2026 IL App (1st) 241339
No. 1-24-1339
Order filed August 7, 2026
Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 09 CR 07794
)
ANTON RUTH, ) Honorable
) John F. Lyke Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment and opinion.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. March 1, 2019) authorizes correction of
clerical errors in the mittimus, not judicial errors resulting in an unauthorized sentence.
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to order the mittimus changed
to reflect a determinate three-year mandatory supervised release term when the statute
mandates an indeterminate MSR term ranging from three years to life for Aggravated
Criminal Sexual Assault. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2010).
¶2 Anton Ruth appeals the denial of his Rule 472 motion to correct the mittimus. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. March 1, 2019). At his guilty plea hearing in 2010, the trial court
incorrectly admonished him that his mandatory supervised release (MSR) term would be three No. 1-24-1339
years. The written judgment was later corrected to reflect the statutory MSR term of three years to
natural life.
¶3 After a direct appeal and several petitions and motions, Ruth asks this court to order the
mittimus changed to reflect the three-year MSR term the trial court orally announced at sentencing,
rather than the indeterminate term required by statute. Ruth also asserts that he never waived this
claim, and that res judicata does not apply.
¶4 We affirm. Rule 472 authorizes correction of clerical errors, not judicial errors resulting in
an unauthorized sentence. Because the Unified Code of Corrections mandates an indeterminate
MSR term ranging from three years to life for Ruth’s offense, neither the trial court nor this court
may order the mittimus changed to reflect a determinate three-year term. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2010). People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶¶ 2, 30. Because the motion fails on
the merits, we need not consider whether res judicata or waiver bars relief.
¶5 Background
¶6 Ruth pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5-2-14(a)(2) (West
2010). The trial court sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment with a three-year MSR term. The
applicable statute required an MSR term of three years “to a maximum of natural life.” 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2018). Nevertheless, the trial court admonished Ruth that he would serve a
determinate three-year term. Ruth did not move to withdraw his plea or appeal the sentence.
¶7 After completing his prison sentence, Ruth learned that the trial court had mistakenly
admonished him about his MSR term. In November 2017, Ruth filed a postconviction petition
alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him correctly about the MSR term.
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), Ruth sought to withdraw his plea and requested a new
trial.
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¶8 The trial court brought Ruth to court in January 2018 and admonished him that he would
face a minimum prison sentence of nine years and a maximum of 67 years if he went to trial on
the charges. With Ruth present, the State also told the court that Ruth had already served the
sentence imposed under his plea agreement. The court explained that under the statute, Ruth would
have to serve three years to life on MSR instead of an absolute term of three years. After receiving
those admonishments, Ruth withdrew his postconviction petition, never reaching the merits of
Ruth’s claim on the length of his MSR term. See People v. Ruth, 2022 IL App (1st) 192023 ¶ 6.
¶9 Ruth then filed a “Complaint for Mandamus,” asserting the Prisoner Review Board refused
to determine whether Ruth could be released from prison on MSR. He asked the court to
“determine the length of his MSR term to be served” and for “immediate release to begin serving
his MSR period.” After a brief in-court appearance, the trial court denied mandamus on the ground
that the complaint was a civil matter that Ruth should have filed in the county where he was
imprisoned. Id. ¶ 7.
¶ 10 Thereafter, Ruth filed a “Petition for Amended Sentencing Order,” arguing that the
Department of Corrections was unlawfully detaining him because the trial court’s original
sentencing order said nothing about MSR, and the trial judge had told him that his MSR term
would be three years when imposing the sentence. Id. ¶ 8. Ruth requested the court amend the
sentencing order to reflect the original oral admonishment. Id. The court denied Ruth’s petition in
open court without Ruth present. Id. The court explained that when Ruth filed his postconviction
petition, “I brought the defendant back. I acknowledged this Court’s mistake and gave him the
opportunity to take back his plea of guilty. * * * He elected here in open court to not take back his
guilty plea. He wanted to keep his original sentence and his MSR would change to three years to
natural life.” Ruth had “agreed to the three years to natural life MSR” term.
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¶ 11 In dismissing the petition, the circuit court found the new admonishments during
proceedings on Ruth’s first postconviction petition sufficient, noting that Ruth declined to pursue
the claims after receiving the new admonishments. Id.
¶ 12 Next, Ruth filed a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)), arguing the
statutory provisions allowing the Prisoner Review Board to set conditions of MSR and determine
the length of his MSR term violated the separation of powers and proportionate penalties clauses
of the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1 (separation
of powers). Id. ¶ 9. Both claims rested on the same premise: the Prisoner Review Board is
unconstitutionally exercising judicial functions. This court found that setting the terms of MSR is
“akin to the executive function of prison administration and setting the release date represents no
more than the executive’s long-recognized ability to bestow grace on parolees who comply with
the terms of parole.” Id. ¶ 1.
¶ 13 After that, Ruth filed a petition for relief from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)),
arguing that his indeterminate MSR term and the statute authorizing it were void ab initio for
violating the separation of powers clause in the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1)
by impermissibly delegating the determination of the conditions of MSR to the Prisoner Review
Board instead of the judiciary. Id. ¶ 9. The trial court dismissed the petition, and Ruth appealed.
In a published opinion, this court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statutes authorizing the
Prisoner Review Board to set the conditions of Ruth’s release are not unconstitutional. See Ruth,
2022 IL App (1st) 192023.
¶ 14 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472
¶ 15 While the appeal was pending, Ruth filed pro se his first “Motion to Correct Mittimus
Pursuant to Rule 472,” requesting the court correct his mittimus to reflect an MSR term of three
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years orally imposed at sentencing. A few months later, the circuit court struck the motion as a
duplicate filing and denied his previously filed motion with “ruling and order of 11/27/18 to stand.”
The November 27, 2018 order denied Ruth’s Petition for an Amended Sentencing Order, which
sought to amend the order to reflect the original oral admonishment.
¶ 16 Ruth filed pro se a second motion to correct his mittimus under Rule 472, again asking the
court to correct his mittimus to reflect an MSR term of three years. Ruth later submitted a copy of
the transcripts from his guilty plea. A different judge denied this motion, stating that “Ruth is
correct that the sentencing court imposed the incorrect MSR term during sentencing,” but “Ruth
had the opportunity to avail himself of relief and chose not to pursue the relief available to him in
2018.” The court found that Ruth waived this argument by withdrawing his postconviction petition
claiming ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
¶ 17 The Illinois Supreme Court directed this court to give Ruth leave to file a late notice of
appeal from the January 24, 2024, judgment denying the motion to correct the mittimus.
¶ 18 Analysis
¶ 19 Ruth asks us to “reverse the circuit court’s judgment and order the mittimus corrected to
reflect the imposed three-year MSR term.” He contends the court erred in denying the MSR term
on his mittimus under Rule 472 because three years of MSR was an explicit term of his plea
agreement. Ruth relies on People v. Smith, 242 Ill. App.3d 399, 402 (1993) (“It is the oral
pronouncement of the judge which is the judgment of the court.”). Moreover, he asserts he never
waived this claim, and that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
¶ 20 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 provides “In criminal cases, the circuit court retains
jurisdiction to correct the following sentencing errors at any time following judgment and after
notice to the parties, including during the pendency of an appeal, on the court’s own motion, or on
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motion of any party: *** (4) Clerical errors in the written sentencing order or other part of the
record resulting in a discrepancy between the record and the actual judgment of the court.” Ill. S.
Ct. Rule 472(a)(4) (eff. March 1, 2019).
¶ 21 In his briefs, Ruth characterizes the judge’s error as “clerical,” so it falls within Rule 472.
The asserted error, however, arose from the trial court’s mistaken oral admonishment and not from
a clerical mistake in reducing the judgment to writing. Because the Unified Code of Corrections
mandates an indeterminate MSR term, the written judgment could not lawfully be changed to
reflect the incorrect oral admonishment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2010).
¶ 22 The legislature has authority to define crimes and establish the nature and extent of criminal
penalties, and courts exceed their authority by ordering a lesser sentence than the one mandated
by statute. People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 374 (1995). A court cannot impose unauthorized
sentences. See People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 511 (2007 (trial court’s misstatement not
supported by law). The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected a determinate MSR term for aggravated
sexual assault based on the statutory requirement that the MSR period be set at the indeterminate
term of three years to life. People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719 ¶ 30.
¶ 23 Moreover, the trial court lacked authority either to initially agree to, or correct the mittimus
to reflect a determinate MSR term. “Even when a defendant, prosecutor, and court agree on a
sentence, the court cannot give the sentence effect if it is not authorized by law.” People v. White,
2011 IL 109616, ¶ 23. (Internal quotation marks omitted.). See also People v. McChriston, 2014
IL 115310, ¶ 31 (trial court has no “discretionary power” in enforcement of mandatory MSR term,
which “attach[es] automatically as written into defendant’s sentence”).
¶ 24 According to Ruth, People v. Umfleet, 190 Ill. App. 3d 804 (1989) suggests that because
he has substantially performed his part of the plea bargain, the three-year determinate MSR
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sentence must apply. Umfleet, however, involved a prosecutor’s promise regarding a sentence the
trial court had authority to impose. Defendant pleaded guilty in Missouri and Illinois, and at the
Missouri plea hearing, the prosecutor stated on the record that the Illinois prosecutor had also
agreed to recommend 17 years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with the Missouri sentence. Id.
When the defendant pleaded guilty to the Illinois charges, the State recommended, and the
defendant was sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 807. After the defendant served his time
in Missouri, he sought specific performance on the Illinois prosecutor’s promise of 17 years.
Id. at 809.
¶ 25 We found a plea agreement existed between the State of Illinois and the defendant, vacated
the sentence, and remanded to the trial court, explaining that “the defendant surrendered
constitutionally protected interests when he pleaded guilty to the Missouri charges, and we have
found that he did so in reliance on the plea agreement with the Illinois prosecutor.” Id. at 813. The
holding in Umfleet clarifies that when a prosecutor in a plea agreement promises to recommend a
term, that promise must be honored, though the trial court is free to accept or reject it. Id.
¶ 26 Ruth contends that, similar to Umfleet, it would be fundamentally unfair to enforce an MSR
term different from the one he agreed to at the plea hearing. But this argument assumes withdrawal
meant he agreed to an “increase” of the MSR term and ignores the admonishments on the practical
effect of withdrawing a guilty plea and risking a conviction after retrial. Ruth acknowledges that
the trial court admonished him that the possible sentence after a conviction would include the full
range of penalties authorized by statute.
¶ 27 The MSR term is mandatory, even when not included in the written sentencing order. The
opinion in Round v. Lamb, 2017 IL 122271, confirms that when a defendant declines the
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opportunity to withdraw a guilty plea after learning of an erroneous MSR admonishment, the
defendant is not entitled to have the sentence reconfigured into one unauthorized by statute.
¶ 28 The petitioner in Round sought an order of habeas or, in the alternative, a writ
of mandamus. The sentencing court and the petitioner believed his guilty plea was in exchange for
a sentence of seven years in custody—five years in prison (concurrent terms of five and three
years) and an erroneous two years of MSR. Enforcing the proper four-year MSR term extended
the sentence to nine years. The petitioner declined the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after
learning of the MSR error. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to have his
sentence reconfigured. Id. ¶ 28. Likewise, under Rule 472, Ruth cannot obtain a sentence the law
does not authorize.
¶ 29 We need not address the procedural issues because the motion fails on the merits.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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