FILED
Aug 07 2026, 8:54 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Amanda M. Wilson,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Matthew V. Mann,
Appellee-Petitioner
August 7, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-DR-248
Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit Court
The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29C01-1401-DR-795
Opinion by Judge Scheele
Judges May and Pyle concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 1 of 23
Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Amanda M. Wilson (Mother) and Matthew V. Mann (Father) (collectively,
Parents) divorced in 2014. Pursuant to a later court order, Parents received joint
legal custody of their daughter and Mother was awarded primary physical
custody with Father exercising parenting time. For approximately ten years,
Parents abided by this order, except with regard to child support, which they
informally modified themselves by agreement in 2018.
[2] In 2024, Mother moved to modify Father’s parenting time. Following a
hearing, the trial court denied her motion, recalculated child support, and
ordered her to pay Father $20,726.00 in arrearage. Mother now appeals, raising
the following issues for our review: whether the trial court erred in calculating
child support and in determining she owed arrearage, and whether the trial
court erred in denying her motion to modify parenting time. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Parents are the biological parents of M.M. (Child), born in 2011. Parents
married in March 2013. In January 2014, Father filed a petition for dissolution,
which was granted in September. As part of the dissolution, the parties agreed
to joint legal and physical custody of Child, then three years old.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 2 of 23 [4] In 2016, both parties petitioned the court to modify parenting time and/or
custody as well as child support. Following a hearing, the court entered an
order of modification (the 2016 Order). The 2016 Order provided the parties
would continue to share joint legal custody and Mother would have primary
physical custody subject to Father’s parenting time. Father’s parenting time was
ordered to be every other weekend from Thursday to Monday, as well as one
mid-week overnight per week. The 2016 Order also provided the parties were to
share “pro rata in all agreed upon extracurricular expenses[.]” App. Vol. II p.
59 (formatting altered).
[5] As to child support, the 2016 Order provided Mother was to pay Father weekly
support “[p]ursuant to the attached child support worksheet[.]” Id. at 58.
According to the child support worksheet, Father was to maintain Child’s
health insurance, for which he received a $56 weekly credit for the cost of the
premiums. This credit plus Mother’s higher income resulted in a negative
support order, in which Mother as the custodial parent was ordered to pay
Father $43 a week in child support.
[6] In late 2017, Father discovered his health care premium costs would be
increasing. Because of this, and with the help of their parenting coordinator,
Parents agreed that Mother, rather than Father, would be responsible for
Child’s health insurance. In exchange, Mother would no longer pay Father the
$43 weekly child support. Parents began implementing this informal agreement
as of January 1, 2018.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 3 of 23 [7] For the next six years, Parents abided by the 2016 Order except for their own
agreement regarding child support. Child did well in school, participated in
extracurriculars and faith-based activities, and had a positive relationship with
Parents. Parents maintained a “cordial co-parenting relationship” and were
generally able to “successfully communicate[] regarding [Child’s] schedule and
their parenting time[.]” Id. at 25-26.
[8] In September 2024, Father remarried and soon after moved into a new home
with his wife and her two sons. Around this time, thirteen-year-old Child was
diagnosed with anxiety. In October, Mother filed a motion to modify custody,
parenting time, and child support, alleging Father’s new relationship was
negatively affecting Child. A provisional hearing was held in November 2024,
after which the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL).
[9] A final hearing was held over two days in September and November 2025.
Prior to the hearing, Mother clarified she was no longer seeking a change of
custody but rather seeking a modification of Father’s parenting time to reflect
the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines for Adolescents and Teenagers as well
as a modification of child support.
[10] At the hearing, both parents presented evidence as to parenting time and child
support, as well as evidence regarding alleged child support arrearage the other
party owed. Specifically, Mother presented evidence Father owed child support
for the cost of Child’s extracurriculars, while Father testified that Mother had
not been paying child support in line with the 2016 Order. On the first day of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 4 of 23
the final hearing in September, the GAL testified and recommended Father’s
parenting time remain the same. But on the second day of the final hearing two
months later, the GAL testified her recommendation had changed, and she
now recommended that parenting time occur on alternating weekends from
Friday to Sunday, in line with Mother’s request and with the Indiana Parenting
Time Guidelines for Adolescents and Teenagers. See Ind. Parenting Time
Guidelines § II(E).
[11] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s motion
to modify parenting time. The court further ordered Mother to pay Father $22 a
week in child support and found she failed to comply with the 2016 Order
regarding child support and therefore owed Father $20,726.00 in arrearage.
Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Mother challenges the trial court’s order, contending it erred in calculating child
support and arrearage as well as erred in denying her motion to modify
parenting time. Where, as here, the trial court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Quinn v. Quinn, 62
N.E.3d 1212, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). First, we determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the
judgment. Id. The trial court’s findings are controlling unless the record
includes no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. Legal
conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. We set aside a trial court’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 5 of 23
judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. “Clear error occurs when our review
of the evidence most favorable to the judgment leaves us firmly convinced that
a mistake has been made.” Id.
I. Child Support
[13] Mother argues the trial court erred in calculating her child support obligation
and in its determination regarding child support arrearage. “On review, ‘[a] trial
court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid.’” Bogner v. Bogner, 29
N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047
(Ind. 2008)). “Child support calculations are made utilizing the income shares
model set forth in the Indiana Child Support Guidelines.” Salser v. Salser, 75
N.E.3d 553, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The Guidelines apportion the cost of
supporting a child between the parents according to their means, on the premise
that the child should receive the same portion of parental income after a
dissolution that they would have received if the family had remained intact. Id.
at 558-59. A trial court’s calculation of a child support obligation will be
reversed only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id. at 559.
[14] Mother brings three challenges relating to the trial court’s order on child
support. First, she argues the trial court improperly calculated her child support
amount. Second, she argues the court erred in determining she had not
complied with the 2016 Order and ordering her to pay $20,726.00 in arrearage.
Finally, she argues the trial court failed to rule on her own request for Father to
pay her arrearage. We address each contention in turn.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 6 of 23
A. Calculations
[15] Mother first argues the trial court erred in determining her weekly income and
therefore in its child support calculations. “When fashioning a child support
order, the trial court’s first task is to determine the weekly gross income of each
parent.” In re Paternity of G.R.G., 829 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Weekly gross income includes “income from any source” such as bonuses. Id.
(quoting Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)). Calculating weekly gross income
is “fact-sensitive when irregular income, such as bonuses . . . is involved.” Id.
[16] Here, each party entered a proposed child support obligation worksheet.
Mother’s worksheet, which was entered as Exhibit E on the first day of the
hearing in September 2025, indicated Father’s weekly gross income was
$4,053.56 and her own was $5,639.62. See Ex. Vol. IV p. 100. Father’s
worksheet was entered as Exhibit 3A on the second day of the hearing in
November 2025. That worksheet indicated Father’s weekly gross income to be
$3,842.06 and Mother’s to be $5,639.62. See id. at 35. In its order, the trial court
assigned Father’s weekly income as $3,842.06 and Mother’s as $5,639.62, in
line with Father’s computations in Exhibit 3A, resulting in Mother owing $22
weekly in child support. Mother argues these figures were determined using
inconsistent methodologies, resulting in an inequitable child support
calculation. We agree.
[17] Although Mother herself attested her weekly income was $5,639.62, that
calculation was done as of the first day of the hearing in September. Mother
testified that figure was reached by taking her year-to-date income, including
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 7 of 23
her bonus received in early 2025, and dividing it by the number of weeks in the
year so far. She similarly applied that methodology to Father’s 2025 year-todate income, including his own bonus received in early 2025, and calculated his
weekly income to be $4,053.56.
[18] When Father testified, he asserted his weekly income was $3,842.06. He
applied the same methodology Mother used—he took his year-to-date income
plus his bonus and divided it by the number of weeks in the year so far.
Importantly though, Father’s testimony occurred on the second day of the
hearing in November, two months after the first day when Mother testified. As
such, Father’s year-to-date income, including his bonus, was divided over a
larger number of weeks, resulting in a lower gross weekly income amount. He
notably did not apply this beneficial adjustment to Mother’s weekly income,
simply assigning her the same $5,639.62 that she had computed two months
earlier.
[19] On appeal, Father does not dispute the figures above or that there was an
inconsistency in the calculations but instead argues any error did not
“materially affect[] the outcome.” Appellee’s Br. p. 25. However, we do not
have all the information on appeal—specifically Mother’s year-to-date income
as of the November hearing date—to recalculate the correct support and
determine whether the difference is de minimis. And given we are remanding
this case due to other matters, we find the error here significant enough to
warrant appellate relief even if the ultimate outcome is a minor change in
support. See Glover v. Torrence, 723 N.E.2d 924, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“We
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 8 of 23
hold that, under the present circumstances where remand is required for
another matter, the $5.00 per week deviation is significant enough to warrant
appellate relief.”). We thus reverse the child support order and remand with
instructions for the court to recalculate child support.
B. Mother’s Arrearage
[20] Mother also argues the court erred in finding she had failed to comply with the
2016 Order to pay child support and ordering her to pay $20,726.00 in
arrearage. As part of the 2016 Order, Father was to maintain health insurance
for Child. Because of this, Father received a $56 credit toward his child support
obligation, resulting in a negative child support order in which the custodial
parent—Mother—was ordered to pay Father $43 a week in child support. The
parties abided by this throughout 2016 and 2017. Thereafter, due to an increase
in Father’s health care premiums, he and Mother, with the assistance of their
parenting coordinator, agreed that Mother would provide Child with health
insurance and in exchange she would no longer pay Father child support. This
continued until the current proceedings. In its order, the trial court determined
Mother had not been paying child support as required in the 2016 Order and
ordered her to pay arrearage. In doing so, the court rejected Mother’s argument
that providing health insurance coverage for Child in place of Father
constituted child support, reasoning that this was an improper retroactive
modification of child support.
[21] In Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 2007), our Supreme Court
addressed the issue of retroactive child support modification and emphasized “a
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 9 of 23
parent subject to a support order must make payments in accordance with that
order until the court modifies and/or sets aside the order. As a result, informal
agreements between parents are generally not effective until a motion for
modification is filed.” The Court acknowledged this bright-line rule “may
occasionally cause inequities” but found these inequities outweighed by the
benefits, as the rule “protects the welfare of children, provides predictability and
certainty, and prevents extended and expensive litigation about alleged informal
agreements between parents.” Id. at 661-62. Nonetheless, the Court went on to
find the rule is subject to certain “narrow exceptions” including where “the
parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative method of payment which
substantially complies with the spirit of the decree[.]” Id. at 662.
[22] Following Whited, we applied the substantial compliance exception to the
payment of educational expenses. In Vagenas v. Vagenas, 879 N.E.2d 1155 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, the parents divorced and the father was ordered to
pay child support. When the child entered college, the parents agreed the father
would pay one-half of the child’s college expenses and continue to pay child
support during the times the child was with the mother on school breaks.
Thereafter, the mother filed suit alleging the father had failed to pay the amount
of support that was ordered. The trial court held the father substantially
complied with the order, and on appeal we agreed. We first emphasized that—
under both Indiana case law and the Indiana Child Support Guidelines—
college expenses were in the nature of child support. Given this and given that
the parties had agreed that the father’s payments would be considered that
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 10 of 23
support, we found the “payment of college expenses equates to a payment of
child support” and the father “substantially complied with the child support
order.” Vagenas, 879 N.E.2d at 1159-60.
[23] As in Vagenas, the situation here meets the substantial compliance exception.
Inarguably, the cost of health insurance premiums is in the nature of child
support—so much so that, under the Child Support Guidelines, a parent
generally receives a health insurance credit in an amount equal to the premium
cost the parent actually pays for a child’s health insurance. See Ashworth v.
Ehrgott, 934 N.E.2d 152, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ind. Child Support
Guideline 3(E)(2)). Notably, in the 2016 Order, in arriving at the child support
obligation for Mother, Father received a credit for the amount he was paying in
Child’s health care premiums. Thereafter, Mother and Father entered into an
agreement that Mother would take over providing the health insurance and
doing so would be in lieu of her paying the $43 weekly child support. Given
this, we find Mother substantially complied with the child support order.
[24] We acknowledge that the substantial compliance exception is “narrow” and the
standard to show it applies is “rigorous.” Whited, 859 N.E.2d at 662.
Nonetheless, its application is appropriate here. To hold otherwise would result
in a “windfall” to Father because for years he did not pay for Child’s health
care premiums—as required by court order and as calculated in his child
support amount—yet he would now receive approximately ten years of back
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 11 of 23
pay for expenses he did not incur. 1 See Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 945-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing trial court’s order of child support arrearage
where the order would result in “a windfall to [the mother] for expenses she did
not actually incur”). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to
Mother’s arrearage. 2
C. Father’s Arrearage
[25] Mother also argues the trial court erred in failing to rule on an issue.
Specifically, she contends she “requested reimbursement for additional childrearing expenses she had paid in full for several years” and that the trial court
failed to rule on that issue. Appellant’s Br. p. 25. While no pre-hearing motion
addressed arrearage, both parties testified and presented evidence at the hearing
that the other party owed past-due child expenses. Additionally, both parties
included this issue in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Specifically, Father alleged Mother owed for unpaid child support as detailed
above, while Mother alleged Father owed for unpaid expenses relating to
Child’s extracurriculars. Yet the trial court in its order addressed only what
1
We note the trial court ordered the arrearage back to 2016, despite undisputed evidence that Mother paid
child support in 2016 and 2017.
2
Father argues that in order for Mother to show substantial compliance with the 2016 Order, she should
have to prove “(1) that specific payments were made; (2) the amount and timing of such payments; (3) that
the payments were for the benefit of the child; and (4) that they substantially complied with the support
order’s purpose.” Appellee’s Br. p. 21. In support, he cites Bendix v. Bendix, 550 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) and Castro v. Castro, 436 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). We do not find support for his
proposed test in either of these cases and decline to adopt such a test. Notably here, there is no dispute
Mother has been providing health insurance to Child in lieu of child support, and even more importantly, no
dispute that Father has not been paying for Child’s health insurance in violation of the 2016 Order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 12 of 23
arrearage Mother owed Father, and did not address what, if any, Father owed
Mother. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to rule on
this issue. See Campbell v. Campbell, 250 N.E.3d 459, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)
(remanding for the trial court to determine an issue it failed to address in its
order).
II. Parenting Time
[26] Mother also argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to modify
Father’s parenting time. As noted above, where the trial court enters findings of
fact and conclusions of law, we must first determine whether the evidence
supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re
Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d 996, 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The judgment will
be reversed only where clearly erroneous. Id.
[27] “Indiana has long recognized that the right of parents to visit their children is a
precious privilege that should be enjoyed by noncustodial parents, and thus a
noncustodial parent is generally entitled to reasonable visitation rights.”
Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted).
The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting
time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests
of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s
parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting
time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 13 of 23
Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2. We review the modification of parenting time for an
abuse of discretion. Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012). We grant latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters
and consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the inferences
flowing therefrom. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness
credibility. Id.
A. Legal Analysis
[28] First, Mother argues the trial court’s findings and conclusions indicate that it
applied the incorrect legal standard. The trial court made the following findings
and conclusions regarding parenting time:
92. Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2 provides: “The court may modify an
order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever
modification would serve the best interests of the child.”
93. Our Supreme Court explained that “Indiana has long
recognized that the right of parents to visit their children is a
precious privilege” and that “a parent is ‘generally entitled to
reasonable visitation rights.’” Manis v. McNabb, 104 N.E.3d 611,
620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989
N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)).
***
96. Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2 does, however, provide: “. . . the court
shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless the court
finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s physical
health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development."
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 14 of 23
97. Even though the statute uses the term “might,” “[o]ur
appellate courts have interpreted this statute to require evidence
establishing that visitation would endanger or impair the physical
or mental health of the child.” 104 N.E.3d at 620 (citing
Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 763) (emphasis added).
98. The appropriate standard for denying parenting time to a
parent was first addressed in Stewart v. Stewart, in which the
Court of Appeals wrote:
Neither party suggests that the word “might” in the statute
(“visitation by the parent might endanger the child’s physical
health or significantly impair his emotional development”)
requires only a mere possibility that the physical or mental health
of the child would be endangered or impaired. In view of the
nature of the parental right being cut off, such a construction
would be an absurd one. Why would the legislature acknowledge
the basic right of visitation of a . . . parent and then effectively
abolish that right by permitting terminations supported only by
speculative, possibility-type evidence. Thus, we have no
hesitation in concluding that statute requires evidence
establishing that visitation “would” (not “might”) endanger or
impair the physical or mental health of the child.
521 N.E.2d 956, 960, n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. [(1988),] trans. denied.
99. “A party who seeks to restrict parenting time rights bears the
burden of presenting evidence justifying such a restriction.” P.S.
v. W.C., 952 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Farrell
v. Littell, 790 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
100. The evidence provided herein does not support a
modification of . . . parenting time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 15 of 23
101. Herein, Mother is the party seeking modification of . . .
parenting time and has the burden to support such modification.
102. . . . The evidence also does not show that a modification of
custody or a reduction of Father’s parenting time is in the best
interest of the Child. As such, the parties shall continue to have
joint legal custody of [Child] and parenting time as established in
the 2016 Order.
***
104. As to parenting time, the Court is unpersuaded that further
restricting Father’s parenting time with [Child] is a necessary
measure to address the alleged concerns.
App. Vol. II pp. 40-43.
[29] Mother takes issue with Findings 96-99 and 104, contending these show the
trial court was applying the standard for a restriction of parenting time under
section 31-17-4-2. As noted above, “[r]estrictions on parenting time require a
specific finding contemplated by the statute.” Payes v. Rivas, 270 N.E.3d 1, 9
(Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Specifically, Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 provides in
pertinent part that the “court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights
unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s
physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.”
Mother argues she sought only to modify Father’s parenting time to be in line
with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, and that such a modification is
not a restriction under section 31-17-4-2. We agree.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 16 of 23 [30] This Court has explained that a finding that the parenting time would endanger
the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development “is only required where parenting time rights are curtailed in an
unreasonable manner.” Matter of Paternity of J.K., 184 N.E.3d 658, 667 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022). 3 Because Mother was seeking to modify Father’s parenting time to
reflect the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, any reduction in Father’s
parenting time would not have been so unreasonable as to amount to a
“restriction” of parenting time under section 31-17-4-2. See id. at 665
(“[P]arenting time awards consistent with the Parenting Time Guidelines meet
the reasonableness requirement[.]”); see also Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 26 N.E.3d
986, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (reduction in the mother’s parenting time was not
a “restriction” under section 31-17-4-2 where the reduction was consistent with
the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines). Thus, all Mother needed to show was
that modification of the parenting time was in Child’s best interests. See ClaryGhosh, 26 N.E.3d at 991.
[31] However, we do not agree with Mother that the trial court applied the incorrect
legal analysis here. While the court did make several findings regarding the
standard and caselaw for restricting parenting time under section 31-17-4-2, it
ultimately applied only the best interests standard to Child. See App. Vol. II p.
3
In Paternity of J.K., this Court was analyzing Indiana Code section 31-14-14-1, which applies to paternity
cases, but contains a similar provision requiring a finding that the parenting time would endanger the child’s
physical health and well-being or significantly impair the child’s emotional development. Compare Ind. Code
§ 31-14-14-1 (2026), with Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 17 of 23
42 (Finding 102). The court made no determination as to whether parenting
time with Father would endanger or impair Child’s physical or mental health.
[32] Ultimately, we presume the trial court knows the law and applies it correctly.
Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.
Without any evidence to the contrary, we cannot say the trial court applied the
incorrect legal analysis in determining whether to modify Father’s parenting
time.
B. Findings and Conclusions
[33] Mother challenges some of the trial court’s findings of fact. 4 Where, as here, the
trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must first
determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings
support the judgment. In re Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d 996, 997 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). The judgment will be reversed only where clearly erroneous. Id. To
determine whether the findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, we
consider only evidence favorable to the judgment. Id.
[34] Mother challenges the following findings:
4
Mother also takes issue with the trial court’s findings relating to legal custody and Father’s relocation.
While Mother initially challenged Father’s relocation and requested a modification of legal custody in her
October 2024 motion, by the time of the hearing in 2025 she testified she no longer was challenging the
relocation or requesting a change in legal custody. Thus, she asks us to strike these findings as “irrelevant.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 25. But despite Mother’s testimony, her motion included an objection to Father’s
relocation and requested a change in legal custody. See App. Vol. II pp. 61-62. As such, we cannot say these
findings were irrelevant.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 18 of 23
60. During [the] final hearing, and after a videocall and a phone
call with [Child], and emails from Mother reporting that [Child]
was returning upset when coming from spending time with
Father, the Guardian ad Litem testified that she had changed her
reported recommendation to the Court on parenting time from
Father continuing to have unrestricted parenting time. (the
“Updated Recommendation”). Nov. 7, 2025 Hearing at 4:42:00;
5:01:45.
***
62. The Guardian ad Litem’s changed recommendation was
emailed to counsel less than 10 days before the hearing and not
timely reported to the Court or counsel. The change to the
recommendation was Father’s midweek parenting time occur as
[Child] desires. At the hearing, however, the GAL was unsure of
her changed recommendation, but ultimately testified that Father
should have no mid-week parenting time, and no Sunday
overnight parenting time thus eliminating three of the five nights
[Child] is with Father in a fourteen day period. Nov. 7, 2025
Hearing at 4:50:30.
***
67. Disagreements between the parties have arisen on occasion
when there is a change to the planned schedule or one party has
withheld information from the other. Mother did not discuss or
share with Father that [Child] was scheduled to undergo DSM-5
testing until a week before the scheduled appointment. Nov. 26,
2024 Hearing at 10:48:00. Mother did not share with Father that
[Child] reported her stepbrother's friend having alcohol at
Father's home. Nov. 7, 2025 Hearing at 1:41:00. Mother failed to
report to Father [Child’s] plans to go on mission trips out of the
country. Nov. 7, 2025 Hearing at 2:43:00; 3:50:00. Mother did not
provide details to Father about a weekend-long camp [Child]
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 19 of 23
attended. Nov. 7, 2025 Hearing at 3:54:15. Mother has not
responded to Father when asked for information regarding
[Child’s] anxiety “panic attack”. Nov. 7, 2025 Hearing at 3:05:15;
3:40:30.
App. Vol. II pp. 34-35.
[35] As to Finding 60, Mother argues “there is no evidence in the record [that] . . .
the GAL recommended restricted parenting time.” Appellant’s Br. p. 28. The
GAL gave two parenting time recommendations: the first was that Father’s
parenting time remain the same, and the updated recommendation was that the
midweek overnight visit and Sunday overnight visit be stopped in line with the
Guidelines. To the extent this finding suggests the GAL recommended
“restricted” parenting time as contemplated by statute, we agree with Mother
that this is not correct.
[36] As to Finding 62, Mother argues this finding is erroneous in two ways. First,
she argues the GAL did not recommend Father’s midweek parenting time
occur as Child desires. We agree. It is clear from the GAL’s updated report and
her testimony that her updated recommendation as to parenting time was that
Father receive “no midweek and no Sunday overnight.” Tr. Vol. III p. 15. At
no point did she suggest Child should dictate that schedule. This portion of the
finding is clearly erroneous. Additionally, Mother argues the finding is
erroneous where it states the GAL was unsure of her changed recommendation.
We agree that the transcript does not indicate the GAL was ever unsure of her
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 20 of 23
changed recommendation, and her updated recommendation and testimony are
quite clear. This portion of the finding is also clearly erroneous.
[37] As to Finding 67, Mother again argues it is erroneous in two ways. First, she
argues Child did not undergo DSM-5 testing—a psychological evaluation. But
this contention is directly contradicted by her own testimony that Child
received “a DSM-5 PHQ evaluation” in November 2024. Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Next,
Mother argues she did not fail to report to Father Child’s plans to attend a
mission trip. However, she does not argue this portion of the finding is clearly
erroneous, and it is supported by her testimony that she had not discussed the
trip with Father. Mother points to testimony that she encouraged Child to talk
to Father about the trip and that the trip was not yet planned and “[n]o details
were known” to relay. Appellant’s Br. p. 28. These are requests to reweigh
evidence, which we do not do. This finding is not clearly erroneous.
[38] However, as detailed further below, even excluding the erroneous findings, the
remaining findings support the trial court’s determination that not modifying
Father’s parenting time was in Child’s best interests.
C. Best Interests
[39] Mother argues that even if the court used the correct legal analysis, it
incorrectly determined it was in Child’s best interests for Father’s parenting
time to remain unchanged. Specifically, she points to the GAL’s testimony
recommending Father’s parenting time be changed and argues this evidence
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 21 of 23
“leads to only one logical conclusion—Mother’s request to modify parenting
time should have been granted.” Id. at 31.
[40] But the trial court’s conclusion that a modification of parenting time was not in
Child’s best interests is supported by other evidence in the record. Specifically,
Child has historically had a “great relationship” with both parents, she is active
and involved in church and school extracurriculars, Parents are generally
successful at communicating regarding her schedule and transportation, and
Child is building positive relationships with Father’s new wife and stepchildren.
App. Vol. II p. 25. All these findings support the court’s conclusion that
maintaining Father’s parenting time is in Child’s best interests. And although
the GAL testified she recommended modifying parenting time, the trial court is
not obligated to follow this recommendation. See Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d
100, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Ultimately, Mother’s argument that the trial
court should have given more weight to the GAL’s testimony is a request to
reweigh evidence, which we do not do.
III. Conclusion
[41] Because Mother substantially complied with the child support order when she
agreed to stop paying Father child support and instead provide Child with
health insurance, we reverse the trial court’s arrearage order as to Mother. We
further reverse the trial court’s child support order and remand for
recalculations, as well as for the trial court to rule on the issue of Father’s
arrearage. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 22 of 23
Mother’s motion to modify parenting time. As such, we affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.
[42] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Melanie K. Reichert
Broyles & Ricafort, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
PRO SE APPELLEE
Matthew V. Mann
Westfield, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-DR-248 August 7, 2026 Page 23 of 23