** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**
Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
07-AUG-2026
10:06 AM
Dkt. 50 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---________________________________________________________________
STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CURTIS RYAN BEKKUM,
Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
August 7, 2026
DEVENS, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND GINOZA, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE MALINAO, IN PLACE OF RECKTENWALD, C.J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
Defendant Curtis Ryan Bekkum (“Bekkum”) was convicted by a
jury on two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree for
engaging in sexual contact by “compulsion.” Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes (“HRS”) § 707-700 (2014), defines “compulsion” as
“absence of consent, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of public humiliation, property damage,
or financial loss.” The State of Hawaiʻi (“the State”)
prosecuted the charges on the grounds the complaining witness
(“CW”) had not consented to the sexual contact engaged in by
Bekkum.
On appeal, Bekkum asserted for the first time that the
charges against him were fatally defective because they did not
include the statutory definition of compulsion. The
Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) agreed and reversed the
convictions, ruling that the omission of the statutory
definition from the charges failed to provide Bekkum with fair
notice of the charges against him. The ICA addressed some but
not all of Bekkum’s other points of error on appeal. We granted
the State’s application for certiorari regarding the validity of
the charges.
We seek to clarify our case law governing the validity of
charges depending on when they are challenged, which has used
language that can cause confusion. At bottom, when a defendant
challenges the sufficiency of charges for the first time on
appeal, the charges are presumed valid and a conviction is not
to be reversed unless the defendant can show (1) the defendant
was prejudiced; or (2) the charge cannot reasonably be construed
to charge a crime (“the Motta/Wells rule”). State v. Brown, 157
Hawaiʻi 354, 384, 577 P.3d 1045, 1075 (2025) (citing State v.
2
Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 90, 657 P.2d 1019, 1019 (1983) & State v.
Wells, 78 Hawaiʻi 373, 382, 894 P.2d 70, 78 (1995)).
Here, the charges against Bekkum contained all required
elements and Bekkum was not prejudiced as he knew that the
State’s theory of compulsion was based on a lack of consent. We
therefore reverse the ICA’s judgment on appeal and remand to the
ICA to address Bekkum’s remaining points of error on appeal.
II. Background
A. Complaint
On February 10, 2022, the State charged Bekkum via
complaint with two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree
in violation of HRS § 707-733 (Supp. 2016).
Under HRS § 707-733(1)(a), a person commits sexual assault
in the fourth degree if “[t]he person knowingly subjects another
person, not married to the actor, to sexual contact by
compulsion or causes another person, not married to the actor,
to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion[.]”
HRS § 707-700 defines “compulsion” as “absence of consent,
or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of
public humiliation, property damage, or financial loss.”
The complaint alleged:
COUNT ONE: (18-020246-001)
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2017, in
the Division of Wailuku, County of Maui, State of Hawaii,
CURTIS RYAN BEKKUM did knowingly subject [CW], a person not
married to him, to sexual contact by compulsion and/or
cause her to have sexual contact with him by compulsion, to
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wit, by touching and/or grabbing her breast, thereby
committing the offense of Sexual Assault in the Fourth
Degree in violation of Section 707-733(1)(a) of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes.
COUNT TWO: (18-020246-002)
That on or about the 30th day of September, 2017, in
the Division of Wailuku, County of Maui, State of Hawaii,
CURTIS RYAN BEKKUM did knowingly subject [CW], a person not
married to him, to sexual contact by compulsion and/or
cause her to have sexual contact with him by compulsion, to
wit, by touching and/or pressing against her buttocks with
his penis, thereby committing the offense of Sexual Assault
in the Fourth Degree in violation of Section 707-733(1)(a)
in the Hawaii Revised Statutes.
As can be seen, the complaint tracked the language of HRS §
707-733(1)(a) and did not include the statutory definition of
compulsion.
Bekkum pled not guilty and demanded a jury trial.
B. Jury trial
At trial, the State’s theory was that Bekkum had engaged in
sexual contact without the CW’s consent. The CW was the State’s
only witness, whose testimony is summarized as follows.
The CW moved to Maui in 2003 and worked for a former state
senator until he resigned around 2021.
In 2015, when she was in her 50s, the senator helped the CW
get a job as a live-in hospice care provider for an individual
in Hana. Bekkum, who is a physician, was close friends with the
senator. The CW met Bekkum when he interviewed her to ensure
she was qualified to provide the requisite hospice care.
4
The CW suffered from stenosis of the spine, which caused
her pain and compromised her mobility. In the fall 2017, CW
moved from Hana to Haʻikū and driving to and from work aggravated
her back pain. Bekkum offered to provide her with cortisone
shots, which she accepted. Bekkum administered three cortisone
shots without payment.
The CW then told Bekkum she was thinking of asking her
doctor for a platelet-rich plasma (“PRP”) shot, in which her own
blood would be drawn, a centrifuge would be used to separate out
the platelets, and the platelets would be injected into the scar
tissue in her back. Bekkum contacted the CW saying he was now
offering PRP shots and could come to her home with to perform
the procedure. The CW agreed, and on September 29, 2017, Bekkum
arrived at her home around 6:00 PM.
Bekkum insisted the CW put on a paper gown, even though she
did not think it was necessary. The CW then straddled a chair,
and Bekkum injected a needle into her lower back. Bekkum then
placed one hand under the paper gown, grabbed her breast with
his right hand, and his left hand moved across her thigh and her
belly into her crotch area. He said something like, “[O]h, did
I hurt you?”
The CW pushed the chair onto the ground, turned to Bekkum
and demanded that he leave, then went into her bedroom and
locked the door. She got dressed, exited her bedroom, then went
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to the kitchen door to let in her two large dogs. Bekkum asked
her to at least let him watch her dress as a payment for his
services. As he was leaving, the CW told him to bill her.
Bekkum suggested there would be other things she could do to pay
him back.
The next day, the CW woke up to a text message from Bekkum
on her phone. She ignored it, but Bekkum continued texting her
throughout the day and asked over Facebook messenger if he could
come over. The CW said no. She eventually turned off her phone
but then heard banging on her kitchen door. It was Bekkum, who
said there was an emergency involving the senator.
Bekkum let himself in then asked her if he could check her
injection site. The CW did not think it was necessary, but she
allowed him to check it. Bekkum then excused himself to use the
bathroom, and the CW started doing the dishes at her kitchen
sink. Bekkum came up behind her and put his arms around her.
He pushed his erect penis into her tailbone area. Bekkum also
tried to kiss her, but she turned away and guided him out the
door, then shut and locked it behind him.
The CW waited seven months to report the incidents to the
police because she was afraid of retaliation and of losing her
job with the senator. She eventually reported the incidents
after speaking with her daughter, as well as her doctor, the
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, and her therapist.
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The jury found Bekkum guilty as charged on both counts of
sexual assault in the fourth degree. The circuit court
sentenced Bekkum to one year of probation and thirty days
imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.
C. ICA proceedings
Bekkum appealed his conviction, challenging for the first
time the validity of the complaint.1 He contended the complaint
was defective because it did not include the statutory
definition of compulsion, which he argued does not comport with
its common meaning.
The State pointed out that because Bekkum challenged the
validity of the 2022 complaint for the first time on appeal, the
Motta/Wells “post-conviction liberal construction rule” applied.
It argued that under the Motta/Wells standard, the complaint
must be presumed valid and should not be vacated unless Bekkum
could show prejudice or that the complaint cannot reasonably be
construed to allege a crime. The State argued that the
complaint was valid and that by the time Bekkum challenged the
1 Bekkum raised six other points of error: that the circuit court erred in failing to (1) enter a judgment of acquittal, (2) instruct the jury regarding the State’s burden of proving timeliness beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) instruct the jury to disregard certain hearsay testimony that was stricken and in admitting certain hearsay evidence. Bekkum also asserted that (4) his due process rights were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct, (5) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (6) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. The ICA addressed the first two points listed above but did not address the others because it vacated Bekkum’s conviction after holding the complaint was deficient. None of the points listed above are at issue in this certiorari proceeding and will not be further discussed.
7
validity of the complaint, he was fully apprised of the charges
against him.
The ICA vacated Bekkum’s conviction based on Bekkum’s
challenge to the charges. State v. Bekkum, 156 Hawaiʻi 154, 570
P.3d 1121, 2025 WL 1673691, at *4 (App. June 13, 2025) (SDO).
The ICA acknowledged applicability of the Motta/Wells rule
because Bekkum challenged the validity of the complaint for the
first time on appeal. Id. But it ruled that “[u]nder the
Motta/Wells rule, a charge will only be adequate when it
provides the accused with fair notice of the offense’s essential
elements, which are conduct, attendant circumstances, and
results of conduct.” Id. (citing State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawaiʻi
362, 370, 452 P.3d 359, 367 (2019)).
The ICA concluded that the omission of the statutory
definition of compulsion failed to provide Bekkum with fair
notice of the charges. Id. It cited its own unpublished
decision holding that “the statutory definition of ‘compulsion’
departs from the commonly understood definitions of the term to
such an extent that charging [the defendant] in the language of
the statutes failed to provide him with fair notice of the
charges.” Id. (quoting State v. Aledo, 145 Hawaiʻi 297, 452 P.3d
765, 2019 WL 6127474, at *3-4 (App. Nov. 18, 2019) (SDO)).
The ICA held that the failure to include the statutory
definition of compulsion rendered the complaint defective and
8
ordered a remand for the circuit court to dismiss the case
without prejudice. Id.
C. Certiorari proceedings
On certiorari, the State argues the ICA applied the wrong
standard of review when it vacated Bekkum’s conviction. The
State also contends the ICA failed to evaluate the complaint’s
validity in light of all the information Bekkum had prior to his
appeal, including the State’s proposed jury instructions that
set forth the statutory definition of compulsion.
Bekkum maintains the omission of the statutory definition
of compulsion rendered the complaint defective regardless of
whether the ICA properly considered the record as a whole. He
argues that the complaint cannot reasonably be construed to
charge a crime.
III. Standard of Review
“Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements of
a charged offense is a question of law, which we review under
the de novo, or right/wrong standard.” State v. Baker, 146
Hawaiʻi 299, 305, 463 P.3d 956, 962 (2020) (citation omitted).
IV. Discussion
As set forth below, we conclude the ICA did not properly
apply the Motta/Wells rule.
The statutory definition of compulsion did not add an
additional element and did not need to be included in the
9
complaint. Thus, Bekkum has failed to show that the charges
against him cannot reasonably be construed to allege crimes.
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Bekkum knew the
State’s theory was that Bekkum acted by compulsion because there
was an absence of consent. Thus, Bekkum also failed to show he
was prejudiced by the non-inclusion of the statutory definition
of compulsion.
Therefore, because Bekkum can neither show (1) that the
complaint cannot reasonably be construed to allege a crime nor
(2) that he was prejudiced, Kauhane, 145 Hawaiʻi at 370, 452 P.3d
at 367, the ICA erred by ruling the charges must be dismissed.
A. The ICA applied the standard applicable to timely, early
challenges instead of the Motta/Wells rule applicable to a
challenge first made on appeal
1. The Motta/Wells rule of liberal construction applies
to this case
When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of a
charge in a timely manner, an appellate court will uphold that
charge if: (1) it contains the elements of the offense; and (2)
it sufficiently apprises the defendant of what the defendant
must be prepared to meet; in other words, the relevant inquiry
is whether or not the charge has provided the accused with fair
notice of an offense’s essential elements. Kauhane, 145 Hawaiʻi
at 369–70, 452 P.3d at 366–67. In addition, in a timely
challenge, if a charge contains generic terms, proscribing
10
different types of conduct or different definitions in the
disjunctive, then fair notice can require that the State provide
specificity in the charge. State v. Jardine, 151 Hawaiʻi 96, 101,
508 P.3d 1182, 1187 (2022).
But a different standard applies where a defendant
challenges charges after conviction. In a post-conviction
challenge to a charge, the charge is presumed valid and will be
invalidated only if the defendant can show (1) the charge cannot
reasonably be construed to allege a crime; or (2) the defendant
was prejudiced:
Under the Motta/Wells rule, charges challenged for the
first time on appeal are presumed valid. Accordingly, we
will only vacate a defendant’s conviction under this
standard if the defendant can show: (1) that the charge
cannot reasonably be construed to allege a crime; or (2)
that the defendant was prejudiced.
Kauhane, 145 Hawaiʻi at 370, 452 P.3d at 367 (cleaned up).
Here, because Bekkum challenged the sufficiency of the
complaint for the first time on appeal, the Motta/Wells rule
applies. Therefore, the only bases for a challenge are that (1)
the charges cannot reasonably be construed to allege crimes; or
(2) that Bekkum was prejudiced. But the ICA invalidated the
charges on a different basis. It stated that “[u]nder the
Motta/Wells rule, a charge will only be adequate when it
provides the accused with fair notice of the offense’s essential
elements, which are conduct, attendant circumstances, and
results of conduct[,]” Bekkum, 2025 WL 1673691, at *4, and cited
11
to Kauhane at 145 Hawaiʻi at 370, 452 P.3d at 367. The ICA cited
to a passage from Kauhane that applies to timely challenges to
charges.
However, as stated in Kauhane, it is only when a charge is
timely challenged that a court is to evaluate whether the charge
provides “fair notice of an offense’s essential elements.” In
other words, even if a charge contains all essential elements,
it is possible that the charge would not provide “fair notice.”
But under the Motta/Wells rule governing post-conviction
challenges, the inquiry is whether a charge can reasonably be
construed to allege a crime, which only requires that all
essential elements be included in the charge. The Motta/Wells
rule does not impose the “fair notice” requirement of Kauhane
because when a defendant has been convicted, whether through a
trial or by change of plea, the defendant is presumed to have
had “fair notice” of the charge. In other words, the
Motta/Wells rule is designed to discourage “technical claims of
invalidity” first raised after trial. Motta, 66 Haw. at 91, 657
P.2d at 1020. Here, the ICA may have conflated the standard
applicable to timely, early challenges to a criminal charge with
the standard governing post-conviction challenges.
But as this was a challenge raised for the first time on
appeal, the Motta/Wells rule applies. Neither criterion for
setting aside the charge exists here, (1) that the charge cannot
12
reasonably be construed to allege a crime, or (2) that the
defendant was prejudiced. Therefore, the ICA erred by ordering
that the charges be dismissed.
2. Bekkum has failed to show that the charges against him
cannot reasonably be construed to allege crimes
because the statutory definition of compulsion did not
create an additional element
Regardless of when a criminal charge is challenged, there
are basic requirements it must fulfill to “reasonably be
construed to allege a crime,” as required by the first prong of
the Motta/Wells analysis. As this court stated in State v.
Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977):
The accusation must sufficiently allege all of the essential
elements of the offense charged. This requirement obtains whether
an accusation is in the nature of an oral charge, information,
indictment, or complaint, and the omission of an essential element
of the crime charged is a defect in substance rather than of form.
A charge defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an
offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for
that would constitute a denial of due process.
58 Haw. at 281, 567 P2d at 1244 (cleaned up). Thus, even under
the Motta/Wells rule, a charge must include all essential
elements of the crime charged.
Under HRS § 702-205, the elements of an offense are such
(1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of
conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense.
“Attendant circumstances” are any circumstances defined in an
offense that are neither conduct nor the results of conduct.
State v. Aiwohi, 109 Hawaiʻi 115, 127, 123 P.3d 1210, 1222 (2005).
In addition, requisite states of mind must also be included in
13
criminal charges. State v. Garcia, 152 Hawaiʻi 3, 7, 518 P.3d
1153, 1157 (2022).
Thus, under the Motta/Wells rule, a charge need only
contain requisite elements to “reasonably be construed to allege
a crime.” The ICA deemed the charges invalid because they did
not include the statutory definition of “compulsion.” But
Motta/Wells only requires that charges include all essential
elements. Thus, a statutory definition need only be included if
it actually creates an additional element.
Different standards apply when a charge is challenged in a
timely manner. As we stated in Garcia, which involved a timely
challenge:
Notice plays the central role in evaluating the
sufficiency of a charging document. Article I, section 5 of
the Hawaiʻi Constitution (right to due process) and article
I, section 14 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution (right “to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”)
inspire the criteria we use to measure the adequacy of a
charge: charging documents must include the elements of an
offense and sufficiently describe the nature and cause of
the accusation. See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawaiʻi 383,
391, 219 P.3d 1170, 1178 (2009) (holding that “the
sufficiency of the charging instrument is measured, inter
alia, by whether it contains the elements of the offense
intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what [they] must be prepared to meet”)
(cleaned up).
Garcia, 152 Hawaiʻi at 6, 518 P.3d at 1156.
Generally, “[w]hen a criminal defendant challenges the
sufficiency of a charge in a timely manner, an appellate court
will uphold that charge if: (1) it contains the elements of the
offense; and (2) it sufficiently apprises the defendant of what
14
the defendant must be prepared to meet; [i]n other words, the
relevant inquiry is whether or not the charge has provided the
accused with fair notice of the offense’s essential elements.”
Kauhane, 145 Hawaiʻi at 369–70, 452 P.3d at 366–67 (emphasis
added) (cleaned up). And if a charging document tracks an
offense’s statutory language, then the State does not need to
“load it with definitions of words defined elsewhere.” Garcia,
152 Hawaiʻi at 8, 518 P.3d at 1158. But if a charge contains
generic terms, proscribing different types of conduct or
different definitions in the disjunctive, then fair notice can
require that the State provide specificity in the charge.
Jardine, 151 Hawaiʻi at 101, 508 P.3d at 1187.2
But this case involves a post-conviction challenge. Here,
the charges against Bekkum tracked the statutory definition of
2 In State v. Kaakimaka, 156 Hawaiʻi 302, 310, 574 P.3d 767, 775 (2025), we stated that in a timely challenge, “the State needs to provide the statutory definition of a term only when it creates an additional essential element of the offense, and the term itself does not provide a person of common understanding with fair notice of that element.” (emphasis added). In Kaakimaka, we held that (1) although “in any private place” is an attendant circumstances element of the charged offense, the statutory definition of “private place” does not create an additional attendant circumstance element; (2) “private place” is not a generic term requiring further particulars; and (3) based on other information provided up to the time of his motion to dismiss, Kaakimaka was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and had actual knowledge of what was alleged to be the “private place.” 156 Hawaiʻi at 305, 574 P.3d at 770.
Although it would not have changed the result in the case, Kaakimaka erroneously used “and” instead of “or.” In a timely challenge, even if a charge includes all elements, those elements must also provide fair notice. This error would not have changed the result in Kaakimaka, as we specifically held that the defendant was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and had actual knowledge of what was alleged to be the “private place” by the time he filed his motion to dismiss.
15
sexual assault in the fourth degree and included all requisite
elements. The charges included the (1) conduct (touching and/or
grabbing breast/touching and/or pressing against her buttocks
with his penis), (2) the attendant circumstance (by compulsion);
and (3) results of conduct (sexual contact); as well as the
state of mind (knowingly). Critically, the statutory definition
of compulsion did not create an additional element; “by
compulsion” itself was the attendant circumstance element.
In deeming the charges against Bekkum insufficient, the ICA
cited its own earlier unpublished summary disposition order in
State v. Aledo, 2019 WL 3127474. But Aledo involved a timely
challenge to indictment. 2019 WL 3127474, at *2. In Aledo, the
ICA concluded that the dictionary definition of “compulsion” did
not “rise to the level of specificity of the statutory
definition of ‘compulsion’ under HRS § 707-700.” 2019 WL
3127474, *4. And in a timely challenge, the relevant inquiry is
whether or not the charge has provided the accused with fair
notice of an offense’s essential elements.
But the “fair notice” requirement does not apply to a postconviction challenge. In a post-conviction challenge governed
by the Motta/Wells rule, a charge must include the statutory
definition of a term only if it creates an additional essential
element of the offense; in post-conviction challenges, fair
16
notice is presumed. Therefore, the ICA erred by relying on its
holding in Aledo in this post-conviction challenge.
Here, the statutory definition of compulsion did not create
an additional essential element. The definition did not create
an additional attendant circumstance, as in Wheeler (that the
defendant’s conduct occurred upon a public way, street, road, or
highway). 121 Hawaiʻi at 392, 219 P.3d at 1179. It did not
create an additional result of conduct, as in Kauhane (of
rendering a highway impassable without unreasonable
inconvenience or hazard). 145 Hawaiʻi at 371, 452 P.3d at 368.
To summarize, under the Motta/Wells rule governing postconviction challenges to criminal charges, a defendant’s
conviction can only be vacated if the defendant can show (1)
that the charge cannot reasonably be construed to allege a
crime; or (2) that the defendant was prejudiced. Bekkum has
failed to show that the charges against him cannot reasonably be
construed to allege crimes. As explained next, Bekkum has also
failed to show he was prejudiced by the non-inclusion of the
statutory definition of compulsion. Therefore, the charges
should have been upheld in this post-conviction challenge.
3. Bekkum has also failed to show he was prejudiced by
the non-inclusion of the statutory definition of
compulsion in the complaint
A criminal charge ensures that an accused’s rights under
the Hawaiʻi Constitution are upheld. State v. Nesmith, 127
17
Hawaiʻi 48, 52, 276 P.3d 617, 621 (2012). One of those
fundamental rights is enshrined in Article I, Section 14, which
mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation[.]” Haw.
Const. Art. I, § 14. Therefore, “[n]otice plays a central role
in our analyses of charging documents’ adequacy.” State v. Van
Blyenburg, 152 Hawaiʻi 66, 74, 520 P.3d 264, 272 (2022).
But the notice requirement is not meant “to facilitate
obtuse technical arguments about . . . what complex statutory
definitions should or should not be included in a charging
document. It is, rather, to safeguard an accused’s fundamental
right to know what they must defend against to avoid
conviction.” Id. And in post-conviction challenges, fair
notice of charges is presumed.
Here, Bekkum did not challenge the charges until he appealed
his convictions. He knew what he had to defend against to avoid
conviction. He knew the State’s theory was that he had engaged
in sexual contact by compulsion on the grounds the CW had not
consented to the sexual contact alleged in the charges. In
fact, he requested standard jury instruction 7.05 regarding
“consent,” which generally provides that a CW’s consent is a
defense to a prosecution.
Also, in the ICA and in this court, Bekkum never claimed he
did not know the State’s theory was that absence of consent
18
constituted “by compulsion” or that he was prejudiced by the
non-inclusion of the statutory definition of compulsion in the
charges against him. His challenges to the complaint were not
based on an alleged violation of his right to know what he had
to defend against to avoid conviction. Rather, he raised an
obtuse, technical post-conviction challenge.
Bekkum therefore failed to show he was prejudiced by the
non-inclusion of the statutory definition of compulsion in the
complaint.
Hence, his challenge to the complaint fails under the
Motta/Wells rule.
V. Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the ICA’s July 17, 2025
judgment on appeal and remand this case to the ICA to address
Bekkum’s remaining points of error on appeal.
Richard B. Rost /s/ Vladimir P. Devens
for petitioner
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Hayden Aluli
for respondent /s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
/s/ Clarissa Y. Malinao
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