the
District] to clarify or change its decision” with respect to Gallo’s hardship petition. Id. at 480.
As Gallo concedes, its appeal of the Administrator’s provisional denial of the petition is still
pending with OAH. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Plus, once that decision is rendered, Gallo may appeal
any adverse ruling to the Rental Housing Commission (“RHC”), which has final say over
hardship petitions. See D.C. Code § 42-3502.16(h); 14 DCMR § 4208.15. Because the District
has not yet “committed to a position” regarding Gallo’s petition, Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479, the
2
In its amended complaint, Gallo labeled its Takings claim “Substantive Due Process Violation or Takings Clause (Deprivation of Entitled Adjustment).” Am. Compl. at 5. This Court will address the claim only as a Takings claim. Even if the Court construed the claim as a substantive due process claim, Gallo would be unsuccessful because it fails to plead “either a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus or a deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights.” Elkins v. District Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Moreover, the logic of Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021), if not the direct holding, would still lead the Court to conclude that the substantive due process claim is not final and therefore not ripe for its review.
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Takings claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Barry Farm Tenants
v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 57, 66 (D.D.C. 2018).
B. Procedural Due Process Claims
Gallo’s three separate due process claims—though difficult to parse—share a common
theme: they all allege that the Administrator violated D.C. law or regulations. First, Gallo claims
the Rent Administrator “acted outside [of her] authority” and contrary to “proper procedure”
when she denied the uncontested hardship petition. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 26. Second, it alleges
that the sua sponte dismissal of the petition violated District regulations. Id. ¶¶ 20, 30–31;
Opp’n at 1. And third, it contends that the Rent Administrator’s alleged ex parte
communications violated District regulations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 35, 37; Opp’n at 3.
But Gallo’s claims cannot survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss because it is axiomatic
that “a mere violation of law does not give rise to a due process claim.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Barwood, Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Tate v. District Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Goode v. District of Columbia, 531 F. Supp. 3d 366, 378 (D.D.C. 2021)
(collecting cases); Badgett v. District of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2013).
Holding otherwise would risk “constitutionalizing every error of state administration.” Comm.
of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Each of
Gallo’s three due process claims follows the same structure as the claims in Barwood, Tate,
Goode, and Badgett. Gallo, like the plaintiffs in those cases, claims that the District violated the
Due Process Clause because it did not comply with its own laws and regulations—here, its
procedures to adjudicate hardship petitions. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 20, 23, 26–27. Because a
violation of state law, without more, is not enough to establish a due-process violation, Gallo
fails to state a procedural due process claim.
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True, Gallo insists in its opposition that it is concerned not with state-law violations, but
with “the Administrator’s acts which violate the constitution.” Opp’n at 3. But “Judges are not
expected to be mindreaders,” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and
Gallo’s threadbare complaint presents no other basis for concluding a constitutional due-process
violation occurred. In effect, Gallo attempts to amend its complaint through its opposition to the
motion to dismiss—which it may not do. See Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d
142, 160 n.7 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases). In any event, Gallo’s last-ditch effort fails
because the new argument is mentioned “in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do
counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 510 F.3d 333, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Gallo’s opposition develops no
meaningful constitutional argument and cites no authority or constitutional principle connecting
Defendants’ alleged conduct to a due-process violation. Instead, like the complaint, it rests on
purported violations of D.C. laws and regulations. See e.g., Opp’n at 1–3. The opposition
therefore does little to cure the deficiencies in the complaint.
Given the barebones and conclusory explanation in the complaint and opposition, the
Court cannot readily discern the basis on which Gallo believes Defendants violated the Due
Process Clause. And the Court is not obliged to divine a theory that Gallo has not clearly
articulated. It will nonetheless endeavor to do so in the interest of completeness. Gallo still falls
short.
To plead a procedural due process claim, Gallo must allege that (1) it was deprived of a
protected property interest without (2) adequate process. See Esparraguera v. Dep’t of the Army,
101 F.4th 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Federal and state laws and regulations can create property
interests. Logan v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 357 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2004). And,
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because due process is a flexible concept, what constitutes sufficient process depends on the
circumstances. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). At a minimum, however, “a
procedural due process claim requires the plaintiff to identify the process that is due.” Doe ex rel
Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Plus, “[i]f
procedures are already in place that provide adequate process but a plaintiff does not utilize those
procedures, there is no constitutional violation.” Medina v. District of Columbia, 517 F. Supp.
2d 272, 281 (D.D.C. 2007). After all, “a procedural due process claim is not complete when the
deprivation occurs. Rather, the claim is complete only when the State fails to provide due
process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023) (cleaned up).
Squinting hard, one might discern a claim that Gallo had a protected interest in raising
rent, and that due process required a hearing before the hardship petition was denied. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 26, 32. But see Opp’n at 3 (“This case does not concern a request for an oral
hearing.”). Assuming for the sake of argument that Gallo pleaded a protected property interest,
that potential claim would nonetheless fail at the adequate-process prong.
As an initial matter, “there can be no claim of a due process violation if a plaintiff
voluntar[ily] foregoes the due process procedures provided him.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on
Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when the
governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not
availed himself of those remedies.”). Here, Gallo could have requested an initial hearing on its
hardship petition, see D.C. Code § 42-3502.16(b)-(c), but chose not to, Opp’n at 3. Had Gallo
elected to do so, the hearing would have come with the full panoply of procedures mandated by
the D.C. Administrative Procedures Act (“DCAPA”). D.C. Code § 42-3502.16(g). That alone
7
dooms Gallo’s due process claims: “If there is a process on the books that appears to provide due
process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back
what he wants.” Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116; see Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir.
1982) (“[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made
procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them.”).
What’s more, the District’s scheme provides ample post-deprivation process. Gallo
appealed the Administrator’s denial to OAH, Am. Compl. ¶ 18; OAH’s eventual decision is
immediately reviewable by RHC, 14 DCMR § 4208.15; and RHC’s final order may be appealed
to the D.C. Court of Appeals, D.C. Code § 42-3502.19. True, “due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In this setting, however, three layers of review—particularly where the
initial hardship-petition denial effected no change in the status quo—affords all the process the
Constitution requires. See 3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of Columbia, 336 F.3d 1068, 1073–
74 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the District’s procedures afforded due process to a developer
challenging a stop work order because they provided for “three levels of review” including
“post-deprivation review before two District officials and then immediate appeal to the District
Board of Appeals and Review”).
To be sure, Gallo’s appeal before OAH was pending for over two years as of the filing of
the amended complaint. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. That is a long time to wait.3 While lengthy delays
can, in some extreme circumstances, raise due process concerns, this is not such a case. For one,
petitioners are entitled to expeditious review at other steps in the process. See D.C. Code §§ 42-3
If OAH has not ruled on the appeal by the date of this Memorandum Opinion, counsel for Defendants is directed to provide the opinion to the assigned hearing officer or other appropriate official, whom the Court respectfully urges to act on the appeal expeditiously.
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3502.16(a), (h) (requiring the Administrator to resolve petitions within 120 days and RHC to
resolve appeals within 120 days). More importantly, Gallo does not allege that it availed itself of
processes to review OAH’s inaction available under D.C. law. For instance, because rentadjustment petitions are subject to the DCAPA, id. § 42-3502.16(g), Gallo could have requested
judicial review to compel “action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 2-510(a)(2). Or it could have sought a writ of mandamus. See D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 21(a)
(providing procedures for seeking a writ of mandamus against a District official); Yeager v.
Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 981 n.3 (D.C. 1985) (explaining that the purpose of the writ of mandamus
is to “require an official to perform an affirmative, mandatory action”). Gallo, however, has
pursued neither of these procedural avenues. See Chavis v. Garrett, 419 F. Supp. 3d 24, 38–39
(D.D.C. 2019) (collecting cases).
In sum, even affording the allegations every possible reasonable construction, the
amended complaint falls short of stating a constitutional due process claim.
C. Monell and Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, the Court may assume a well-pleaded due-process violation and still
dismiss the amended complaint. Gallo’s suit unavoidably founders on the two doctrinal shoals
that sink many § 1983 actions: Monell blocks the municipal-liability claims, and qualified
immunity defeats the claims against the Rent Administrator.
The District cannot be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its
employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, the
District is liable only if “official municipal policy” was the “moving force” behind the alleged
constitutional violation. Id. at 691, 694. Such a policy exists when (1) the District adopts an
explicit unconstitutional policy; (2) the unconstitutional action was taken by a final policymaker
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with decision-making authority; (3) District employees pervasively engage in the same
unconstitutional conduct such that a supervising policymaker must have been aware of the
unconstitutional custom; or (4) the District knew or should have known of a high risk of
constitutional violations yet showed deliberate indifference to that risk by failing to supervise or
train its employees. Hurd v. District of Columbia, 997 F.3d 332, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Gallo has not pleaded any such policy or practice by the District. As best the Court can
tell from the opposition’s cryptic three-sentence discussion of municipal liability, Gallo proceeds
on a final-policymaker theory of liability. See Opp’n at 5. But the Administrator is not a final
policymaker because she lacks rulemaking authority. See Singletary v. District of Columbia, 766
F.3d 66, 73–74 (D.C. Cir. 2014). D.C. law gives RHC the “sole authority to issue, amend, and
rescind rules and procedures” related to hardship petitions, while the Administrator merely runs
the program “according to [those] rules and procedures.” D.C. Code §§ 42-3502.02(a)(1), 42-3502.04(b); see also id. §§ 42-3502.02(a)(2), 42-3502.16(h) (decisions by the Administrator are
appealable to RHC). The Administrator was thus “constrained by policies not of [her] making,”
so any decision to “depart[ ]” from those policies was not an “act of the municipality” for
purposes of § 1983. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality op.); see
also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (no municipal liability where an
“otherwise sound program has occasionally been negligently administered”).
Qualified immunity similarly insulates the Administrator from suit. Qualified immunity
shields state and local officials from damages claims unless they (1) violated a right (2) that was
clearly established at the time. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A right is clearly
established if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Usually, that requires
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controlling precedent involving analogous facts or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive
authority.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But Gallo has not cited a single similar case showing that the Fifth Amendment bans what the
Administrator supposedly did in these circumstances. Nor is this one of the rare cases in which
the constitutional “violation was so obvious” that factually on-point case law is unnecessary to
overcome qualified immunity. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734–35, 741–42 (2002)
(handcuffing shirtless prisoner to hitching post to scorch under the sun for seven hours); see, e.g.,
Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (per curiam) (forcing prisoner to live in a feces-covered
cell and sleep naked in another, frigid cell awash in raw sewage for six days total). Qualified
immunity thus forecloses the remaining claims against the Administrator.4
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. A
separate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: August 7, 2026
4
Besides damages, Gallo also asks the Court to order the Administrator to grant its petition or declare it granted. Am. Compl. at 5. But Gallo has appealed the Administrator’s decision, and the remedy it seeks here is “roughly coextensive” with the relief OAH—or potentially RHC or the D.C. Court of Appeals later in the appeal process—may ultimately award. Dist. Props. Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This request therefore functions as an impermissible “attempt to circumvent the DC APA” and housing code and cannot be granted. See id.; see also Rhodes v. Quaorm, 465 A.2d 370, 372 (D.C. 1983) (“A party may come directly to the trial court only to enforce, not to challenge, a decision of the Rent Administrator.”).
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